A History of Indian Philosophy Part 63

Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajnana which also is unreal should be the cause of it.

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Ajnana established by Perception and Inference.

Ajnana defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as "I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,"

or "I do not know what you say," or more particularly "I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything." Such perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics, and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative.

It may be objected that the perception "I do not know" is not the perception of the indefinite, the ajnana, but merely the negation of knowledge. To this Vedanta says that had it been the perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have been a.s.sociated with the specific object to which it applied.

A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation.

But the perception "I do not know or I had no knowledge" does not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless ignorance. Such an indefinite ajnana is positive in the sense that it is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive in the same sense in which other definite ent.i.ties are called positive, for it is merely the characterless, pa.s.sive indefinite showing itself in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation, and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there.

Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception "I do not know" can persist, even though many individual objects be known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of "I do not know" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category namely the indefinite, the ajnana. It is our common experience

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that after experiencing the indefinite (_ajnana_) of a specific type we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving consciousness ([email protected]_) is such that both the root ajnana as well as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented in mental states ([email protected]_), are comprehended by it.

Of course when the [email protected] about a thing as in ordinary perceptions of objects comes in, the ajnana with regard to it is temporarily removed, for the [email protected] is opposed to the ajnana.

But so far as our own perceiving consciousness ([email protected]_) is conceived it can comprehend both the ajnana and the jnana (knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all positives either as indefinite ajnana or as states of knowledge or as specific kinds of ajnana or ignorance, but it is unable to comprehend a negation, for negation (_abhava_) is not a perception, but merely the absence of perception (_anupalabdhi_). Thus when I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from the Nyaya point of view that since without the knowledge of a qualification ([email protected]_) the qualified thing ([email protected]@ta_) cannot be known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness without the object being known first. To this Vedanta replies that the maxim that the qualification must be known before the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as well perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not out of place here to say that negation is not a separate ent.i.ty, but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive.

Even the naiyayikas would agree that in the expression "there is no negation of a jug here," no separate negation can be accepted, for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions and differences in positive ent.i.ties by illusory impositions, so negations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions and appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all distinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be accepted that negation like position is one which appears as many on account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the

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content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to object that such perceptions as "I do not know" refer to the perception of an indefinite ajnana in consciousness. So also the perception "I do not know what you say" is not the perception of negation, for this would require that the hearer should know first what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is impossible to say "I do not know what you say."

So also the cognition "I was sleeping long and did not know anything" has to be admitted as referring to the perception of the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that during sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the awakened man as "I did not know anything so long" is only an inference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and active state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity had ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of knowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no invariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of the senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately preceding state. During sleep there is a mental state of the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is by the impression ([email protected]_) of the aforesaid mental state of ajnana that one remembers that state and says that "I did not perceive anything so long." The indefinite (_ajnana_) perceived in consciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere negation of knowledge (_jnanabhava_) and the two are so connected that though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from the perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite is thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as such in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened state as well as in the sleeping state.

The presence of this ajnana may also be inferred from the manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness, as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness which was not known or rather known as indefinite before we say "I did not know it before, but I know it now." My present knowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just as the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by removing the darkness[Footnote ref 1]. Apart from such an inference its existence

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[Footnote 1: See [email protected], Tattvadipana_, and _Advaitasiddhi_.]

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is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there was no ajnana to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajnana there would have been no illusion. It is the ajnana that const.i.tutes the substance of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded as const.i.tuting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it is unchangeable. This ajnana is manifested by the perceiving consciousness ([email protected]_) and not by the pure consciousness. The perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which reflects itself in the states of avidya (ignorance).

Locus and Object of Ajnana, [email protected], and [email protected]@na.

This ajnana rests on the pure _cit_ or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajnana or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajnana and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states ([email protected]_). The ajnana thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as a.s.sociated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego "_aham_" or the individual soul. Vacaspati Mis'ra however holds that the ajnana does not rest on the pure cit but on the jiva (individual soul). Madhava reconciles this view of Vacaspati with the above view, and says that the ajnana may be regarded as resting on the jiva or individual soul from this point of view that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jiva (_Cinmatras'ritam ajnanam [email protected] jivas'ritam ucyate_ [email protected], p. 48). The feeling "I do not know" seems however to indicate that the ajnana is with reference to the perceiving self in a.s.sociation with its feeling as ego or "I"; but this is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of the close a.s.sociation of ajnana with [email protected]@na (mind) both of which are in essence the same (see [email protected]@mgraha, p. 48).

