The Economist - Can anyone stop Narendra Modi? Part 5

At the Tianjin facility, a surly watchman says visitors are not allowed in and that the facility will close soon. Officials in the southern city of Guangzhou have already closed their baby hatch less than two months after opening it. They have been "overwhelmed" by the 262 babies left there. Most of them had severe health problems, they say.

As in other countries, it is often economic hards.h.i.+p that compels parents to abandon a child. But China's one-child policy is also a factor. The policy is being relaxed, but only gradually. A sick or disabled baby is still often an unwanted burden for a family limited to one child.

Some critics say the hatches encourage abandonments that might otherwise not happen. Chen Lan, founder of a child-protection group, disagrees. She says giving up a child is an act of such desperation that parents will not do it just because a policy makes it safer.

A recent commentary at Caixin Online, a leading Chinese news website, accused officials at the Guangzhou facility of "retreating from their public duty". The 262 abandoned infants did not just suddenly appear because a baby hatch was created, it said. "They were already around, but not cared for properly."

Ms Chen is confident the policy will survive. She says many nations have shown that, when a society reaches a certain level, it starts taking care of vulnerable children. "China has now reached that level," she says.

Middle East and Africa.

Egypt's probable president: Pretending to be a civilian The Saudi succession: Next after next...

Israel and Palestine: Last-ditch bargaining Iran's universities: Breathing again South Africa: Why invest?

Kenya: Muslim martyr Ghana: He won't give up Egypt's probable president Pretending to be a civilian The military strongman must do more than just take off his uniform before his election as president Apr 5th 2014 | CAIRO | From the print edition IN A soft-spoken television address announcing his bid for Egypt's presidency, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi intimated that his would not be a traditional election campaign. The caution seems unneeded. Few Egyptians expect that the field-marshal, a former defence minister and head of military intelligence, will have to exert himself much before coasting to victory in the polls, now scheduled for May 26th.

As leader of the coup that toppled President Muhammad Morsi last July, Mr (as he now is) Sisi is in effect the candidate of Egypt's state, backed by its 7m-strong civil service as well as the powerful army and police. He is also a hero to the many Egyptians who loathe Mr Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood. Their fervour has generated a minor industry of Sisibilia, from T-s.h.i.+rts to chocolates and costume jewellery, all sporting his image. Against such momentum, rival candidates face a daunting challenge. There are few takers so far.

It helps, too, that Egyptians who might have voted against him are likely instead to boycott the polls. This includes the 20% or so who still back the Brotherhood, despite a fierce state campaign of vilification, accompanied by ma.s.s arrests and, more recently, ma.s.s trials of Brotherhood "terrorists". Likely non-voters also include a growing number, particularly among the young, who see Mr Sisi as the spearhead of a rolling counter-revolution that has slowly but steadily dashed hopes for sweeping change raised during the heady days of the Arab spring three years ago.

Opinion polls in Egypt are notoriously unreliable, but one independent pollster, Baseera, has tracked a recent drop in support for Mr Sisi. In February, 51% of respondents said they would vote for him. This fell to 39% in March. That does not yet presage unpopularity: fewer than 1% said they would vote for anyone else, and most remained undecided. Mr Sisi, now 59, is an effective public speaker, with a gift for catchy colloquialisms, a penchant for emotional appeals to nationalism and an aura of quiet strength. Shedding his military garb, the smiling candidate recently appeared atop a mountain bike, in a training suit: hardly the profile of a stern dictator.

All this resonates well with the many Egyptians who yearn above all for stability after years of turmoil. But he must also stem the rise in poverty (see chart). Incomes have sagged as the economy stagnates. Electricity shortages now affect even the well-off. Egypt experienced the biggest drop in a UN-sponsored global "happiness" index, outstripping even bankrupt Greece, between 2006 and 2012.

Yet this mood of misery does not seem to have engendered any lingering sympathies for the fallen Brothers, whose efforts to sustain protests are met mostly with annoyance. Despite anguish over police brutality and the death of some 3,000 people since the July coup, most of them Mr Morsi's supporters, the common talk on Egyptian streets is that only a strongman can fix things.

So the presidential poll may replicate a pattern set in December, when Egyptians voted on a new const.i.tution. It pa.s.sed by an embarra.s.sing 98%, but the turnout of just 38% showed a society that is both apathetic and polarised.

Egyptians had puzzled over why it took Mr Sisi so long to announce his candidacy, and why the election date kept being delayed. Recent changes in the army may offer a clue. Though the sprawling inst.i.tution has underpinned Egypt's state since officers seized power in 1952, taking direct charge between the revolution of 2011 that ousted Hosni Mubarak and Mr Morsi's election in mid-2012, many generals have been wary of exposing their supreme commander to the direct line of political fire.

