My Three Years in America Part 8

It may be said, perhaps, in answer to the above, that America was indeed bitterly angry, but still not resolved on war; and that public opinion was indignant, not at Wilson's desire to keep the peace, but at the unfortunate expression "Too proud to fight."

This view was held, for example, by von Tirpitz, and also found expression more than once in the reports of the so-called German Chamber of Commerce in New York, which were regularly transmitted to Germany, and exercised considerable influence on opinion in that country, although their author was a man of no political insight, and the Chamber of Commerce had, as a matter of fact, no actual existence.

They were simply a journalistic device on the part of the paper which published these reports. During the war, and under the influence of the pa.s.sions which it aroused, there was continually going on in America any amount of mischievous gossip and intrigue concerning which many interesting stories might be told. I have no intention, however, of concerning myself with these unworthy matters now, any more than I allowed them at the time to color my official reports to the home Government; I can only say that if the reports of the Chamber of Commerce had any sort of influence on German opinion, it was much to be regretted. The opinion, therein expressed, that the United States would never, under any circ.u.mstances, embark on hostilities against us was unfortunately belied by later events, and the idea that America was at that time compelled to keep the peace by defects in her military equipment, had no foundation in fact. Admittedly, she was in the year 1917 insufficiently equipped for war, and the question of making good her deficiencies had not got beyond the stage of discussion. I should, of course, have been only too pleased if my repeated warnings as to the danger of war with America had proved to be unfounded; in point of fact, after the _Lusitania_ incident, America was, for a period of three weeks, on the verge of breaking off diplomatic relations, and panic reigned on the Stock Exchanges throughout the country. The fact that Congress was not sitting at the time prevented a flood of speeches which would only have increased the tension. It will be remembered that by the American Const.i.tution the annual sessions of Congress are short and long alternately; the short session had come to an end on March 4, 1915, and the President had refrained from summoning Congress again, as he wished to avoid discussion on the question of war.

The irresistible strength of the popular indignation may be accurately estimated from the fact that even the German-Americans were terror-stricken by its violence. Not only did our propaganda collapse completely, but even our political friends dared not open their mouths, and only ventured to a.s.sert themselves once more after the settlement of the _Arabic_ case. Germanism in America may be said to have been absolutely killed by the _Lusitania_ incident, and only gradually came to life again.

The first expressions of opinion which I received from the President and Mr. Bryan gave me good grounds for hope that these gentlemen would do everything in their power to preserve peace. I append the two telegrams which I sent to the Foreign Office:

(1). "Was.h.i.+ngton, May 9th, 1915.

"_Lusitania_ incident has caused great excitement, especially in New York, which is most affected, but I hope that no serious consequences will ensue. Mr. Wilson regards matters calmly. I recommend expression of regret for loss of so many American lives, in whatever form may be possible without admission of our responsibility."

(2). "Was.h.i.+ngton, May 10th, 1915.

"Bryan spoke to me very seriously concerning _Lusitania_ incident.

His influence will, in any case be exercised in favor of peace. This influence is great, as Wilson depends on Bryan for his re-election.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, is beating the patriotic drum, in order to win over the Jingo elements. It is significant of Bryan's real views that he regrets that we did not support his well-known attempt at mediation; therefore, I again recommend that we should endeavor to bring about an attempt at mediation in some form, in case the position here becomes critical. This would be a good _argumentum ad hominem_ in order to avoid war. Another way out, which is recommended, is that we should renew our offer to give up submarine warfare provided that England adheres to the principles of International Law, and gives up her policy of starvation. The position is in any case _very serious_; I hope and believe that we shall find a way out of the present crisis, but in case of any such recurrence, no solution can be guaranteed."

American indignation was directed particularly against Dr. Dernburg, who had defended, in public, the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_. I had, therefore, no other resource but to advise him to leave the country of his own accord. He would probably have been deported in any case, and his continued presence in America could no longer serve any useful purpose, while it was to be hoped that his voluntary departure would appease the popular wrath in some degree, and postpone the imminent rupture of diplomatic relations. The sea was raging and demanded a sacrifice. I sent the following report to Berlin on the subject of Dr. Dernburg's resolve to leave the country:

"Was.h.i.+ngton, May 17th, 1915.

