Finland's War of Choice Part 12

Armistice.

Vehvilainen writes that Mannerheim "prevaricated for three weeks before taking the crucial step" of opening negotiations with the Soviets.36 It was no doubt painful for the old soldier to seek peace with the country he had faced in war three times in 26 years but he was well aware that the Finnish Army would not be able to repel another full-scale Soviet attack.

However, there were practical considerations. Finland was totally dependent on Germany for food aid and this would cease once relations were broken. Negotiations with Sweden to fill the needs after a breach with Germany were initiated, and Sweden undertook to provide grain and other foods needed by the Finns for a period of six months.37 Furthermore, the Finns were not sure what the reactions of Germany would be to a Finnish withdrawal from the war. Steps to counter any German military moves were undertaken, such as strengthening the defense of the land Islands. Finally, the possibility existed that portions of the army and public would refuse to accept a peace and would continue to support the Germans. Over the summer the Germans had toyed with various ideas to keep Finnish resistance going but none went beyond the discussion stage.38 The deteriorating German military situation may have hastened the eventual decision. The announcement of an armistice between the USSR and Romania on August 24, 1944 also increased the pressure for Finland's withdrawal from the war. Vehvilainen writes that the Finns had received a communication from the Soviet Union via Stockholm that they should act speedily, that the terms would be reasonable, and that it was not the goal of the Soviet Union to terminate Finland's independence.39 The decision to sue for peace was made on August 24 and on the following day a message was sent to Alexandra Kollontai, the Soviet amba.s.sador in Stockholm, asking if the Soviet Union would receive a Finnish peace delegation. The Soviets were also told that Finland had repudiated the Ryti-Ribbentrop Pact, although Germany was not informed until the following day.

On August 29, 1944 the Soviet Union sent its conditions for accepting a peace delegation. First, Finland had to make an immediate public declaration that it was breaking diplomatic relations with Germany. Secondly, Finland had to demand publicly that Germany withdraw its troops from Finland by September 15, 1944. Any German troops remaining in the country after September 15 would be disarmed and handed over to the Soviets as prisoners. In order to prevent any Finnish procrastination, the message stated that the terms were also made on behalf of Great Britain, and with the approval of the US.40 While these preliminary terms did not demand unconditional surrender as had been demanded in the terms of June 23, Finland was required to break with Germany without knowing what the final terms would be. The Soviet answer required that Finland reply within four days-not later than September 2, 1944. The Finnish government convened a special session of parliament and recommended acceptance of the Soviet demands. The vote in the parliament on September 2 was 113 to 43 for accepting the Soviet terms. Those who voted against it were from the National Coalition Party, the Agrarian League, and the Patriotic People's Movement. A recommendation to sever diplomatic relations with Germany was also approved and the Finnish foreign minister notified Amba.s.sador Blucher that evening that Germany had to remove its troops from Finland by September 15.

The Germans knew about the negotiations that had been underway but had hoped that, as in the past, the Soviet demands would be unacceptable to the Finns. They were therefore surprised by the Finnish acceptance and the announcement of a cease-fire. In a last-minute effort on September 2, General Rendulic called on Mannerheim and warned that the Soviet demands could bring on a conflict between German and Finnish troops. Such a conflict would result in heavy losses on both sides since the best troops in Europe would be pitted against each other.41 Having accepted the Soviet demands, the Finns sent an armistice delegation headed by Prime Minister Hackzell to Moscow. The delegation also included General Walden, the minister of defense, and General Heinrichs, Mannerheim's chief of staff. It was also authorized to negotiate a peace settlement. Mannerheim proposed to Stalin that a cease-fire take effect at 0700 hours on September 4, 1944. Through a misunderstanding, or possibly to underscore their victory, the Soviets did not cease fire until 24 hours later.42 On September 2, 1944, Mannerheim's adjutant handed General Erfurth a long personal letter from the marshal to Hitler. It read in part: In this hour of hard decisions I am impelled to inform you that I have arrived at the conviction that the salvation of my nation makes it my duty to find a means of ending the war.... The Russians' great a.s.saults in June exhausted our reserves. We cannot expose ourselves to another such bloodletting without the whole future of the small Finnish nation being jeopardized.

I wish especially to emphasize that Germany will live on even if fate should not crown your arms with victory. n.o.body could give such an a.s.surance regarding Finland. If that nation of barely four millions be militarily defeated, there can be little doubt that it will be driven into exile or exterminated. I cannot expose my people to such fate.

Even though I can hardly hope that my opinions and reasons will be accepted by you, I wish to send you these lines before the hour of decision....

I regard it as my duty to lead my people out of the war. The arms which you have generously given us I will never of my own accord turn against Germans. I cherish the hope that, even though you may take exception to my letter, you will share my wish and the wish of all Finns, that the change in our relations may not give rise to animosity.43 The Finnish delegation reached Moscow on September 7 but a week pa.s.sed before it was given the Soviet armistice terms. These included the restoration of the 1940 borders. They also included the entire Pechenga region thus depriving the Finns of a northern outlet to the ocean. The Soviets did not insist on the retention of Hanko or Salla, but in return they demanded a 50-year lease on Porkkala in the Gulf of Finland, which was within artillery range of Helsinki. The demand for reparations was cut in half to $300,000,000 to be paid in the form of goods over the next five years. The Finnish Army was required to withdraw to the 1940 border within five days and be reduced to peacetime strength within 10 weeks. The Soviets demanded the right to use Finnish ports, airfields, and merchant s.h.i.+pping for the duration of the war against Germany and a Soviet commission was established to supervise the armistice.44 After some wrangling in the Finnish cabinet, the armistice was signed before noon on September 19, 1944.

ELEVEN.

FROM FRICTION TO FIGHTING.

German Plans and Preparations after Directive 50.

The prospect of a Finnish defection became obvious to the Germans in February 1944. Military planning was immediately revived which had been called for in Directive 50 of September 28, 1943, but postponed when the situation began to improve later that year. Part of the planning now expedited related to German control of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea. If Finland defected, this would become problematic. The Soviet Baltic Fleet had been bottled up in the Bay of Kronstadt and was for all practical purposes neutralized. The situation began to change with the lifting of the siege of Leningrad and was expected to change further if the Germans were unable to hold the Panther Line.

Increased efforts by the Soviets to clear mines in the Gulf of Finland provided evidence that they expected to put their fleet back into operation. The Soviet fleet had to be kept bottled up-otherwise German naval control of the Baltic would be jeopardized.

