The Battle of Atlanta Part 10

It was expected when I left General Dodge that the greater part of my command would be able to reach Moulton, some forty miles distant, by the next night, but, owing to the heavy rains and consequent bad condition of the roads, it was impossible; consequently I dispatched a messenger to General Dodge, stating that I would halt at Mount Hope and wait for the portion of my command who were on foot to come up.

We continued to scour the country for horses and mules, but so many of those drawn at Nashville were continually failing, that, although we were successful in collecting a large number, still, many of the men were without anything to ride.

On the night of the 27th, at Mount Hope, I received word from General Dodge, stating that he had driven the enemy, and that I should push on. My command had not all come up yet, nor did they until about 10 a. m. the next day, when we proceeded to Moulton, where we arrived about dark. Up to this time we had been skirmis.h.i.+ng occasionally with small squads of the enemy, but I could hear of no force of consequence in the country. All of the command but about fifty men were now mounted.

We started from Moulton, in the direction of Blountsville, via Day's Gap, about midnight on April 28. The two previous days it had been raining most of the time, and the roads were terrible, though on the evening of the 28th it bid fair for dry weather, which gave us strong hopes of better times.

We marched the next day (the 29th) to Day's Gap, about thirty-five miles, and bivouacked for the night. Every man now was mounted, and although many of the animals were very poor, nevertheless we had strong hopes that we could easily supply all future demands. We destroyed during the day a large number of wagons belonging to the enemy, laden with provisions, arms, tents, etc., which had been sent to the mountains to avoid us, but, luckily, they fell into our hands.

We were now in the midst of devoted Union people. Many of Captain Smith's men (Alabamians) were recruited near this place, and many were the happy greetings between them and their friends and relations. I could learn nothing of the enemy in the country, with the exception of small squads of scouting-parties, who were hunting conscripts. We moved out the next morning before daylight. I will here remark that my men had been worked very hard in scouring so much of the country, and, unaccustomed as they were to riding, made it still worse; consequently, they were illy prepared for the trying ordeal through which they were to pa.s.s. I had not proceeded more than two miles, at the head of the column, before I was informed that the rear guard had been attacked, and just at that moment I heard the boom of artillery in the rear of the column. I had previously learned that the gap through which we were pa.s.sing was easily flanked by gaps through the mountains, both above and below; consequently, I sent orders to the rear to hold the enemy in check until we could prepare for action. The head of the column was at the time on the top of the mountain. The column was moving through the gap; consequently the enemy was easily held in check.

I soon learned that the enemy had moved through the gaps on my right and left, and were endeavoring to form a junction in my advance; consequently I moved ahead rapidly until we pa.s.sed the intersecting roads on either flank with the one we occupied. The country was open sand ridges, very thinly wooded, and afforded fine defensive positions. As soon as we pa.s.sed the point above designated (about three miles from the top of the mountains), we dismounted and formed a line of battle on a ridge circling to the rear. Our right rested on a precipitous ravine and the left was protected by a marshy run that was easily held against the enemy. The mules were sent into a ravine to the rear of our right, where they were protected from the enemy's bullets. I also deployed a line of skirmishers, resting on our right and left flanks encircling our rear, in order to prevent a surprise from any detached force of the enemy that might approach us from that direction and to prevent any straggling of either stray animals or cowardly men.

In the meantime I had instructed Captain Smith, who had command of our rear guard (now changed to our front), to hold his position until the enemy pressed him closely, when he should retreat rapidly, and, if possible, draw them onto our lines, which were concealed by the men lying down immediately back of the top of the ridge. The lines were left sufficiently open to permit Captain Smith's command to pa.s.s through near the center. I had two twelve-pounder mountain howitzers, which were stationed near the road (the center). They were also concealed. We had hardly completed our arrangements when the enemy charged Captain Smith in large force, following him closely, and no sooner had he pa.s.sed our lines than our whole line rose up and delivered a volley at short range. We continued to pour a rapid fire into their ranks, which soon caused them to give way in confusion; but their reinforcements soon came up, when they dismounted, formed, and made a determined and vigorous attack. Our skirmishers were soon driven in, and about the same time the enemy opened upon us with a battery of artillery.

