A History of Sea Power Part 30

The contacts made by British destroyers and cruisers confirm the accounts of the Germans as to the course of their fleet during the night. About nine o'clock Scheer changed course sharply from west to southeast and cut through the rear of the British fleet.

At dawn, about 2.40, he was twenty miles to eastward of Jellicoe on the road to Wilhelmshaven. At noon the greater part of the German fleet was safe in port. Some of the lighter s.h.i.+ps, to escape the a.s.saults of the British destroyers during the night, headed north and got home by way of the Skagerrak and the Kiel Ca.n.a.l.

Jellicoe had avoided a night pursuit for the sake of fighting on better terms the next morning, but at dawn he found his destroyers scattered far and wide. Judging it unwise to pursue the High Seas Fleet without a screening force, and discovering by directional wireless that it was already south of Horn Reef and in the neighborhood of the mine fields, he gave up the idea of renewing the engagement and turned north. He spent the forenoon in sweeping the scene of the previous day's fighting, collecting his dispersed units, and then returned to his bases.

The claim of victory, which was promptly and loudly made by the German press, is absurd enough. After the Grand Fleet arrived there could be only one thought for the Germans and that was a fighting retreat. Nevertheless, they had every reason to be proud of what they had done. They had met a force superior by a ratio of about 8 to 5 and had escaped after inflicting nearly twice as much damage as they had sustained. These losses may be compared by means of the following table[1]:

BRITISH, Three Battle Cruisers, QUEEN MARY 26,350 tons INDEFATIGABLE 18,800 "

INVINCIBLE 17,250 "

Three Armored Cruisers, DEFENSE 14,600 "

WARRIOR 13,550 "

BLACK PRINCE 13,350 "

Eight Destroyers, TIPPERARY 1,430 "

NESTOR 890 "

NOMAD 890 "

TURBULENT 1,100 "

FORTUNE 965 "

ARDENT 935 "

SHARK 935 "

SPARROWHAWK 935 "

------------ Total 111,980 tons

GERMANS, One Battle Cruiser LUETZOW 26,180 tons One Pre-dreadnought, POMMERN 13,200 "

Four Light Cruisers, WIESBADEN 5,400 "

ELBING 4,500 "

ROSTOCK 4,900 "

FRAUENLOB 2,700 "

Five Destroyers, V-4 570 "

V-48 750 "

V-27 640 "

V-29 640 "

S-33 700 "

------------ Total 60,180 tons

Personnel, killed and wounded: BRITISH, about 6,600: GERMANS, 3,076.

[Footnote 1: Figures in these tables taken from Lieut. Comdr. H.

H. Frost, U. S. N., _U. S. Naval Inst.i.tute Proceedings_, Jan., 1920, p. 84.]

With all allowance for the poor visibility conditions and the deepening twilight, it must be admitted also that Scheer handled his s.h.i.+ps with great skill. Caught in a noose by an overwhelming force, he disentangled himself by means of the torpedo attacks of his destroyer flotillas and turned away under cover of their smoke screens. After nightfall he boldly cut through the rear of the British fleet in battle line, and reached his base in safety with the great bulk of his s.h.i.+ps. Meanwhile at practically all stages of the fighting German gunnery was both rapid and accurate, the seamans.h.i.+p was admirable, and there was no lack of courage of the highest order.

As to material, Admiral Jellicoe notes the superiority of the German fleet in range-finding devices, searchlights, smoke screens, a star sh.e.l.l--unknown to the British and invaluable for night fighting--and in the armor piercing quality of the sh.e.l.ls. Moreover the Germans were completely equipped with systems of director firing, while the British were not. According to Admiral Sir Percy Scott,[1]

"at the Battle of Jutland ... the commander in chief had only six s.h.i.+ps of his fleet completely fitted with director firing ... he had not a single cruiser in the fleet fitted for director firing."

[Footnote 1: FIFTY YEARS IN THE ROYAL NAVY, p. 278.]

The greatest superiority of all probably lay in the structural features of the newer German s.h.i.+ps. For some years prior to the war Admiral von Tirpitz had devoted himself to the problem of under water protection, to localize the effect of torpedo and mine on the hull of a s.h.i.+p. To quote the words of von Tirpitz:[2]

[Footnote 2: MY MEMOIRS, Vol. I, p. 171.]