Suursaari Island-located in the middle of the inner Gulf of Finland, southwest of Viipuri-served to block the exit of the Soviet Baltic Fleet as long as Finland remained an ally and the same was true for the land Islands, at the southern end of the Gulf of Bothnia, with respect to the German iron ore s.h.i.+pments from Lule in Sweden. The occupation of Suursaari would prevent or hamper the exit of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The occupation of the land Islands would help secure the sealanes to the northern ports in that Gulf. The loss of these islands would threaten the sea supply route for the 20th Mountain Army and the flow of iron and nickel to Germany.

To prevent this from happening Hitler ordered on February 16, 1944, that both the land Islands and Suursaari be occupied immediately in case Finland defected. The planned operation against Suursaari was given the code name Tanne Ost (Fir East) and the occupation of the land Islands was code-named Tanne West. Army Group North was initially given the responsibility for providing troops for the occupation of Suursaari. This was later changed to a naval operation but one SS parachute battalion was also held in readiness.

One infantry division and the 6th Parachute Regiment were earmarked for the land operation. In addition, the Army of Norway would provide coastal artillery. The navy had completed its preparations for Tanne West by the end of March 1944. OKW retained overall control of these operations.

The major part of the contingency planning involved the withdrawal of the 20th Mountain Army-given the code name Birke (Birch). It was a monumental operation. The 20th Mountain Army, of over 200,000 men,1 had to pivot and withdraw its 600-kilometer front from one facing east to one facing both east and south at a distance of 500 kilometers from its right wing. Its lines of withdrawal were limited and poor and could become unusable with the onset of winter. General Hermann Holter, chief of staff of the 20th Mountain Army, describes the ambitious idea and goal of Birke succinctly: "While holding on to the Murmansk front, disengage from the enemy at Loukhi and Kandalaksha, withdraw to the north via Rovaniemi, and build up a new defensive front facing east from south of Kautokeino to south of Ivalo."2 The Germans planned to conduct this complicated operation, under possible strong pressure, in two phases. The first phase of the operation involved the withdrawal of the x.x.xVI and the XVIII Mountain Corps from the Kandalaksha, Luokhi, and Ukhta sectors to Rovaniemi. A strong covering force between Kemijarvi and Autinkyla (east of Rovaniemi) would screen this operation until the main German forces had pa.s.sed through Rovaniemi on their way north towards Ivalo. The second phase involved the movements of the two corps from Rovaniemi to their new defense positions. The x.x.xVI Mountain Corps would move along the Arctic Ocean Highway into positions south of Ivalo and tie into the right flank of the XIX Mountain Corps. The XVIII Mountain Corps route was via the road from Rovaniemi to Skibotten in Norway. It would take up defensive positions in the vicinity of Karesuando near the Swedish border.

The plan for the second phase of the withdrawal was based on it being executed in summer since the road to be taken by the XVIII Mountain Corps was impa.s.sable in winter. In case of a winter withdrawal, both mountain corps would withdraw via the Arctic Ocean Highway. After reaching the area south of Ivalo, the XVIII Mountain Corps would continue its withdrawal into Norway. The x.x.xVI would occupy the same positions as it would in the summer but would also provide forces to man the line near Karesuando.

The Army of Norway was tasked to reconnoiter and prepare fallback positions for the German withdrawal between the Swedish border and Lyngenfjord. These positions were to be located so that Bardufoss Airfield and the town of Troms were within the German lines. The Army of Norway also a.s.sisted the 20th Mountain Army in the preparation of supply bases in northern Finland and construction on the road from Muonio to Skibotten.

The preparation of supply bases in northern Norway to support Birke was well on its way as was the establishment of a supply base in Ivalo. The 20th Mountain Army had begun moving some of the stores from central Finland to the new depots at Ivalo. Work to improve the road from Rovaniemi to Skibotten was underway. Most of the construction of roads and supply depots was carried out by the Todt Organization, augmented by construction troops from the Army of Norway. However, much of the work did not get underway until May 1944 because of the snow and frost.

Over 3,300 laborers were employed on the Ivalo positions starting on July 1, 1944, and another 1,800 men were employed in the Karesuando position beginning on August 1. Work was also undertaken to improve the main roads, and bridges were strengthened to the point where they could support heavy military traffic. The movement of large stocks of supplies to the areas at Ivalo and Pechenga was also begun. It was a monumental task to move about 180,000 tons of military supplies, fuel, and foodstuffs from central Finland to the new depots in a timely manner.

The 20th Mountain Army questioned the wisdom of proceeding with construction of the defensive positions near Ivalo and Pechenga, behind the Murmansk front. The army's point was that such construction would reveal German intentions to carry out long-term defensive operations on Finnish territory. The 20th Mountain Army proposed that their activities be limited to a reconnaissance of the new positions. The OKW did not go along with the recommendation of the 20th Mountain Army but ordered General Erfurth to make the Finns aware that the Germans intended to construct fortifications in Lapland but that these positions would not be occupied voluntarily. Erfurth informed the Finns on June 14, 1944, but they had their hands full with the Soviet offensive and apparently did not attach much importance to the information.3 The 20th Mountain Army had raised strong objections to Directive 50 on various grounds when it was issued in September 1943. These objections were still valid. The main problem, as seen by the 20th Mountain Army, was that the sea route along the Norwegian coast and in the Baltic would certainly be cut by the enemy, leaving the army without the possibility of replenis.h.i.+ng supplies. Should that happen, the 20th Mountain Army would be able to hold out for only a few months. The withdrawal would be channeled via two routes-possibly just one in winter-that would be subjected to continual air attacks in summer. The att.i.tude of Sweden was uncertain and the possibility that transit for Soviet troops would be granted threatened Narvik and the withdrawal route of the 20th Mountain Army and the other German units in Norway's two northernmost provinces. As the nickel and iron ore mines would lose their importance once their ores could no longer be sent to Germany, the 20th Mountain Army viewed the occupation of new defensive positions under highly unfavorable conditions as a waste of precious resources.

The 20th Mountain Army had voiced these arguments after Directive 50 was issued without receiving any satisfactory answers. General Dietl, who understood the gravity of these problems better than anyone else, visited Hitler at the Fuhrer Headquarters on June 22, 1944 and again voiced his objection, unsuccessfully. As fate would have it, Dietl never returned from this visit. He was killed on June 23 when the aircraft bringing him back to Finland crashed in the Austrian Alps. General Lothar Rendulic a.s.sumed command of the 20th Mountain Army on June 28, 1944.

Antic.i.p.ated Overland Withdrawal Problems.

The planning for Birke had been very tentative because the military situation at the time of its execution could not be predicted in advance. Much depended on the att.i.tude of the Finns and the time of year at which a withdrawal would take place. It must have come as a great relief to the German planners in Rovaniemi when it appeared that the Finns would do their best to cooperate with the Germans in their withdrawal, at least until the time imposed in the armistice agreement for expulsion or internment of the German troops-September 15, 1944.

