The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 46

20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.

In the Brihad-aranyaka (V, 5) it is said that Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the orb of the sun and within the right eye; and then the text mentions two secret names of Brahman--_aham_ and _ahar_.

Here the Purvapaks.h.i.+n holds that both these names are to be comprehended in each of the two meditations 'On account of connexion,' i.e. on account of the object of meditation, i.e. Brahman being one only, although connected with different abodes, it is 'thus elsewhere also,' i.

e. the same conclusion which had been arrived at in the case of the Sandilya-vidyas, has to be accepted with regard to Brahman abiding in the sun and in the eye. The meditation is one only, and hence the two secret names apply to Brahman in both its abodes.--This view the next Sutra negatives.

21. Or not so, on account of difference.

This is not so, for as Brahman is to be meditated upon in two different abodes, the meditations are separate. In both the Sandilya-vidyas, on the other hand, Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the heart.

22. The text also declares this.

That the qualities of that which abides within the sun and that which abides in the eye are not to be combined, the text itself moreover shows by specially stating that the characteristics of the one are those of the other. For such a special transfer of qualities is needed only where the qualities are not of themselves established, i.e. where the two things are naturally different.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion,'

23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the sky.

In the Taittiriyaka and in the khilas of the Ranayaniyas we have the following pa.s.sage: 'Gathered together are the powers among which Brahman is the oldest; Brahman as the oldest in the beginning stretched out the sky. Brahman was born as the first of all beings; who may rival that Brahman?' which declares that Brahman gathered together all the most ancient powers, that it pervades the sky, and so on. And as these attributes are not stated in connexion with any special meditation, we must infer that they are to be included in all meditations whatever on Brahman.--This prima facie view is controverted by the Sutra. The holding together of all powers, &c., although not mentioned in connexion with any special meditation, is not to be included in all meditations whatever, but to be connected with particular meditations 'on the same ground,' i.e. according to difference of place. _Where_ those qualities have to be included must be decided on the ground of feasibility. The attribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be included in a meditation on Brahman as abiding within a small place such as the heart, and hence the other attributes also which are stated together with the attribute mentioned cannot be included in those meditations. And when we find that in meditations on Brahman as abiding within a small place it is said that Brahman is greater than the earth, or that the ether within the heart is as great as the universal ether, these attributes cannot be taken in their literal sense and hence included in those meditations, but must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object proposed for meditation.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'holding together.'

24. And although (they both be) meditations on man; on account of others not being recorded.

In the Taittiriyaka as well as the Chandogya we meet with a meditation on man (purusha-vidya), in which parts of the sacrifice are fancifully identified with the parts of the human body.--Here the Purvapaks.h.i.+n maintains that these two meditations are identical; for, he says, both meditations have the same name (purusha-vidya), and the same character as stated above; and as the Taittiriyaka mentions no fruit of the meditation, the fruit declared in the Chandogya holds good for the Taittiriyaka also, and thus there is no difference of fruit.--This view the Sutra negatives. Although both meditations are meditations on man, yet they are separate 'on account of the others not being recorded,' i.e.

on account of the qualities recorded in one sakha not being recorded in the other. For the Taittiriyaka mentions the three libations, while the Chandogya does not, and so on. The character of the two meditations thus differs. And there is a difference of result also. For an examination of the context in the Taittiriyaka shows that the purusha-vidya is merely a subordinate part of a meditation on Brahman, the fruit of which the text declares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of Brahman; while the Chandogya meditation is an independent one, and has for its reward the attainment of long life. The two meditations are thus separate, and hence the details of one must not be included in the other.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the meditation on man.'

25. On account of the difference of sense of piercing and so on.

The text of the Atharvanikas exhibits at the beginning of their Upanishad some mantras, 'Pierce the sukra, pierce the heart.' The followers of the Sama-veda read at the beginning of their rahasya- brahmana 'O G.o.d Savitri, promote the sacrifice.' The Kathakas and the Taittiriyakas have 'May Mitra be propitious to us, may Varuna be propitious.' The Satyayanins have 'Thou art a white horse, a tawny and a black one!' The Kaus.h.i.+takins have a Brahmana referring to the Mahavrata- ceremony, 'Indra having slain Vritra became great.' The Kaus.h.i.+takins also have a Mahavrata-brahmana. 'Praj.a.pati is the year; his Self is that Mahavrata.' The Vajasaneyins have a Brahmana referring to the Pravargya, 'The G.o.ds sat down for a sattra-celebration.' With reference to all this a doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial works referred to in the Brahmana texts form parts of the meditations enjoined in the Upanishads or not.--The Purvapaks.h.i.+n affirms this, on the ground that as the mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of the meditations the idea of their forming parts of the latter naturally presents itself. Such mantras as 'pierce the heart' and works such as the pravargya may indeed--on the basis of direct statement (sruti), inferential mark (linga), and syntactical connexion (vakya), which are stronger than mere proximity--be understood to be connected with certain actions; but, on the other hand, mantras such as 'May Varuna be propitious' have no application elsewhere, and are suitable introductions to meditations. We therefore take them to be parts of the meditations, and hence hold that those mantras are to be included in all meditations.--This view the Sutra sets aside 'on account of the difference of sense of piercing, and so on.' The inferential marks contained in texts such as 'pierce the sukra, pierce the heart'; 'I shall speak the right, I shall speak the true,' show that the mantras have an application in connexion with certain magical practices, or else the study of the Veda, and the like, and do not therefore form part of meditations. That is to say--in the same way as the mantra 'pierce the heart' enables us to infer that also the mantra 'pierce the sukra'