The enemy soon attempted to carry our lines, but were handsomely repulsed. During their advance they had run their artillery to within three hundred yards of our lines, and as soon as they began to waver I prepared for a charge. I ordered Colonel Hathaway, Seventy-third Indiana, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana, on the left, to make a charge, in order to draw the attention of the battery, and immediately threw the Third Ohio, Colonel Lawson, and the Eightieth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Rodgers, forward rapidly, hoping to capture the battery. The enemy, after a short but stubborn resistance, fled in confusion, leaving two pieces of artillery, two caissons, and about forty prisoners, representing seven different regiments, a larger number of wounded, and about thirty dead on the field. Among the former was Captain William H. Forrest, a brother of General Forrest. Our loss was about thirty killed and wounded, among the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana (mortally), a brave and gallant officer and one that we were illy prepared to lose, and Lieutenant Pavey, Eightieth Illinois (on my staff), severely.

It was now about 11 o'clock, fighting having continued since about 6 o'clock in the morning. I had learned, in the meantime, that the enemy were in heavy force, fully three times our number, with twelve pieces of artillery, under General Forrest in person; consequently I was fearful that they were making an effort to get around us and attack in the rear of our position; hence I decided to resume the march.

Everything was soon in readiness, and we moved out, leaving a strong guard (dismounted) in the rear, to check any immediate advance the enemy might make previous to the column getting in motion. We were not too soon in our movements, for the column had hardly pa.s.sed a cross-road some six miles from our first battle-ground when the enemy were discovered advancing on our left. Sharp skirmis.h.i.+ng commenced at Crooked Creek, which is about ten miles south of Day's Gap, and finally the enemy pressed our rear so hard that I was compelled to prepare for battle. I selected a strong position about a mile south of the crossing of the creek, on a ridge called Hog Mountain. The whole force soon became engaged (about one hour before dark). The enemy strove first to carry our right; then charged the left; but with the help of the two pieces of artillery captured in the morning and the two mountain howitzers, all of which were handled with good effect by Major Vananda, of the Third Ohio, we were able to repulse them.

Fighting continued until about 10 p. m. when the enemy were driven from our front, leaving a large number of killed and wounded on the field. I determined at once to resume our march, and as soon as possible we moved out. The ammunition which we had captured with the two guns was exhausted, and being very short of horses, I ordered the guns spiked and the carriages destroyed. I had ordered the Seventy-third Indiana (Colonel Hathaway) to act as rear guard, and I remained in the rear in person, for the purpose of being at hand in case the enemy should attempt to press us as we were moving out. We had but fairly got under way when I received information of the enemy's advance.

The moon shone very brightly, and the country was an open woodland, with an occasional spot of thick undergrowth. In one of these thickets I placed the Seventy-third Indiana, lying down, and not more than twenty paces from the road, which was in plain view. The enemy approached. The head of his column pa.s.sed without discovering our position. At this moment the whole regiment opened a most destructive fire, causing a complete stampede of the enemy. I will here remark that the country from Day's Gap to Blountsville (about forty miles) is mostly uninhabited; consequently there is nothing in the country for man or beast. I had hopes that by pus.h.i.+ng ahead we could reach a place where we could feed before the enemy would come up with us, and, by holding him back where there was no feed, compel him to lay over a day at least to recuperate. I had learned that they had been on a forced march from Town Creek, Ala., a day and two nights previous to their attacking us. We were not again disturbed until we had marched several miles, when they attacked our rear guard vigorously. I again succeeded in ambuscading them, which caused them to give up the pursuit for the night. We continued our march, and reached Blountsville about 10 o'clock in the morning. Many of our mules had given out, leaving their riders on foot, but there was very little straggling behind the rear guard.