The Germans could not, however, base their plans on a rosy scenario that would most likely prove false. It was fully realized that the 20th Mountain Army would find itself in an untenable and perilous position when Finland withdrew from the war. Along the front it was in contact with three Soviet armies of the Karelian Front under General K. A. Meretskov: the 14th Army in the Murmansk area under Lieutenant General V. I. Shcherbakov, the 19th Army in the Kandalaksha sector under Lieutenant General G. K. Kozlov, and the 26th Army in the Kestenga sector under the command of Major General L. S. Skvirsky.4 Most serious of all was the fact that both the 20th Mountain Army's right flank and rear were wide open. While the Germans were only aware of the broad outlines of the armistice agreement announced by the Soviets on September 19, they had to a.s.sume that the 26th Soviet Army would penetrate into Finland south of the German right flank without opposition from the Finns. The Germans may not have been aware that the armistice provisions called for the Soviets to cross the Finnish 1940 border only if they were asked to do so by the Finns. Even had they known, it would not have been wise to put too much credence in such a provision.

It appears that the Soviets interpreted the armistice agreement in such a way that they should stop at the border if confronted by Finnish units but felt free to cross into Finland in areas where they confronted German troops. For example, General Kozlov's 19th Army facing the Germans in the Kandalaksha sector was given the mission of advancing as far as Rovaniemi. The Soviets realized that a gap had developed between the withdrawing Germans and the advancing Finns and that if they pursued the Germans towards Rovaniemi, the 19th Army could find itself caught between the Finns coming from the south and the withdrawing Germans. The Soviet decision was to let the 19th Army move to the border and upon reaching it on September 17/18 the army halted, allowing the Finnish forces to move north in front of it.5 The Germans also had to a.s.sume that the bulk of the Finnish Army could be turned against its open flank in order to satisfy Soviet demands for internment or expulsion of the German forces. They had to keep in mind what had happened in Romania when that country capitulated on August 23, 1944. Two Romanian armies allied themselves with the Soviets, trapping and destroying most of the German 6th Army and 8th Army. Hitler probably had the disaster in Romania in mind when he issued orders on September 3, 1944, directing that relations with the Finns should be handled in a friendly and compromising manner.6 He also ordered that the detention of Finnish s.h.i.+ps, held in German harbors in retaliation for a decision by the Finns not to allow German s.h.i.+ps to leave from southern Finnish harbors, be discontinued.

The question of what would happen after the two corps of the 20th Mountain Army in central Finland disengaged was one on which there was total disagreement between the Finns and Germans. The Finns told the Germans that the Soviets would not advance across the 1940 border and that once the Germans had disengaged from the front the withdrawal would become a purely technical matter involving the movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. General Rendulic, the commander in chief of the 20th Mountain Army, believed that the Finns were living in a fantasy world or were intentionally dishonest in what they told their former brothers-in-arms. The Finns had to take military action against any Germans left in Finland as of September 15 and the Finns had calculated that it would take the Germans at least three months to remove their troops and equipment.7 General Rendulic considered it extremely unlikely that the Soviets would respect the border and instead he believed that their intention was to occupy all of Lapland. This was the only logical conclusion the Germans could draw. The German withdrawal had, therefore, to be conducted as a tactical operation in unfriendly territory.8 It was not only the southern flank of the forces in contact that was in jeopardy, the whole rear area of the 20th Mountain Army was wide open, to include the ports on the Gulf of Bothnia. This area was over 300 kilometers wide from east to west and over 600 kilometers long from south to north. The road network in this area was poor and the only railway line ran from Salla to Rovaniemi.

At the same time, the tasks that Hitler had spelled out in Directive 50 were still in force. This included maintaining control over the Pechenga area and the nickel mines. Finally, winter was drawing perilously close in the arctic. Despite the planning that had taken place since the fall of 1943, the Germans were indecisive, primarily because all courses of action appeared to be nothing more than invitations to disaster.

The 20th Mountain Army had no a.s.surance that it would succeed in establis.h.i.+ng a new defensive line about 400 kilometers north of Rovaniemi that would hold as required by Directive 50. The new defensive line was planned to run from just south of Ivalo westward to Karesuando, located at the southern end of a sliver of Finnish territory extending into Norway south of Lyngenfjord.

The first leg of the German withdrawal from Finland would be perhaps the most difficult and perilous. With few exceptions, the troops were not motorized. While the XIX Corps continued its defensive mission on the Murmansk sector, the x.x.xVI Corps would disengage and withdraw to the Ivalo position via Rovaniemi while the XVIII Corps planned to withdraw directly to the Norwegian border.

There were only three routes available for the withdrawal and the onset of winter could prevent the use of large stretches of these routes. The first route, the one to be used by the XIX Corps when it eventually withdrew, ran from the front to Kirkenes where it linked up with the main northsouth road in Norway, Route 50. The x.x.xVI Corps was expected to use the road from Alakurtti to Rovaniemi and Ivalo and when that position was vacated the route of withdrawal continued through Ivalo via Inari across the Norwegian border at Karasjok to where the road intersected with Route 50 at Lakselv. The roads the XIX Corps and x.x.xVI Corps were expected to use had been constructed or improved during the war by the Todt Organization. The XVIII Corps was expected to withdraw to Rovaniemi and then continue by way of Muonio to Skibotten in Norway.

The task given to the 20th Mountain Army was enormous and it would take a virtual miracle for it to succeed. Cut off from its supply line to Germany, it had to disengage its forces along a 600-kilometer front while facing a vastly numerically superior enemy. In addition, Mannerheim was sending forces north to honor the obligation of the armistice agreement to capture or expel all German forces still in the country on September 15, 1944.

Operation Tanne.

The German Navy had responsibility for Operation Tanne West and its preparations were completed by the end of March 1944. The Germans expected the land Islands to be defended by between 3,000 and 4,000 Finns, supported by coastal batteries. The Germans earmarked the 416th Infantry Division in Denmark and the 6th Parachute Light Infantry Regiment for this operation. Coastal artillery batteries for the defense of the islands were to be brought in from Norway.

The OKW also had made an effort to gain a foothold in the land Islands through peaceful means. The German Navy was ordered on April 24, 1944, to discuss the stationing of German naval forces on the islands with the Finns. The reason to be given for this request was to protect against the possibility of a sortie by the Soviet Baltic Fleet from Kronstadt and its future operations from Estonian ports. Apparently, the Naval Staff elected to handle the request through the German liaison staff at Mannerheim's headquarters. The request was provided to the Finns on May 10. It placed the Finns in an awkward position since the stationing of foreign military forces on the islands would be a violation of the 1921 treaty. It appears they elected to ignore the request, hoping that the issue would go away.

