The Two Great Republics: Rome and the United States Part 9

Much of the criticism of each of these historians is manifestly true; but the charge that Gaius Gracchus contemplated the subst.i.tution of the rule of a despot for the rule of the oligarchy seems not to be borne out by the facts.

A true understanding of the policies and objects of Gaius Gracchus can be had only when we start our investigation with an appreciation of the strongest motive which urged him onward. This motive was not, on the one hand, a deep-rooted love and reverence for popular rights (as was undoubtedly the case with his brother Tiberius); nor, on the other hand, was it selfish interest, or the desire to usurp to himself the supreme power in the state. The strongest influence in the life and character of Gaius Gracchus was the desire to be avenged upon the senatorial party for the murder of his brother. His efforts in behalf of popular rights were instigated primarily by the desire to show respect to his brother's memory and to carry out his brother's policies. Upon this hypothesis the life and character of Gaius Gracchus can be easily understood.

CHAPTER VIII

MARIUS AND SULLA

The Roman government after the death of Gaius Gracchus, while still nominally a republic, had lost all its democratic character and had once more become an oligarchy such as had existed centuries before, during the period of the patrician republic. It was evident, however, that the existing situation could not permanently continue. The oligarchical government is that form of government which from its very nature can never acquire stability. Both democracy and monarchy possess elements of strength which may give to such governments a long continuance of life; the oligarchy, lacking both the strength of foundation of the one and the unity of action of the other, must inevitably be supplanted by a freer or a more restricted system of government. After the fall of Gaius Gracchus the last opportunity for the re-creation in Rome of a truly democratic form of government was lost. It should have been evident to any one who could read the signs of the future that the power for the time possessed by the senatorial oligarchy would soon be s.n.a.t.c.hed from it, either by the frenzied hand of a mob or by the strong hand of a despot.

Few in Rome at this time, however, seem to have been thinking much about the future. To reactionists or even to conservatives the future is always almost an unknown word; satisfied with the present, or looking back with regret to the past, the supporters of special interests and the votaries of tradition walk backward over the precipice, the near presence of which they will neither see for themselves nor be warned of by others.

A flicker of life on the part of the popular party was seen in an effort by the tribune Decius to indict the former consul Opimius for his part in the murder of Gaius Gracchus and his friends. The defense of Opimius was undertaken by the renegade Carbo. The life of this politician seems an excellent example in proof of the statement that the demagogue seeks the favor of the people only for his own advantage, and that as soon as he has acquired such favor, and has become a person of influence, his next step is to sell himself, now valuable on account of the political power he has acquired through his hypocrisy toward the people, to the special interests. No better contrast can be found in history between the true reformer and the unprincipled demagogue than is the contrast between Tiberius Gracchus and Carbo. While it is comparatively easy, however, to go back into past ages and to separate the sheep from the goats, and to distinguish between reformer and hypocrite, it is a much harder undertaking to do this with the living politicians. It often happens that the people are too ready to follow the demagogue and to repudiate and ridicule the honest reformer. Striking ill.u.s.trations of this phenomenon could easily be given from recent American history. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest applies in all sciences, social as well as natural. In all its applications, however, this doctrine is that of the survival of the fittest to meet existing conditions, not the survival of the fittest from the standpoint of absolute merit. With those who attempt to secure the political support of the proletariat of a great city, merit is to a great extent a handicap, and a certain cla.s.s of vices the greatest advantage.

There are some men naturally so const.i.tuted that the doctrine that the end justifies the means can be consistently and safely applied by them in their public life. To this cla.s.s have belonged most of those men through whom all the greatest victories for liberty and the greatest reforms in this world have been finally achieved. The ma.s.s of mankind, however, are incapable of consistently and permanently following the doctrine; and with all men, except the few above referred to, the character of their objects and methods must act and react upon each other. The result is that those seeking reform and honesty in politics, in the main seek to accomplish their purposes by honest methods; while the demagogue, seeking his own interests alone, a hypocrite as to his motives, will never consider as to the honesty of his methods. It is only on exceptional occasions that the honest advocate of popular rights can win the support of the mob by honest methods. Several causes work together to accomplish this result. In the lower economic strata the individual is far more strongly influenced by his own immediate interests than by the permanent interests of the cla.s.s to which he belongs. Perhaps it would be too much to expect the contrary.