At Blountsville we found sufficient corn to feed our tired and hungry animals. Ammunition and rations were hastily distributed to the men, and the remaining ammunition was put on pack-mules and the wagons burned, as it was now understood that it would be impossible to take them over the roads before us. After resting about two hours, we resumed our march in the direction of Gadsden.

The column had not got fairly under motion before our pickets were driven in, and a sharp skirmish ensued between Forrest's advance and our rear guard, under Captain Smith, in the town of Blountsville. The enemy followed closely for several miles, continually skirmis.h.i.+ng with the rear guard, but were badly handled by small parties of our men stopping in the thick bushes by the side of the road and firing at them at short range, and when we reached the East Branch of the Black Warrior River the ford was very deep and the enemy pressed so closely that I was compelled to halt and offer him battle before we could cross. After some maneuvering, I advanced a heavy line of skirmishers, who drove the enemy out of sight of my main line, when I ordered the troops, except the skirmishers, to cross the river as rapidly as possible. After all had crossed except the skirmishers, they were rapidly withdrawn, under cover of our artillery, and a heavy line of skirmishers thrown out on the opposite bank for that purpose. It was about 5 p. m. when the last of the command crossed the East Branch of the Black Warrior. We proceeded in the direction of Gadsden without further interruption, with the exception of small parties who were continually hara.s.sing the rear of the column, until about 9 o'clock the next morning, May 2, when the rear guard was fiercely attacked at the crossing of Black Creek, near Gadsden. After a sharp fight the enemy was repulsed.

I had learned in the meantime, through my scouts, that a large column of the enemy was moving on our left, parallel with our route, evidently with the intention of getting in our front, which made it necessary for us to march all night, though the command was in no condition to do so, and, to add still more to my embarra.s.sment, a portion of our ammunition had become damaged in crossing Will's Creek, which, at the time, was very deep fording. I only halted at Gadsden sufficiently long to destroy a quant.i.ty of arms and commissary stores found there, and proceeded on. Many of our animals and men were entirely worn out and unable to keep up with the column; consequently they fell behind the rear guard and were captured.

It now became evident to me that our only hope was in crossing the river at Rome and destroying the bridge, which would delay Forrest a day or two and give us time to collect horses and mules, and allow the command a little time to sleep, without which it was impossible to proceed.

The enemy followed closely, and kept up a continuous skirmish with the rear of the column until about 4 p. m., at which time we reached Blount's plantation, about fifteen miles from Gadsden, where we could procure forage for our animals. Here I decided to halt, as it was impossible to continue the march through the night without feeding and resting, although to do so was to bring on a general engagement.

Accordingly, the command was dismounted, and a detail made to feed the horses and mules, while the balance of the command formed in line of battle on a ridge southwest of the plantation.

Meanwhile the rear guard, in holding the enemy in check, had become severely engaged and was driven in. The enemy at once attacked our main line, and tried hard to carry the center, but were gallantly met and repulsed by the Fifty-first and Seventy-third Indiana, a.s.sisted by Major Vananda, with two mountain howitzers. They then made a determined effort to turn our right, but were met by the gallant Eightieth Illinois, a.s.sisted by two companies of the Third Ohio.

The enemy, with the exception of a few skirmishers, then fell back to a ridge some half a mile distant, and commenced ma.s.sing his force, as if preparing for a more determined attack. It was becoming dark, and I decided to withdraw un.o.bserved, if possible, and conceal my command in a thicket some half a mile to our rear, there to lie in ambush and await his advance. In the meantime I had ordered Captain Milton Russell (Fifty-first Indiana) to take two hundred of the best-mounted men, selected from the whole command, and proceed to Rome, and hold the bridge until the main command could come up.