The planned operation against the land Islands was controversial in Germany and in the end presented more problems than advantages. Sweden was a co-guarantor of the status of the land Islands by the 1921 treaty. German occupation of these islands would undoubtedly elicit a strong reaction from the Swedes and put in jeopardy the flow of iron ore and ball bearings from that country.

In addition to these political objections, there were also problems in providing the necessary forces. The 416th Infantry Division was needed in Denmark as Allied amphibious operations against this area were considered possible. The 50th Infantry Division was slated to replace the 416th, but had to be moved to the eastern front. About 14,000 men on leave in Germany from the 20th Mountain Army had been held back in Danzig despite General Dietl's objections. These troops were considered for use in Operation Tanne and were therefore placed at the disposal of the OKW. However, it was quickly decided that this mixed force lacked unit organization and they were transferred as individual replacements to the eastern front. It was also difficult to come up with sea transportation. Finally, the German Naval Staff had serious objections since the navy needed all its forces to block the Gulf of Finland. Because of the serious ramifications the occupation of the land Islands would have on GermanSwedish relations, Hitler reserved the final decision for himself. Apparently, the lack of forces, and danger to the flow of raw materials and finished products from Sweden caused Hitler to cancel Tanne West on September 3, 1944.

The Tanne Ost (Suursaari Island) operation was to be carried out by Army Group North under the direction of OKH. The objective of the planned operation was to block the Gulf of Finland. The OKW had considered whether Hanko or another point on the southern coast of Finland should be occupied instead of Suursaari but had concluded that the island was the most suitable location. A change in the planning occurred on July 4, 1944, when Hitler ordered that the navy should carry out the operation instead of Army Group North. The stabilization of the Finnish front led to a postponement of the operation on July 9.

The armistice between the Soviet Union and Finland revived the operation. Although the navy reported on September 3 that the operation could not be carried out due to a lack of trained troops, the OKW issued a warning order for the operation in the evening of September 4.9 The operation remained in limbo for another week. The carrying out of the operation was given impetus by a report from the German naval liaison officer on Suursaari on September 11: the Finnish commander on the island had told him that he would never fire on German troops, even if ordered to do so.10 At the urging of the navy, which now apparently did not believe the quality of their troops important since no opposition was expected, Hitler ordered preparations for the occupation of Suursaari speeded up. On September 13 the time for the attack was set for 0200 hours on September 15.

The German Navy embarked a mixed force of naval and army personnel in Reval. Ziemke reports the size of the force as approximately that of a regiment. It was likely somewhat larger since the first wave comprised 1,400 men. A Finnish source gives the size of the landing force as 2,500.11 The landing commenced at the specified time.

The defense of Suursaari was the responsibility of the 16th Coast Artillery Regiment, part of the East Gulf of Finland Coastal Brigade. It had approximately 1,600 troops on the island.12 The Germans landed their first wave directly in the harbor and demanded a Finnish surrender. The Finnish commander refused the German demand in accordance with his instructions, and hostilities commenced. The Germans were only able to occupy a part of the northern half of the island. The Soviets intervened with heavy air strikes after daylight and the second wave, consisting mostly of naval personnel, was prevented from landing. The fighting continued the whole day but the Germans eventually gave up and withdrew as many personnel as they could from the island.13 The Suursaari operation was a total fiasco for the Germans. They suffered 153 killed and the Finns took 1,231 prisoners, 175 of which were wounded. The Finnish 16th Coastal Artillery Regiment had 36 killed, 67 wounded, and eight missing.14 The German prisoners were turned over to the Soviets in accordance with the terms of the armistice agreement.

The repercussions from the operation were equally detrimental to German interests. The Finns immediately ordered all Finnish s.h.i.+ps in the Baltic to Finnish or Swedish ports. This order also applied to the Finnish s.h.i.+ps that the Germans had leased to carry equipment and supplies back to Germany. Mannerheim also demanded on September 15, 1944, that General Rendulic immediately vacate the area south of a line running from Oulu to Suomussalmi and the entire Bothnian coastline to the Swedish border. Since much of this area had already been evacuated, the 20th Mountain Army replied that it would abide by the Finnish request.15 However, the Germans were slow in complying and this soon led to serious consequences.

Finnish relations with the Soviet Union benefited from the fighting on Suursaari. The action demonstrated to the Soviets, at a time when sensitive negotiations were taking place in Moscow that the Finns were prepared to use force against their former brothers-in-arms.

Evacuations from Baltic Ports.

The Germans began withdrawing staff, nonessential personnel, troops destined for the eastern front, and supplies from Finland shortly after the FinnishSoviet armistice became effective. These evacuations were carried out by sea from ports in the Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Bothnia. The 303rd Self-Propelled a.s.sault Gun Brigade, which had been at the Finnish front, was loaded on s.h.i.+ps and sailed from Finland on September 6, despite a request from the 20th Mountain Army on 24 August to have that unit come under its command. All Germans in southern Finland, including diplomatic and military staff, had left Finland by September 13.

The 20th Mountain Army evacuated 4,049 nonessential troops, 3,336 wounded soldiers, 332 political refugees, and 42,144 tons of supplies from the ports of Oulu, Kemi, and Tornio on the Gulf of Bothnia. A number of the s.h.i.+ps used in the evacuation were leased from the Finns. Some of these s.h.i.+ps failed to sail to Germany but put in at southern Finnish ports or in Sweden. A total of 13,064 of the 42,144 tons of supplies evacuated were thus lost. There was not enough s.h.i.+pping for most of the supplies and 106,000 tons were destroyed to keep them from falling into enemy hands. The Germans evacuated the port of Oulu on September 15 and the last s.h.i.+p left the port of Kemi on September 21. The German Navy evacuated their base at Uno on September 15. The 20th Mountain Army s.h.i.+fted its evacuation from the ports to the road leading to Skibotten in Norway on September 18.16 Disengagement of XVIII Corps.

The Germans planned to start the disengagement with the XVIII Corps, commanded by General Friedrich Hochbaum, in the Kestenga-Ukhta sector. This corps had to cover the longest distance. The movement of this corps would also address two chief concerns of the 20th Mountain Army, the army's open rear area stretching all the way to the Gulf of Bothnia and the unprotected right flank of the XVIII Corps.