belongs to some magical rite, so we infer from the special meaning of mantras such as 'I shall speak the right,' &c., that also mantras such as 'May Mitra be propitious' are connected with the study of the Veda, and do not therefore form part of meditations. That mantras of this kind and Brahmana pa.s.sages relative to the Pravargya and the like are placed at the beginning of Upanishads is owing to their having, like the latter, to be studied in the forest.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'piercing and the like.'

26. But in the case of the getting rid of (it has to be combined with the obtaining), as it is supplementary to statements of obtaining; as in the case of the kusas, the metres, the praise, and the singing. This has been explained.

The Chandogas read in their text 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Rahu, I obtain the world of Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 13). The Atharvanikas have 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil, free from pa.s.sion, reaches the highest oneness.' The Satyayanins have 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done.' The Kaus.h.i.+takins 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds.

His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done.' Two of these texts mention only the shaking off, on the part of him who knows, of his good and evil works; one mentions only the obtainment of these works, on the part of friends and enemies; and one mentions both these occurrences.--Now both the occurrences, although mentioned in several meditations, must be considered elements of all meditations: for whoever, on the basis of a knowledge of Brahman, reaches Brahman, necessarily leaves behind all his good and evil works, and those works unless thus left behind cannot be obtained by others.

Meditation on those two matters therefore enters as an element into all meditations. The doubtful point, however, is whether there is option between the meditation on the abandonment of works, and that on the obtainment of works by others, and that on both these events; or whether in each case all these meditations are to be combined.--There is option, the Purvapaks.h.i.+n holds; for the reason that the texts make different declarations on this point. For, if the meditations had to be combined, there would be in each case meditation on both the matters mentioned; and as such double meditation is established by the Kaus.h.i.+takin text, it would follow that the statements of the other texts are without meaning.

Thus the only motive for the declarations made in different places can be to allow option. Nor must this conclusion be controverted on the ground that declarations of the same matter, made in different places, are made with reference to the difference of students severally reading the several texts; for this holds good in those cases only where identical statements are made in different texts; while in the case under discussion two sakhas mention the abandonment of works, and one their pa.s.sing over to other persons. Nor can you account for the difference of statement on the ground of difference of vidyas; for you yourself maintain that the meditations in question form part of all meditations.--This view the Sutra impugns, 'but where the getting rid of is mentioned,' &c. Where a text mentions either the abandonment only of works or only their being obtained by others, both these matters must necessarily be combined, since the statement as to the works being obtained forms a supplement to the statement of their being abandoned.

For the former statement declares the place to which the good and evil works, got rid of by him who knows Brahman, are transferred.--This supplementary relation of two statements the Sutra ill.u.s.trates by some parallel cases. A clause in the text of the Satyayanins, 'the kusas are the children of the udumbara tree,' forms a defining supplement to a more general statement in the text of the Kaus.h.i.+takins, 'the kusas are the children of the tree.' The clause, 'the metres of the G.o.ds are prior,'

defines the order of the metres which in other texts mentioning 'the metres of the G.o.ds and Asuras' had been left undefined, and therefore forms a supplement to those texts. a.n.a.logous is the relation of the clause, 'he a.s.sists the stotra of the shodasin when the sun has half risen,' to the less definite statement 'he a.s.sists with gold the stotra of the shodasin;' and the relation of the clause, 'the adhvaryu is not to sing,' to the general injunction 'all the priests join in the singing.'

Unless we admit that one statement, which defines some other more general statement, may stand to the latter in a supplementary relation, we are driven to a.s.sume an optional proceeding, and this is objectionable as long as there is any other way open; according to a principle laid down in the Purva Mimamsa (X, 8, 15). As the clauses referring to the abandonment of the works, and those referring to their being taken up by others, thus form one connected whole, there is no such thing as mere abandonment and mere taking up, and hence there can be no option between the two. That the text of the Kaus.h.i.+takins mentions both thus explains itself, on the ground that the several declarations of what is really only one and the same matter are directed to different hearers.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'getting rid of.'

27. At departing; there being nothing to be reached. For thus others (also declare).

The further question arises whether the putting off of all good and evil deeds takes place only at the time when the soul leaves the body, or also after it has departed and is on its journey to the world of Brahman.