But in March Mr Sisi shuffled the military's 25-member ruling council. Further ensuring loyalty, he raised a lower-ranking general, Mahmoud Hegazy, to the key post of chief of staff. As operational commander of the 450,000-strong force, Mr Hegazy is close to Mr Sisi, having previously been appointed by him to his own former post as head of military intelligence. Mr Hegazy's daughter happens to be married to one of Mr Sisi's three sons.

Lining up the ducks in his military pond required the skills that Mr Sisi honed as a discreet intelligence chief. A devout Muslim, he also persuaded the Muslim Brothers, during their brief rule, that he was a man to be trusted. Such canniness will be needed in future, as Egypt's next leader faces the gargantuan task of cleaning up a range of creaking inst.i.tutions, from the courts and the police to failing health and education systems.

He must do this not only to rescue Egypt, but for his own sake. Trigger-happy police and judges who recently sentenced hundreds of Brothers to death (and a farmer to a stint in prison for putting a Sisi-style hat on a donkey) may turn out to be more of a liability than an a.s.set.

The Saudi succession Next after next...

King Abdullah appoints a second in line to the throne Apr 5th 2014 | CAIRO | From the print edition MOST monarchies favour primogeniture, a simple way of pa.s.sing the crown from one generation to the next. Kings.h.i.+p in Muslim dynasties has tended instead to pa.s.s between brothers. But whose son should then inherit the throne? Ottoman sultans solved this problem by murdering their brothers. That is not easy if you happen to have 45-odd male siblings, as was the case for the five succeeding sons of Abdel Aziz bin Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, who have ruled since his death in 1953.

Most of those sons are now dead, leaving Saudis to wonder when the prolonged hold of this gnarled second generation will end. On March 27th the reigning king, Abdullah, thought to be at least 89, provided an answer: not soon. A royal decree appointed his youngest surviving brother, Muqrin, born in 1945, as second in line to the throne after the crown prince, Salman, 78 and ailing. Should the newly anointed heir survive as long as Abdullah, he could still be king in 2034.

A former intelligence chief, governor of the holy city of Medina and pilot who trained at a Royal Air Force college in Britain, Muqrin is considered a steady hand, though palace gossips sniff that his mother was a Yemeni concubine. But he is close to the king and well thought of, says Joseph Kechichian, author of "Succession in Saudi Arabia". At a function in Riyadh days after the announcement, the prince showed himself to be "dynamic and congenial", says Mr Kechichian.

The appointment of a second heir prompted whispers that Abdullah may soon abdicate. That is unlikely. Saudi kings tend to rule until death, though one was ousted by a brother (see chart). More likely Abdullah fears that Salman, believed to be suffering from Alzheimer's, will be unable to take over. The statement from the royal palace hinted as much, referring to a situation where the positions of both king and crown prince could become "vacant".

The House of Saud can ill afford for that to happen, since the oil-rich kingdom faces mounting challenges. The ruling coterie fears the Arab spring may yet provoke its youthful, internet-using population of 30m into more forcefully airing grievances, such as the strictness of Islamic laws and the lack of jobs. They fear Saudi jihadists who have gone to fight in Syria could return to make trouble at home. And they dread developments abroad. In particular, the royal Saudis are "hysterical"-in the word of a recent visitor-over America's outreach to Iran. They have fallen out with Qatar over its support for the Muslim Brothers. And as chief patrons of Syria's rebels, they have failed to create a force strong enough to turn the tide against Bashar a.s.sad.

Some Saudis quietly criticise Abdullah for ducking once again the challenge of picking an heir from the next generation. That will now most likely be Muqrin's choice, if he wins the crown and lasts into old age. The third generation-the founder's grandsons-now numbers hundreds of princes; subsequent generations probably take the male tally past 8,000, of whom at least a score may consider themselves eligible one day for the throne. They may be getting impatient.

Israel and Palestine Last-ditch bargaining As negotiations over the big issues stall, both sides bid for minor advantages Apr 5th 2014 | JERUSALEM | From the print edition IF ISRAELI and Palestinian headlines agree on anything, it is that the negotiations John Kerry, America's secretary of state, began broking last July are running into the sand. Israel's prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, reneged on his promise-as the Palestinians understood it-to free the fourth and last batch of two dozen long-serving Palestinian prisoners by the end of March. In response, Palestine's president, Mahmoud Abbas, spurned America's umpiring and took his campaign for statehood global, earning the first plaudits in years from more radical Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, which have long deemed him feeble. Mr Kerry, mocked by an Israeli minister as "messianic", momentarily seemed to lose faith in his mission, turning his back on both parties by cancelling another emergency visit. "It's up to the parties to make decisions," he said.