The engagement at Blount's plantation revealed the fact that nearly all of our remaining ammunition was worthless, on account of having been wet. Much of that carried by the men had become useless by the paper wearing out and the powder sifting away. It was in this engagement that the gallant Colonel Hathaway (Seventy-third Indiana) fell, mortally wounded, and in a few moments expired. Our country has seldom been called upon to mourn the loss of so brave and valuable an officer. His loss to me was irreparable. His men had almost wors.h.i.+ped him, and when he fell it cast a deep gloom of despondency over his regiment which was hard to overcome.

We remained in ambush but a short time when the enemy, who by some means had learned of our whereabouts, commenced a flank movement, which we discovered in time to check. I then decided to withdraw as silently as possible, and push on in the direction of Rome, but as a large number of the men were dismounted, their animals having given out, and the remainder of the stock was so jaded, tender-footed, and worn down, our progress was necessarily slow; yet, as everything depended on our reaching Rome before the enemy could throw a sufficient force there to prevent our crossing the bridge, every possible effort was made to urge the command forward. We proceeded without interruption until we reached the vicinity of Centre, when one of my scouts informed me that a force of the enemy was posted in ambush but a short distance in our front. I immediately threw forward a line of skirmishers, with orders to proceed until they were fired upon, when they should open a brisk fire on the enemy, and hold their position until the command had time to pa.s.s.

The plan worked admirably, for, while my skirmishers were amusing the enemy, the main column made a detour to the right, and struck the main road some three miles to the rear of the enemy. As soon as our main force had pa.s.sed, the skirmishers withdrew and fell in the rear of the column. I was then hopeful that we could reach Rome before the enemy could overtake us. My princ.i.p.al guide had thus far proved reliable, and I had made particular inquiries of him as to the character of the road and the country the evening before, and he a.s.sured me that there were no difficult streams to cross and that the road was good; hence we approached the Chattanooga River at the ferry without any information as to the real condition of things. Captain Russell had managed to ferry the last of his command across about one hour previous to my arrival, but the enemy had seized and run off the boat before we reached there.

I then ascertained that there was a bridge some seven or eight miles up the river, near Gaylesville, and procured new guides and pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to reach the bridge before the enemy should take possession of it. We had to pa.s.s over an old coal-chopping for several miles, where the timber had been cut and hauled off for charcoal, leaving innumerable wagon-roads running in every direction, and the command was so worn out and exhausted that many were asleep, and in spite of every exertion I could make, with the aid of such of my officers as were able for duty, the command became separated and scattered into several squads, traveling in different directions, and it was not until near daylight that the last of the command had crossed the river. The bridge was burned, and we proceeded on and pa.s.sed Cedar Bluff just after daylight. It now became evident that the horses and mules could not reach Rome without halting to rest and feed. Large numbers of the mules were continually giving out. In fact, I do not think that at that time we had a score of the mules drawn at Nashville left, and nearly all of those taken in the country were barefooted, and many of them had such sore backs and tender feet that it was impossible to ride them; but, in order to get as near as possible to the force I had sent ahead, we struggled on until about 9 a. m. when we halted and fed our animals. The men, being unaccustomed to riding, had become so exhausted from fatigue and loss of sleep that it was almost impossible to keep them awake long enough to feed. We had halted but a short time, when I was informed that a heavy force of the enemy was moving on our left, on a route parallel with the one we were marching on, and was then nearer Rome than we were. About the same time I received this information our pickets were driven in. The command was immediately ordered into line, and every effort made to rally the men for action, but nature was exhausted, and a large portion of my best troops actually went to sleep while lying in line of battle under a severe skirmish-fire. After some maneuvering, Forrest sent in a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of my forces.

Most of my regimental commanders had already expressed the opinion that, unless we could reach Rome and cross the river before the enemy came up with us again, we should be compelled to surrender.

