Finland's War of Choice Part 11

In the evening of June 21, Lieutenant General Oesch ordered Lieutenant General Laatikainen to send the 17th Division from Juustila, north of Viipuri, to the northern coast of Viipuri Bay at Tienhaara to prevent a Soviet crossing of that bay. Only the 61st Infantry Regiment, a separate battalion, a mortar company, and most of the divisional artillery were available.

The 61st Infantry Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Alpo Kullervo Marttinen, arrived at Tienhaara in the afternoon of June 22 and established itself along the sh.o.r.e. German aircraft from Group Kuhlmey carried out a bombing attack against the amphibious craft a.s.sembled by the Soviets on the other side of the bay. Troops from two Soviet divisions attacked across the bay in the evening of June 22 following a heavy artillery barrage. The attack was repelled but new attempts were made throughout the night.

Marshal Govorov decided that trying to cross the Bay of Viipuri would be too costly and time-consuming. The Soviet troops involved were relieved by other forces and moved to the main operational theater in the Juustila-Ihantala area.

Despite having frustrated Soviet attempts to cross the Bay of Viipuri, things were far from bright for the Finns. The loss of Viipuri was a heavy blow to Finnish morale. Having captured Viipuri the Soviets could direct their offensive both westward along the northern sh.o.r.e of the Gulf of Finland against the harbor city of Hamina and northward to Ihantala and Lake Saimaa from Lappeenranta to Imatra. After reaching these areas the terrain opened up and the possibilities for an armor-led advance were excellent. The Finns knew that the decisive fight was close at hand.

German a.s.sistance and Political Developments.

As soon as the magnitude of the Soviet summer offensive became evident, the Finnish military leaders.h.i.+p realized that they could avert catastrophe only with help from Germany. The only other alternative was to seek peace with the Soviet Union. Both avenues were tried-simultaneously. The two avenues were actually linked since the Finns had concluded that the only way they could get acceptable terms from the Soviets would be by stabilizing their fronts. In their desperate situation the Finns were prepared to use German aid for purposes that were against the interests of their brothers-in-arms. The Germans may well have realized what the Finns were up to in view of the many flirtations with the West and the Soviet Union over the past two years but there was not much they could do about it except, as we shall see in the next chapter, conditioning their aid on a firm commitment by the Finns to stay in the war at the side of Germany. Not providing the requested aid would only lead to Finland being promptly knocked out of the war.

The Germans responded quickly to Finnish requests for a.s.sistance despite their own precarious situation. Hitler lifted the embargo on June 13. German torpedo boats brought in 9,000 Panzerfausts.30 Mannerheim also requested a large number of Panzerschrecks31 as well as ground support aircraft. The Finnish request stated that the VKT Line could be held only if these requests were approved and delivery expedited. Five thousand Panzerschrecks were airlifted to Finland on June 22.

The Finns also tried to get military a.s.sistance, in the form of arms, from Sweden. A request to that effect was made on June 18. It resulted in a unanimous refusal by the Swedish government.

Lieutenant General Heinrichs asked Erfurth late on June 19 whether the Germans were prepared to provide aid other than weapons. He specifically asked for six divisions to take over the front in East Karelia in order for the Finns to concentrate their efforts on the Karelian Isthmus. The formal request was made by Mannerheim on June 20.

The German answer came quickly. It pointed out that to provide the six divisions Mannerheim requested was impossible but other help was promised. This was a sensible answer in view of Germany's own force requirements. However, setting these aside, it made little military sense to send a large German force to East Karelia. The Germans already had their strongest army tied up in central and northern Finland, contributing virtually nothing to the war effort. It would be folly to send an equally strong force to be isolated in East Karelia where there would be great difficulties keeping it supplied.

The OKW answer on June 20 was based on the verbal request from Heinrichs on June 19. Aside from not being able to provide the requested six divisions, OKW promised significant help as long as they were a.s.sured that the Finns were determined to hold the VKT Line. Besides weapons, ammunition, and supplies, the Germans offered the 122nd Infantry Division from Army Group North, and the 303rd a.s.sault Gun Brigade.32 They also agreed to make available Luftwaffe units. Air Group Kuhlmey, consisting of one fighter group and a group plus a squadron of Stuka ground support aircraft were made available. These 70 aircraft came from the 1st and 5th Air Fleets. They were stationed at Imola Airfield outside Helsinki. The air support was immediate and the German aircraft flew 940 support sorties in support of the Finnish Army on June 21.33 This was substantial aid considering the desperate situation in which the Germans found themselves. The Western Allies had landed in Normandy while the greatest Soviet offensive of the war was expected any day.

The Finnish political leaders, surprised by the magnitude of the Soviet offensive, were prepared to make peace quickly and on almost any terms. The loss of the VT Line caused a political crisis in Finland. Linkomies and Tanner decided on June 15 that there should be a change in government and that President Ryti had to step down so that a new government acceptable to the Soviet Union could seek peace. They felt that Mannerheim should take over as president. They believed he would be acceptable to the Soviet Union and at the same time his prestige would help keep the country together after the expected harsh conditions.

Ryti was willing to give up the presidency and Mannerheim agreed with a change in government and suing for peace but he refused adamantly to accept the position being offered.34 Mannerheim was obviously in a pessimistic mood and that is understandable as the VT Line had been lost, his troops were retreating, and reinforcements were not in place. He urged that the proposed steps be undertaken quickly since it was not a matter of days but of hours. He soon had a change of heart, probably because of promised German a.s.sistance and the fact that his troops were fighting a successful delaying action that would provide the time needed for reinforcements to arrive. He concluded that it was risky to burn the bridge to Germany by discussing peace terms with the Soviets until the front had been stabilized.35

TEN.

SOVIET OFFENSIVE ENDS-FINLAND LEAVES THE WAR.

East Karelia.

In antic.i.p.ation of Soviet attacks on the Svir and Maaselka fronts, Mannerheim issued orders on June 16 for a gradual withdrawal to the so-called U Line (from Koirinoja on Ladoga Lake to Loymola). Ziemke reports that at the last minute the OKW intervened unsuccessfully to have Mannerheim reverse his decision.1 This was a strange turn of events in view of the strong recommendations by General Dietl to both the OKW and Hitler that the withdrawal be speeded up so that the Finns could concentrate their forces in a shorter line where he thought they could hold out indefinitely.

