My Three Years in America Part 14

1. REPORT IN CIPHER

Was.h.i.+ngton, 23rd November, 1915.

Secretary of State Lansing after long hesitation took up the _Lusitania_ question again with me. At the beginning of October I had handed to him a draft of a letter which contained what I thought myself able to write to him within the scope of my instructions. This draft was merely intended to serve as a basis for more detailed negotiations and was only to be regarded as official in case the American Government should regard the whole incident as satisfactorily settled. There was nothing to be gained by stirring up public opinion again here by publis.h.i.+ng doc.u.ments which were regarded from the beginning as unsatisfactory.

As I have several times had the honor to report, there is, in my opinion, no hope of settling the _Lusitania_ question, as the American Government does not think that it can agree to refer it to a court of arbitration _now_. They are, however, counting here on a decision at a later date by such a court, which would be sure to award the Americans an indemnity, because the Hague court of arbitration from its very nature is obliged to stand for the protection of neutral non-combatants. Consequently, Mr. Lansing cannot understand why we do not pay the indemnity of our own accord and so settle the whole matter, especially as, in view of our pledge for the future, it is of no practical importance to us. Mr. Lansing is primarily concerned with the indemnity, whereas President Wilson now, as formerly, lays the chief weight on the pledge for the future and the humanitarian aspect of the question. Mr. Wilson always keeps his eye fixed on the two closely connected goals: the development of international law with regard to the freedom of the seas and the restoration of peace.

Mr. Lansing now reopens the _Lusitania_ question for the following reasons, part of which he has himself openly stated, and the rest have become known to me through other channels. In the first place the Government is afraid of attacks in the impending Congress.

It was, therefore, eminently desirable that it should be able to inform Congress that something had been done in the _Lusitania_ affair. Even if nothing comes of it they could answer that they are waiting for a reply from Germany. President Wilson himself does not believe in the possibility of the question being solved, and hopes to keep the matter in the air until the conclusion of peace, provided that public opinion does not become restive or new eventualities occur. The _Ancona_ affair has had an unfavorable effect in this respect. Even though it has not aroused any great excitement, it has caused the whole question to be reopened, and everyone on this side lays at our door the responsibility for the Austrian act; for they base their reasoning on the a.s.sumption that the war is directed entirely from Berlin. Whenever mention is made of the _Ancona_ incident it recalls the fact that the _Lusitania_ question still remains unsettled.

It is a well known fact that we are faced here with an anti-German ring of great influence. I have repeatedly pointed this out in my reports. This ring is trying to exploit the _Ancona_ and _Lusitania_ questions with a view to driving into the background the American Note to England and the British infringements of international law. The Government is treating this anti-German ring with the same weakness as are the majority of American private citizens.

They are submitting patiently to terrorization as well as continual baiting and sneering. The recluse at the White House has, indeed, great plans, but his freedom of decision is seriously compromised by his anxiety to be re-elected. He refuses to allow himself to be drawn into too serious extravagances; and so he certainly deserves the credit for having prevented war with Germany, but he allows himself, nevertheless, to be influenced by the anti-German ring and hampered in the pursuit of his plans.

2. TELEGRAM IN CIPHER

"Was.h.i.+ngton, 2nd December, 1915.

"The Government here have lost their nerve as a result of the impending Congress, the Hapag case, the _Ancona_ incident, and the explosions and fires in munition and powder works, and like all private individuals here are allowing themselves to be terrorized by the anti-German ring. Hence the anxiety for the recall of Papen and Boy-Ed. The Government fear that Congress will take the above questions, as well as the _Lusitania_ affair, into their own hands, and deal with them in more radical fas.h.i.+on than the Government. This is the reason for the present demand for the recall--which is intended to serve as a safety-valve--lest Congress should break off diplomatic relations with us. Whether there is any real danger of this happening it is difficult to say. Lansing thinks there is. In any case everything is possible in the present state of public feeling. They have not the courage to swim against the stream. Perhaps the recall of the attaches will still the storm for a time, as was the case with Dernburg and Dumba; meanwhile everything turns on the att.i.tude of Congress, who, it is to be hoped, will not be anxious to declare war on us. Colonel House, who is a good reader of the barometer here, sees no danger. I, personally, also do not believe that Congress will decide to resort to extremes on one side,--_i.e._, without attacking England--for the breaking-off of diplomatic relations would certainly be quickly followed by war.