Consequently, I called a council of war. I had learned, however, in the meantime that Captain Russell had been unable to take the bridge at Rome. Our condition was fully canva.s.sed. As I have remarked before, our ammunition was worthless, our horses and mules in a desperate condition, the men were overcome with fatigue and loss of sleep, and we were confronted by fully three times our number, in the heart of the enemy's country, and, although personally opposed to surrender, and so expressed myself at the time, yet I yielded to the unanimous voice of my regimental commanders, and at once entered into negotiations with Forrest to obtain the best possible terms I could for my command, and at about noon, May 3, we surrendered as prisoners of war.

We were taken to Richmond, Va. The men were soon sent through the lines and exchanged. My officers and myself were confined in Libby Prison, where we remained until the night of February 9 last, when four of my officers and myself, together with several other prisoners, succeeded in making our escape, and reached Was.h.i.+ngton in safety about March 1. The balance of my officers, or nearly all of them, are still confined as prisoners or have died of disease the result of long confinement, insufficient food, and cruel treatment at the hands of the enemy.

I am unable to report the exact number of casualties in the command, but from the best information I have been able to obtain there were fifteen officers and about one hundred and thirty enlisted men killed and wounded. It was a matter of astonishment to all that so much fighting should occur with so few casualties on our side; but we acted purely on the defensive, and took advantage of the nature of the country as best we could. From actual personal observation where we had driven the enemy from the field, and from what my surgeons, left with our wounded, learned in relation to the loss of the enemy, I am convinced that we killed more of his men than we lost in both killed and wounded.

Previous to the surrender, we had captured and paroled about two hundred prisoners, and had lost about the same number in consequence of the animals giving out, and the men, unable to keep up, broke down from exhaustion, and were necessarily picked up by the enemy; but in no case was the enemy able to capture a single man in any skirmish or battle within my knowledge.

I deem it proper to mention the barbarous treatment my wounded received at the hands of the enemy. Owing to the nature of the service we were performing, we were compelled to leave our wounded behind. I provided for them as best I could by leaving them blankets and such rations as we had, and two of my surgeons remained behind to attend them; but no sooner did the enemy get possession of our hospitals than they robbed both officers and men of their blankets, coats, hats, boots, shoes, rations, and money. The medical stores and instruments were taken from the surgeons, and my wounded left in a semi-naked and starving condition, in some instances many miles from any inhabitants, to perish.

Many thanks to the Union ladies of that country, for they saved many a brave soldier from a horrible death.

In reviewing the history of this ill-fated expedition, I am convinced that had we been furnished at Nashville with 800 good horses, instead of poor, young mules, we would have been successful, in spite of all other drawbacks; or if General Dodge had succeeded in detaining Forrest one day longer, we would have been successful even with our poor outfit.

A. D. STREIGHT,

_Colonel Fifty-first Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry_.

On my return, I dispatched Colonel Cornyn with his Brigade to the attack of the force of the enemy that I had located near Tupelo, Miss. He tells the story of his battle better than I can, in his official report, which follows:

We arrived at Tupelo on Tuesday, May 5, and here we fought the best-contested fight of the whole expedition. Just before entering the town of Tupelo, and to the east of the railroad, it is necessary to cross a dense and almost impa.s.sable swamp, on the western edge of which runs Old Town Creek. We had almost reached the western edge, and were approaching, as well as the nature of the swamp would permit, the bridge over this creek, when the enemy, entirely unseen by us, opened upon us with musketry. I immediately threw out to my right and left several squadrons of the Tenth Missouri, who succeeded in dislodging the enemy, and securing an easy pa.s.sage of the bridge for the balance of the command. Still keeping my skirmishers out to my right and left, and an advance guard in front, I moved down a lane to the left and south of the town and ma.s.sed my command in an open field, about six hundred yards from the southern border of Tupelo. Here word was brought me from one of my skirmis.h.i.+ng squadrons that the enemy were drawn up in line on their front, to the number of six hundred. I ordered two squadrons of the Seventh Kansas, that were armed with Colt's revolving rifles, to dismount and attack them on foot, supporting them with two squadrons of the Tenth Missouri (mounted), under Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, with orders to charge with the saber as soon as the enemy's line should break. This order, I am proud to say, was well obeyed and gallantly executed by both the mounted and dismounted soldiers, for the enemy retired, and for a few minutes all was silent along the lines. In about half an hour from the first attack, sharp firing was heard on my front, and the enemy was advancing toward us with yells. I immediately moved my whole force to the rear and west of the village, and, placing my mountain howitzers upon the brow of a hill, I sent forward all the cavalry except one squadron of the Fifteenth Illinois, which I ordered to dismount and support the battery. Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, commanding the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, having been detailed for that purpose early in the morning, acted as the rear guard and guard for the train, and, knowing that the rear was in such good hands, I felt no anxiety on that account; and this important trust was well sustained. As soon as my front had become fully engaged with the enemy, who fought with considerable determination, I ordered the battery to sh.e.l.l the woods from which the enemy was emerging. This fire was effective, and from that moment the battle became general. At one time two regiments of mounted infantry, commanded by the rebel General Ruggles, forced their way between my fighting column and my reserve, but were suddenly induced to retire much more rapidly than they came. My left at one time fell back toward the battery, which then poured charge after charge of canister into the rebel ranks, with considerable effect, forcing them to retreat, rapidly followed by the cavalry. The enemy had scarcely begun to waver when his whole force fled in dismay, throwing away their arms, coats, and hats. We took from the enemy eighty-one prisoners, including three commissioned officers. On the field, the scene of the battle, immense quant.i.ties of arms, coats, and blankets were found and destroyed by us. I had no means of ascertaining the enemy's loss in killed and wounded, but from the evidence of the battle-field it must have been heavy.

FLORENCE M. CORNYN,

_Colonel Tenth Missouri Cavalry, Commanding Cavalry Brigade_.

Colonel Cornyn was a very efficient cavalry officer and always accomplished whatever he was sent to do. He was an aggressive fighter, always attacking, no matter what the force before him, and had won a deserved standing as a Brigade commander. When he was killed, by his Lieutenant-Colonel, Bowen, during the latter's trial before a court-martial on charges preferred by Colonel Cornyn, there was a bitter personal dispute and enmity between them which came to this sad ending.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ARMY AND CORPS COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE

Left to Right--Front Row, Major-General W. T. Sherman, Major-General U. S.

Grant, Major-General James B. McPherson, Major-General O. O. Howard. Rear row, Major-General John A. Logan, Major-General G. M. Dodge, Major-General Frank P. Blair. Extreme right, Brigadier-General John A. Fuller, leading Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps. Copy of painting by James E. Taylor for Major-General W. T. Sherman.]

THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE

ADDRESS TO THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE DELIVERED AT THE NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT, G. A. R.

WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D. C., OCTOBER, 1902 BY MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE

_Comrades of the Army of the Tennessee_:

On the 28th of August, 1861, General U. S. Grant was a.s.signed to duty in command of the District of Southeast Missouri, with headquarters at Cairo, Ill., and here commenced the organization and growth of the Army of the Tennessee. It remained under his personal command, or as a unit of his great Army, from the beginning until the end of the war, except for two short intervals, one after the great Battle of Donelson, and the other after the greater Battle of s.h.i.+loh, both of which he won, and gave the first great light and hope to our country; and it is hard now, after reading all the records, to understand the reasons for his being relieved.

It appears to have been done through a misunderstanding, and with no intention of doing injustice to General Grant.

Following General Grant as commander came General Sherman, a member of the Army almost as long as General Grant. General Sherman was in direct command, or the Army served under him as a unit of his greater Army, from the time he a.s.sumed command until the end of the war.

After General Sherman came General McPherson, that ideal soldier, who commanded the Army until he fell in the great Battle of Atlanta, on the 22d of July. Upon his death, General Logan took command of the Army, as the senior officer present, and at the end of the battle of July 22d he could say that he had met and defeated Hood's whole Army in the greatest battle of that campaign.