All this may yet prove to be more theatrical than truly menacing. Messrs Netanyahu and Abbas are jockeying in the weeks still within Mr Kerry's nine-month time-frame for talks to end. Contrary to many headlines, Mr Abbas did not actually go to the UN, but signalled that he was just a signature away from doing so. None of the 15-odd international conventions he signed, such as the Geneva ones governing rules of war, actually inducts Palestine into UN bodies. Nor has Mr Netanyahu ruled out freeing the remaining 26 prisoners. Rather, both are holding out for last-minute better deals. Mr Netanyahu wants the Americans to free a Jewish-American spy, Jonathan Pollard, a naval-intelligence officer sentenced to life in prison for stealing state secrets in 1987. Mr Abbas just wants his own despairing and fractious const.i.tuency to let him keep on talking.

Mr Kerry, in any event, must be running out of ploys to keep the negotiations alive. Since last July he has reduced his sights first to a statement of principles, then to a "framework" for talks, and most recently to a non-binding American paper. Even that now seems too much for Israeli and Palestinian leaders to stomach. Palestinians fear Mr Kerry may deprive them of a host of statehood attributes, including East Jerusalem as their would-be capital. Both sides are bartering over confidence-building measures simply to keep the process going.

Mr Netanyahu is proposing a partial settlement freeze, excluding East Jerusalem and the thousands of new buildings for settler homes that his government has put out for tender in recent months. As a sweetener, he may offer to free 400 more Palestinian prisoners, most of them women and minors, on top of the 26 previously agreed. The Palestinians are holding out for the release of other jailed leaders, such as Marwan Barghouti and Ahmed Saadat, and want a total freeze on settlement building.

Even if this latest bout of bargaining ends in a modest deal, hopes of resolving bigger outstanding issues on the road to creating two states will still be dim. Mr Kerry must be close to his wits' end.

Iran's universities Breathing again The new president is giving students a longer leash Apr 5th 2014 | TEHRAN | From the print edition "AT LEAST one thing hasn't changed", remarked a Tehran University professor who had recently returned to work after several years. "The faculty still gossips terribly." But under President Ha.s.san Rouhani bigger changes on Iran's leading campus-and perhaps in universities elsewhere-may also be on the way.

One sign of this was the recent sacking of Tehran University's conservative chancellor. Appointed in 2008 by Mr Rouhani's populist predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he had overseen the expulsion of independent-minded students and academics, promoting mediocre yes-men and stifling the intellectual atmosphere.

Since his departure, things have loosened up. Last month over 1,000 students gathered to hear a lecture by Immanuel Wallerstein, an 83-year-old, left-wing American sociologist. Widely translated into Persian, he is respected across Iran's intellectual spectrum, albeit under various interpretations. For some, he is a herald of America's decline, affirming Iran's official narrative. For others, he still represents America, even if he challenges the global status quo.

In the early years of this century, under the presidency of Muhammad Khatami, Western intellectuals visited quite often. Under Mr Ahmadinejad, they virtually stopped coming. But since Mr Rouhani was elected last summer, intellectual waters are being tested again. Hosted by the Iranian Sociological a.s.sociation, Mr Wallerstein's lecture tour included two other notable universities, at s.h.i.+raz and Isfahan.

Many of the students did not know who he was, but wanted to see an American scholar anyway. When he observed that third-world regimes born out of revolution tended to create the same social and economic problems their founders had promised to solve, a frisson rippled through the a.s.sembly. At the back of the hall, where students craned to see him, whistles and applause erupted.

South Africa Why invest?

Some recent business bills pander to populists, deterring foreign investors Apr 5th 2014 | JOHANNESBURG | From the print edition AS THE elections on May 7th draw closer, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) seems increasingly troubled by a challenge on its left flank from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) led by Julius Malema, a former head of the ANC's Youth League, who wants to nationalise white businesses and farms without compensation. The ANC is sure to win the election. But fear of losing votes to the EFF has had a worrying effect on recent legislation related to business.

Two bills, on how to govern mining and private security, were rushed through parliament before its recess. Neither bill has yet reached the statute book, but in their present form they are sure to chase away foreign investors. If the strike in the country's platinum mines, now in its third month, has not deterred them, these bills may well do so.