The Purvapaks.h.i.+n holds the latter view, for, he says, the texts declare both. The Kaus.h.i.+takins say that the soul shakes off its good and evil deeds when it crosses the river Viraja in the world of Brahman; while the Tandins say 'Shaking off all evil, and shaking off the body,' &c., which shows that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body. And when the Satyayanaka says that 'his sons obtain his inheritance, his friends his good deeds,' and so on, this also intimates that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body.

We therefore must conclude that a part of the deeds is left behind at the moment of death, and the remainder on the journey to the world of Brahman.--This view the Sutra controverts. All the good and evil deeds of the dying man are left behind, without remainder, at the time when the soul parts from the body. For after the soul of him who knows has departed from the body, 'there is nothing to be reached,' i.e. there are no further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result of good and evil deeds, different from the obtaining of Brahman, which is the fruit of knowledge. Thus others 'also declare that, subsequently to the soul's departure from the body, there is no enjoyment of any pain or pleasure different from the obtaining of Brahman. 'But when he is free of the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him'; 'Thus does that serene being, rising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1; 3); 'For him there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body); then he will be perfect' (VI, 14, 2).

28. As it is desired; on account of there being no contradiction of either.

The time when good and evil deeds are left behind thus having been determined on the basis of the reason of the thing, the several words of the pa.s.sages must be construed as it is desired, i.e. so as not to contradict either, i.e. either the declaration of scripture or the reason of the thing. Thus in the text of the Kaus.h.i.+takins the later clause, 'he shakes off his good and evil deeds,' must be taken as coming before the earlier pa.s.sage 'having entered on that path of the G.o.ds.'-- Here the Purvapaks.h.i.+n raises a new objection.

29. There is meaning of the soul's going (only) on the twofold hypothesis; for otherwise there is contradiction.

It is only on the hypothesis of a part of the good and evil works being left behind at the time of the soul's departure from the body, and another part later on, and the effacement of works thus taking place in a double way, that a sense can be found in the scriptural declaration of the soul proceeding on the path of the G.o.ds. For otherwise there would be a contradiction. For if all the works perished at the time of the soul's departure from the body, the subtle body also would perish, and if this were so, no going on the part of the mere Self would be possible.

It is not therefore possible that at the time of the soul's departure from the body all works should perish without a remainder.--To this the next Sutra replies.

30. (That a.s.sumption) is justified; on account of the perception of things which are marks of that; as in ordinary experience.

The a.s.sumption of all the works peris.h.i.+ng at the time of 'departure'

involves no contradiction; since we perceive, in the sacred texts, matters which are marks of connexion with a body even on the part of the soul which has divested itself of all its works and become manifest in its true nature. Compare 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form'; 'He moves about there laughing, playing, and rejoicing'; 'He becomes a self-ruler, he moves about in all worlds according to his will'; 'He becomes one, he becomes three,' &c.

(Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2). All these texts refer to the soul's connexion with a body. The soul therefore, joined to the subtle body, may proceed on the path of the G.o.ds, even after all its works have pa.s.sed away. But how can the subtle body persist, when the works which originate it have pa.s.sed away? Through the power of knowledge, we reply.

Knowledge does not indeed by itself originate the subtle body, but it possesses the power of making that body persist, even after the gross body--which is the instrument for the experience of all ordinary pains and pleasures--and all works have pa.s.sed away, so as thereby to make the soul capable of moving on the path of the G.o.ds, and thus to obtain Brahman which is the fruit of knowledge. 'As in ordinary life.' As in ordinary life, a tank, which may have been made with a view to the irrigation of rice-fields and the like, is maintained and used for the purpose of drawing drinking-water, and so on, even after the intentions which originally led to its being made have pa.s.sed away.--Here an objection is raised. It may be admitted, that at the time when a man possessing true knowledge dies, all his works pa.s.s away without a remainder, and that the subtle body only remains, enabling him to move towards Brahman; but it cannot be held that the soul in that state does not experience pain and pleasure; for we know from sacred tradition that Vasishtha, Avantara-tamas, and others, who had reached intuition of the highest truth, entered after death on other embodiments, and experienced pain and pleasure due to the birth of sons, various calamities, and so on.--To this the next Sutra replies.

31. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of their works) as long as the office lasts.

We do not maintain that all those who have reached true knowledge divest themselves at the time of death of all their good and evil works; we limit our view to those who immediately after death attain to moving on the path, the first stage of which is light. Persons like Vasishtha, on the other hand, who are entrusted with certain offices, do not immediately after death attain to moving on the path beginning with light, since the duties undertaken by them are not completely accomplished. In the case of beings of this kind, who owing to particular deeds have been appointed to particular offices, the effect of the works which gave rise to the office does not pa.s.s away before those offices are completely accomplished; for the effect of a work is exhausted only through the complete enjoyment of its result. In the case of those persons, therefore, the effects of the works which gave rise to their office continue to exist as long as the office itself, and hence they do not after death enter on the path beginning with light.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'pa.s.sing away.'