The Germans learned that the Finns were moving two divisions north for the stated purpose of preventing a vacuum to develop between the Finnish Army in the south and the 20th Mountain Army. It was feared by both Finns and Germans that the Soviets might exploit such a vacuum. In case the Finnish motives for the move were not as stated, General Rendulic hastily a.s.sembled a force to screen the withdrawal against interference from the south and a possible Finnish attempt to move behind the 20th Mountain Army. It consisted of the army reserve-a motorized regiment commanded by Major General Hans St.e.e.t.s-reinforced by units withdrawn from the Loukhi and Kandalaksha sectors. These forces, divided into Battle Group East and Battle Group West, moved southward to set up screening positions along a line extending eastward along a chain of lakes from Oulujarvi. These two battle groups were concentrated in the Oulu and Hyrynsalmi areas, behind the flanks of the agreed demarcation line. Their mission was to guard against any threatening advance by the Finnish Army against Rovaniemi. The screening forces were to retire northward gradually while protecting the lines of communication of XVIII Corps. They were to destroy lines of communication behind them sufficiently to hamper a pursuit by motorized forces.17 The German concerns for the right flank of the XVIII Corps were somewhat alleviated when the front in the Kestenga sector was pulled back to new defensive positions at Sofyanga, and by the promise of the Finnish 14th Division, on the Finns' left flank, to maintain contact with the Germans until they had withdrawn west of the Finnish border.18 The first part of the withdrawal was to pull the XVIII Mountain Corps back from its forward positions east of Kestenga to rearward positions at Sofyanga, which had been under construction for several months. The corps consisted of the 6th SS Mountain Division and Divisional Group Krautler east of Kestenga. This group consisted of the 139th Mountain Regiment, formerly part of the 3rd Mountain Division, two ski battalions, and a regiment of artillery. The 7th Mountain Division in the Ukhta sector was also part of the XVIII Corps.

It had been planned to occupy the Sofyanga position even if Finland remained in the war. This position, anch.o.r.ed on two lakes, was shorter and allowed the formation of a corps reserve.

The OKW had approved the move to the Sofyanga position, pending its completion, on June 9, 1944. However, Hitler reserved to himself the decision as to the timing of the move. The approval for the move was given on August 24, and was expected to take place within a few days. The move got underway on September 6. The 6th SS Mountain Division and Division Group Krautler were securely established in the Sofyanga position on September 10 and the 7th Mountain Division had begun its withdrawal from the Ukhta sector.

The withdrawal of the XVIII Corps from the Sofyanga position began in the middle of September 1944. The first serious clash between Soviet and German forces in this area took place on September 16 and 17. The Germans repelled the Soviet attacks and thereafter the evacuation of the XVIII Corps proceeded smoothly since, to the surprise of the Germans, the four Soviet divisions stopped their pursuit at the Finnish border. The Finns moved in to fill the vacuum left by the XVIII Corps. The Germans maintained contact with the Finnish units on the right flank until September 18.

The XVIII Corps, after disengaging, had the mission of screening the withdrawal of x.x.xVI Corps from the Kandalaksha sector and covering its withdrawal to Ivalo via Rovaniemi. Having carried out this mission the XVIII Corps would commence its slow withdrawal through Rovaniemi and on to Norway via Muonio. To carry out its mission after disengaging, the XVIII Corps spread out across central Finland with the 7th Mountain Division in the east while Divisional Group Krautler moved west to screen the coastal sector between Tornio and Oulu. From these locations the Germans would give ground gradually and form a bridgehead southeast of Kemi in the first week of October. Battle Group East, located near Oulu, was to fall back to Pudasjarvi to converge with the 7th Mountain Division. This position was to be held until the first week of October when a slow withdrawal to Rovaniemi was to commence. The 6th SS Mountain Division executed a more direct withdrawal via Kuusamo to Rovaniemi, which its advance elements reached on September 22.

By the middle of September Mannerheim had deployed or was in the process of deploying the bulk of the Finnish Army against the Germans in the area to the south of XVIII Corps. The Finnish 6th Division had been moved into the Kajaani area. The Border Jager Brigade was also moved into the area south of Hyrynsalmi. The main concentration took place in the west along the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. The 15th Brigade, 3rd Division, the Armored Division, and the 11th Division were moved into this area. Lieutenant General Hjalmar Siilasvuo, designated as commanding general of the Finnish forces in Lapland, established his headquarters in Oulu. Siilasvuo arrived in Oulu on September 26 and immediately severed all contacts with the 20th Mountain Army Headquarters in Rovaniemi. The designation of Siilasvuo as commander was probably not accidental. In addition to being an excellent commander he had not exactly demonstrated a friendly att.i.tude towards the Germans ever since his III Corps had been attached to Mountain Army Norway in 1941.

The Finnish 6th Division began its advance from the Hyrynsalmi-Kajaani area on September 19. This unit encountered Soviet troops which had crossed the Finnish border near Suomussalmi, but there were no incidents. The 6th Division reached Puolanka north of Oulujarvi on September 24. Lieutenant General Siilasvuo placed the Finnish troops west of Oulujarvi under the commander of the Armored Division, Major General Lagus, on September 19. The 15th Brigade was ordered to advance towards Kemi on September 21 and the Armored Division was given the town of Pudasjarvi as its objective. The advance began on September 24.

Disengagement of x.x.xVI Corps.

While the disengagement of XVIII Corps had proceeded rather smoothly, the disengagement of the x.x.xVI Corps from the Kandalaksha sector resulted in bitter fighting. The x.x.xVI Corps, under the command of General Emil Vogel, consisted of the 163rd and 169th Infantry Divisions. In Chapter 8, it was noted that the Soviets had undertaken to extend their right flank northward in the Kandalaksha sector in an attempt to envelop the German left flank. General Dietl, who recognized the danger, proposed an attack to disrupt the Soviet plans. He traveled to see Marshal Mannerheim in March 1944 and asked for Finnish troops to support the attack. Mannerheim declined to partic.i.p.ate in the operation and it therefore never came about.

The northward and westward extension of the Soviet right flank had continued and it was evident that they intended to trap and destroy the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps. While General Vogel was aware of the danger to his corps, his timetable for withdrawal was also dictated by activity in other areas of the theater. Foremost was the requirement to time his withdrawal in such a manner that the XVIII Mountain Corps could pa.s.s through Rovaniemi behind his troops.

Although the Germans were aware of Soviet efforts to outflank the Kandalaksha sector, they were taken by surprise when Soviet troops captured Korya, northwest of Salla, on September 7, 1944. The Soviets managed to cut the road from Korya to Salla, an important supply route for the Germans. They had also managed to bring in tanks over terrain that had been considered impa.s.sable even for infantry. The use of the tanks did not prove very productive for the Soviets since, although they had succeeded in bringing them forward, the terrain was such that they could not be adequately supported. Nevertheless, within days, the Soviets had brought in a tank brigade and a reindeer brigade and were threatening the town of Salla and the line of retreat of the entire corps. The appearance of Soviet tanks in the rear area of an infantry corps had serious psychological effects and made commanders view the threat as greater than it actually was.