"As I have already wired to your Excellency, Dr. Dernburg has decided to leave the country of his own free will. I believe that, in so doing, he is rendering a great service to the Fatherland, a service rendered easier by the fact that he could no longer hope to continue in the exercise of his former duties. As I have already reported, he had exposed himself to attack by our enemies by his action in going counter to the present outbreak of hysterical feeling in a speech and an interview which were, unfortunately, not in accordance with your Excellency's instructions, received by me on the following day. So long as Dernburg only wrote articles for the papers, he rendered distinguished and highly appreciated service, but when he commenced to deliver speeches at German-American meetings he trod on very dangerous ground. On this point we are all in agreement here. In any case, in war every possible method must be tried, and if any individual is sacrificed it must be regarded as unfortunately unavoidable.

"When I informed Mr. Bryan that Dr. Dernburg had decided to return home if the American Government would secure him a safe conduct from our enemies, the satisfaction of the Secretary of State was even more p.r.o.nounced than I had expected. He remarked that Dr.

Dernburg's speeches had given rise to the suspicion that the German Government wished to inflame the minds of the American people against President Wilson's administration. It might be possible, now that there were no longer any grounds for this idea, to avoid an immediate rupture of diplomatic relations."

On May 13th the American Government dispatched a strongly worded Note to Berlin, which restated their point of view, as previously given. I reproduce textually the following pa.s.sage from the Note, which, from the point of view of subsequent events, is of fundamental importance.

"The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats.... Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

"American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their s.h.i.+ps and in travelling wherever their legitimate business calls them on the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

"There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial Germany Emba.s.sy at Was.h.i.+ngton, addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas, would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful, but very earnest protests of his Government, the Government of the United States.

I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial Germany Emba.s.sy at Was.h.i.+ngton addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission.

"The Government of the United States cannot believe that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval authorities.... It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and firmly contended.

"The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

The demands contained in the above Note would have made the continuance of the submarine campaign impossible, and this was, no doubt, the intention of the Union Government. The German answer of May 28th, which defended the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ on the grounds that she should be considered as an auxiliary cruiser and provided with guns, changed the situation in no way. Besides, the _Lusitania_ had ammunition and Canadian troops on board; there can be no doubt that the main reason why she sank so rapidly was the exploding of her cargo of ammunition by the torpedo which struck her. With regard to the loss of human life, the German Government had already expressed, to the neutral Powers concerned, its deep regret for the death of their subjects--I had in person conveyed these regrets to the United States Government a few days after the destruction of the _Lusitania_.

After this first exchange of Notes, the gulf between the two points of view appeared fixed, and was bound in face of the prevalent excitement to lead to a severance of diplomatic relations, unless sufficient time were gained to allow the storms of pa.s.sion to abate.

Telegraphic communication between the German Government and the Emba.s.sy at Was.h.i.+ngton was carried out by a circuitous route, which made it extremely slow; thus I was compelled to decide on my own responsibility and take immediate action. I fully realized that the rupture of diplomatic relations would mean war. In America we were face to face with a vigorous hostile propaganda, which had as its sole object to draw the United States into war, and thus bring about a decision by force of arms. From the time of the _Lusitania_ incident onwards, the diplomatic struggle between ourselves and the Entente was centred entirely around the question of the future action of the United States. The threatened rupture of relations between that country and Germany would have left the field open for hostile propaganda, by taking from us all chance of combating it. War would thus have been inevitable sooner or later. The first and most urgent necessity was, therefore, the avoidance of such a rupture at whatever cost, and my efforts were now solely directed to this end. As things turned out, it might, perhaps, have been better if the United States had actually gone to war at this moment. Her military pressure, and our consequent defeat, would have come two years earlier, before the German people had been demoralized and exhausted by four years of war and blockade.

But at that time I had good hopes of being able to bring about peace through American mediation, and consequently wished to gain time at all costs.

I resolved, without waiting for instructions from Berlin, to make use of my privileged position as Amba.s.sador to demand an audience with the President. I heard later, among other things when I was at Manila, that on this very day, June 2nd, all preparations had been made for breaking off relations, and for the inevitable resulting war. As a result of my interview, however, they were cancelled. I had a long conversation with the President and two of his advisers.