"We built a section of a modern s.h.i.+p by itself and carried out experimental explosions on it with torpedo heads, carefully testing the result every time. We tested the possibility of weakening the force of the explosion by letting the explosive gases burst in empty compartments without meeting any resistance. We ascertained the most suitable steel for the different structural parts, and found further that the effect of the explosion was nullified if we compelled it to pulverize coal in any considerable quant.i.ty.

This resulted in a special arrangement of the coal bunkers. We were then able to meet the force of the explosion ... by a strong, carefully constructed steel wall which finally secured the safety of the interior of the s.h.i.+p."

The only German armored s.h.i.+p that succ.u.mbed to the blow of a single torpedo was the _Pommern_, an old vessel, built before the fruits of these experiments were embodied in the German fleet. The labor of von Tirpitz was well justified by the results, as may be seen by the instantaneous fas.h.i.+on in which the three British battle cruisers went to the bottom, compared with the ability of the German battle cruisers to stand terrific pounding and yet stay afloat and keep going. According to the testimony of a German officer,[1] the _Lutzow_ was literally shot to pieces in the battle and even then it took three torpedoes to settle her. Actually she was sunk by opening her seac.o.c.ks to prevent her possible capture. The remarkable ability of the battle cruiser _Goben_, in Turkish waters, to survive sh.e.l.l, mines, and torpedo, bears the same testimony, as does the _Mainz_, which, in the action of the Heligoland Bight had to be sunk by one of her own officers, as in the case of the _Lutzow_.

It is possible that Jellicoe a.s.sumed an inferiority of the British armor piercing sh.e.l.l because of this power of the German s.h.i.+ps to stay afloat. But photographs published after the armistice showed that British sh.e.l.ls penetrated the 11-inch turret armor of the _Seydlitz_ and the 13-inch of the _Derfflinger_ with frightful effect. The difference was in the fact that they did not succeed in sinking those s.h.i.+ps, which, after all is the chief object of a sh.e.l.l, and this must be attributed to better under-water construction.

[Footnote 1: Quoted in _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 24, 1919, p. 822.]

The only criticism it seems possible to suggest on Scheer's tactics is the unwariness of his pursuit, which might so easily have led to the total destruction of the German fleet. Strangely enough, although a Zeppelin hovered over the British fleet at dawn of the day after the battle, no aircraft of any kind scouted ahead of the Germans the day before. In pursuing Beatty, Scheer had to take a chance, well aware that if the Grand Fleet were within reach, Beatty's wireless would bring it upon him. But Scheer was evidently perfectly willing to risk the encounter. Such criticism as arose in Germany--from Captain Persius, for example--centered on "Tirpitz's faulty constructional methods"; which, in the light of the facts of the battle would seem to be the very last thing to hit upon.

As for types and weapons it is clear that the armored cruisers served only as good targets and death traps. The British would have been better off if every armored cruiser had been left at home. The dominating feature of the story is the influence of the torpedo on Jellicoe's tactics. It is fair to say that it was the Parthian tactics of the German destroyer, both actual and potential, that saved the High Seas Fleet and robbed the British of a greater Trafalgar. At every crisis in the battle it was either what the German destroyer did or might do that governed the British commander's maneuvers. At the time of deployment he formed on the farthest rather than on the nearest division because of what German destroyers might do. When the Grand Fleet swung away to the east and lost all contact with their enemy for the rest of the battle, it was because of a destroyer attack. At this time eleven destroyers accomplished the feat of driving 27 dreadnoughts from the field!

Again, the pursuit was called off at nightfall because of the peril of destroyer attacks under cover of darkness, and finally Jellicoe decided not to risk an action the following morning because his capital s.h.i.+ps had no screening forces against the torpedo of the enemy. It is worth noting in this connection that although the Admiralty were aware of the battle in progress, they held back the Harwich force of destroyers and light cruisers which would have proved a welcome reenforcement in pursuing the retreating fleet.

The reason for this decision has never been published.

In connection with the important part played by the German destroyers at Jutland it is worth remarking that before the war it was the Admiralty doctrine that destroyers could not operate successfully by day, and they were accordingly painted black for night service.