We have constantly before us to-day the spectacle of men who--loudest in their denunciation of the discrimination which public officials exercise in favor of the special cla.s.ses and against the common citizen--at election time, in consideration of a few dollars for themselves, exert all their influence in favor of the worst exponents of the system they denounce. By the return, in the form of direct or indirect bribes to a selected few of the proletariat, of a small portion of the money previously illegally or unjustly exploited from the poor, the politicians of the "practical" type are able to secure the a.s.sent of the greater portion of the proletariat to the continuation of such exploitation.

Again, the candidate or political leader who intends to carry out his promises is under a disadvantage in comparison with the candidate or leader who does not. There are limitations to what government can accomplish; there are no limitations to what a demagogue can promise.

There is no more unfavorable criticism possible upon the lack of proper intelligence of the majority of the American voters than the character of the promises and the arguments which are received with applause at political meetings of every political party.

This criticism upon the political actions of the poorer cla.s.ses, economically, by no means indicates that they are the least desirable cla.s.s of voters in a country, or that a country would be better governed if the ballot were taken away from them. The truth of the matter is that it is mainly by the votes and efforts of the lowest cla.s.ses in a community (from the standpoint of wealth and social status) that every great reform or popular victory must be achieved.

It is at the great crises that the ma.s.ses are most generally right, and the cla.s.ses most generally wrong. No phenomenon of history is more clear and more striking than that, at every great crisis of the world's history, the ma.s.s of the wealthy and educated cla.s.ses has been always wrong. Nowhere is this more plainly to be discerned than in the history of our own country. In the Revolutionary days the great ma.s.s of the wealth and education in the country was to be found on the Tory side. At the crisis the concrete question of personal interest prevails over the abstract idea of public welfare; those who are personally satisfied with existing conditions are slow to advocate a change; those who have little to lose find it easier to be courageous.

Next to the small nucleus of true reformers, the first adherents of any reform movement are apt to be the discontented and restless elements of the community.

We can see a working example of this phenomenon, many centuries ago, in the brief account which the Bible gives us of the recruiting of the force with which David first offered resistance to King Saul. "David therefore departed thence, and escaped to the Cave Adullam: and when his brethren and all his father's house heard it, they went down thither to him. And every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves unto him; and he became a captain over them."

In the case of the demagogue Carbo, we find him, after a violent career as a popular tribune, selling his influence and services to the senatorial party, of which he was henceforth the most servient tool.

He was rewarded for his services to this party by an election as consul, and it was during his consuls.h.i.+p (120 B.C.) that the indictment was brought against Opimius. Carbo's influence, coupled with the fear which the murderers of the Gracchi and their followers had left in the minds of the people, was sufficient to secure the acquittal of Opimius. The triumph of Carbo, however, was short-lived.

He was himself indicted by L. Licinius Cra.s.sus, brother-in-law of Gaius Gracchus, and the manifestation of the feeling against him became so bitter that Carbo was driven to take his own life by poison.

The Roman politicians of the next few years, the Metelli, aemilius Scaurus, and others, left little impress upon the course of Roman history, and their lives and triumphs are of little interest to us.

Their aims were of a strictly personal character, their civic work was of a routine character; if they did little harm to the state, they conferred no benefit upon it.