Ziemke offers three reasons for the German change of heart. First, he notes correctly that it had become a virtual obsession of Hitler not to surrender any ground to the enemy. The second reason, which he feels was more important, was that by giving up East Karelia the Finns would lose their most important bargaining chip with the Soviets, and thus their motivation for staying in the war. Finally, with a major offensive pending on the eastern front, the Germans may have surmised that the Soviets would stop short of a decisive effort in Finland. He concludes that "the OKW line of reasoning had much to recommend it-from the German point of view but not from the Finnish."2 The reasoning attributed to OKW is not convincing. Dietl had correctly concluded that the Finns could not hold widely separated fronts amounting to 290 kilometers in length against ma.s.sive Soviet a.s.saults and that they risked having their forces cut off and defeated in detail. He believed that concentrating their forces on a much shorter line would offer the best prospect for keeping Finland in the war. In February 1944, after Army Group North withdrew to the Neva River (see Chapter 8), OKW had offered to provide the Finns with additional military a.s.sistance in recognition of newly exposed salients in East Karelia and along the Svir River. OKW was fully aware that Mannerheim had already set in motion a thinning out of forces on the Maaselka and Svir fronts to bolster his forces on the Karelian Isthmus. These withdrawals left the two fronts even less capable of surviving a Soviet onslaught in their forward positions. Dietl and Mannerheim were right and it would be odd if OKW did not share their views.

It should be kept in mind that at this time the Finns had requested the Germans to provide six divisions (see Chapter 9) to take over the fronts in East Karelia. This request was turned down; even had they wished to do so, no forces were available to send to Finland. In addition, had they any troops to dispatch to East Karelia, they would have been difficult to supply and subject to entrapment. OKW's last-minute intervention was most likely related to the Finnish request and the German refusal and also in line with Hitler's obsession against any withdrawals.

The Maaselka front between the northern point of Lake Onega and Lake Seg (Seesjarvi) was defended by the Finnish II Corps, under the command of Major General Einar Makinen. It had consisted of three divisions, one brigade, and two separate battalions until two divisions were withdrawn and sent to the Karelian Isthmus. After these withdrawals, the II Corps was no longer considered capable of mounting a forward defense against the 32nd Soviet Army of three divisions, one tank regiment, and ample artillery and air support. It was this situation that led Mannerheim to order the II Corps on June 16 to make a fighting withdrawal to the old border along with the forces on the Svir front. The forces from both sectors were placed under the command of Lieutenant General Paavo Talvela.

Major General Makinen ordered his troops to hold their positions until the evening of June 21. The Soviets launched their attack on June 21 and the following night II Corps commenced its planned withdrawal. The town of Medvezhyegorsk (Karhumaki) was abandoned on June 24. The withdrawal was conducted over two widely separated routes. The 1st Division withdrew southward from Kontuphoja (Kondopoga) and Munjarvi (Munozero) towards Suojarvi and Loymola. The 21st Brigade withdrew over a route almost 100 kilometers to the north-from Medvezhyegorsk via Porosozero to Ilomantsi. The 21st Brigade's delaying actions in the north had a very important objective. This unit had to ensure that Soviet troops in the north were sufficiently delayed to allow Finnish troops coming north from the Svir along the east sh.o.r.e of Lake Ladoga to arrive at the U Line before their route to the west was cut.

The troops on the Svir front and east of Lake Ladoga were under the VI Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Paavo Talvela. After the movement of the 11th Division to the Karelian Isthmus, the forces consisted of the 5th, 7th, and 8th Divisions and the 15th Brigade. There was also a coastal brigade on the sh.o.r.es of Lake Onega. The number of troops was about 45,000.

Facing these troops was the Soviet 7th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Alexei Krutikov, of about 150,000 with 1,600 field artillery pieces and rocket launchers, 340 tanks, and 600 aircraft. Soviet forces were organized into eight divisions, three brigades, a tank brigade, and a multiple rocket launcher brigade.

Fortifications behind the Svir front were under construction by the Finns but, as in other places in the country, they had not been completed. The so-called PSS Line north of the Svir River ran from Pisi via Saarimaki to Sammatus. The next defensive line under construction was the U Line. The 7th Army's operational objectives were the cities of Sortavala and Petrozavodsk.

Mannerheim's order was that the troops in the east, when faced with attacks by vastly superior enemy forces, should initiate a fighting withdrawal to the old border. The Finns evacuated the large bridgehead south of the Svir River on June 18 without Soviet interference and established themselves behind the northern bank of the Svir. These troops were issued some 200 German infantry ant.i.tank weapons.

The first Soviet attack was a relative minor one. They tried to capture the hydroelectric dam and power station on the Svir. Their attempt was unsuccessful and the Finnish troops blew the sluice gates causing the western part of the river to rise significantly.

The Soviet 7th Army, following a three-hour heavy artillery and air preparation, began its attack on the Finnish troops behind the Svir River on June 21. Over 76,000 sh.e.l.ls and 62,000 bombs fell on the Finnish defense line. Soviet troops crossed the river in a.s.sault boats and amphibious tanks on both sides of Lodeynoye Pole and quickly established a two-kilometer deep bridgehead on the north bank of the river. The Finns made a deliberate withdrawal to the PSS Line and were established there by the evening of June 22.

The 7th Finnish Division on the eastern part of the isthmus withdrew northward along the sh.o.r.e of Lake Onega. The city of Petrozavodsk was abandoned on June 27. The 7th Division's further withdrawal was by train while the coastal brigade joined the withdrawing VI Corps. This withdrawal took on a sense of urgency as Soviet troops from the Maaselka front threatened to cut the Finnish line of retreat.

In a further attempt to cut off the Finnish line of retreat the Soviets landed a naval infantry brigade in the rear of the VI Corps north of Tuloksa. Finnish attempts to counter this landing were ineffective. The landing took place outside the effective range of the coastal artillery and the Finnish Air Force could not prevent the landing. The naval infantry brigade was able to establish a bridgehead and cut the road leading north to Salmi, which was the line of retreat of the Finnish 5th Division and the 15th Brigade. The Finns counterattacked the bridgehead, but they were unable to eliminate it.

