My Three Years in America Part 16

"But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action, we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.

"For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the Nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor.

"To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed.

It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amid the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this Government has attempted and everything that it has accomplished during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and futile.

"It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a Nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world."

Soon afterwards--on the 3rd March--the Senate decided by 68 votes to 14 to postpone the discussion of the Gore resolution _sine die_.

The struggle had then already ended in a victory for Mr. Wilson when I handed over the above-mentioned Memorandum.

Regarded from our own point of view, the declaration of the "unrestricted submarine war" was a serious political mistake, which was not even justified by the results of the measure. The least we could have done was to wait for the settlement of the Lusitania question and the subsequent action of Mr. Wilson. The "unrestricted submarine war" was not the right way to improve our situation, but was bound inevitably to lead to a new conflict with America. It was absolutely impossible for the submarine captains to ascertain with certainty through the periscope whether an enemy merchant s.h.i.+p was armed or not. Mistakes, therefore, were sure to arise sooner or later. On the other hand, the Americans would not refrain from travelling on enemy pa.s.senger s.h.i.+ps, as their business took them mostly to England and France, and there were not enough of their own or neutral s.h.i.+ps at their disposal.

The one hope for the continued avoidance of a conflict was that the Imperial Government should not withdraw the concessions they had made on the 5th October, 1915, with regard to "liners," and that enemy pa.s.senger s.h.i.+ps should not be unarmed out of regard for their neutral pa.s.sengers.

There were, as a rule, no Americans on cargo s.h.i.+ps, for there were at that time few sailors in the United States. From the above-mentioned letter of Mr. Wilson to Mr. Stone, however, it appeared that the American Government regarded our concessions as applying to all merchant vessels, while, as I have already stated, the German naval authorities had only intended to include pa.s.senger steamers.

This misunderstanding might now give rise to a fresh conflict, even if mistakes on the part of submarine captains were by special good fortune avoided.

CHAPTER IX

THE "SUSs.e.x" INCIDENT

On the 24th March the unarmed pa.s.senger-s.h.i.+p _Suss.e.x_ was torpedoed without warning, and several Americans lost their lives. The first information about this incident was so vague that the matter was at first treated in a dilatory fas.h.i.+on in Was.h.i.+ngton. At the time I sent the following report to Berlin:

REPORT IN CIPHER

"Was.h.i.+ngton, 4th April, 1916.

"During the fourteen months that have pa.s.sed since the opening of the submarine campaign there have been intermittent periods in which the American Government have shown themselves aggressive towards us, and others in which the now proverbial expression 'watchful waiting" formed the _Leit-motif_ of their att.i.tude. The past month belonged to the second category until the sinking of the _Suss.e.x_ and other similar incidents stirred American public opinion to fresh excitement. Officially I have, during the last four weeks, heard nothing further from the American side on the subject of the submarine campaign. During this time Mr. Lansing even allowed himself a fortnight's holiday for recuperation. On my side there was no occasion to reopen the submarine question as a complete understanding with the American Government cannot be attained,[*]

and in my opinion it is advisable to avoid as far as possible any new crisis in our relations with the United States. I therefore contented myself with keeping in touch with Colonel House so that I should not be taken by surprise by any _volte-face_ on the part of the American Government. As soon as a new crisis arises Mr.

Wilson will, as usual, be in a fearful hurry and bring us to the brink of war. Whether such a crisis will be precipitated by the _Suss.e.x_ incident, and whether the President in that case will shrink from war at the last moment, it is difficult to foretell, as this question--like all others at the present moment--will be viewed exclusively from the standpoint of the approaching presidential election.

[Footnote: *i.e., Without instructions from Berlin.]

"Except for the surprises that are usual over here, things are at present quite calm. This is due, in the first place, to the desire for peace shown by the population, who are not anxious to be disturbed in their congenial occupation of money-making, and secondly, to the development of the Mexican question. This latter question stands in the forefront of public interest, and it seems to be increasingly probable that the punitive expedition against Villa will lead to a full-dress intervention. A few days ago it was reported that Villa was defeated, then wounded, and finally even a prisoner. All this good news proved later to be false and now Villa is said to have escaped south and won over fresh supporters.

So long as the Mexican question holds the stage here we are, I believe, safe from an act of aggression on the part of the American Government.