The most important event of the closing years of the second century before Christ was the famous, or rather infamous, Jugurthine War. The story of this war furnishes the final evidence as to the corruption and degradation of Roman politics and officials at this time. This war arose out of a disputed succession to the throne of Numidia. Jugurtha, at first the friend and ally of Rome, after he had secured possession of the whole country through the murder of his two rivals, his cousins, found himself at last at war with Rome. The fortune of war going against him, he secured an advantageous peace by bribing the Roman general. The facts relative to this peace becoming known at Rome, Jugurtha was summoned to appear at Rome to give his account of the proceedings. His history, during this famous visit to Rome, is thus related by the Roman historian Sall.u.s.t:

"During the course of these proceedings at Rome, those whom Bestia had left in Numidia in command of the army, following the example of their general, had been guilty of many scandalous transactions. Some, seduced by gold, had restored Jugurtha his elephants; others had sold him his deserters; others had ravaged the lands of those at peace with us; so strong a spirit of rapacity, like the contagion of a pestilence, had pervaded the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of all.

"Ca.s.sius, when the measure proposed by Memmius had been carried, and whilst all the n.o.bility were in consternation, set out on his mission to Jugurtha, whom, alarmed as he was, and despairing of his fortune, from a sense of guilt, he admonished 'that, since he had surrendered himself to the Romans, he had better make trial of their mercy than their power.' He also pledged his own word, which Jugurtha valued not less than that of the public, for his safety. Such, at that period, was the reputation of Ca.s.sius.

"Jugurtha, accordingly, accompanied Ca.s.sius to Rome, but without any mark of royalty, and in the garb, as much as possible, of a suppliant; and, though he felt great confidence on his own part, and was supported by all those through whose power or villainy he had accomplished his projects, he purchased, by a vast bribe, the aid of Caius Baebius, a tribune of the people, by whose audacity he hoped to be protected against the law, and against all harm.

"An a.s.sembly of the people being convoked, Memmius, although they were violently exasperated against Jugurtha (some demanding that he should be cast into prison, others that, unless he should name his accomplices in guilt, he should be put to death, according to the usage of their ancestors, as a public enemy) yet, regarding rather their character than their resentment, endeavoured to calm their turbulence and mitigate their rage; and a.s.sured them that, as far as depended on him, the public faith should not be broken. At length, when silence was obtained, he brought forward Jugurtha, and addressed them. He detailed the misdeeds of Jugurtha at Rome and in Numidia, and set forth his crimes towards his father and brothers; and admonished the prince 'that the Roman people, though they were well aware by whose support and agency he had acted, yet desired further testimony from himself; that, if he disclosed the truth, there was great hope for him in the honour and clemency of the Romans; but if he concealed it, he would certainly not save his accomplices, but ruin himself and his hopes forever.'

"But when Memmius had concluded his speech, and Jugurtha was expected to give his answer, Caius Baebius, the tribune of the people, whom I have just noticed as having been bribed, enjoined the prince to hold his peace; and though the mult.i.tude who formed the a.s.sembly were desperately enraged, and endeavoured to terrify the tribune by outcries, by angry looks, by violent gestures, and by every other act to which anger prompts, his audacity was at last triumphant. The people, mocked and set at naught, withdrew from the place of a.s.sembly, and the confidence of Jugurtha, Bestia, and the others whom this investigation had alarmed, was greatly augmented.

"There was at this period in Rome, a certain Numidian named Ma.s.siva, a son of Gulussa and grandson of Masinissa, who, from having been, in the dissensions among princes, opposed to Jugurtha, had been obliged, after the surrender of Cirta and the murder of Adherbal, to make his escape out of Africa. Spurius Albinus, who was consul with Quintus Minucius Rufus the year after Bestia, prevailed upon this man, as he was of the family of Masinissa, and as odium and terror hung over Jugurtha for his crimes, to pet.i.tion the senate for the kingdom of Numidia. Albinus, being eager for the conduct of a war, was desirous that affairs should be disturbed, rather than sink into tranquillity; especially as, in the division of the provinces, Numidia had fallen to himself, and Macedonia to Minucius.