The bulk of the VI Corps was in danger of being encircled. The Finns had begun construction of an interior road to (Vedlozero) Vieljarvi in the spring of 1944 and it appears the Soviets were unaware of this road. While not completed, the Finns used this road to withdraw in a series of delaying actions around the bridgehead in the Tuulos-Vidlitsa (Vitele) area. This kept the line of retreat open for the 7th Division and the coastal brigade. The Soviets expanded their bridgehead at Tuloksa by landing troops at Vidlitsa. It was critical for the Finns to hold open the road north from Vidlitsa so that the other troops could join the VI Corps in the U Line. This was accomplished on July 10 when the 7th Division joined the other troops of VI Corps.3 The U Line was relatively well laid out. It actually consisted of three lines, each a short distance behind the other. The Soviet 7th Army was reinforced by a new corps and a tank brigade. These forces succeeded in breaking through the first two lines. The Finns were not certain that they could hold the U Line, and construction was begun on defensive positions between Yanis Lake and Lake Ladoga. The fighting for the U Line lasted over a week, but all Soviet attempts to break through the third line failed. The last attempt was made on July 17.

Lieutenant General Talvela succeeded in establis.h.i.+ng a strong defensive front north of Lake Ladoga. After July 17 the front became stabilized and later actions can best be described as positional warfare. The final deployment in this line was as follows: The VI Corps held the southern sector between Koirinoja and Loymola with the 5th Division on the right and the 8th Division on the left. The 15th Brigade was in reserve. Further back, in the vicinity of Sortavala was a coastal brigade. The center was held by II Corps consisting of the 7th Division, a border jager brigade, the 1st Division, and the 20th Brigade, from south to north in that order. The northern part of the line was held by Group E, consisting of the 21st Brigade and a cavalry brigade.

The 21st Brigade of the II Finnish Corps abandoned the town of Kondopoga on Lake Ladoga on June 27, the same day that the town of Petrozavodsk was abandoned. The 32nd Soviet Army had been reinforced by a new corps and the situation for the Finnish II Corps would have become critical were it not for the fact that VI Corps withdrawing from the Svir managed to hold the lines of retreat open. Major General Makinen was therefore able to bring his forces back in good order.

However, a new critical situation had developed to the east of Ilomantsi. There was a real risk that the Soviets would be able to break through the Finnish forces towards this town and thereby penetrate the northern portion of the new defensive line. Major General E. Raappana (commander of the Finnish 14th Division) was brought down from the Rugozero (Rukajarvi) area to take command of the forces northeast of Ilomantsi-the 21st Brigade, the cavalry brigade, and two infantry battalions from the Armored Division. General Raappana commenced operations on July 30 and the Finns were able to encircle the two attacking Soviet divisions-the 176th and 289th. The Soviets brought in reinforcements but these were also encircled. Most of the encircled Soviet troops managed to slip out of the trap but had to abandon much of their equipment. General Erfurth claims that four Soviet regiments were destroyed in this action.4 The Finns captured 51 artillery pieces, six tanks, and 41 trucks.5 This successful operation, which ended on August 10, was Finland's last major operation of the war.

General Raappana returned to his own division after the successful conclusion of the operation east of Ilomantsi. The 14th Division was attacked by a Soviet division, but two Soviet battalions were immediately encircled. This ended Soviet activity in this area and General Raappana was able to bring his division back to the old border in good order.

The command arrangements of the forces in East Karelia were changed on July 18. Lieutenant General Talvela returned to Mikkeli. On July 22 he succeeded General osterman as Finnish military representative at the OKW, a job he had held once before. The two corps in East Karelia were placed directly under Mannerheim.

The Soviets Attack the KTV Line.

It was on the Karelian Isthmus that the decisive battle was being fought. Soviet troops had so far kept to the time schedule in their plan. In less than two weeks they had driven the Finnish defenders back almost 100 kilometers. This was a serious loss of terrain in the critical Karelian Isthmus as the Finns now found themselves in the last defensive line before the Soviets could reach the open country north of Viipuri, terrain well suited for tank forces.

The Finnish troops had fought well against overwhelming odds. Their morale had not been broken despite heavy losses-including the ancient city of Viipuri-and continual retreats. Reinforcements had arrived on the Karelian Isthmus from East Karelia and this bolstered their morale. Matti Koskima attributes the loss of ground to lack of operational mobility, inadequate radio communications, and ineffective ant.i.tank weapons.6 He could have added that the failure of the General Staff to properly interpret the many signs of an imminent Soviet offensive and an unfortunate delay in giving up the forward positions in East Karelia had contributed to the loss since reinforcements from there were slow in arriving. However, the tough defensive fighting by the Finnish soldiers bought the time required for reinforcements to arrive from East Karelia and from Germany to stabilize the situation.

Soviet troops were also beginning to show signs of fatigue. They had suffered significant losses, especially in men and tanks. But the Soviets had large reserves, which allowed them time to rest and reorganize their forces. This was especially true for the elite 30th Guards Corps, which had basically rested between June 12 and 24. However, the time was nearing when Soviet troops would be needed in the great offensive against the Germans. Marshal Govorov had received orders to be on a line from Lappeenranta to Imatra no later than June 28. He had a short week to accomplish his task.

The Soviets quickly concentrated their troops in the area to the northeast of Viipuri. The plan was for the 59th Army and the 21st Army to drive north with the 59th Army expected to capture Lappeenranta while the 21st Army turned west, north of Viipuri, in the direction of Miehikkala and Hamina. The 23rd Army would strike further to the east with the main force heading for Imatra while part of the army would turn east towards Hiitola.

There was heavy fighting at Tali, east of Viipuri, from June 22 onward. The terrain was particularly suitable for tank operations. A breakthrough here could bring about the collapse of the Finnish front.

