An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake Part 3

------------------------------------------------------------------- Northern San Andreas 2:30 a.m. 3,000 12,000 2:00 p.m. 10,000 37,000 4:30 p.m. 11,000 44,000

Hayward 2:30 a.m. 3,000 13,000 2:00 p.m. 8,000 30,000 4:30 p.m. 7,000 27,000

Southern San Andreas 2:30 a.m. 3,000 12,000 2:00 p.m. 12,000 50,000 4:30 p.m. 14,000 55,000

Newport-Inglewood 2:30 a.m. 4,000 18,000 2:00 p.m. 21,000 83,000 4:30 p.m. 23,000 91,000 ---------- [1] Uncertain by a possible factor of two to three.

[2] Injuries not requiring hospitalization are estimated to be from 15 to 30 times the number of deaths.

D. OVERVIEW OF OTHER TYPES OF DAMAGE

For this a.s.sessment, estimates of damage to substantial numbers of different type facilities essential to the immediate response capability were updated. Earthquakes a.s.sociated with the same four major fault systems identified earlier in this chapter were used as a basis for these estimates. The types of facilities a.n.a.lyzed included _hospitals_, _medical supply storages_, _blood banks_, and _custodial care homes_, together with their essential services and personnel resources. Although newer hospitals in California are being built according to substantially improved seismic safety standards and practices, older hospital facilities can be expected to be poorly resistant to earthquakes.

Among residential buildings, single family homes are expected to suffer structural damage and loss of contents. Damage to multifamily dwellings--particularly older buildings--would, in all likelihood, be more extensive. a.n.a.lysis of expected damage indicates that temporary housing for as many as 200,000 families might be needed--a requirement calling for careful planning and exceptional management skills.

Schools are judged to be among the safest facilities exposed to the earthquakes. Since pa.s.sage of the Field Act in 1933, after the Long Beach earthquake, school buildings in California have been continuously improved to withstand seismic hazards.

As a result of continuing and substantial upgrading of design and construction practices in the past 10 years, dams and reservoirs can be expected to show an improved performance in an earthquake.

Nonetheless, on a contingency basis, one dam failure might be a.s.sumed for each planning effort.

Realizing the fact that 84 key communications facilities, earth stations, Department of Defense voice and data switches, commercial transoceanic cable heads, Federal Telecommunications System switches, and major direct distance dial switches are located within 55 miles of either Los Angeles or San Francisco, damage must be expected to occur.

With this realization, priorities have been a.s.signed to all critical circuits transiting the key facilities, based on established criteria of criticality of service continuity. _National warning systems circuitry, command and control circuits, and circuits supporting diplomatic negotiations_ (of which a high concentration exists in California) are examples of those circuits carrying high-restoration priority.

In the civil sector there would be 24 to 72 hours of minimal communications, with a possible blackout of telephonic communications in the area immediately following an earthquake. The commercial carriers would inst.i.tute network control procedures to regain control of the situation as fast as possible.

The impact on transportation facilities in any of the four hypothesized earthquakes could be ma.s.sive. Since the magnitude and severity is unprecedented in recent years, conclusions regarding losses must be accepted as tentative. As in the case of hospitals, however, the lessons learned in earthquakes during the past 10 years are being incorporated in the design and construction of new facilities.

In general, all major transportation modes would be affected--_highways_, _streets_, _overpa.s.ses and bridges_, _ma.s.s transit systems_, _railroads_, _airports_, _pipelines_, and _ocean terminals_, although major variances in losses are expected among the modes. From a purely structural standpoint, the more rigid or elevated systems (such as railroads and pipelines) which cross major faults on an east-west axis would incur the heaviest damage, with initial losses approaching 100 percent. Other major systems (such as highways, airports, and pile-supported piers at water terminals) have better survivability characteristics and therefore would fare much better, with damage generally in the moderate range of 15 to 30 percent. These transportation facility loss estimates are stated in terms of immediate post-quake effects. They do not reflect the impact of priority emergency recovery efforts and expedient alternatives that are available, some within hours, to aid in restoration of transportation capacity. In addition, transportation systems generally have an inherently significant degree of redundancy and flexibility.

Consequently, an unquantified but significant movement capability in all transport modes is expected to survive. Finally, these loss estimates do not take into account the question of availability of essential supporting resources, particularly petroleum fuels, electricity, and communications. In the initial response phase, these could prove to be the most limiting factors in the capability of the transportation system.

Business and industry would be affected by damage to office buildings, plants, and other support facilities. Although the 1971 San Fernando earthquake occurred on the margin of a largely suburban area, industrial facilities incurred significant damage. For example, several buildings of the kind commonly used for light industry or warehouses suffered from collapsed roofs or walls. Generally, building codes do not apply to special industrial facilities, and the ability of these structures to resist earthquake shaking will depend largely on the foresight of the design engineer. For example, a major electrical power switching yard and a water filtration plant were seriously damaged in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake.

About 10 percent of the population and industrial resources of the Nation are located in California. Over 85 percent of these resources (or about 8.5 percent of the Nation's total) are located in the 21 California counties that are subject to the possibility of damage from a major earthquake. Much of the aeros.p.a.ce and electronics industry is centered in California. For example, about 56 percent of the guided missiles and s.p.a.ce vehicles, 40 percent of the semiconductors, 25 percent of the electronic computer equipment, and approximately 21 percent of the optical instruments and lenses manufactured in the Nation are manufactured in these 21 counties. The probability that all these counties would be affected by one earthquake is extremely remote; yet the significant concentration of key industries remains a concern. For example, about 25 percent of the Nation's semiconductors are manufactured in Santa Clara County, an area along the Northern San Andres fault that suffered very heavy damage in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Estimates of damage to these industrial facilities and the resulting loss of production have not been made. Similarly, the resulting impact of possible damage to national production has not been adequately a.n.a.lyzed.

