An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake Part 4

TABLE 5

QUALITATIVE a.s.sESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES

---------------------------------------------------------- Preparedness Element Capability Rating ---------------------------------------------------------- Planning 2.67 Exercises 2.64 Public Education 1.44 Public Information 1.50 Operational Capability 2.91 ----------------------------------------------------------

It should be emphasized that these ratings apply to the State's _present_ level of planning and preparedness for response to a major destructive earthquake (magnitude 8), not a moderate (San Fernando-type) event.

C. FEDERAL RESPONSE

At the Federal level the princ.i.p.al capability to respond to a catastrophic earthquake in California resides in FEMA, the agency responsible by law to coordinate Federal activities in all emergencies. FEMA has developed a basic plan for supplemental Federal a.s.sistance for a major earthquake in the San Francis...o...b..y area. This plan, however, covers only the emergency phase of response (first few days of efforts to save lives and protect property). In addition, FEMA is partic.i.p.ating in a broader effort concentrating in Southern California. This cooperative effort is getting under way with State and local governments, other Federal departments, voluntary agencies, practicing professions, business and commercial interests, labor, educators, and researchers. It is expected to develop an effective program to respond to an earthquake or a credible earthquake prediction in that part of the State. The emphasis is being placed on _public safety, reduction of property damage, self-help on the part of individuals, socioeconomic impacts, improved response and long-range recovery planning, mitigation activities, and public partic.i.p.ation for both the post-prediction and immediate post-earthquake periods_. This pilot effort is expected to be usable in other highly seismic areas of California as well as in other States.

In the event of a catastrophic earthquake, a substantial number of Federal agencies would provide support to and be coordinated by FEMA.

Ill.u.s.trative are the following:

1. Department of Defense (DOD)

Initially, local military commanders may provide necessary support to save lives, alleviate suffering, or mitigate property damage. Normally, additional DOD resources would not be committed until a presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster.

When this occurs, the Secretary of the Army is DOD Executive Agent for military support. The Commander, Sixth U.S. Army, at the Presidio, San Francisco, has been further delegated authority to coordinate disaster relief operations in the western portion of the United States.

Extensive planning and coordination have taken place between the Sixth U.S. Army and FEMA Region IX. DOD emergency functions include: _damage survey_, _search and rescue_, _emergency medical care_, _identification and disposition of dead_, _emergency debris clearance_, _emergency roads and bridge construction_, _airfield repair_, and _identification and demolition of unsafe structures_.

Specific units have been identified to respond to an earthquake in any of the major population centers of California. For example, at this time the following units would be prepared for commitment within 8 hours after a disaster is declared by the President:

Six medical units with a 1,320 bed capacity

Seven helicopter units with 90 utility helicopters and 36 medium helicopters

One Infantry brigade of 1,500 personnel

Two engineer units with 78 pieces of heavy equipment

Two transportation units with 124 cargo trucks and trailers

These as well as additional DOD a.s.sets could be made available, contingent on defense priorities.

2. The National Communication System

This Agency's plan, the "National Plan for Communications Support in Emergencies and Major Disasters," provides for planning and using national telecommunications a.s.sets and resources during presidentially declared emergencies and major disasters. The plan, which has been exercised repeatedly in past disasters, provides the management structure and the communications staff to support FEMA. Restoration priorities have been a.s.signed to all critical circuits.

3. Department of Transportation (DOT)

DOT has established an Office of Emergency Transportation. This office has developed and maintains comprehensive emergency plans and procedural manuals for natural disasters and other civil crises. It constantly monitors the civil transportation system for indications of potential adverse impacts from all hazards. It conducts scheduled periodic training and readiness exercises for DOT emergency personnel and maintains quick response cells and emergency operating facilities at DOT headquarters and in the field to provide an immediate reaction capability. The system has been activated several times in the recent past (e.g., Three Mile Island, 1979 Energy/Fuel Crisis, Independent Truckers' Strike, and the Mt. St. Helens eruption).

D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVING RESPONSE CAPABILITY

Earthquake prediction has not been incorporated into existing plans.