The Soviet attack on the isthmus between Viipuri and Kuparsaari was intensive. For example, on a 15-kilometer wide sector they concentrated 14 divisions, three or four tank brigades, and 70 12-gun artillery batteries. There was an artillery piece every five meters in the areas of the main attacks.7 These troops attacked in the morning of June 25 with the main effort in the direction of Ihantala. The fire from almost 400 tubes of artillery and rocket batteries was directed at the defenders' front line and as far in the rear as Portinhoikka. The attack by the 30th Guards Corps tore open the Finnish front between Lakes Leitimojarvi and Karstilanjarvi. The Finnish troops in the path of this steamroller were the 48th Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment. The Soviet infantry that exploited the intensive artillery preparation had only to occupy the Finnish lines, as there were no soldiers left alive to offer any resistance. The Soviets followed the tank spearhead in a deep penetration that by the end of the day had captured Portinhoikka, and from there reached halfway to Ihantala. A Soviet tank unit continued in the direction of Juustilankangas, but was stopped by a unit of heavy Finnish tanks from the armored division. The Soviet tank unit was thrown back and the Finns reoccupied Portinhoikka in the evening.8 Over the following four days of heavy fighting the Finns succeeded in sealing the Soviet penetration but not in restoring the front. The Soviets held a dangerous salient near terrain north of Tali that was favorable for mobile warfare.

The RibbentropRyti Pact.

While the Finnish military was seeking German help, the Finnish political leaders were still trying to find a way out of the war. The Foreign Affairs Committee decided to explore again the Soviet att.i.tude on the subject. An unofficial feeler was delivered to the Soviet amba.s.sador in Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontai, on June 22, asking if the Soviet government would agree to receive a peace delegation to discuss peace with a new Finnish government. The feeler resulted in an answer from Moscow the following day. The answer demanded that as a precondition for receiving a Finnish delegation, the Finnish president and foreign minister must sign a declaration to the effect that Finland was ready to surrender.9 The answer was interpreted by the Finns as a demand for unconditional surrender, something they were not ready to accept.

On June 21, the day before the Finnish government approached the Soviets for peace conditions, Mannerheim sent a message to Hitler thanking him for the aid and stating that Finland was prepared to establish closer ties with Germany.10 It would appear on the surface that there was a split in Finnish leaders.h.i.+p but it is more likely evidence that the Finns were playing a double game, trying to keep doors open to both Germany and the Soviet Union. German military and economic a.s.sistance in the present crisis had been provided without any preconditions despite German worries that Finland might seek a separate peace. The Germans now decided that the time was ripe for binding Finland irrevocably to Germany. On June 22, as the Finns were telling the Soviets that they were ready to exit the war and asking for conditions, Hitler sent Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to Helsinki. The sudden appearance of Ribbentrop ill.u.s.trated the importance the Germans attached to this mission.

The Finns were surprised and dismayed by the arrival of the German foreign minister. Ribbentrop basically demanded a political alliance between Germany and Finland where Finland would firmly obligate herself to continue the war at Germany's side in return for continued German aid. Mannerheim should not have been surprised in view of his message to Hitler on June 21, which had basically invited closer relations between the two countries.11 Even in the absence of this message, it should have come as no surprise to Mannerheim that the Germans, in their own predicament, would demand some form of guarantee that Finland would remain in the war before providing further a.s.sistance.

The German demand led to intense discussions within the government. It was recognized that an agreement ratified by the Finnish parliament was not likely in view of the peace sentiments that prevailed in the country. The Germans expressed a willingness to accept a letter signed by President Ryti in lieu of a doc.u.ment ratified by the parliament.12 The German position was strengthened the following day-June 23-when the Finns received the Soviet answer, basically demanding unconditional capitulation.13 The negotiations were lengthy and intense. In the evening of June 24, President Ryti and Foreign Minister Ramsay met with Mannerheim at his headquarters to discuss the situation. Hitler added pressure by a directive stating plainly that without a public declaration of Finland's att.i.tude, German a.s.sistance to Finland would end.

Finland did not have much choice. Its leaders had to accept the Soviet demand for an unconditional surrender, or the German demand for a binding alliance. The government was split. Tanner, leader of the Social Democrats, was adamantly opposed to an understanding with Germany. Prime Minister Linkomies, on the other hand was equally adamant against surrender. Mannerheim made it clear that Finland could not continue the fight without German armament a.s.sistance. This was underscored by the news from the fronts where the Soviets were continuing their advances. In his memoirs Mannerheim makes no secret of the fact that his support for the alliance with Germany which resulted from the Ribbentrop visit was not done to "enable the country to continue the war, which had to be regarded as lost, but to stabilize the position and create a basis for peace negotiations."14 The majority in the government supported the views of the prime minister.

President Ryti initially refused to agree to Germany's demands without the approval of parliament. However, when it became clear that there was no parliamentary majority in favor of the understanding with Germany, Prime Minister Linkomies refused to submit the question under threat of his resignation. It may well have been his intention not to submit the issue to a parliamentary vote since not doing so could afford the Finns a loophole in later abrogating the agreement. This was also the view of Mannerheim who wrote that such an understanding "would not bind the people of Finland" and that under a future president, "Finland would be free to act as the situation demanded."15 The end result was that President Ryti agreed to sign a letter to Hitler where he stated that neither he nor a government appointed by him would make a separate peace with the Soviet Union. Ryti's letter also a.s.sured Hitler that Finland's commitment to Germany would be made public in a speech to the nation. This announcement was made by Prime Minister Linkomies, in a radio broadcast on June 27. The speech stressed Finland's determination not to conclude a separate peace without the agreement of Germany.

Ribbentrop's visit and the German demands placed great stress on political unity in Finland. Within the government the Social Democrats and Progressive Party voted against the understanding with Germany and the Social Democrats even issued a proclamation disavowing the government's policy. The Swedish People's Party withdrew its support for the government. After an acrimonious debate, however, the Social Democrats decided to stay in the government.

There was a price to pay for the new agreement. The US severed diplomatic relations with Finland on June 30. The breaking of relations, however, did not result in a declaration of war. Erfurth writes that this was due to a "masterful political strategy" by the Finns. The Swedes also denounced the GermanFinnish alliance in a speech by the Swedish prime minister on July 2 and the Swedish press made references to the Ryti coup and a German dictators.h.i.+p in Finland.16 While Ribbentrop returned to Germany in triumph, he brought with him a Finnish agreement that was unenforceable by Germany. Ribbentrop's high-handed pressure tactics ended up obscuring the generosity that the Germans had shown despite their own predicaments. The Finns concluded they had been subjected to blackmail and it removed some of their own feelings of guilt in what they were about to do.17 Tali-Ihantala Battle.

