The Ethics of Aristotle Part 31

before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire pa.s.sing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place.

Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].

But one obvious function of the feelings and pa.s.sions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler's Sermon II. and the First upon Compa.s.sion.

P. 133, l. 24. It is the opening statement of the Post a.n.a.lytics.

P. 133, l. 27. Aristotle in his logical a.n.a.lysis of Induction, Prior.

a.n.a.lytics II. 25, defines it to be "the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1) through the minor term." He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. "If of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus coextensive." The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take Aldrich's instance. All Magnets attract iron A B C are Magnets | Presupposed Syllogism reasoning A B C attract iron. / from an universal.

A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)

All Magnets are A B C (a.s.sumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive faculty)

All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)

Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C attract iron.

But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron.

Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says in the same place that for this reason we must _conceive_ ([Greek: noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above) as composed of all the Individuals.

If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity depends _entirely_ upon the quality of the particular mind which performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguis.h.i.+ng mark of Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss _literally_ false.

It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction _as the term is used by Aristotle_, a.n.a.lytica Prior. II 25 26 a.n.a.lytica Post. I.

1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.

P 133 1 32. The reference is made to the Post a.n.a.lyt I II and it is impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae]

draws its conclusions they are to be "true, first principles incapable of any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and causes of it." (See the appendix to this Book.)

P 134 1 12. This is the test of correct logical division, that the _membra dividentia_ shall be opposed, _i.e._ not included the one by the other. P. 134, l. 13. The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and [Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to prove that connection to be "coextensiveness," we predicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics, 1. vi.

P. 135, l. 2. See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]--Luke xvi. 8.

P. 135, l. 5. Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath' ekasta pepaideumenos] of Book I. chap. 1.

P. 135, l. 35. The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are the two Principles of our moral const.i.tution naturally supreme and "Conscience and Self-Love, _if we understand our true happiness_, always lead us the same way." Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.

And again:

"If by _a sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the principle of Virtue or Moral Rect.i.tude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be improved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is there for Moralists to disclaim this principle." From the note on sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, a.n.a.logy, part I chap. v.

P. 136, l. 6. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.

The student will find it worth while to compare this pa.s.sage with the following--Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d' exis to ommati touto k. t. l]--vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.]

vii. 9.--[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]--iii. 7 _ad finem_. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]

P. 136, l. 15. This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom.

In popular language we use the term "wiser man," as readily as "better artist" really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous epainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.

P. 136, l. 17. He would be a _better Chymist_ who should poison intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that "Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum." P. 137, l. 13. The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:----] here. "Then wrought Bezaleel and Ahohab, and every _wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put wisdom and understanding_ to know how to work all manner of work for the service of the Sanctuary" Exodus x.x.xvi. i.

P. 137 l. 27. [Greek:----] and [Greek:----], (in the strict sense, for it is used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole function [Greek:----], [Greek:----] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ----] supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ----] might exist independent of [Greek:----], but not this without that.

Put the two together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being [Greek:----]. There are three branches of [Greek:----] according to Greek Philosophy, [Greek:----], [Greek:----], [Greek:----]. Science is perhaps the nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.

P 137, l. 29. [Greek:----] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:----] would be its chief Instrument.

P. 138, l. 16. The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:----].

P. 139, l. 16. In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.

Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.

P. 139, l. 27. [Greek:----], "our mere Operatives in Public business."

(Chalmers.)

P. 139, l. 32. Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is [Greek:----] proper) or not-Self, _i.e._ either one's family=[Greek:----], or one's community=[Greek:----], but here the supreme and subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Greek:----], the latter [Greek:----] proper, whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.

P. 140, l. 16. But where can this be done, if there be no community?

see Horace's account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv.

105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, a.n.a.logy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.

The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler's first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence in _fact_ of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence _i.e._ love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].

P. 140, l. 17. More truly "implied," namely, that Practical Wisdom results from experience.

P. 140, l. 23. This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.

P. 140, l. 27. An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei].

(Book 1. chap. viii.)

P. 141, l. 1. Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.

P. 141, l. 12. I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense, "Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind." In a pa.s.sage so utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take much trouble about such a point.

P. 141, l. 25. The definition of it in the Organon (Post a.n.a.lyt. 1.

xxiv.), "a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it."

The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation the rapid ascertaining of which const.i.tutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun. The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side next to the sun.

P. 141, l. 34. Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.

P. 142, l. 19. The End does not sanctify the Means.

P. 142, l. 28. The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right means to the Grand End of all. P. 142,1. 34. The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].

P. 143,1 27. We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].

P. 144, 1 i. Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action.

[Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).