"When Ma.s.siva proceeded to carry these suggestions into execution, Jugurtha, finding that he had no sufficient support in his friends, as a sense of guilt deterred some and evil report or timidity, others from coming forward in his behalf, directed Bomilcar, his most attached and faithful adherent, to procure by the aid of money, by which he had already effected so much, a.s.sa.s.sins to kill Ma.s.siva; and to do it secretly if he could, but if secrecy should be impossible, to cut him off in any way whatsoever. This commission Bomilcar soon found means to execute; and, by the agency of men versed in such service, ascertained the direction of his journeys, his hours of leaving home, and the times at which he resorted to particular places, and, when all was ready, placed his a.s.sa.s.sins in ambush. One of their number sprang upon Ma.s.siva, though with too little caution, and killed him; but, being himself caught, he made at the instigation of many, and especially of Albinus the consul, a full confession. Bomilcar was accordingly committed for trial, though rather on the principles of reason and justice than in accordance with the law of nations, as he was in the retinue of one who had come to Rome on a pledge of the public faith for his safety. But Jugurtha, though clearly guilty of the crime, did not cease to struggle against the truth, until he perceived that the infamy of the deed was too strong for his interest or his money. For that reason, although at the commencement of the proceedings, he had given fifty of his friends as bail for Bomilcar, yet thinking more of his kingdom than of the sureties, he sent him off privately into Numidia, for he feared that if such a man should be executed, his other subjects would be deterred from obeying him. A few days after, he himself departed, having been ordered by the senate to quit Italy. But, as he was going from Rome, he is said, after frequently looking back on it in silence, to have at last exclaimed that 'it was a venal city, and would soon perish, if it could but find a purchaser.'"

Upon the resumption of the war with Jugurtha the Romans at first met with a great disaster, the army under Spurius Albinus being defeated and compelled to pa.s.s under the yoke and withdraw from Numidia. The result of this defeat was a sweeping investigation of the wholesale bribery of Roman officials by Jugurtha. Many, though not all, of those guilty in this respect were punished by banishment. The conduct of the war was now delegated to Q. Caecilius Metellus, by whom it was soon after brought to a successful termination. This result, however, was due less to the military genius of Metellus than to that of his lieutenant Gaius Marius, who immediately afterwards became the central figure in the political arena at Rome.

Marius was born near Arpinum about 157 B.C. of peasant parents.

Abandoning agriculture for the army, at a very early age he had won distinction not only for personal strength and courage but also for military ability. As early as the year 132 B.C. Scipio Africa.n.u.s, once being asked by a flatterer where a general could be found to fill his place, touched the arm of Marius, who happened to be present on the occasion, and answered, "Perhaps here." It was not only in the field of war but also in that of politics that Marius had won a reputation before the time that he served under Metellus against Jugurtha. Being elected tribune in 119 B.C., his actions, upon some unimportant controversies which arose during the year, had been such as to show the determination and ferocity of his disposition, and to win the favor of the populace and the distrust of the senatorial party.

Through the influence of the aristocracy Marius was defeated for both the aediles.h.i.+ps, but was finally elected praetor in 115 B.C.

It was while he was serving under Metellus in Africa that Marius became a candidate for the consuls.h.i.+p. The idea of Marius as consul was very distasteful to Metellus, who permitted Marius to leave the camp for Rome only twelve days before the day set for the election.

Marius, by almost superhuman exertions, succeeded in making the journey to Rome in the first six of these days, and in the remaining six conducted a successful campaign for the consuls.h.i.+p.

The election of Marius to the consuls.h.i.+p marks the beginning of the last age of the Roman republic. With Marius began the habitual rule of might rather than of right; rule by armies, instead of rule by majorities. For something over half a century power at Rome was to be shuffled backward and forward between different military commanders, until finally a military despot arose strong enough both to overthrow the oligarchy and to put down the mob. The manner in which the Romans had abstained from internal violence for centuries, during all the heat of so many bitter political and cla.s.s contests, is one of the wonders of ancient history. The aristocracy first broke this rule by resorting to force to block the reforms of the Gracchi. Such a procedure must always be a two-edged weapon, and Marius was the man fated to turn the sword against those who first drew it in Roman politics. The very election of Marius as consul (107 B.C.) was the occasion of much disquietude to the oligarchy.