The German destroyers were painted gray. After Jutland the British flotillas also were painted the battles.h.i.+p gray.

Naturally the failure of the superior fleet to crush the inferior one aroused a storm of criticism, the most severe emanating from English naval writers. The sum and substance is the charge of overcaution on the part of the British Commander in Chief. It is held that Jellicoe should have formed his battle line on his starboard instead of his port wing, thus turning toward the enemy and concentrating on the head of their column at once. Forming on the port division caused the battle fleet to swerve away from the enemy and open the range just at the critical moment of contact, leaving Beatty unsupported in his dash across the head of the enemy's line. It is said that the latter even sent a signal to the _Marlborough_ for the battles.h.i.+ps to fall in astern of him, and the failure to do so made his maneuver fruitless. Apparently this message was not transmitted to the flags.h.i.+p at the time. In answer Jellicoe explains in great detail that the preliminary reports received from Goodenough and others as to the position of the High Seas Fleet were so meager and conflicting that he could not form line of battle earlier than he did, and secondly that deploying on the starboard division at the moment of sighting the enemy would have thrown the entire battle fleet into confusion, blanketed their fire, and created a dangerous opening for torpedo attack from the destroyers at the head of the German column. On this point Scheer agrees with the critics. Deploying on the starboard division instead of the port, he says, "would have greatly impeded our movements and rendered a fresh attack on the enemy's line extremely difficult."

The second point of criticism rested on the turning away of the battles.h.i.+ps at the critical point of the torpedo attack at 7.20, under cover of which the German battles.h.i.+ps wheeled to westward and disappeared. Jellicoe's reply is that if he had swung to starboard, turning toward the enemy, he would have headed into streams of approaching torpedoes under conditions of mist and smoke that were ideal for torpedo attack, and if he had maintained position in line ahead he would have courted heavy losses. In connection with this turn he calls attention to the fact that British light cruisers and destroyers could not be used to deliver a counter attack because, on account of the rapid changes of course and formation made by the battlefleet, they had been unable to reach their proper station in the van.

Thirdly, if conditions for night battle were too risky why did the Grand Fleet fail to keep sufficient touch with the enemy by means of its light flotillas so as to be informed of his movements and prevent his escape? There were frequent contacts during that short night, and the Germans were sighted steering southeast. The attacks made by British destroyers certainly threw the German line into confusion, and some of the light vessels were driven to the north, reaching German bases by way of the Baltic. Nevertheless the fleet succeeded in cutting through without serious loss. To this there seems to be no answer.

Lastly, to the query why Jellicoe did not seek another action in the morning, as originally intended, he replies that he discovered by directional wireless that the Germans were already safe between the mine fields and the coast, and that he could not safely proceed without his screening force of destroyers and light cruisers, which, after their night operations, were widely scattered. From German accounts, however, we find no mention of a shelter behind mine fields, but astonishment at the fact that they were permitted to go on their way unmolested. Morning found the two fleets only twenty miles apart, and the Germans had a half day's steaming before they could reach port. They were in no condition to fight. The battles.h.i.+p _Ostfriesland_ had struck a mine and had to be towed. The battle cruiser _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to keep her from sinking, and other units were limping along with their gun decks almost awash.

Certainly the tactics of Jellicoe do not suggest those of Blake, Hawke, or Nelson. They do not fit Farragut's motto--borrowed from Danton[1]--"l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace," or Napoleon's "frappez vite, frappez fort." War, as has been observed before, cannot be waged without taking risks. The British had a heavy margin to gamble on. As it happened, 23 out of the entire 28 battles.h.i.+ps came out of the fight without so much as a scratch on their paint; and, after deployment, only one out of the battle line of 27 dreadnoughts received a single hit. This was the _Colossus_, which had four men wounded by a sh.e.l.l.

[Footnote 1: And borrowed by Danton from Cicero.]

The touchstone of naval excellence is Nelson. As Mahan has so ably pointed out, while weapons change principles remain. Dewey, in deciding to take the chances involved in a night entry of Manila Bay did so in answer to his own question, "What would Farragut do?" Hence in considering Jutland one may take a broader view than merely a criticism of tactics. In a word, does the whole conduct of the affair reveal the method and spirit of Nelson?