"In any case it is my sacred duty to inform your Excellency that Congress may produce unpleasant surprises, and that we must, therefore, be prepared to do _something_ with regard to the _Lusitania_ question.

How far we can approach the Lansing draft it is difficult to judge from here. It depends in the first place on the state of public opinion in Germany, for the matter has no further practical importance since we have pledged ourselves to spare pa.s.senger-s.h.i.+ps.

"Hitherto my personal relations with the American Government have been so good that it was always possible to prevent the worst happening.

Lansing volunteered yesterday to send this telegram. But if the matter once gets into the hands of Congress it will be much more difficult to exert influence, especially as nothing can be kept secret here. It is not yet possible to say when Congress will ask for the _Lusitania_ doc.u.ments, but it will probably be in a few weeks' time, provided that no diplomatic understanding can be reached meanwhile."

3. REPORT IN CIPHER

"Was.h.i.+ngton, 7th December, 1915.

"The action that _Congress_ will take with regard to the _Lusitania question_ is of primary importance for us. It is my opinion that President Wilson, when he asked for the recall of our two attaches, had the thought in the back of his mind that Congress would let the _Lusitania_ question rest for a time, because relations with Germany are already sufficiently strained and only the rabid pro-English want war. One cannot, however, count on anything now, because the anti-German ring are seeking to terrorize all who do not agree with them. The senators and members of Congress from the west are certainly more difficult to influence, as their const.i.tuents have only a slight economic interest in the cause of our enemies. It is also probable that the senators from the south will all stand by us, because they are very much embittered against England on account of the cotton question. Nevertheless, we must, as I have already pointed out by telegram, be fully prepared for further negotiations on the subject of the _Lusitania_. If we refuse to give way at all, the breaking of diplomatic relations, followed by war, is inevitable. In my opinion it is out of the question to find a formula that will satisfy public opinion on both sides. It may, however, be possible to find a formula that will skim over the points of contention, as was done in the _Arabic_ case. In spite of all the outcry over here there is no doubt that the American Government and the greater part of public opinion would be only too delighted if we could find a graceful way of settling the _Lusitania_ question without a conflict. What is required in the first place is:

"1. A. declaration on our side that the attack on the _Lusitania_ should be regarded as an act of reprisal and, therefore, not within the scope of existing international law.

"2. The payment of an indemnity, which in my opinion could be made without committing ourselves on the question of responsibility.

"President Wilson had hoped that the whole question could be shelved until after the end of the war. Now the war still drags on, and Mr.

Wilson is afraid of radical intervention on the part of Congress.

Over here it is quite impossible to prophesy. The unexpected is the only thing that consistently recurs. No one can say what Congress will do. Meanwhile, it is my duty to describe the situation as I see it to-day. Whether the _Lusitania_ question is of sufficient practical importance to allow it to bring upon us the breaking-off of diplomatic relations and war with the United States I must leave it to the exalted judgment of your Excellency to decide."

The American Government had established a basis for the negotiations with regard to the _Lusitania_ and "the Freedom of the Seas" which was in our favor when, on the 21st October, they sent a very circ.u.mstantial Note to London in which they demonstrated that the English blockade was a breach of international law and definitely stated that this blockade was neither effective, legal nor defensible.

Further, that the United States could not, therefore, submit to an infringement of her rights as a neutral through measures which were admittedly reprisals, and, consequently, contrary to international law. That she could not with equanimity allow her rights to be subordinated to the plea that the peculiar geographical position of the enemies of Great Britain justified measures contrary to international law.

The conclusion of the Note read as follows:

"It is of the highest importance to neutrals not only of the present day, but of the future, that the principles of international right be maintained unimpaired.