Federally regulated financial inst.i.tutions were generically a.n.a.lyzed to determine their ability to continue to promote essential services in the event of a major earthquake like those that have been postulated for this a.s.sessment. The conclusion reached thus far is that large-magnitude earthquakes pose no significant or unantic.i.p.ated problems of solvency and liquidity for such inst.i.tutions. The Federal Reserve System and other regulatory ent.i.ties have procedures in place that are designed--and have been tested--specifically to provide for the continued operation of financial inst.i.tutions immediately following an earthquake or other emergency.

CHAPTER IV

AN a.s.sESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF READINESS CAPABILITY OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE

A. INTRODUCTION

An earthquake of catastrophic magnitude, with or without credible warning, happens suddenly. The potential for disaster, however, does not occur suddenly. The degree of preparedness and commitment to comprehensive planning and mitigation programs for the inevitable event will largely determine the degree of hards.h.i.+p to be experienced through loss of life, human suffering, property destruction, and the other related economic, social, and psychological aspects of disruption to day-to-day community activities. The impacts can be reduced substantially from current expected levels through the development and implementation of improved and more widely practiced earthquake hazards reduction measures. These include _coordinated emergency preparedness plans and procedures_, _earthquake prediction and warning systems_, _improved construction techniques_, and _effective public education and information programs_.

The State of California Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA conducted an a.n.a.lysis of the readiness capability for potential catastrophic earthquakes in California at the Federal, State, and local government levels. The planning of 22 counties and 38 cities, of 34 State agencies, and of 17 Federal organizations were reviewed with the following objectives: (a) identify opportunities for improvement; (b) provide a basis for making decisions that would strengthen program direction and planning efforts; and (c) specify resource needs and potential legislative initiatives. Annex 2 summarizes current Federal and California earthquake planning.

The environment in which preparedness planning in California occurs is characterized by the following observations of public expectations and att.i.tudes:

There is widespread public support for government action.

Most people have some ideas as to what government should be doing.

There is understanding of the need for hazard reduction as well as emergency response planning.

People are willing, in the abstract, to have government funds spent for hazard mitigation.

The public is not very satisfied with what government officials have done.

Public officials perceive that current preparedness plans and response are inadequate at best.

As discussed below, the review indicates that all is not well in earthquake plans and preparedness. Current plans and preparedness are judged to be adequate for the "moderate" earthquakes most likely to occur frequently in California. By moderate it is meant an event causing property damage on the order of $1 to $2 billion. Such an event, however, will severely tax existing resources and provide a major test of management relations.h.i.+p among different governmental jurisdictions and levels. For a catastrophic earthquake, current plans and preparedness are clearly inadequate, leading to a high likelihood that Federal, State, and local response activities would become disorganized and largely fail to perform effectively for an extended period of time.

B. STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE

Although there are widely differing approaches, local emergency planning in California generally consists of a basic plan and a series of contingency plans. The basic plan establishes the authority, sets forth references, addresses hazard vulnerability, states the planning a.s.sumptions, establishes an emergency services organization, a.s.signs tasks, formulates a mutual aid system, and directs the development of specific support annexes. For those hazards identified in the basic plan, a separate contingency plan is then developed to address the unique nature of the hazardous event. The contingency plan contains service support plans for each of the functional operations, including detailed standard operating procedures. The planning efforts of local jurisdictions are coordinated with adjacent jurisdictions and the California OES for consistency.

A plan is not considered complete without the support annexes which make the plan operational. The survey undertaken for this a.s.sessment disclosed that approximately 93 percent of the jurisdictions examined have existing, basic plans; 50 percent have completed annexes; 28 percent of the basic plans addressed an earthquake hazard vulnerability; 35 percent have planned for earthquake contingency; and only 1 percent (one city) has a plan to respond to an earthquake prediction.

At the State level, the California OES, as an integral part of the Governor's Office, functions as his immediate staff and coordinating organization in carrying out the State's emergency responsibilities.

Specific emergency a.s.signments have been made to 34 State agencies by the OES Director through a series of Administrative Orders. During emergencies the activities of these agencies and departments are coordinated by the California OES.

The State OES is also responsible for maintaining and updating the California Emergency Plan (CEP) and a.s.sociated readiness plans. As in the case of local plans, the basic doc.u.ment is supported by operational annexes as listed below:

CONTINGENCY MUTUAL AID

Earthquake Fire and Rescue Earthquake Prediction Law Enforcement Oil Spill Medical Nuclear Blackmail Utilities Reactor Accident Military Support Radioactive Material Incident Flood

SUPPORTING SYSTEMS EMERGENCY RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Warning Construction and Housing Emergency Broadcast System Economic Stabilization Emergency Public Information Food Intelligence Operations Health Radiological Defense Industrial Production Manpower Petroleum Telecommunications Transportation Utilities

Based on this planning concept, the review a.s.sessed quant.i.tatively the preparedness activities of the 34 State agencies that have preparedness responsibilities in accordance with the CEP. The quant.i.tative data are listed in the following table.

TABLE 4

QUANt.i.tATIVE a.s.sESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES

----------------------------------------------------------------- Number of Percent of Preparedness Element Agencies 34 Agencies ----------------------------------------------------------------- Existence of Plan 22 65 Conduct of Exercises 27 79 Public Education Activities 10 29 Public Information Activities 9 26 Operational Capability 32 94 -----------------------------------------------------------------

The quality of the plans, activities, and operational capabilities were then evaluated on a scale of 1 (expected to fail/inadequate) to 5 (expected to succeed well/adequate). The qualitative results are shown below.