Start with the mining bill. One of its clauses says the state will take a 20% stake in any new petroleum venture. Another lets the state buy a larger stake at "an agreed price" or through an output-sharing deal. Any business considering prospecting for shale oil in South Africa would think twice. If the venture proved profitable, the state could end up owning the lot. The bill also cla.s.sifies minerals as "strategic", which means they can be directed away from their most profitable use as ministers see fit. For instance, coal destined for export could instead be diverted to Eskom, the state-owned electricity company, which is struggling to keep the lights on. The criteria that will govern such decisions are not clear.

There are similar concerns around the security bill. New regulations were surely needed to govern an industry that has expanded rapidly in the past decade. There are now almost twice as many security guards in South Africa as regular police. But the bill also requires at least 51% of the owners.h.i.+p and control of security firms to be exercised by South African citizens. The investments of two British security firms, G4S and ADT, ought to be protected by a bilateral trade treaty. The trouble is, South Africa is also junking such treaties, to the consternation of its biggest trading partners in Europe. That Jacob Zuma, South Africa's president, chose not to attend this week's European Union-Africa summit in Brussels will hardly have helped matters.

These two business-bas.h.i.+ng bills are part of an ominous trend. The South African Inst.i.tute for Race Relations has just published a report on all business-related legislation since the start of 2013. It concludes that a common thread through all the bills is that "they weaken property rights, reduce private-sector autonomy, threaten business with draconian penalties, and undermine investor confidence."

They have something else in common. The amendments regarding owners.h.i.+p were inserted into both the mineral and security bills quite late in the day. An early draft of the mineral bill capped the state's potential stake at 50%. The local-owners.h.i.+p clause was slipped into the security bill only as it made its way through the committee stage of parliament. The timing suggests that the elections in general, and in particular, the EFF's call for nationalisation, influenced their drafting.

Kenya Muslim martyr The latest murder of a militant cleric may recruit more youths to his cause Apr 5th 2014 | NAIROBI | From the print edition Mr Graveyard goes there IT WAS clear that Abubakar Sheikh Ibrahim Shariff was a marked man. Vehicles from Kenya's anti-terror police unit (ATPU) were always being mended in the garage opposite his compound in the port city of Mombasa. The sheikh's neighbour, a mechanic, got good custom from the ATPU in return for watching the radical preacher.

The mechanic will now have to find customers elsewhere. On April 1st Mr Shariff, known by the nickname "Makaburi" (meaning graveyard in Swahili), was shot dead by unidentified men as he waited to make a court appearance.

His death was widely foretold, not least by himself. Sitting in his cramped office in November, he said it was "only a matter of time" before he would be killed, just as other radical Kenyan imams had been. "The government is murdering us," he said matter-of-factly. A surprisingly jovial presence, he lived under virtual house arrest for his last two years, receiving visitors in his bas.e.m.e.nt home and surfing the internet while watching comings and goings on a security camera. Makaburi got his nickname for threatening to disinter the graves of Sufi Muslims whose burial rites clashed with his literalist reading of the Koran.

In August 2012 Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed, another radical imam, was shot dead. He had been under investigation by the UN and the Americans for links to the Shabab, a Somali Islamist militia. Late last year his unofficial successor as leader of the coast's radical community, Sheikh Ibrahim Omar Rogo, was killed in nearly identical circ.u.mstances. Locals blame those killings, as well as a string of others, on government-run death squads. The murders, none of which has been adequately investigated, have led to riots. Unrest is again expected after Friday prayers on April 4th at the Musa mosque in Mombasa, the scene of frequent recent deadly clashes.

A local watchdog, Muslims for Human Rights (Muhuri), listed a string of extra-judicial killings in a report in November ent.i.tled "We are tired of taking you to court". It accused ATPU, which has received nearly $50m from the American state department, of torture and a.s.sa.s.sinations.

UN investigators and Kenyan security officials accused Makaburi of recruiting young men for the Shabab. This he denied, but openly called for Kenya's central government to be violently overthrown and cheered on the Shabab, an affiliate of al-Qaeda. Increasingly popular among Mombasa's many disaffected youths, he was given to joking that his enemies, among whom he counted the governments of Kenya and the West, were more effective as recruiters than he. Counter-terrorism operations were, he said, making more Kenyan Muslims agree with him. "Every time there's a killing, it wakes more of them up. Now there are boys going to the mosque with daggers. One day they will bring guns." For all his precautions with cameras and not leaving his home, he also relished martyrdom: "The jihad is a tree," he said. "The more blood you spill, the more it will grow."