Mr. Wilson felt the position acutely, and was animated solely by a desire to preserve peace. We both realized that it was a question of gaining time, and succeeded in coming to an agreement on the measures to be taken to mitigate the crisis. We took the view that the isolation of Germany had given rise to an atmosphere of misunderstanding between her and the United States, and that the establishment of some sort of personal relations.h.i.+p might be expected to ease this tension; I, therefore, proposed, and the President agreed, that Meyer Gerhardt, a member of the Privy Council, who had accompanied Dr. Dernburg to America, and was then acting on behalf of the German Red Cross, should at once go to Germany and report in person to the Government. Mr. Wilson, for his part, undertook that no final decision should be taken until Meyer Gerhardt had reported the results of his mission.

At the end of this interview I was convinced in my own mind that the President would never enter on war with Germany, otherwise I could not conceive why he should have concurred in my proposals instead of breaking off relations at once. He would, had he chosen the latter course, have had American public opinion more decidedly behind him than it was later, at the time of the final breach. Not a voice would have been raised in opposition, except that of the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, who, as it was, resigned his office on the ground that the exchange of Notes threatened to involve the United States in war, and could not be reconciled, therefore, with his own pacific intentions.

It is certain that if I had not at this stage of the _Lusitania_ crisis had my interview with the President, relations would have been broken off and war between the United States and Germany must inevitably have followed. The view is still held in many quarters that we might safely have disregarded American susceptibilities, as President Wilson was entirely averse to war and would have avoided it by whatever means; then we should have been free to carry on our submarine campaign. This was not the opinion held by myself or any of my colleagues at the Emba.s.sy, and later events proved us to have been in the right, as against those Germans and German-Americans, who, in May, 1915, and afterwards, averred that the United States would never declare war on us, and maintained the same view in January and February, 1917. The principles of my later policy were based on the events of this _Lusitania_ crisis; I had then gathered the conviction that Mr. Wilson wanted peace but the country wanted war; that the President alone had prevented an immediate rupture, but that as the responsible leader of the American people, he would be compelled to bow eventually to public opinion. When Mr. Wilson had to explain away his unlucky speech at Philadelphia, no action was taken from the German side, and no information given him which might lead him to understand that Germany desired to avoid a _casus belli_ at all costs, for fear of giving Mr. Wilson an opportunity to gain a cheap triumph over Germany in a verbal wrangle.

I believe it unjust to Mr. Wilson to suppose that he wished to bluff us into surrender at this time. He had, while fully realizing the danger of war, sought all ways and means to avoid it, and on this hypothesis my whole policy was founded. Moreover the President had then mentioned to me for the first time that he was considering an attempt at mediation between the belligerents.

After my audience at the White House I sent the following wire to the Foreign Office:

CIPHER

"Was.h.i.+ngton, June 2nd, 1915.

"Seriousness of the present situation here induced me to seek interview with President Wilson. In most cordial exchange of views, in course of which we repeatedly emphasized our mutual desire to find some solution of the present difficulties, Wilson always came back to point that he was concerned purely with humanitarian aspect of matter, and that question of indemnification for loss of American lives in _Lusitania_ was only of secondary importance. His main object was complete cessation of submarine warfare, and from point of view of this ultimate aim, smaller concessions on our part could only be regarded as half measures. It behooved us by giving up submarine campaign to appeal to moral sense of world; for issue of the war could never be finally decided by armies but only by peace of understanding. Our voluntary cessation of submarine warfare would inspire Wilson to press for a raising of English hunger blockade.

_Reliable reports from London state that present Cabinet would agree to this._ Wilson hopes that this might be first stage in a peace movement on large scale, which he would introduce as head of leading neutral Powers.

"American reply may be expected to lay little stress on purely legal aspect of matter and to dwell rather on question of humanity, emphatically enough, but as Wilson told me, in a sharper form.

"President remarked that on one point at least we should be in agreement, as both Germany and United States of America had always been in favor of freedom of seas.