Although the consuls.h.i.+p had at this time, in theory, been for two hundred sixty years open to all Roman citizens, nevertheless, in practice, it had, with occasional exceptions, been confined to the members of the few great families. In fact, so general had this become that a man who was the first of his family to be elected to this office was known as a "new man." Not only was Marius a "new man," but his immediate ancestors, in all probability, were men lower in the social and economic scale than had been the father and grandfather of any previous Roman consul. If the rise of Marius was a source of danger to the senatorial party, the qualities which had rendered his success possible were a source of danger to the whole community.

Marius was and had been a soldier, and a soldier only. There is nothing in his whole life to indicate that he combined with the attributes of the general any of those of the statesman, as did Caesar and Napoleon. The same fighting qualities which brought to him success in war likewise produced success in politics, and the same ferocity of disposition was manifested in both fields.

The military ability of Marius, in connection with the peculiar circ.u.mstances of the times, soon secured to this general a more absolute control of the Roman community than had previously been possessed by any consul of Rome. The military ability of Marius has never been disputed either by his contemporaries or by later historians. His military successes after his election to the consuls.h.i.+p were rapid and decisive. Where his predecessors had failed, Marius succeeded in the Jugurthine War, and the year 104 B.C.

witnessed at Rome the triumph of Marius, with the craftiest, ablest, and most unscrupulous of African kings walking in chains as a captive in his train.

Of greater importance and benefit to Rome were the great victories won by Marius over those terrible invaders, the Teutones and the Cimbrians, who had been threatening Rome and hara.s.sing northern Italy for a number of years. In 102 B.C. the Teutones were defeated by Marius at the battle of Aquae s.e.xtiae, where the number of the vanquished who were killed is variously estimated at from one hundred twenty thousand to two hundred thousand. The following year, during the fifth consuls.h.i.+p of Marius, the Cimbrians were practically annihilated, sixty thousand being captured and sold as slaves and the remainder of the vast host, with few exceptions, killed.

The second century before Christ thus closed with brilliant foreign victories for the Roman arms. This close likewise saw the beginning of another period of slave insurrections and civil war. As before, the princ.i.p.al resistance by the slaves occurred in the island of Sicily.

The immediate cause of this insurrection was the neglect or refusal of the Roman praetor in Sicily to obey a decree of the Senate. So great a scandal had arisen from the continued actions of the Roman tax collectors in the East in seizing and selling into slavery persons who failed to pay the exorbitant taxes demanded from them that the Senate pa.s.sed a decree providing that all persons illegally held as slaves should be immediately released. This decree would have affected so many slaves in the island of Sicily that the praetor suspended its operation. The slaves, rendered desperate by seeing this promised liberty s.n.a.t.c.hed from them, once more rose in rebellion.

Again the slaves were commanded by able leaders, and again they won a number of victories over Roman armies before they were finally put down.

"The revolt was thus apparently suppressed, yet many years the disturbances continued, and there were innumerable local insurrections, causing great carnage and unspeakable misery.

A Roman knight, t.i.tus Minucius, hara.s.sed by debt, and annoyed by the importunities of his creditors, through revenge incited an insurrection, and placed himself at the head of three thousand slaves. A b.l.o.o.d.y battle ensued before he was put down. Soon after this, two very able slaves, Sabrius and Athenio, headed revolts. Their forces were marshaled in well-disciplined bands, and for some time they successfully repelled all the power Rome could bring against them. Several Roman armies were defeated with great loss, and the whole island was surrendered to blood and violence.