The x.x.xVI Mountain Corps began evacuating the Verman Lake line in the evening of September 9 because the corps' rear was endangered. The order of withdrawal was the 169th Infantry Division, followed by the 163rd Infantry Division. The Soviet attack into the corps' rear area had split the German forces into two groups. The 169th Division took up an all-around perimeter defense in the Salla area but was unable to prevent Soviet forces from moving south from Korya to cut the road from Salla to Alakurtti between Salla and the Kayrala Lake narrows on September 11. This cut the main withdrawal route of the 163rd Infantry Division. The Germans had built an alternate road that ran south from Alakurtti via Vuorijarvi and Mikkola back to the main road west of Kayrala. The Soviets were apparently unaware of this road and traffic was able to proceed over it without interruption, although its capacity was limited. The 163rd Division had to attack towards the west in order to clear the main route and this was accomplished after bitter fighting on September 13, 1944, when the two German divisions again linked up.

The rear elements of the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps pa.s.sed through Alakurtti on September 14 and although the Soviets mounted a second attack against the southern flank in the direction of Vuorijarvi, the Germans escaped what was intended to be a Soviet trap. The statement by Mannerheim that the German corps in the south disengaged "without the Russians making the slightest attempt to hold them"19 is hard to square with what actually happened on the ground.

In view of the weight of the Soviet attacks in the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps sector, the Germans changed their route of withdrawal. There was a danger that the Arctic Ocean Highway would be cut by the Soviets between Rovaniemi and Ivalo. Therefore, instead of withdrawing all its troops from Salla and Kemijarvi to Rovaniemi, the x.x.xVI Corps sent two-thirds of the 169th Division northwest to Savukoski to block a Soviet drive against the highway between Rovaniemi and Ivalo.

Salla had to be held until the XVIII Mountain Corps had withdrawn sufficiently in the direction of Rovaniemi to be out of harm's way. This necessitated the x.x.xVI Corps holding positions in the vicinity of Korya and Kayrala for another ten days. The Germans withdrew from their bridgehead at Kayrala on September 24 and continued quickly westward through Salla to Kemijarvi and Savuloski. The Soviet forces did not pursue into Finnish territory. The x.x.xVI remained in this area until October 3. The withdrawal was then continued after the destruction of the very large railroad bridge across Kemi Lake.

Onset of GermanFinnish Hostilities.

The Finns wanted to spare their country from devastation and the Germans also wished to avoid hostilities with their former "brothers-inarms." They therefore had a mutual interest in seeing that the German withdrawal proceeded as smoothly as possible. However, given that they fully expected the Soviets to intervene or otherwise pressure the Finns to become more active, the Germans would have been derelict in their duty had they left the road network behind them intact.

Ollie Vehvilainen writes that this mutual interest between the Germans and Finns "resulted in a secret agreement between the Finnish and German military authorities in which the Germans agreed to limit the devastation of the country and the Finns to facilitate the Germans' withdrawal even after 15 September."20 Also, Westerlund refers to the Lapland War as the "Sham War" (Skenkrig). These contentions don't paint an altogether accurate picture of the situation.

Relations between the Finns and Germans were as good as could be expected until September 15, the end of the grace period for a German voluntary withdrawal from Finland. Finnish liaison officers continued to perform their functions at various German headquarters and the 20th Mountain Army instructed the Germans to behave in a friendly manner towards the Finns. Ziemke notes, as an example of the loyal cooperation, that the Finns told the 20th Mountain Army on September 13 that they had moved all railroad rolling stock between Salla and Rovaniemi to the west of Rovianiemi but would not prevent the Germans from seizing this stock.21 This is true but not of much consequence for the northward withdrawal since there were no railroad lines north of Rovaniemi. It did a.s.sist some in the movement of supplies from the Salla area and from Rovaniemi to the ports on the Gulf of Bothnia.

A primary purpose of the railroad stock in the Rovianiemi area was to facilitate the evacuation of Finnish civilians from Lapland to the coast and to Sweden. Cooperation between the Finns and Germans in this area resulted in 133,000 refugees being moved from Lapland (particularly the Salla and Pechanga areas) to southern Finland and Sweden. A total of 77,000 were moved across the temporary demarcation line between German and Finnish forces to the southern part of the country while 56,000 were moved through Tornio to Sweden.22 By September 15, the 20th Mountain Army and the Finnish Army had worked out an agreement governing the behavior of both sides.23 The agreement was designed to avoid clashes between the Germans and Finns, while allowing the Finns to report steady progress to the Soviets in their task to expel the Germans. The fact that liaison officers were withdrawn as of September 15 made its smooth execution more difficult. The agreement involved the Germans providing the Finns with phase lines for the withdrawal and tentative boundaries between the two armies were established based on these phase lines. The initial demarcation line ran from Oulu along the Oulu River to the town of Sotkamo. The Germans were to give the Finns a two-day notice before moving from one location to the next. The Finns, in return, agreed to German destruction of roads, railroads, and bridges and promised not to rebuild railroad bridges and to make the rebuilding of road bridges so light that they would not support heavy military traffic. The destruction of the roads and bridges also gave the Finns an excuse to the Soviets for their slow northward advance. This arrangement appeared to have worked relatively well even after the Germans tried to seize Suursaari on September 15.

Erfurth paints a less rosy picture of the cooperation. He notes that "frictions and even serious clashes occurred soon after the departure of the German diplomatic and military representatives from Helsinki and Mikkeli."24 Without a.s.signing guilt, he tells about Finnish coastal batteries firing on German s.h.i.+ps, Finnish liaison officers at some headquarters subordinate to the 20th Mountain Army being disarmed by the Germans, and the baggage of German units being detained and confiscated.

Nevertheless, the agreement worked out between the Finns and Germans generally held for ten days. The Finns followed the German forces from phase line to phase line without undue pressure. German troops were destroying all bridges and roads as they pa.s.sed, sometimes within view of Finnish troops. The troops who watched the destruction and the newspapers reporters who reported on it were not aware that it was something their government had agreed to.

General Erfurth also argues persuasively against the notion that the conflict in Lapland was a "sham war." In describing the incidents during the withdrawal he writes "These engagements were by no means sham fights in order to make the Russians believe that the Finns had fulfilled their obligations, but the fighting was real according to German and Finnish standards."25 His conclusion is fully supported by what Emil Schuler and Roland Kaltenegger write about the 7th Mountain Division.26 The fighting was hard and the casualties high. M. Krautler writes that "The Finnish attack on Kemi and Tornio in conjunction with their advance on Rovaniemi unfortunately cost much German and Finnish blood."27 That conflicts should occur is not difficult to understand. Finnish soldiers were witnessing German destruction of the country's infrastructure and the withdrawal was slow. The shock of the Finnish secession from the war caused the feelings of many German soldiers to change from one of trust and confidence in the Finns to one of distrust and bitterness. Many Finns attributed the destruction to German revenge for Finland's withdrawal from the war. Repeated clashes took place between German and Finnish troops during the second half of September. Most of the clashes were minor and generally involved the possession of bridges. Later, as destruction became more widespread, incidents between Germans and Finns increased.