"On the other hand it looks as though Mr. Wilson were looking for a fresh way out of the _impa.s.se_ into which his att.i.tude on the question of the submarine campaign has led him. As I have already had the honor to cable, Colonel House holds out the prospect of an early move towards peace by the President. The view is entertained here, and strengthened by the impressions gathered from Colonel House, that gradually the stress of circ.u.mstances will force all the neutral Powers into the war. If this happens there will be no further prospect of the conclusion of peace, as there will be no one available to set the ball rolling. It is therefore essential that the foundations of peace should be laid before the world conflagration spreads any further and finally destroys the prosperity of every nation. This view may sound like pure theory, but it gains substance from the fact that it can very well be made to harmonize with Mr. Wilson's election campaign. In his capacity of founder of peace in Europe, and peace-maker--i.e., indirectly conqueror--of Mexico, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to vanquish Mr.

Wilson in the election. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt would then shout himself hoa.r.s.e to no purpose and Mr. Charles Hughes, the strongest Republican candidate, would perhaps not even go so far as nomination if his position seemed hopeless."

In that report I announced for the first time that Mr. Wilson had so far changed his policy as now to put peace mediation in the foreground and to give the question of the 'Freedom of the Seas'

second place. I shall return later to this political development.

When news reached Was.h.i.+ngton which left no doubt that the _Suss.e.x_ had been torpedoed by a German submarine, I immediately cabled to Berlin for instructions in order to be in a position to give an official disavowal of the act. It required nothing further to convince me that it was now a question of bend or break. I had no means of knowing whether the supporters of the submarine campaign or the partisans of an understanding with the United States would win the day. In the former case war was inevitable. To provide for the second alternative I recommended in my cablegram that there should be no question of an official exchange of Notes, because I was anxious that our withdrawal should not be accompanied by a humiliation. If our Government were prepared to give way I regarded as the most appropriate _modus procedenti_ the immediate issue of instructions to me, empowering me to offer the American Government satisfaction and compensation for this fresh incident. There was no hope of purchasing immunity from a break with any less concession than a pledge to carry on the submarine campaign for the future in accordance with the principles laid down by international law for cruiser warfare. I recommended, however, a provisional cessation of the submarine war on the basis of an oral agreement with the American Government. If this proposal had been acted on, the American Government would have been obliged to follow suit and there would have been no sharp exchange of Notes, which still further prejudiced the position on both sides. If, after such a pause in the submarine war and the establishment of a really clear diplomatic situation, Mr. Wilson failed us and made no positive progress either with regard to his programme for the 'Freedom of the Seas' or the conclusion of peace, we should have held quite a different position from which--if we really thought it desirable--to reopen unrestricted submarine warfare. We had always made the mistake of dealing in half-hearted concessions. In my opinion it was essential for us to strive for a complete understanding with America if we were not prepared to carry on the submarine campaign without regard to consequences.

No attention was paid to my suggestion in Berlin at the time. Admiral von Tirpitz had just resigned and the decision had been taken against the continuance of unrestricted submarine warfare. I do not know why the dispatch of an official Note was preferred to the oral negotiations I had suggested, but I think that the deciding factor was consideration for public opinion in Germany.

A few days later I cabled the following to Berlin:

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER

"Was.h.i.+ngton, 8th April, 1916.

"House gave me a very gloomy view of the position with regard to the _Suss.e.x_. At the White House the situation is regarded as hopeless because the view is held that, in spite of Tirpitz's resignation, the German Government, with the best will in the world, cannot curb the submarine campaign. It has. .h.i.therto been merely due to good luck that no American has lost his life and any moment might precipitate a crisis which would be bound to lead to a break. The American Government are convinced that the Suss.e.x was torpedoed by a German submarine. A repet.i.tion of such mistakes would be bound to drive the United States of America into war with us, which Wilson would greatly regret, as he is anxious--as I have already reported--to lay the foundations of peace in a few months. If the United States were drawn into the war all hope of an early peace would be at an end.

"I request to be furnished with instructions on the basis of which I can pacify the Government here, which now has doubts of our _bona fides_."