Response to predictions in the current environment, if given, would be _ad hoc_. The State of California has only a rudimentary plan and the Federal Government none. The City of Los Angeles has examined the problem extensively, but only considers its own jurisdiction and has not produced an actionable plan. Current planning for the recovery period is incomplete, uncoordinated, and not functional. State and local governments have done little to plan for the recovery period when, following the emergency lifesaving phase, efforts and resources are concentrated on restoring the functioning of the community. They presume that the Federal Government will "step in" after a presidential declaration. The Federal Government has an untested draft plan for the San Francisco area that is not fully coordinated with the State plans. Current Federal plans are geared to the provision of a.s.sistance on the order of a few hundred million dollars. Thus, there is little confidence that they would function under the requirements for tens-of-billions-of-dollars and concomitant service demands.

Both Federal and State agencies need to commit the financial resources and a.s.signment of personnel to maintain and enhance earthquake plans and preparedness. Earthquake preparedness, although responding to high damage expectation, is still based upon a relatively low probability occurrence. When it is in compet.i.tion with pressing social needs for a portion of limited resources, social needs tend to prevail at all levels of government. Without a clear commitment, future development of earthquake preparedness, as in the past, is problematic and its implementation is in considerable doubt. The Federal earthquake preparedness effort needs to focus on a high state of readiness.

History in the area of natural hazard mitigation suggests that a.s.signment of responsibility, even by the President, when not followed by leaders.h.i.+p and regular oversight over the allocation of financial resources, seldom leads to programs which can be expected to function.

The same weakness is evidenced at the State and local government levels with few exceptions. The stresses likely to occur in emergency response programs after a catastrophic earthquake will be such that effective response will require a cooperative, integrated effort among different jurisdictions and levels of government.

Experience in other areas of planning and preparedness, particularly for civil defense, indicates that damage to existing programs occurs when the Federal Government raises expectations of the public and of other levels of government and then fails to follow through with implementation and funding. It is better to maintain the _status quo_ with minor changes at the margin than to announce substantial program initiatives and not meet their requirements.

CHAPTER V

AN a.s.sESSMENT OF THE SOCIAL IMPACTS

Often, it is a.s.sumed that disasters leave ma.s.ses of the population in the impacted areas dazed and helpless and unable to cope with the new conditions, or that those not so immobilized panic or display antisocial behavior. Another common a.s.sumption is that local communities and organizations are rendered ineffective to handle the many problems, leading to further disorganization, loss of morale, and requiring the quick a.s.sertion of "strong" outside leaders.h.i.+p and control.

Practical experience and field studies of disasters indicate that these a.s.sumptions are not necessarily correct. The widespread sharing of danger, loss, and deprivation produces an intimate cooperativeness among the survivors, which overcomes social isolation and provides a channel for very close communication and expression and a major source of physical and emotional support and rea.s.surance. This capacity seems to account for the resiliency of personality and social organization in dealing with threat and danger. It is also at the base of the ability of social life to regenerate.

In addition, a good case can be made in that community systems experiencing impact may be more efficient and rational than they are in "normal" circ.u.mstances. Normal (pre-disaster) community life traditionally operates at a low level of effectiveness and efficiency.

Activities are directed toward a very diffuse set of goals, just as human resources within the community are inadequately utilized. Upon disaster impact, certain community goals--care for victims and the restoration of essential services--develop a high priority while others are ignored or held in abeyance. Thus, the entire range of community resources, even taking into account "losses," can be allocated to the accomplishment of the more critical goals. Also, human resources are better utilized. Many women, older persons, younger persons, and members of minorities now become "productive;"

the "labor" market after impact is open to those underutilized resources. In effect, then, disasters create the conditions for the more efficient utilization of material resources and the more effective mobilization of human resources.

To accomplish this, certain modifications have to occur in the normal community structure, since the usual decision-making structures are designed for a different range and type of problem. Outsiders see this restructuring process as disorganized, chaotic, and creating the necessity for the imposition of some strong outside authority. On the contrary, this restructuring process is functional and adaptive. Its consequences are seen in communities and societies that rebound dramatically from the disruption and destruction to levels of integration, productivity, and growth capacity far beyond the pre-disaster state.

In summary, the picture drawn points to the capacity of individuals and inst.i.tutions to deal with difficult problems created by disaster impact. It also points to the adaptive capacity of social organization within communities to deal with unique and dramatic problems. These findings are not an argument against planning nor against "outside"

a.s.sistance, but they should condition both the nature of planning and the direction of a.s.sistance.

ANNEX 1

LETTERS OF CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WAs.h.i.+NGTON

September 19, 1980

To Governor Jerry Brown