Ghana He won't give up An old warhorse gallops back into the fray Apr 5th 2014 | ACCRA | From the print edition NANA AKUFO-ADDO, the long-serving leader of Ghana's opposition, is determined to run again for president in 2016-so he declared before a boisterous crowd in the front garden of his home in Accra, the country's capital. Even though the polls are two-and-a-half years away, it feels as if a starting-gun has been fired.

Ghana has had six fair elections since 1992, with power twice changing hands between the two main parties, Mr Akufo-Addo's New Patriotic Party (NPP) and President John Dramani Mahama's National Democratic Congress (NDC).

For Mr Mahama, Mr Akufo-Addo, now 70, is a familiar foe. Mr Mahama's predecessor as president and NDC leader, John Atta Mills, defeated Mr Akufo-Addo, previously foreign minister, in the election of 2008. Mr Akufo-Addo then lost again in 2012, to Mr Mahama, after the latter had stepped up from vice-president to president following Mr Mills's death in office earlier that year.

Mr Akufo-Addo then withdrew to France and Britain to lick his wounds, returning home in March, having evidently decided that he was ready to do battle again. Few politicians in the NPP have his clout and national recognition, so he is favoured to fend off anyone within the party when nominations to bear the NPP standard are considered. If he gets it, could it be third time lucky in his bid for the nation's top spot?

The contest between the old rivals in 2016 may have begun already. Mr Mahama recently announced that he would seek to provide high-school education free, the very promise that Mr Akufo-Addo put at the heart of his campaign in 2012. Mr Mahama may have been trying to ensure that his dogged foe would not pledge the same again.

Meanwhile, Mr Akufo-Addo's running-mate last time round, Mahamudu Bawumia, recently slammed Mr Mahama's handling of the economy in a well-publicised speech, blaming him for everything from the depreciation by 30% of the cedi, the national currency, to the government's faltering efforts to slim the budget deficit, which reached 11% of GDP in 2013, prompting ratings agencies to downgrade the country.

But Mr Akufo-Addo's biggest challenge will be to offset the advantage of inc.u.mbency: no Ghanaian president has been voted out of office since democracy was restored 22 years ago. That record, if the resilient Mr Akufo-Addo gets his party's nomination, will not deter him.

Europe.

France's new government: Valls triste-or happy?

Turkey's local elections: Erdogan on a roll Hungary's election: Four more years Water in Berlin: The moisture down below Charlemagne: Trading places France's new government Valls triste-or happy?

Francois Hollande's new prime minister, Manuel Valls, is a centrist and a bruiser. He will need these qualities if he is to help turn France round Apr 5th 2014 | PARIS | From the print edition FIVE years ago, in 2009, after Manuel Valls urged his unreconstructed party to drop the word "socialist" from its name, he was ordered by its leader to shut up or quit. Two years later, after explaining how painful it would be to remedy France's economic weaknesses, he scored less than 6% in the party primary for the 2012 presidential nomination. Yet on March 31st Francois Hollande, the French president, appointed the party's most heretical activist as his new prime minister, in place of the bland Jean-Marc Ayrault. It was a move as uncharacteristically bold as it is potentially encouraging for the cause of economic reform in France.

That the ultra-cautious Mr Hollande has made such an appointment reflects how crus.h.i.+ng was his defeat in the local elections held on March 23rd and 30th. Thanks to high unemployment, high taxes, low growth and inept government, the Socialists lost over 150 towns, mostly to the mainstream right, including Toulouse, which they thought safe, Roubaix and Tourcoing, two towns in the industrial north with a long left-wing heritage, and Limoges, held by the left ever since 1912. Marine Le Pen's populist National Front picked up eleven more town halls, including Frejus and Beziers, to add to Henin-Beaumont, which it won in the first round, a big step forward for her party. The only consolation for the Socialists was that Anne Hidalgo won Paris (coincidentally, she shares with Mr Valls the distinction of Spanish birth and family origins).

Right up to the last moment, the president seemed to hope that he could avoid appointing France's now most popular politician, and thus a potential rival, to Matignon. But, with his poll ratings languis.h.i.+ng at just 17%, the risk-averse Mr Hollande was forced to take an unusual gamble, calculating that his woolly presidency needed a bit of Mr Valls's tough-guy tactics. Fully 61% of the French approved of the choice. By April 2nd, Mr Valls had his feet under his new desk and had picked his new government.