"This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which have received the sanction of the civilized world against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States unhesitatingly a.s.sumes, and to the accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality which from the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations."

The above programme was in accordance with the proposal of the American Note of 21st July, which had touched on the subject of co-operation in realizing the "Freedom of the Seas." It was, however, clear to me, apart from anything else, that the United States would not expend energy in championing the rights of neutrals so long as a conflict with Germany threatened. The settlement of the _Arabic_ question gave grounds for hope that the views of the two Governments on the question of submarine warfare would coincide. This appeared to me to be the most important point; the American Government, however, insisted on the settlement of the _Lusitania_ incident, which I foresaw was going to prove a very difficult problem. Even in the _Arabic_ affair it was only by my own independent action that it was possible to avoid a break. The _Lusitania_ question, however, was much more unfavorable to us because at that time the old instructions to submarine captains were still in force. I should, therefore, have been glad to avoid negotiations on the _Lusitania_ question, but Mr. Lansing insisted on a settlement before he spoke on the future "Freedom of the Seas." The reason for this att.i.tude of the Secretary of State, as appears in my reports reproduced above, lay in the state of public opinion. It was unfortunately impossible for the American Government to carry through the policy they had adopted in respect to England so long as the _Lusitania_ question was brought forward daily in the American Press.

The negotiations should have been carried through orally and confidentially between Mr. Lansing and myself. Unfortunately, however, it was impossible to keep anything confidential in Was.h.i.+ngton, particularly as, very much against my wishes, the conversations were protracted for weeks. The state department was continually besieged by journalists, who reported in their papers a medley of truth and fiction about each of my visits. In this way they provoked denials, and so ended by getting a good idea of how the situation stood. In addition to this, authoritative persons in Berlin gave interviews to American journalists, who reported to the United States papers everything that they did not already know.

Consequently, the negotiations did not progress in the way Mr.

Lansing and I had expected. We wanted to arrive quickly at a formula and make it known at once. Public opinion in both countries would then have been set at rest, and the past would have been buried so long as no fresh differences of opinion and conflict arose out of the submarine war. The formula, however, was not so easy to arrive at. The wording of the Memorandum which I was to present to the American Government had to be repeatedly cabled to Berlin, where each time some alteration was required in the text that Mr.

Lansing wanted.

The American Government held to the point of view which they had formulated in the Note of the 21st July, as follows:

"...for a belligerent act of retaliation is _per se_ an act beyond the law and the defense of an act as retaliatory is an admission that it is illegal."

The standpoint of the American Note of the 21st July, 1915, shows clearly the mistake of treating the submarine war as reprisals.

It shows how every surrender of a position compromises the next.

The German Government, on the other hand, refused under any circ.u.mstances to admit the illegality of the submarine warfare within the war-zone, because they regarded the right to make reprisals as a recognized part of the existing international law. Further, the American demand was regarded in Germany as a deliberate humiliation, as well as an attempt to coerce us unconditionally to renounce unrestricted submarine warfare once and for all. To have admitted that the submarine war was a breach of international law would have involved us in the same unpleasant consequences to which now, after our defeat, we are compelled to submit. If we admitted the illegality of the submarine campaign we should have been obliged, on the conclusion of peace, to meet all the demands for damages arising out of it.

For the third time, then, the word "illegal" brought us face to face with a crisis which was within an ace of causing a rupture of diplomatic relations. The last days of the negotiations turned out very unfortunately for us. Mr. Lansing and I had agreed upon a formula in which the word "illegal" did not occur, because my instructions categorically prohibited its use. In Berlin it was not yet known that we had arrived at the desired agreement, and it was there thought necessary to call public attention to the danger of the situation, and explain the seriousness of the position in the hope that by this means the American Government might be moved to adopt a more conciliatory att.i.tude.