While Ribbentrop was applying maximum political pressure on the Finns in Helsinki the decisive battle between the Finnish Army and Soviet forces was raging in the Tali-Ihantala area on the isthmus between Viipuri and the Vuoksi River. Marshal Govorov's simple objective was to defeat the Finnish Army in a final battle and then penetrate the defenseless interior of the country. This time he found his task much more difficult. With the arrival of reinforcements from East Karelia, the Finns had eleven divisions and four brigades on terrain favorable for defensive operations.18 These divisions were deployed as follows: The 10th and 17th Divisions along with the Cavalry Brigade and the Gulf of Finland Coastal Brigade were located in the area north of the Bay of Viipuri. The 20th Brigade and the Armored Division were located north of Viipuri. The 18th, 4th, and 3rd Divisions were in line from Tali to Kauparsaari in that order from west to east. The 6th and 11th Divisions had just arrived in the area north of Viipuri. The 2nd and 15th Divisions and the 19th Brigade were deployed in that order from north to south along the Vuoksi River. There was also the 3rd Coastal Regiment located along the west sh.o.r.e of Lake Ladoga.19 By its tough defensive fighting the 18th Finnish Division under Major General Paavo Paalu had succeeded in stemming the Soviet offensive long enough for reinforcements to arrive in the form of the 6th and 11th Divisions. The 18th Division had been helped immeasurably by counterattacks launched by the Finnish Armored Division. The arriving 11th Division took over some of the sectors for which the 18th Division had been responsible, as in the area of Ventelanselka and Ihantala. The 4th Division took over defensive positions on the 11th Division's left flank. The battalions in the 13th Infantry Regiment, which had been in the thick of fighting, were given a chance to rest and reorganize.

The front line, which had somewhat stabilized over a period of several days of hard fighting, contained several penetrations that had been sealed but not eliminated. For example, north of Repola a substantial wedge had been driven into the Finnish defensive line and the Finns had not been able to eliminate it by counterattacks. Because of the resulting zigzag front, larger forces were needed to man it. General Oesch recommended to Mannerheim that the front be straightened out and his recommendation was accepted.

The Soviets noticed what was going on and began a new series of attacks to frustrate the Finnish plan. The relief of forces could not be carried out as planned and the straightening of the front was only partially successful. The responsibility for defensive operations on the most northerly front against the center of the main Soviet thrust fell to the 6th Division under Major General Einar Vihma.

The 6th Division fought a remarkable defensive battle. The Soviets attacked it repeatedly with tank support but each time they were driven back. German and Finnish aircraft tried repeatedly to interdict the lines of communications of the forward Soviet troops by carrying out bombing attacks against bridges. But Soviet infantry attacks continued with the support of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. A report by the Finnish General Headquarters on July 1 mentions Soviet air formations of up to 200 aircraft and takes note of the destruction of 57 Soviet tanks in the Tali area.20 The Finns were beginning to reap the benefits of their shortened line of defense. The Soviet penetration of the Finnish front was limited to a depth of seven kilometers and there was no breakthrough.

A Finnish intercept of Soviet radio traffic on July 3 indicated that several elite guard and tank units were preparing a decisive attack in the direction of Ihantala. The Finns concentrated all the artillery they could lay their hands on-about 250 pieces. They fired on the area where the attack formations were a.s.sembling just before the attack was to be launched. This heavy artillery attack was followed by attacks by 26 German Stukas from Group Kuhlmey and by Finnish aircraft. The mortars also laid down a solid barrage in front of the Finnish position. The terrible fire covered the whole area between the roads that ran from Portinhoikka to Juustila and from Portinhoikka to Ihantala. The planned Soviet attack was completely frustrated.

However, the Soviet attacks did not stop. For almost a week they continued to carry out combined arms attacks against the whole 6th Division sector with air support. Most of these attacks were repelled, primarily through excellent use of artillery and mortar fire. The Finnish losses were also great. Among those who were killed was Major General Einar Vihma, the division commander. Only minor penetrations of the Finnish line took place and the front was restored through counterattacks.

The fighting, which had taken place in the Tali-Ihantala area northeast of Viipuri over a three-week period, is referred to as the largest battle in Nordic history. It ended in a Finnish defensive victory, which undoubtedly had its impact on later political developments. The fighting had been carried out successfully against a vastly superior enemy and the margin between success and failure had often been razor-thin.

Several elements came together to make this defensive victory possible. Reinforcements from East Karelia arrived just in the nick of time to prevent a decisive Soviet breakthrough. Finnish defensive operations had become firm and this must in large measure be attributed to their new technique in the use of artillery. Like the Soviets, the Finns ma.s.sed their artillery in the threatened sectors and this had a devastating effect on the attackers. The new ant.i.tank weapons received from the Germans demonstrated their effectiveness even against the heaviest Soviet tanks. The Finnish Air Force, reinforced by the German Group Kuhlmey, also proved its effectiveness. Finally, the toughness of the individual Finnish soldier had been restored.

On July 13 Marshal Govorov was ordered to transfer five fully equipped divisions to Leningrad because they were needed in southern Russia. Govorov ordered his troops to end their attacks in the Ihantala sector. Finnish intelligence noted that although Soviet strength on the Karelian Isthmus had grown to 26 infantry divisions and 12 to 14 tank brigades, some of the best guard units had begun withdrawing and were being replaced by garrison troops. While Soviet attacks ended northeast of Viipuri, operations in the Bay of Viipuri and at Vuosalmi continued.

Soviet Attempt to Cross the Bay of Viipuri.

On July 2, the commander of the Soviet 59th Army, Lieutenant General L. Korovnikov, was ordered to cross the Bay of Viipuri with two divisions, one armored brigade, and one naval infantry brigade. The troops numbered about 20,000 and were supported by some 180 pieces of artillery, rail-mounted guns, multiple rocket launchers, amphibious craft, and hundreds of bombers and close-support aircraft. The initial objective of the amphibious operation, after securing a beachhead, was to capture the town of Tienhaara. The obvious goal of the Soviets was to thereby threaten the right flank of the IV Corps.