The Germans resorted to a scorched-earth policy similar to that used in north Norway at the conclusion of the withdrawal. While the writings of most Germans who partic.i.p.ated deny any wanton destruction, there is little doubt that in many places the devastation was more widespread and thorough than what is permitted under the 1907 Hague Convention in such circ.u.mstances.28 According to Finnish sources, of the 113,531 buildings in Lapland 41,306 were destroyed by the withdrawing Germans.29 An incident on the German southern wing occurred on September 28, 1944, that led to a short exchange of fire between German and Finnish forces. After fire was opened, a Finnish battalion commander demanded that the 7th German Mountain Division evacuate the town of Pudasjarvi before nightfall. The 20th Mountain Army at first dismissed the incident as the action of an overzealous Finnish officer. Later, when it became obvious that the Finns refused to negotiate, General Rendulic gave the 7th Mountain Division permission to return fire if that should become necessary. He also sent a message to General Siilasvuo, the Finnish commander in Lapland, asking him to affirm that the Finns would continue to observe the agreement they had made with the Germans or accept the consequences of open hostilities. Incidents in Pudasjarvi continued for the next two days, resulting in the capture of a German platoon on September 30. Incidents were also taking place at Tornio and Kemi between Finnish and German troops. These incidents appear to have resulted from Soviet pressure on the Finns for their lack of determination in enforcing the terms of the armistice. To reinforce their demands, Soviet troops crossed into Finland at Suomussalmi and Kuusamo.

General Rendulic sent a note to the Finnish Military Headquarters on October 1 announcing that he would be forced to take counteraction if the Finns did not live up to previous agreements. The Finnish answer on October 4 refuted the German complaints in an indignant tone and Rendulic reported to OKW that relations with the Finns were continuing to deteriorate.

The Germans sincerely believed that the Soviets would advance deeply into Finland with motorized forces and intercept the non-motorized German units in their withdrawal, bringing about their destruction. It was therefore militarily imperative for the Germans to impede Soviet progress as much as possible. They believed themselves justified according to the rules of war to deprive the enemy of the means of transportation and billeting, so important in arctic warfare. Furthermore, a sense of bitterness towards their former allies who had now turned against them had set in among the German soldiers. They were aware of the events in Romania and Bulgaria and felt betrayed when the same pattern began to unfold in Finland.

OKW a.s.sessment.

When looking at the directions and decisions of the OKW pertaining to Finland in the wake of that country's withdrawal from the war, one is struck with the impression of uncertainty and inconsistency. This is not strange in view of the position in which the German military leaders.h.i.+p found itself. Faced since June 1944 with devastating offensives in both the west and east, Finland had basically become a footnote in this great struggle. Nevertheless, halfway measures and a reactive posture in regard to Finland were not in Germany's interests. The continued insistence on hanging on to the Pechenga nickel mines is difficult to understand once the s.h.i.+pment route of nickel to Germany was severed. A quick withdrawal to Norway before winter with minimum losses was the logical course of action. Any delay posed serious danger to German forces in both Finland and north Norway.

In late September 1944 the OKW made some significant revisions to their earlier plans for the 20th Mountain Army. The OKW was making an overall strategic a.s.sessment of the situation in Scandinavia and the revised outlook by the OKW was caused to a large extent by this a.s.sessment.

The loss of the submarine bases on the French coast was an important element in the a.s.sessment. The loss of these bases had caused an immense increase in the importance of naval bases in Norway. The German Navy planned to resume large-scale submarine warfare with new types of submarines equipped with snorkels and hydrogen peroxide engines.30 The OKW expected the Allies to do all they could to eliminate this threat and they also expected that the British wanted to prevent the Soviets from gaining a foothold in northern Scandinavia. A move by the Western Allies in this direction would place the supply route from Germany to Norway and along the Norwegian coast to north Norway, completely under their domination.

It was finally decided that the nickel from Pechenga had lost its importance. Albert Speer, in charge of war production, stated that there were sufficient quant.i.ties of nickel on hand in Germany to cover their needs. The OKW therefore believed that there was no further need to hold the Birke position in the Murmansk sector.

The OKW concluded that the 20th Mountain Army had to be withdrawn from Finland before the expected action by the Western Allies against Norway. Not to do so could result in its loss since the 20th Mountain Army depended entirely on sea transportation for supplies. The Anglo-Americans would be able to dominate this supply line even without landing troops in Norway. A withdrawal of the 20th Mountain Army would relieve the pressure on coastal s.h.i.+pping. Such a withdrawal would also strengthen the defenses of Norway both against the threat from the Western Allies and against the possibility that Sweden would intervene on the side of the Allies. In short, a withdrawal of the 20th Mountain Army would alleviate most of the problems facing the Germans if they remained in Finland.

The conclusions of the OKW were given impetus by receipt of 20th Mountain Army plans on September 28, 1944. These plans outlined how the army intended to conduct operations in the Rovaniemi position as well in the next two positions: the IvaloKaresuando line and the LyngenfjordSwedish frontier line. Both the OKW and 20th Mountain Army planners concluded that every day of delay would make the withdrawal to the Lyngenfjord position in Norway more perilous.

The lateness of the season made the 20th Mountain Army's successful withdrawal to the Lyngenfjord position in Norway very problematic. This raised the unpleasant possibility that, due to the onset of winter, the operation could not be accomplished until June 1945. Nevertheless, General Rendulic was told to prepare for the possibility that the withdrawal would have to be executed during the winter.

The issues and recommendations in the OKW a.s.sessment were left unresolved until Hitler was briefed on September 30. He approved the withdrawal to the Lyngenfjord position on October 3 and the OKW issued the necessary warning orders on October 4 and 5. The operation was given the code-name Nordlicht, not to be confused with the earlier operation against Leningrad with the same code name.

The Fighting at Tornio.

At dawn on October 1 the Finns landed a regiment from the 3rd Division behind the German lines at Tornio. The troops had been embarked on transports at Oulu on September 30 and covered the approximately 100 kilometers in the Gulf of Bothnia during the night. A smaller Finnish force of about 300 troops had taken preparatory measures at Tornio, paving the way for the landing.