It was not, however, exactly the fresh "combat government" that Mr Hollande had promised. There was no change for several solid old-timers, including Laurent Fabius, the foreign minister, and Jean-Yves Le Drian, at defence. By contrast Pierre Moscovici, the finance minister, lost his job to Michel Sapin, who held the post in 1992-93 and is to have control of the budget, too. There were also some truly odd choices. Arnaud Montebourg is staying as industry minister, where he has proved unable to resist meddling in corporate affairs and exasperating foreign investors and digital entrepreneurs. So, despite recent blunders, is Christiane Taubira at justice. Segolene Royal, Mr Hollande's ex-partner and the Socialists' 2007 defeated presidential candidate, takes over the environment portfolio, which she held in 1992-93.

The new team seems to reflect both Mr Valls's need to keep the party's left wing quiet and Mr Hollande's taste for compromise and distrust of his prime minister. As such, it hints at the constraints under which Mr Valls will operate. Impetuous at times, he is deeply distrusted by a chunk of the Socialist left wing, particularly after his hard line over evicting illegal Roma. Mr Valls has no parliamentary base, and is not known as a team player. The Greens, who were junior partners in Mr Ayrault's government, have refused even to take part in Mr Valls's government. The party's leftists blame Mr Hollande's new business-friendly orientation for the poor local-election results-and they see Mr Valls's politics as the problem, not the solution.

A former spin doctor for Lionel Jospin when he was prime minister, and communication chief in Mr Hollande's presidential campaign, Mr Valls will need more than PR skills to answer the pressing question hanging over France: is Mr Hollande serious about the new business-friendly economic policy he announced in January, but has since done little about? He promised 10 billion ($14 billion) of new payroll-tax cuts for firms, as part of a "responsibility pact" meant to encourage job creation, and pledged 50 billion of budget cuts in 2015-17 as well as (according to Mr Hollande this week) tax cuts for employees that he terms a "solidarity pact".

Mr Valls has no experience of economic policy. He is a party hack and former mayor of the multicultural suburb of Evry, best known for his tough line as interior minister on security and immigration. Yet he has also carved out a reputation as a "social-liberal", meaning centre-left moderate in the French left-wing lexicon. A one-time aide to Michel Rocard, a Socialist prime minister in the Mitterrand years, Mr Valls has thought hard about how to impose modern social democracy on the French Socialist Party, criticising the 35-hour working week his party introduced, and arguing against selling voters "false hopes" based on a tax-and-spend doctrine.

n.o.body doubts the new prime minister's energy and grit. In many ways he resembles another ambitious former interior minister who set his sights high: Nicolas Sarkozy, the former centre-right president. Like Mr Sarkozy, the Barcelona-born Mr Valls, whose father was a Catalan painter, has something of the outsider's drive and dynamism. Also like Mr Sarkozy, he is not a pure product of the French elite, not having attended the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, which has groomed so many French prime ministers and presidents (and indeed members of Mr Valls's government), including Mr Hollande.

Yet Mr Valls will have to tread a delicate line between business's hopes and the left's fears. By mid-April he needs to present France's future budget plans to the European Commission, which has put France under special supervision, and explain how it plans to keep the deficit below 3% of GDP next year. Figures this week showed that the pace of fiscal consolidation has slowed: in 2013 France missed its deficit target of 4.1%, ending up at 4.3%.

If Mr Valls plans to request yet another delay (and Mr Hollande this week hinted that he would), the wary commission will want at least firm evidence that he is serious about reforming public spending at home. This means spelling out budget savings and finalising the "responsibility pact", which must go to a parliamentary vote of confidence by the end of April. In short, hemmed in by fiscal and political constraints, Mr Valls may have less room for manoeuvre than he hoped-which may be precisely why Mr Hollande agreed, against the odds, to give him the job.

Turkey's local elections Erdogan on a roll The AK party wins convincingly. What next?

Apr 5th 2014 | ISTANBUL | From the print edition Erdogan rules and divides HE SEEMS unbeatable. Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, secured his eighth big win in 14 years when his Justice and Development party (AK) swept to over 45% of the vote in local elections on March 30th. After facing down corruption charges, ma.s.s protests and accusations of authoritarianism, Mr Erdogan may feel emboldened to run for president in August. In an overtly polarising victory speech, he hinted as much. "We are ready to devote ourselves to whatever mission we are entrusted with," he said. He also promised to go after his enemies: "we will enter their lair. They will pay for this."

Mr Erdogan was referring to Fethullah Gulen, a Sunni cleric and former ally, who runs an empire of schools, media outlets and charities and was expected to hurt the AK party in the polls. The Pennsylvania-based preacher is accused of being behind leaked tapes that support corruption claims against Mr Erdogan, his children and various cabinet members. Mr Erdogan, who denies any wrongdoing, has resorted to a reshuffle of thousands of policemen and judges said to be Gulenists and, most recently, to a ban on Twitter and YouTube for airing the recordings.