The Soviets successively captured the small islands in the Gulf of Viipuri. The two islands of Teikarinsaari and Melansaari were defended tenaciously by the 22nd Coastal Artillery Regiment between July 3 and 5, but the Soviets' vast superiority eventually prevailed. The islands were captured on July 5. Some defenders saved themselves by swimming to the mainland.

The 59th Army was now ready to launch the main attack against the northern sh.o.r.e of the bay. The Finnish defenders were reinforced by the arrival of the 122nd German Infantry Division and it was in the sector of this unit that the main attack struck, on a 10-kilometer wide front between Niemenlautta and Harjuniemi. The 122nd Division had just moved up to relieve the Finnish Cavalry Brigade in this sector. The decisive battle in this area was fought in the period July 8 to 10. The Soviet operation was a complete failure as the Germans attacked and repelled the landing force. The Soviets had succeeded in gaining a small foothold in the river delta of the bay where the water was too shallow for Finnish torpedo boats to intervene.21 The defensive operations by the Finns and Germans in the Bay of Viipuri became a victory when Lieutenant General Korovnikov received orders canceling his attack.

Soviets Cross the Vuoksi River at Ayrapaa.

The III Finnish Corps withdrew to its sector of the VKT Line without serious interference from the enemy. The 2nd Division had now been transferred from IV Corps to III Corps and it reached its a.s.signed segment of the VKT Line in the Vuosalmi area. Two battalions of this division-belonging to the 7th Infantry Regiment-were left in a small bridgehead on the western bank of the river while the rest of the division went into positions on the eastern bank.

The reason for leaving two battalions on the western bank of the Vuoksi River was related to topography. The western bank was about 20 meters higher in elevation than the eastern side in this sector. The river varied in width between 200 and 600 meters and occupation of the western ridge gave the Finns a good view of the river valley. It was therefore an excellent spot from which to direct artillery fire and it was important that it be held. Soviet forces, particularly armor, were expected to a.s.semble in attack positions west of the river. The small islands in the river presented the Soviets with good intermediate objectives.

The commander of the 23rd Army, Lieutenant General Tjerepanov, deployed his forces so that two divisions had the mission of seizing the ridgeline at Ayrapaa. These divisions were supported by almost 60 tanks and 20 artillery batteries. The Finns held the ridgeline initially, but it was just a matter of time before they would have to abandon the bridgehead.

The fighting for the ridgeline on the west bank of Vuoksi River developed into a large battle. The commander of the 23rd Army was replaced by Lieutenant General V. Sjvetsov and the army was reinforced by another corps.

The Soviets started new attacks on July 3 and 4, but it was not until July 9 that the Finns were forced to give up their positions on the west bank of Vuoksi south of Vuosalmi. The eastern bank of the river also came under attack that same day after heavy artillery bombardment and the employment of several hundred aircraft. Under cover of this strong supporting fire the Soviets crossed the river on a two-kilometer front using a.s.sault boats. They were able to seize a one-kilometer deep bridgehead on the eastern bank. The Finns lacked the strength to eliminate the bridgehead and could only resort to containment.

Within a short time, however, the Soviets widened the bridgehead to such an extent that they were able to deploy one infantry division supported by tanks. The Jager Brigade and a.s.sault guns from the Finnish Armored Division were moved from the Tali-Ihantala area to reinforce the III Corps. The Soviets were able to expand their bridgehead despite these Finnish reinforcements due to the hasty and incomplete construction of fortifications. The situation was difficult for the Finns because the dominant terrain on the west side of the river was occupied by the Soviets. This made operations to contain or eliminate the bridgehead exceedingly difficult and costly.

Nevertheless, the defenders were eventually able to limit the dangerous penetration and prevent a breakthrough. Finnish artillery continued to dominate the river crossing sites and this prevented a large inflow of Soviet reinforcements and complicated their supply situation. The combat activity lessened and the front took on the aspects of trench warfare.

The Soviets are reported to have lost 15,000 troops in the Vuosalmi area. Finnish losses were also heavy, primarily in the 7th and 49th Infantry Regiments. These two regiments had 2,296 casualties. The fact that 13 men were decorated with the Mannerheim Cross, the highest Finnish military decoration, speaks to the intensity of the combat.

German Military a.s.sistance.

The overriding purpose of the negotiations with Ribbentrop as far as the Finns were concerned had been to secure a.s.sistance to stop the Soviet offensive in order to stabilize their front and thus perhaps receive acceptable peace terms from the Soviets. To some the Finnish att.i.tude may appear callous-they wanted German a.s.sistance in order to break their understanding with Germany. They wanted the help promised by Ribbentrop but had no intention of honoring the condition which called for them not to conclude a separate peace without German acquiescence. However, the prime responsibility of the Finnish government and Mannerheim was the continued survival of their country as an independent nation. This took priority over an agreement that had been virtually forced on them under the most unfavorable circ.u.mstances. Clausewitz' dictum that "One country may support another's cause, but will never take it as seriously as it takes its own"22 applies to the GermanFinnish coalition as it does to all coalitions.

For the Germans the primary purpose of the agreement was to keep Finland in the war. While they provided valuable a.s.sistance that was instrumental in achieving what the Finns wanted-the stabilization of the fronts-it was less than what Ribbentrop had promised. This is also understandable under the circ.u.mstances. The Germans wanted to provide the a.s.sistance but they were overwhelmed by military catastrophes in both the east and west. They also eventually made the decision that stabilizing their own fronts took priority over aid to Finland.

The ma.s.sive Soviet offensive against Army Group Center that began on June 22, Allied breakouts in Normandy, and the offensive in Italy, imposed an overwhelming drain on German resources. Nevertheless, the help provided was effective. The Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck provided by Germany greatly increased the Finnish Army's ability to thwart Soviet armor attacks. They were instrumental in restoring the fighting morale of the Finnish infantrymen who had previously felt helpless against Soviet tank attacks.

Claims that German aid was provided only as a result of the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement are not true.23 As we have seen, the deliveries of infantry light ant.i.tank weapons by both air and sea were provided before June 22 without preconditions. Over and above the deliveries ordered on June 13 and 15, additional supplies were ordered delivered on June 20. Among these were 500 Panzerschreck and 150,000 hand grenades. Five thousand Panzerschreck were sent by air on 22 June. Seventy aircraft from Group Kuhlmey had flown 940 sorties on June 21.