The poorer cla.s.s of the free inhabitants availed themselves of the general confusion to indulge in unrestrained license and devastation. This insurrection became so formidable, that again Rome was compelled to rouse her energies. A consular army was sent, which drove the insurgents into their strongholds and then subdued them by the slow process of siege. The carnage and misery resulting from these servile wars no tongue can tell. The whole power of the Roman empire was pledged to put down insurrections; and though the captives could avenge their wrongs and sell their lives dearly, it was in vain for them to hope for ultimate success.

"A law was pa.s.sed prohibiting any slave from carrying a warlike weapon. Rigorously was this law enforced. At one time a boar of remarkable size was sent as a present to L.

Domicius, then praetor of the island. He inquired who had killed it. On being informed that it was a slave, who was employed as a shepherd, he summoned the man before him, and asked how he had contrived to kill so powerful an animal.

The shepherd replied that he had killed it with a boar spear. The merciless Domicius ordered him immediately to be crucified for having used a weapon in violation of the law.

This rigor was pursued so unrelentingly, that, for a long period, there were no more revolts!" (Abbott's _History of Italy_.)

The victories of Marius over the Teutones and Cimbrians had been followed by his sixth election to the consuls.h.i.+p. This election, however, had not been secured without great difficulty and tumult. The aristocratic party had been consistently the opponents and enemies of Marius throughout his whole career. The great victories which he had won for Rome, instead of reconciling this cla.s.s to him, had made them only the more jealous and fearful of him.

By this time Marius had in addition, to a great extent, alienated the lower cla.s.ses of the Roman citizens. The enmity between the proletariat at Rome and the Italians, which had commenced at the time of the younger Gracchus, had been constantly increasing. Marius had inclined more and more toward the side of the Italians. Like most generals, his thoughts and affections were for his soldiers rather than for the state which he served; and the soldiers over whom Marius had command and with whom he had won his great victories were mainly Italians. The degenerate city mob at Rome no longer desired or was fit for military life, and the safety of Rome and the extension of her territories now rested mainly upon those to whom the rights of her citizens.h.i.+p were denied.

The Italians, probably appreciating both the strength of their position and the injustice of their treatment, were demanding the rights of Roman citizens.h.i.+p, and in this demand they found a sympathizer in the consul Marius. Immediately after his victories in the north of Italy, Marius, in direct violation of the law, had granted Roman citizens.h.i.+p to one thousand soldiers in his army who had distinguished themselves in the campaign. His excuse was characteristic of the existing conditions and prophetic of the course of Roman history during the succeeding century: "Amid the din of arms, I could not hear the voice of the laws."

During his sixth consuls.h.i.+p Marius endeavored to secure the Roman franchise for certain of his soldiers in a more regular manner. The tribunes, Apuleius Saturninus and Servilius Glaucia, secured the pa.s.sage of a law by which Marius was authorized to grant the rights of Roman citizens.h.i.+p to three persons in every colony which enjoyed the Latin franchise.

The career of the tribune Saturninus is ill.u.s.trative of the condition of anarchy into which Rome was rapidly drifting. Saturninus was the first of the Roman politicians to rely as a regular practice upon "strong-arm methods" to carry elections. In his first race for the tribunes.h.i.+p he had brazenly murdered one of the opposing candidates; he had been the princ.i.p.al campaign manager for Marius at the time of his sixth election to the consuls.h.i.+p, when the disbanded army of Marius had been distributed among the Roman citizens in the meetings of the comitia tributa in such numbers as to overawe all opposition.

Finally, when C. Memmius, a bitter political enemy of his, seemed about to be elected to the consuls.h.i.+p, he caused him to be stabbed in the Forum by one of the thugs who const.i.tuted his own bodyguard.

Saturninus, however, had now reached the point where he stood almost alone. The senatorial party were his natural enemies; the Roman mob had, in the main, fallen away from his support on account of his friendly feeling toward the Italians, and his extreme methods had compelled even Marius to withdraw his support.