On 5th February, Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann gave an interview to the a.s.sociated Press in which he said he did not wish to conceal the seriousness of the position. That Germany could under no circ.u.mstances admit the illegality of the submarine campaign within the war-zone. The whole crisis arose from the new demand of America that Germany should admit the sinking of the _Lusitania_ to be an act infringing the law of nations. Germany could not renounce the submarine as a weapon. If the United States insisted on bringing about a break Germany could do nothing further to avoid it. The Imperial Chancellor confirmed these statements in a conversation with the Berlin correspondent of _The World_.

These interviews compromised once more the settlement of the negotiations, because the American Government were doubtful as to whether they could allow the word "illegal" to be omitted, after the sharp difference of opinion between the two Governments had become public property. The agreement which had been reached voluntarily now looked like a weak surrender before a German threat. In the end, however, a compromise was arrived at. I handed to Mr. Lansing in writing a declaration amounting to an admission that reprisals were admissible, but that they should not be allowed to injure neutrals, and that therefore the German Government regretted the incident and were prepared to offer satisfaction and compensation.

The American Government were willing to confirm the receipt of this Memorandum and declare themselves satisfied. Fate, however, had decreed that I should play the role of Sisyphus at Was.h.i.+ngton.

Scarcely were the negotiations terminated when the German Government, on the 8th February, declared the so-called "ruthless submarine war," _i.e._ announced to the sea powers their intention of sinking armed merchantmen without warning and without regard to crew or pa.s.sengers. In view of this the American Government refused to complete the exchange of letters on the subject of the _Lusitania_.

Instead of this there began a new controversy on the question of "armed merchantmen." My hope of settling the _Lusitania_ question and then pa.s.sing on to the discussion of "Freedom of the Seas"

was shattered. This. .h.i.t me all the harder as I was convinced that the conversations on the latter question would have developed into peace negotiations.

The opinion has been expressed in Germany that the breaking-off of diplomatic relations at this stage was regarded, even in America, as precipitate, since no really acute provocation had been given.

That it was a shamelessly engineered break after we had in principle yielded on every point. That the Americans had apparently been bluffing and continually increasing their demands with a view of enhancing their own prestige by scoring further diplomatic successes against us which, in view of the previous course of events, they could regard as certain.

In this case I do not myself believe that the American Government were really thinking seriously of breaking off diplomatic relations.

They only wanted to pacify public opinion by a settlement of the _Lusitania_ question, which was essential before pa.s.sing on to negotiations with regard to the "Freedom of the Seas" or to steps for peace. Threats of war arose only because the negotiations were protracted for weeks, and the word "illegal" was discussed in the Press in every possible tone. It was a misfortune that these negotiations were not carried on--like the subsequent conversations with regard to peace--in secret. I had actually persuaded the American Government to give way on the word "illegal," which had become much more difficult for them owing to the publicity that was given to the negotiations. Had it not been for the ruthless submarine campaign the _Lusitania_ question would have been finally buried and the negotiations could have been continued in a friendly spirit.

Moreover, the so-called ruthless submarine campaign was, according to the opinion of Admiral von Tirpitz, who was at that time still in office, although he was not consulted until the decision was taken, a military farce. He declared the order to be technically nonsense, and the pompous way in which it was issued as unnecessarily provocative and a challenge. The whole thing was neither "fish nor flesh."

The controversy over the "armed merchantmen" had a prologue which could only be described as a comedy of errors, were the matter not so serious. It is well known that the const.i.tution of the United States allows the President the right of independent political action. He alone is responsible, and his Secretary of State and the other Ministers are only his a.s.sistants, without personal responsibility. Mr. Wilson has made much greater use of his rights in this respect than even Mr. Roosevelt. From the very beginning his administration was a one-man Government.

In general terms the development of democracy in America amounts to this, that the electors vest unlimited rights in one man for a short time, and after that they re-elect or replace him according to whether he has won or lost their confidence.

Thus arises a sort of temporary autocracy which combines the advantages of a monarchy and a democracy. Whether this historically developed system really coincides with our idea of formal democracy is another question.

However this may be, the political life of a nation is not to be ruled by catch-words. History is the only builder of state organisms.