The 303rd Self-propelled a.s.sault Gun Brigade reached Finland by s.h.i.+p on June 23 and was committed on the front to the east of Viipuri on June 27. One-third of the combat elements of the 122nd Infantry Division were ready for s.h.i.+pment at Tallinn on June 23. This division arrived in Finland on June 28, and the OKW approved Finnish plans to commit it to the right flank of the Finnish front north of Viipuri. It moved from Helsinki to the Karelian Isthmus by railroad and relieved the Finnish Cavalry Brigade just in time to thwart the 59th Soviet Army's attempt at an amphibious landing on the north sh.o.r.e of the Bay of Viipuri.

Despite Germany's own precarious position, Hitler ordered that wars.h.i.+ps be employed to speed up the deliveries of weapons and ammunition. Seven hundred thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, as well as ant.i.tank and a.s.sault guns were either sent or ready in German ports for s.h.i.+pment.24 However, no further combat units could be spared. It was intended to send an additional a.s.sault gun brigade but it had to be diverted to Army Group Center at the last minute. However, German supplies and weapons, including some tanks, continued to be sent to Finland.25 Help from the 20th Mountain Army was out of the question. That army was required to guard a long front and the forces were just sufficient for that task. The greatest service it could provide to the Finns was to remain in position and keep the Soviets from penetrating the waistline of Finland and thus threaten the Karelian Isthmus front from the north. However, the Luftwaffe s.h.i.+fted one fighter and one ground support squadron from the 20th Mountain Army to support the Finns in the south.

On June 27, the same day as Ribbentrop flew back to Germany, two German officers arrived in Finland. One was the new commander in chief of the 20th Mountain Army, General Lothar Rendulic.26 He came from Croatia where he had commanded the 2nd Panzer Corps. The second officer was Major General Hero Brusing, commander of the 122nd Infantry Division.

Rendulic's appointment had been kept secret for several days in order to conceal that General Dietl had been killed in a plane crash in the Austrian Alps on June 23 as he was returning from a visit with Hitler. The 20th Mountain Army and Finnish Headquarters learned about Dietl's death and Rendulic's appointment at the same time, on June 27, 1944. It was thought that Dietl's death might adversely affect Ribbentrop's negotiations in Helsinki since the general was very popular in Finland. Mannerheim sent condolences to both Dietl's widow and to Hitler. Dietl was awarded the highest Finnish war decoration, the Grand Cross of the Finnish Cross of Freedom. General Rendulic made a short courtesy visit to Mannerheim and then flew to Rovaniemi and a.s.sumed command of the 20th Mountain Army.

The Finnish requests for aid kept coming. On June 30, 1944, Mannerheim asked for another German division as well as one additional a.s.sault gun brigade. This was followed on July 3 with an urgent request for the early delivery of rifles and submachine guns. A large amount of small-arms ammunition had been lost in the withdrawals from the original front on the Karelian Isthmus and from the VT Line. The Germans had difficulties filling the ammunition requests for the Finnish rifles and it was suggested to OKW that Germany undertake to arm the Finnish infantry and artillery with German weapons for the sake of uniformity.

Mannerheim's request for another German division came at a time when the central German front in Russia had collapsed. OKW answered on July 5 that it was not possible to accommodate Mannerheim's request in view of the situation on the eastern front. However, the OKW agreed to give help in other areas of Finnish shortage by providing heavy weapons and by bringing the 122nd Division's a.s.sault-gun battalion up to brigade strength. Mannerheim protested and reminded OKW that he had recommended acceptance of the German proposal during the Ribbentrop visit based on German promises of help. If that help was withheld, the military situation would deteriorate and his prestige in Finland damaged. Hitler thereupon promised two more a.s.sault-gun brigades, tanks, artillery, and a.s.sault guns. The two self-propelled a.s.sault-gun brigades ended up being sent to the eastern front, one on July 17 and the second on July 18.27 In the period June 18-20, 1944 the Finns received information that confirmed that the Soviets were withdrawing forces from the Karelian Isthmus and transferring them to the Narva front. Some of the forces were replaced with new infantry divisions and fortress units. However comforting this news was to the Finns, they had to keep in mind that the Soviets continued to be superior in numbers and smaller-scale offensives could be expected. The Finns estimated that the Soviet forces confronting them now consisted of the following: 29 light infantry divisions, two light infantry brigades, ten armored brigades, and a number of fortress units. These forces were certainly capable of carrying out further offensive operations.

While the Finns had managed to stabilize their fronts by the second half of July, the situation for the Germans on the eastern front had grown desperate. Army Group Center had been decimated and driven back into Poland. Army Group North was about to be isolated in the Baltic States unless it withdrew behind the Dvina River. Hitler placed General Schorner in command of Army Group North with orders to hold the line between Narva and Pskov. The loss of this line was also critical to the Finns since with the Baltic coast under Soviet control their supply route from Germany for both military a.s.sistance and food would be jeopardized. The Germans recalled Air Group Kuhlmey and returned it to the 1st Air Fleet supporting Army Group North on July 21. The fall of Pskov on July 23 and Narva on July 27 was bad news for the Finns. The Finns had been promised that an additional a.s.sault-gun battalion (1122nd) would be added to the 122nd Infantry Division. The Finns were informed on July 22 that this battalion would not be coming. Finnish alarm was increased on July 29 when Hitler ordered the 122nd Division back to Army Group North. The OKW explained that the quiet situation in Finland was the deciding factor in the division's withdrawal and that the Germans would come to Finland's aid in the future if they were needed. The sector held by the 122nd Division was taken over by the Finnish 10th Division. Mannerheim requested that the German division leave from Hanko rather than Helsinki to avoid alarming the Finnish public.