"Cordiality of conversation must not blind our eyes to seriousness of situation. If our next Note does not tend to tranquilize matters, Wilson is bound to recall his Amba.s.sador. I recommend most earnestly that this should be avoided at all costs, in view of its disastrous moral effect and fact that this result would be immediate increase in export of munitions, and in financial support for our enemies on immense scale. Good prospect exists of success of present movement for forbidding export of arms should understanding be reached; and also movement by Wilson in direction of peace is sure to follow.

Decisive factor in result is that our reply should strike correct note from point of view of public opinion, which is decisive factor in balance here. For this essential to leave out legal details and to lift discussion to level of humanitarian standpoint. Meyer Gerhardt leaves tomorrow for Germany as Red Cross representative; he will report fully in Berlin on situation. Beg that our reply be held up till his arrival. Wilson concurs in this."

Meyer Gerhardt was in a position to give for the first time a full and accurate review of the American situation to the Berlin authorities.

I had given him most precise information of my own views and had placed him in full possession of the details of my interview with Mr. Wilson. For the rest I had to content myself with short telegrams by circuitous routes. During our conversation, however, the President offered for the first time to permit me to dispatch a cipher telegram through the State Department, to be sent on by the American Emba.s.sy in Berlin. My reports as a matter of fact were somewhat infrequent and always short, as we had to put all our messages into cipher, and this was not always possible. In explanation of the inevitable incompleteness of my communication with the Foreign Office, I may remark that the telegrams of the Wolff and Trans-Ocean Bureaus were regarded as the main sources of information for either side, and that I made use of various arrangements of words, to which the Foreign Office alone had the key, for the purpose of making my own views easily distinguishable in these telegrams.

Meyer Gerhardt, armed with a certificate from Mr. Bryan, to the effect that he was undertaking his journey at the express desire of the American Government, crossed over to Germany with all possible speed. It may be doubted if the English authorities would have taken any notice of this safe conduct, but by good fortune the Norwegian vessel which took him over escaped the attention of their cruisers. His mission was so far successful that the excitement in the United States had time to die down somewhat and the first crisis in German-American relations was thereby tided over satisfactorily. Apart from that, Meyer Gerhardt's mission had no effect on the future course of negotiations. The exchange of Notes between Was.h.i.+ngton and Berlin continued without an understanding being arrived at; both Governments persisting in their original points of view.

The second American Note, dispatched on June 10th, led to the resignation of Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State. He considered that American citizens should be forbidden to take pa.s.sage in vessels bearing the flag of any belligerent nation, and holding these views as he did, declined to make himself responsible for a further exchange of Notes which he believed was bound in the end to result in war.

The resignation of the Secretary of State had another diplomatic prelude of a tragi-comic character. The Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador, Dr. Dumba, besought Mr. Bryan to discuss the German-American conflict with him; both gentlemen wished to find some solution to the dispute and hoped that the Amba.s.sadors not directly concerned in it might profitably try to mediate. It was said later and probably with truth, that there was a mutual misunderstanding on this subject; but whatever be the truth of that, Dr. Dumba took upon himself to send a radiogram to Vienna, by way of Nauen, in which he gave the following resume of Mr. Bryan's views:

"The United States desire no war. Her Notes, however strongly worded, meant no harm, but had to be written in order to pacify the excited public opinion of America. The Berlin Government therefore need not feel itself injured, but need only make suitable concessions if it desires to put an end to the dispute."

This telegram from Dr. Dumba had just reached the German Foreign Office at the moment when the American Amba.s.sador arrived to inform the Under Secretary of State, Zimmermann, in his customary blunt and abrupt manner, that Germany must yield to America's demands or war would inevitably follow. Zimmermann thereupon, with the object of causing Mr. Gerard to moderate his tone, showed him Dumba's wire, which pointed to the inference that the att.i.tude of the American Amba.s.sador was merely a bluff. Mr. Gerard, as in duty bound, reported the facts to Was.h.i.+ngton; mutual recriminations ensued and the Press got hold of the story (nothing ever remained a secret for long in the American capital). The general impression there was that Germany, once she were convinced of America's serious intentions to appeal if necessary to arms, would back down; and that now Mr.

Bryan was made to appear as a wrecker of the President's policy. His resignation thus became more necessary than ever, and Mr. Lansing, hitherto head of the State Department of Justice, replaced him.