Erfurth writes in 1977 that "The details and motives of this regrettable incident, which largely influenced GermanFinnish relations, have not yet so shaped up as to form a clear picture for historians."31 He goes on to speculate that it may have been the action of local Finnish commanders and not in accordance with the intentions of the highest Finnish military leaders.h.i.+p. He also suggests that it may have taken place as a pre-emptive move by the Finns to keep the bridge over the Tornio River to Sweden from being destroyed. Lundin writes that the landing in the rear of the Germans at Tornio was intended to hasten the German withdrawal "so that they would not have time to destroy anything on their way."32 Vehvilainen writes that "The phony war that the Finns were conducting in the north was glaringly at odds with the terms of the armistice agreement, and it placed the whole country in jeopardy."33 The Soviet Control Commission had arrived in Finland at the end of September and it had begun to apply pressure on the Finns to take effective measures to honor their commitment under the armistice agreement to expel or intern the German troops. The Finns were given what amounted to an ultimatum by the Soviet head of the Control Commission, Lieutenant General Savenenko, on September 30. This ultimatum, according to Vehvilainen, caused Mannerheim to order General Siilasvuo "to do something spectacular enough to satisfy the Russians."34 According to Vehvilainen, General Siilasvuo thereupon ordered an amphibious landing at Kemi, later changed to Tornio.

The sequence of events within the time frame suggested by Vehvilainen does not hold up to scrutiny. An amphibious operation of this type, even a makes.h.i.+ft one, requires planning, a.s.sembly of forces and s.h.i.+pping, and briefings before it can be launched. To suggest that all this and the transport to the objective took place within about 12 hours defies logic. The planning and execution of the operation probably took several days. It may have taken place at the initiative of General Siilasvuo (or Mannerheim and Siilasvuo), but it could not have been in response to an ultimatum issued by General Savenenko on September 30. Mannerheim himself writes that the troops were ready to sail on September 29 (the day before the ultimatum) but a storm forced a postponement.35 The fact that a number of foreign journalists were brought along by the Finns to witness the fighting at Kemi and Tornio ill.u.s.trates that it was a well planned operation intended to influence foreign opinion and disprove Soviet accusations that the Finns were not living up to their agreement.

The Germans did not have many troops at Tornio. Divisional Group Krautler, with one infantry battalion, two battalions of artillery, and some supply troops, was responsible for Tornio, Kemi, and about 100 kilometers of coastline. The German troops in Tornio were apparently taken by surprise by the landing and initially did not offer resistance. This soon changed and heavy fighting broke out between German and Finnish troops in and around the town as Divisional Group Krautler rushed troops into the area. The Finns, who had also carried out a landing on the islands outside Kemi harbor, brought in the rest of the 3rd Division under Major General Aaro Pajari and later also the 11th Division under Major General Kalle Heiskanen. The Luftwaffe sank two s.h.i.+ps carrying troops from the 11th Division.36 Erfurth relates that Finnish troops entered the German hospital in Tornio and allegedly carried out violence against staff and patients. They also attacked and captured the German fuel depot north of Tornio.37 General Rendulic took steps to regain control of the situation in the Kemi-Tornio area. The regimental-size Battle Group West, which had joined the 7th Mountain Division as it withdrew through Pudasjarvi, was ordered to join Divisional Group Krautler. Another two infantry battalions and the Machinegun Ski Brigade were also ordered into the sector of Divisional Group Krautler on October 2.38 The Machinegun Ski Brigade had been the largest unit in Battle Group East. It was formed in the summer of 1944 as a reserve for the 20th Mountain Army when Hitler blocked the return of personnel on leave in Germany. It consisted of three machinegun ski battalions and some infantry.

It was important for the 20th Mountain Army not to let events in Tornio and Kemi interfere with the withdrawal. The army's quartermaster reported on October 2 that all supplies at Rovaniemi had been evacuated. It was therefore only necessary to hold Rovaniemi, the Lapland capital, long enough for the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps and the 6th SS Mountain Division from XVIII Corps to pa.s.s through. The 7th Mountain Division from XVIII Corps was ordered to hold Pudasjarvi until 6th SS Mountain Division and the 163rd Infantry Division from x.x.xVI Corps had pa.s.sed through Rovaniemi. General Rendulic did not consider it necessary to retake either Kemi or Tornio, only to keep the Finns bottled up in those areas so they would not be able to interfere with the withdrawal. Those were the orders he gave to Divisional Group Krautler.

However, the fighting around Kemi and Tornio was heavy. Holter notes that "the losses on both sides were high."39 Divisional Group Krautler made some progress in its attack against the Finnish beachhead at Tornio on October 3 but the Finns were bringing in heavy reinforcements. The Germans were not able to push into Tornio or to recapture the important fuel depot. The Germans east of Kemi were also forced back on October 4, and with pressures in the Kemi area building, the 20th Mountain Army ordered a withdrawal to begin on October 7. All German troops had departed the Tornio-Kemi region by October 10.

Part of Group Krautler was ordered to withdraw along the Swedish frontier to Muonio while the rest were told to engage in delaying action along the road from Kemi to Rovaniemi. The next day, the Finns, resorting to "motti" (shallow encirclement) tactics, encircled a German force north of Tornio. The withdrawal had to be postponed for twenty-four hours while the encirclement was broken after heavy fighting.

The combat in the Kemi-Tornio area, which lasted for several days, resulted in heavy losses for both sides. The Finns reported that they had 1,700 casualties, including 189 killed. They also claimed to have captured 1,000 German troops. The majority of these appear to have been support troops. The captured soldiers were later turned over to the Soviets.

The protest that General Rendulic had lodged as a result of the incident at Pudasjarvi on September 28 was finally answered by Siilasvuo late on October 2. Siilasvuo rejected Rendulic's ultimatum. He stated that no agreement had ever been made that was contrary to the terms of the armistice entered into with the Soviets. Siilasvuo stated that the Finnish military leaders.h.i.+p would not be bound by arrangements made by local commanders.

On October 3 General Rendulic announced that the German troops would from now on operate against the Finns without restraint. He abandoned the policy of limiting destruction to lines of communication. The Germans viewed the Finnish action at Kemi and Tornio as treachery and Rendulic ordered that "all cover, installations, and objects of use to the enemy are to be destroyed."40 The taking of hostages was also begun on a large scale but halted within a few days by orders from OKW.41 This OKW action was apparently taken in order not to cause an open breach with Sweden.

At the same time as the operations against Kemi and Tornio were underway, Major General Lagus began an advance further to the east, in a northerly direction from Pudasjarvi. The Finnish forces there consisted of the Armored Division, the 6th Division and elements of the Border Jager Brigade.

The Jager Brigade of the Armored Division, under Colonel Valter Nordgren, met stiff resistance south of Rovaniemi. After fighting that lasted four days, the Germans abandoned the town of Rovaniemi on October 16 and the 7th Mountain Division and elements of Group Krautler withdrew northward through Lapland. The town of Rovaniemi was utterly destroyed by the Germans.42 The Germans admit that it far exceeded that permitted by the exigencies of war but Rendulic points out that some of that destruction was caused by the detonation of an ammunition train carrying 400 tons of explosives standing at the Rovaniemi railway station. Before this mishap,