At Trafalgar there was no need for a deployment after the enemy was sighted because in the words of the famous Memorandum, "the order of sailing is to be the order of battle." The tactics to be followed when the French appeared had been carefully explained by Nelson to his commanders. No signal was needed--except the fine touch of inspiration in "England expects every man to do his duty."

In brief, the British fleet had been so thoroughly indoctrinated, and the plan was so simple, that there was no room for hesitation, uncertainty, or dependence on the flags.h.i.+p for orders at the last minute. It is hard to see evidence of any such indoctrination of the Grand Fleet before Jutland.

Again, Nelson was, by example and precept, constantly insisting on the initiative of the subordinate. "The Second in Command will ... have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.... Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his s.h.i.+p alongside that of an enemy." At Jutland, despite the urgent signals of Beatty at two critical moments, neither Burney of the sixth division nor Jerram of the first felt free to act independently of the orders of the Commander in Chief. The latter tried, as Nelson emphatically did not, to control from the flags.h.i.+p every movement of the entire fleet.

Further, if naval history has taught anything it has established a point so closely related to the responsibility and initiative of the subordinate as to be almost a part of it; namely, a great fleet that fights in a single rigid line ahead never achieves a decisive victory. Blake, Tromp, and de Ruyter fought with squadrons, expecting--indeed demanding--initiative on the part of their flag officers. That was the period when great and decisive victories were won. The close of the 17th century produced the "Fighting Instructions," requiring the unbroken line ahead, and there followed a hundred years of indecisive battles and bungled opportunities. Then Nelson came and revived the untrammeled tactics of the days of Blake with the added glory of his own genius. It appears that at Jutland the battles.h.i.+ps were held to a rigid unit of fleet formation as in the days of the Duke of York or Admiral Graves. And concentration with a long line of dreadnoughts is no more possible to-day than it was with a similar line of two-decked sailing s.h.i.+ps a century and a half ago.

Finally, in the matter of spirit, the considerations that swayed the movements of the Grand Fleet at all stages were apparently those of what the enemy might do instead of what might be done to the enemy, the very ant.i.thesis of the spirit of Nelson. It is no reflection on the personal courage of the Commander in Chief that he should be moved by the consideration of saving his s.h.i.+ps.

The existence of the Grand Fleet was, of course, essential to the Allied cause, and there was a heavy weight of responsibility hanging on its use. But again it is a matter of naval doctrine. Did the British fleet exist merely to maintain a numerical preponderance over its enemy or to crush that enemy--whatever the cost? If the battle of Jutland receives the stamp of approval as the best that could have been done, then the British or the American officer of the future will know that he is expected primarily to "play safe."

But he will never tread the path of Blake, Hawke, or Nelson, the men who made the traditions of the Service and forged the anchors of the British Empire.

Thus the great battle turned out to be indecisive; in fact, it elated the Germans with a feeling of success and depressed the British with a keen sense of failure. Nevertheless, the control of the sea remained in the hands of the English, and never again did the High Seas Fleet risk another encounter. The relative positions at sea of the two adversaries therefore remained unaltered.

On the other hand, if the British had destroyed the German fleet the victory would have been priceless. As Jervis remarked at Cape St. Vincent, "A victory is very essential to England at this hour."

The spring of 1916 was an ebb point in Allied prospects. The Verdun offensive was not halted, the Somme drive had not yet begun, the Russians were beaten far back in their own territory, the Italians had retreated, and there was rebellion in Ireland. The annihilation of the High Seas Fleet would have reversed the situation with dramatic suddenness and would have at least marked the turning point of the war. Without a German battle fleet, the British could have forced the fighting almost to the very harbors of the German coast--bottling up every exit by a barrage of mines. The blockade, therefore, could have been drawn close to the coast defenses. Moreover, with the High Seas Fleet gone, the British fleet could have entered and taken possession of the Baltic, which throughout the war remained a German lake. By this move England would have threatened the German Baltic coast with invasion and extended her blockade in a highly important locality, cutting off the trade between Sweden and Germany. She would also have come to the relief of Russia, which was suffering terrible losses from the lack of munitions. Indeed it would have saved that ally from the collapse that withdrew her from the war.