After Mr. Gerard, apart from other questions concerning doubtful cases of torpedoing, had also submitted a similar inquiry to the Foreign Office on the subject of the _Suss.e.x_ incident, an official reply was handed to him on the 10th April which read in the following terms:

"A decision as to whether the Channel steamer _Suss.e.x_ was damaged by a German submarine or not is made extraordinarily difficult owing to the fact that no exact information is known as to the place, time and accompanying circ.u.mstances of the sinking, and moreover a picture of this s.h.i.+p could not be obtained until the 6th April. Consequently the inquiry has had to be extended to all submarine enterprises which took place on the day in question, 24th March, in the Channel anywhere on the course between Folkestone and Dieppe.

"In this area on the 24th March, in the middle of the English Channel, a long, black vessel, flying no flags, with a gray funnel, small gray superstructure and two high masts was. .h.i.t by a German submarine.

The German captain was definitely convinced that she was a s.h.i.+p of war, and indeed a mine-layer of the newly-built English _Arabic_ cla.s.s. He was led to this conviction:

"1. By the flush deck of the s.h.i.+p.

"2. By the shape of the stern, which sloped outwards.

"3. By the paintwork, which was that of a s.h.i.+p of war.

"4. By the high speed of about eighteen knots which the s.h.i.+p developed,

"5. By the fact that the s.h.i.+p was not steering the course north of the light buoys between Dungeness and Beachy Head within which frequent observation had led the German submarines to keep a look out for merchant s.h.i.+pping, but was in mid-Channel, heading almost for Le Havre.

"Consequently, the submarine fired a torpedo at 3.55 p.m. Central European time, 1-1/2 knots southeast of the Bull Rock. The torpedo struck, and so heavy an explosion occurred that the whole of the s.h.i.+p forward of the bridge broke away. The unusually heavy explosion leaves no doubt that there were large stores of ammunition on board.

"The German captain has prepared a sketch of the s.h.i.+p he attacked, of which two copies are sent herewith. The two copies of pictures of the _Suss.e.x_, also enclosed, were photographed from the English newspaper _The Daily Graphic_, of the 27th inst. A comparison of the sketches and the photograph shows that the vessel attacked is not identical with the _Suss.e.x_; particularly striking is the difference in the position of the funnel and the shape of the stern.

No other attack was made by a German submarine on the course between Folkestone and Dieppe at the time of the _Suss.e.x_ incident.

"From this the German Government are obliged to a.s.sume that the sinking of the _Suss.e.x_ is to be set down to other causes than attack by a German submarine. Some light may be thrown on the incident by the fact that on the 1st and 2nd April alone no less than twenty-six English mines were destroyed in the Channel by German naval forces.

In general the whole of that area is rendered dangerous by drifting mines and not torpedoes. Off the English coast the Channel is also made increasingly dangerous by German mines which have been laid for the enemy naval forces.

"If the American Government should have at their disposal any further data that may help to elucidate the _Suss.e.x_ incident, the German Government beg that it may be communicated to them so that they may subject it to examination. In the event of differences of opinion arising between the two Governments the German Government now declare themselves ready to submit the whole incident to an International Commission in accordance with the third clause of the 'Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of the 18th October, 1907.'"

I have reproduced this Note in full because its influence was quite particularly fateful and because it was probably the most unfortunate doc.u.ment that ever pa.s.sed from Berlin to Was.h.i.+ngton. Mr. Wilson thought he detected a direct untruth, and the mixture of an uneasy conscience and clumsiness which the German Note appeared to betray prompted the sharp tone of the President's reply. For the sake of his prestige Mr. Wilson was now compelled by the recent course of events to take action, although the excitement of public opinion was this time undoubtedly less than was the case after the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ and the _Arabic_. The American Government, therefore, couched the Note which they dispatched on the 18th April in the terms of an ultimatum. In the meantime, the discovery in the hull of the _Suss.e.x_ of a piece of a German torpedo placed the matter beyond all doubt. Additional importance was given to the ultimatum by the fact that before dispatching it Mr. Wilson laid it personally before Congress at a special sitting.

It is my firm conviction that had it not been for this ultimatum diplomatic relations would not have been broken off immediately, even in 1917. In the increased tension of the situation resulting from the exchange of Notes on the subject of the _Suss.e.x_ I see, therefore, one of the immediate germs of the war with America.

After this exchange of Notes a challenge in the form of our formal declaration of the 31st January, 1917, could no longer be tolerated.

The clumsiness of such formal declarations was, as I have said, only surpa.s.sed by the regrettable impression of a juristic argument produced by our first _Lusitania_ Note.