The ajnana however does not only rest on the cit, but it has the cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are with reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is thus the ent.i.ty on which the veiling action of the ajnana is noticed; the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on the part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the [email protected],

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but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does not s.h.i.+ne (_nasti na prakas'ate iti [email protected]_) or rather there is no appearance of its s.h.i.+ning or luminosity. To say that Brahman is hidden by the ajnana means nothing more than this, that it is such {_tadyogyata_) that the ajnana can so relate itself with it that it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other states of ajnana-consciousness in experience. Ajnana is thus considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel it. The action of this [email protected] is thus on the light of the reality which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss; so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss const.i.tuting the essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal experiences of pleasure. The ajnana is one, but it seems to obstruct the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it may be said that the ajnana has many states as const.i.tuting the individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajnana are technically called tulajnana or avasthajnana. Any state of consciousness ([email protected]) removes a manifestation of the ajnana as tulajnana and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

The most important action of this ajnana as obstructing the pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated in the notion of the ego or [email protected] This notion of [email protected] is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other a.s.sociations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.; it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand limitations, characters, and a.s.sociations. This illusory creation of the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal a.s.sociations held up in the mind ([email protected]@na_) with the real, the false with

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the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the [email protected]@na taken as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns, there are two ent.i.ties of the ball and the fire fused into one, so, here also when I say "I perceive", there are two distinct elements of the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused into one. The part or aspect a.s.sociated with sorrow, materiality, and changefulness represents the [email protected]@na, whereas that which appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self.

Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and other unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhakara sought to repudiate. Prabhakara did not consider the self to be self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought ([email protected]_), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the a.n.a.logy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the [email protected]@na are never separately experienced, and we can never say that these two are really different, and only have an illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (_anubhava_) is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and like it does not require the a.s.sistance of anything else for the fulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedanta objects to this saying that according to Prabhakara's supposition, it is impossible to discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge are indeed one and the same. k.u.marila thinks this thought (_anubhava_), to be a movement, Nyaya and Prabhakara as a quality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of a thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything, if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own

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[Footnote 1: According to Nyaya the _atman_ is conscious only through a.s.sociation with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_).

Consciousness is a.s.sociated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus, _Nyayamanjari_ in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity {_svaprakas'a_) says (p.432)

_sacetanas'cita yogattadyogena vina [email protected]@h narthavabhasadanyaddhi [email protected] nama [email protected]]

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const.i.tution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the self, the atman, is the self-luminous ent.i.ty. No one doubts any of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else.

The self is thus the same as vijnana, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1].

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet [email protected] is absent during deep sleep.

It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slept happily and did not know anything"; yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the [email protected]@na and the [email protected] are altogether submerged in the ajnana, and there are only the ajnana and the self; on waking, this [email protected] as a state of [email protected]@na is again generated, and then it a.s.sociates the perception of the ajnana in the sleep and originates the perception "I did not know anything." This [email protected] which is a mode ([email protected]_) of the [email protected]@na is thus const.i.tuted by avidya, and is manifested as jnanas'akti (power of knowledge) and kriyas'akti (power of work). This kriyas'akti of the [email protected] is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The [email protected] itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or [email protected] of the [email protected]@na, and as such the [email protected] of a past period can now be a.s.sociated; but even then the [email protected] of [email protected]@na, [email protected], may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of the [email protected]@na. The same [email protected]@na is called manas in its capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When the pure cit s.h.i.+nes forth in a.s.sociation with this [email protected]@na, it is called a jiva. It is clear from the above account that the ajnana is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (_as'raya_); its own nature as the ajnana or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamakaranda_, pp. 130-140, _Citshkha_ and [email protected]@mgraha_, pp. 53-58.]

[Footnote 2: See [email protected]_, p. 88, Bombay edition.]

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these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the [email protected]@na, and the light of the real s.h.i.+nes forth through these states. The [email protected]@na of which [email protected] is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajnana-phenomena containing within it the a.s.sociations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jiva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvacyavada and the Vedanta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajnana could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedanta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidya, ajnana or maya is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.

It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

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examined, and one cannot make such a.s.sertion about them as that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by [email protected] and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.

I shall give here, only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference (_bheda_)from [email protected]@[email protected]@dakhadya_. Four explanations are possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience (_svarupa-bheda_) as Prabhakara thinks; (2) the difference between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other (_anyonyabhava_), as some Naiyayikas and [email protected]@tas think; (3) difference means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the [email protected] speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality in itself like the [email protected] quality of Nyaya. Taking the first alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?

i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference from something else, it is expected that something else such as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if the perception of "difference" between two things has penetrated together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction becomes apparent. Difference as an ent.i.ty is not what we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from something else, and if that thing from which the difference is perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an ent.i.ty be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

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the jug only indicates a term from which difference is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent of any a.s.sociation of its difference from other things, and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but ident.i.ty results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation between these two, then that relation would require another relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference.

But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely different from the perception of difference. It should also be noted that the notion of difference is also different from the notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.