There are many reasons for Mr Erdogan's electoral success. To many, AK means financial stability and competent management. "They may steal but they also get things done," is a frequent line from voters. Urban migration remains high and AK's seamless social services and conservative values are a magnet for new arrivals.

The left has seldom won more than 30% of the vote. Even with the Gulenists' tacit backing, the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) trailed a distant second in the elections, with 27% of the vote. It lost narrowly in Ankara and decisively in Istanbul. In Turkey's Kurdish regions it scored a miserable 1%, not least because of its opposition to peace talks with the imprisoned Kurdish rebel leader, Abdullah Ocalan. The CHP did best where it fielded moderate conservative candidates, as in Mr Erdogan's home district, Uskudar.

The other big winner was the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which called the elections "a referendum on Kurdish autonomy". The Kurds raised the number of cities under their control in the south-east from eight to 11, s.n.a.t.c.hing the provinces of Mardin, Bitlis and Agri from AK. They are expected to support Mr Erdogan for president.

The big question then would be who becomes prime minister. Abdullah Gul, co-founder of AK and current president, still seems the most likely choice, unless Mr Erdogan wants a puppet prime minister so that he can consolidate his presidential power. Mr Gul has proved his loyalty. He was mildly critical of police brutality during last year's Gezi Park protests. Turning a deaf ear to rebukes from the European Union, he recently approved a law on internet censors.h.i.+p. He seems to have burnt his bridges with the Gulenists.

Turkey's friends (and the financial markets) would welcome Mr Gul. As foreign minister and then president, he is credited with curbing Mr Erdogan's impulsive nature. His supporters insist that concessions to Mr Erdogan are purely tactical. Once in charge, they say, he will steer Turkey back to reform and away from adventurism, particularly in Syria, where Mr Erdogan's support for the rebels is questioned by secularists and Islamists alike.

With the economy heading into the doldrums and the Gulenists unlikely to give up, Mr Erdogan may yet decide instead to junk the AK party's three-term rule and run for a fourth time. This would give him four more years of parliamentary immunity from prosecution. Some speculate that he might call a snap parliamentary election before the effects of a slowing economy kick in. Should AK win a two-thirds majority, it could rewrite the const.i.tution to fulfil Mr Erdogan's long-held dream of being a more powerful executive president. Either way, as the elections on March 30th showed again, Mr Erdogan remains Turkey's dominant political figure.

Hungary's election Four more years Viktor Orban heads to a third term-and wants to centralise power Apr 5th 2014 | BUDAPEST | From the print edition THE Hungarian election on April 6th is likely to bring another big victory for Viktor Orban, the prime minister. He will do more to entrench the power of his right-wing Fidesz party, showing the inability of the European Union to bring wayward members to heel. Fidesz has 33% support, say polls by Szazadveg, a think-tank. Just 19% back Unity, the left-leaning opposition alliance, 14% the far-right Jobbik and 5% LMP, a green-liberal party.

More than 400,000 attended a Fidesz rally in Budapest's Heroes Square on March 29th, reported the interior ministry. Unity's rally a day later had a small fraction of that number. The opposition is crying foul. It claims that political and electoral changes over the past four years have made it near impossible to defeat Fidesz.

"The election will be free in the sense that you can vote in a secret ballot, but not fair," says Gordon Bajnai, a former technocrat prime minister of a Socialist-Liberal coalition. "Orban is trying to build a post-Soviet country on the model of Central Asia, Ukraine or Belarus. Hungary is en route to becoming an increasingly managed democracy." But the pollsters could also be wrong, says Mr Bajnai, because many people are scared to voice opinions to a stranger. Collective folk memories from the dictators.h.i.+p have returned. "Fidesz has instilled fear into the hearts of many."

The opposition's main complaints concern a new electoral law which, they say, allows the creation of instant parties, paid for with public money, that confuse voters and split the anti-government vote; new electoral districts, which they say are gerrymandered in Fidesz's favour; and ever tighter control of state television and radio. "Hungary's state media has become a mouthpiece for the ruling parties," says Amy Brouillette, at the Central European University in Budapest.

More than 200,000 ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries have registered to vote by post for national party lists. But Hungarians who live abroad and retain an address in the country (and who are more likely not to support Mr Orban), must register online, which many say is tricky, and then turn up at a consulate or emba.s.sy. The Hungarian emba.s.sy in London reckons 100,000 such citizens live in Britain but only around 5,000 are registered.