Aside from German a.s.sistance, the gravest problem facing the Finnish Army at the end of June 1944 was the lack of manpower. And this concern was growing daily. It was difficult to replace the large losses suffered since June 9. By the end of June, Finnish losses in the Soviet offensive had reached 18,000. Only 12,000 of these were replaced. The losses continued to rise at an alarming rate, reaching 32,000 by July 11 and 44,000 by July 18.28 The Finnish solution to compensate for the loss in manpower was to redraft older members of the reserves. However, these numbers were small. The losses were mostly in the infantry but there were only about 9,000 infantrymen in the 1907 and 1908 year groups and the number was the same for the 1905 and 1906 year groups. The untrained reserve numbered about 10,00012,000 men. The last resort was to call to active duty the infantrymen from the 19021904 year groups but even these numbered not more than 15,000 and they were definitely old for the rigors of infantry service. The 1926 year group was at training camps but these 17-year-olds were not sent to the front. A total of 31,700 reservists were called up and brought to the front as replacements for the 44,000 who had been lost.29 Political Developments-Mannerheim Becomes President.

Excerpts of President Ryti's letter to Hitler on June 26 were leaked to the Western press shortly after. The Stockholm correspondent of the British newspaper The Observer provided the story. It has not been established who leaked the story and many parties are candidates as culprits. Since the story goes into some background and mentions that the letter was extracted from a weak Finnish government under pressure from Germany, it is not likely that Germany was behind the leak. It mentioned that Ribbentrop's visit coincided with the readiness of a Finnish delegation going to Moscow to terminate the war. It is therefore most likely a Finnish leak, probably by circles opposed to making the commitment to Germany.

Peace sentiments in Finland were increasing day by day and the internal political crisis brought on by the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement were reflected in the press. The sentiments of many, including the Finnish labor unions, were that the war was lost. The political opposition increased in strength and urged that peace be concluded even under harsh conditions and that the interests of Germany were irrelevant.

Tanner, the leader of the Social Democrats, was searching for a solution and he returned to his earlier proposal of a change in government and president. This proposal contained the implied threat that the Social Democrats would leave the government coalition if it were not accepted. It also appears that Mannerheim had concluded that Finland had to detach itself from Germany. The Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement had served Mannerheim's purposes by obtaining the aid needed from Germany to stabilize the fronts.30 By the end of July the fronts were quiet and Germany was withdrawing the reinforcements it had sent to Finland. Tanner and Ryti held a secret meeting with Mannerheim at his country estate at Sairila on July 28. Ryti announced his intention to resign and both he and Tanner urged Mannerheim to accept the presidency.

Ryti's resignation was submitted to the parliament on July 31. The parliament had to quickly draft a new law that would allow Mannerheim to become president without an election. The law was pa.s.sed by unanimous vote on August 4. The stage was now set for a reversal of Finnish policy. This had to start with a repudiation of the agreement it had made with Germany six weeks earlier, followed by a pet.i.tion to the Soviet Union for peace.

The new prime minister was a conservative from the National Coalition Party, Antti Hackzell. He had been a former amba.s.sador to Moscow and foreign minister in the 1930s. The foreign minister post went to Carl Enckell who had been part of Paasikivi's delegation to Moscow in March. The rest of the cabinet was made up, as had the previous administration, of members from the two prominent parties-National Coalition Party and the Social Democrats.31 The Germans appear to have been caught offguard by Ryti's resignation. They were not sure what the changes in the Finnish political landscape meant. Mannerheim had the prestige to rally the nation to continued resistance and his staunch opposition to communism over many years gave the Germans some hope. However, most concluded that the change was not advantageous to Germany.32 Nevertheless, they had no power to influence the direction of the new government.

The Finns had directed a general inquiry to the Germans about the situation in the Baltic area and this inquiry was used as a reason for the OKW to send General Schorner, the commander of Army Group North, to make a personal report to Mannerheim, on August 3. The trip appears to have been arranged between General Talvela and the German Attache Branch.

Mannerheim was surprised at the rather sudden appearance of Schorner, whose instructions seemed to be limited to briefing Mannerheim on the situation of his army group. It took an eternal optimist like Schorner to paint the situation in Army Group North as encouraging. After the fall of Narva and Pskov, most of the Narva-Peipus line had remained in German hands but at the end of July the Soviets had broken through to the Baltic Sea, thus isolating Army Group North. As a result, telephone communications were broken between Germany and Finland, and Lufthansa suspended its flights into Finland. This may have been what caused the Finns to enquire about the situation in the Baltic states.

General Schorner was undaunted by the catastrophic situation of his army group. He promised Mannerheim that the Baltic area would be held, that his troops would be supplied by air and sea, and that armored forces from East Prussia would break the encirclement. Mannerheim probably did not believe these promises. However, Schorner through his determination-fully supported by Hitler-kept his promise. Holding the Baltic states was of direct benefit to Finland. It did not convince Mannerheim to remain in the war but it gave him the time needed to negotiate an end before Finland was completely isolated.33 The military situation in Finland had returned to positional warfare and the Soviets continued to withdraw forces from the fronts. The Soviet forces on the Karelian Isthmus were reduced to 10 infantry divisions and five tank brigades by mid-August. The military situation looked more promising than even the most optimistic observer could have predicted only four to six weeks earlier.

Marshal Keitel, chief of the OKW, was sent to Helsinki by Hitler on August 17. He brought an oak leaf cl.u.s.ter for Mannerheim and a Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for General Heinrichs.34 The German military situation at the time of Keitel's visit could not give the Finns any confidence. The Allies had broken out of Normandy, and had also landed in southern France, the liberation of Paris was imminent, and the Germans had been driven back to the Gothic Line in Italy. The Soviets were on the outskirts of Warsaw. Few observers would have guessed that the war would last almost nine more months.

Keitel's mission was to rea.s.sure the Finns that Germany would continue to provide both military and economic aid. Mannerheim, now both head of state and military commander in chief, used the opportunity of Keitel's visit to abrogate the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement. While the military situation had stabilized, Finland could not endure a second bloodletting. The pact between Ryti and Ribbentrop had been made under dire circ.u.mstances and Finland felt that Ryti's resignation invalidated the agreement and that Finland would only fight as long as it served its interest to do so.35 Keitel was surprised by this blunt announcement. While he rejected the premise, he pointed out that he was not authorized to concern himself with political matters. The official notification that Finland had abrogated the Ryti-Ribbentrop Pact was not provided to Germany until August 26, 1944.