Mr Orban's triumph is a.s.sured in part because of a feeble opposition. Belying their political brand, the five parties that make up Unity could not agree on a common electoral list until January. Gabor Simon, a former deputy chairman of the Socialist Party, has been arrested on suspicion of tax evasion and falsifying doc.u.ments. Mr Simon's lawyer insists that his client is not guilty, but as one diplomat puts it, "Orban won the election the day the news about Simon broke".

A Fidesz victory will bring four more years of consolidation, with a focus on economic policy, promises Tibor Navracsics, deputy prime minister. He rejects claims that Hungarians are scared to speak out. Nor is the electoral system rigged in favour of Fidesz, he says. "The separation of party and state is of crucial importance, a basic principle of const.i.tutional democracy."

Changes in electoral districts were in line with suggestions by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, concludes a recent OSCE report. "There was no gerrymandering. The distribution of electoral districts was highly disproportionate," says Mr Navracsics, adding that population differences between districts are now smaller than 3%. "First the left complained that the system was too narrow, now that it is too broad. They complain that the system is undemocratic, then that it is too democratic."

Meanwhile, the far-right Jobbik party is playing a long game, aiming at young, first-time voters. Jobbik's leaders have toned down the party's anti-Semitism and anti-Roma rhetoric. "Jobbik no longer focuses on enemies. It has remodelled itself as a modern, trendy and youthful party," says Peter Kreko of Political Capital, a think-tank. It seems to be working: the party has doubled its support in six months.

Water in Berlin The moisture down below The capital's groundwater is rising to dangerous levels Apr 5th 2014 | BERLIN | From the print edition LAS VEGAS or Los Angeles would love to have Berlin's problem: too much water. In the Spree valley, the water table has risen in places to just 2.5 metres below ground level. With most cellars in Berlin between two and three metres deep, that means wet bas.e.m.e.nts, water damage and mould. Some 200,000 people, out of Berlin's total of 3.4m, live in the worst-hit areas (see map).

The puzzle is why, since Berlin is booming, the groundwater is rising at all. The last time it was a magnet for people on such a scale was during the interwar years, when the city's population was larger than it is today. Water levels then fell as people, factories, breweries and tanneries all tapped into groundwater supplies. It hit an all-time low in the 1930s when Hitler was pumping water for his megalomaniacal projects.

After 1945, when industry all but halted, the water level began rising. But it fell again after West Berlin recovered in the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) of 1950s, and because the communists kept prices artificially low and East Berliners used water greedily. But then came unification in 1990. The Ossis of the former East Berlin began conserving water when it became more expensive. And Berliners in east and west alike started to save more, because they were now good, green Germans. Industry returned, but in the form of lawyers and techies sipping cappuccinos, not widget-makers pumping water. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the groundwater level has risen by over half a metre.

This now threatens much of the Berlin that tourists see. When Potsdamer Platz, formerly in the Wall's death strip, was remade into its present, modern form, garages had to be built behind dams to keep out the water. The State Opera at Unter den Linden, facing the square where the n.a.z.is burned books in 1933, is temporarily closed for renovation for similar reasons. The Bundesrat, the upper house of parliament, has had to pump water out of its bas.e.m.e.nt at huge cost.

Berliners now use only about 200m cubic metres of water, whereas they should be using at least 300m, says Manfred Schafhauser, a geologist who did a study for the local chamber of commerce. But those extra 100m would be bigger than Berlin's two largest lakes combined. And as all Europeans know, it's hard to get Germans to stop saving.

Charlemagne Trading places How China is affecting Europe's position in the world Apr 5th 2014 | From the print edition NOTHING could be better designed to rea.s.sure Eurocrats that Europe remains a force in the world than the arrival in Brussels of the leaders of America and China, the two biggest economies, within days of each other. Barack Obama and Xi Jinping both paid homage to the European Union and sought better trade relations with Europe, the world's biggest exporter. But there the similarities end. The American president talked mostly of universal values and security as he girded the transatlantic alliance to confront a newly aggressive Russia. Xi Jinping spoke instead of reviving the Silk Road and was non-committal over Russia's annexation of Crimea.

Europe is eager to do an ambitious transatlantic trade deal, but lukewarm about Mr Xi's calls for a separate EU-China trade pact. Europe's dealings with China are still marked by suspicion, not to say incomprehension. What to make of the gift by Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, to Mr Xi, for instance? Whether by error or design, Mrs Merkel gave him an 18th-century map that excluded Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria from China's domains; it also seemed to exclude the islands of Taiwan and Hainan. Official Chinese media either ignored the map or subst.i.tuted it with a 19th-century one that showed China extending all the way into Siberia.