Our Navy in the War Part 15

In summing up the work of the navy throughout the war one month after the armistice had been signed, Secretary Daniels paid the highest tribute to the widely recognized efficiency of Vice-Admiral Sims; he had also superlative praise for Rear-Admiral Rodman, who commanded our battles.h.i.+ps attached to the Grand Fleet; for Vice-Admiral Wilson, commanding our forces in French waters; for Rear-Admiral Niblack, our Mediterranean commander, Rear-Admiral Dunn in the Azores, and Rear-Admiral Strauss in charge of mining operations.

When the fighting ended our force in European waters comprised 338 vessels, with 75,000 men and officers, a force larger than the entire navy before the war. The navy, in its operations, covered the widest scope in its history; naval men served on nearly 2,000 craft that plied the waters, on submarines, and in aviation, while on land, marines and sailors helped to hold strategic points. The regiments of marines shared with the magnificent army their part of the hard-won victory; wonderfully trained gun-crews of sailors manned the monster 14-inch guns--which marked a new departure in land warfare--while naval officers and men in all parts of the world did their full part in the operations which mark the heroic year of accomplishment.

While the destroyers led in the anti-submarine warfare, the 406 submarine chasers, of which 335 were despatched abroad, should have credit for efficient aid, also the American submarines sent to foreign waters.

The transportation of 2,000,000 American troops 3,000 miles overseas, with the loss of only a few hundred lives, and without the loss of a single American troops.h.i.+p on the way to France, was an unparalleled achievement. From a small beginning this fleet expanded to 24 cruisers and 42 transports, manned by 3,000 officers and 41,000 men, these being augmented by 4 French men-of-war and 13 foreign merchant vessels, a grand total of 83 s.h.i.+ps. In spite of the constant menace of submarines, only 3 of these troops.h.i.+ps were lost--the _Antilles_, _Lincoln_, and _Covington_. All were sunk on the homeward voyage.

Four naval vessels were lost as a result of submarine activity--the destroyer _Jacob Jones_, the converted yacht _Alcedo_, the coast-guard cutter _Tampa_, sunk with all on board, and the cruiser _San Diego_, sunk in home waters by striking an enemy mine. The loss of the collier _Cyclops_, bound for South America, whose disappearance is one of the unsolved mysteries of the seas, will probably never be explained.

The notable achievements in naval ordnance, especially the work of the 14-inch naval guns on railway mounts on the western front, which hurled sh.e.l.ls far behind the German lines, have received adequate recognition from Allied authorities. These mounts were designed and completed in four months. The land battery of these naval guns was manned exclusively by bluejackets, under command of Rear-Admiral C. P. Plunkett, and work of the Bureau of Ordnance was conducted by Admiral Early, the chief of the bureau, one of our "ablest and fittest" officers.

CHAPTER XVII

Lessons Of The War--The Submarine Not Really a Submarine--French Term For Undersea Fighter--The Success of the Convoy Against Submersibles--U-Boats Not Successful Against Surface Fighters--Their Shortcomings--What The Submarine Needs To Be A Vital Factor In Sea Power--Their Showing Against Convoyed Craft--Record Of Our Navy In Convoying And Protecting Convoys--Secretary Daniel's Report

Naval scientists learned much as a result of this war, but contrary to popular theory the events of the four and a half years strengthened belief in the battles.h.i.+p as the deciding element in sea power. The submarine was frightful, and did a vast amount of harm, but not so much as one might think. Against surface fighters it was not remarkably effective; indeed the war proved that the submarine's only good chance against a battles.h.i.+p or cruiser was to lurk along some lane which the big surface craft was known to be following, and strike her quickly in the dark. Within effective torpedo range a periscope, day or night, is visible to keen-eyed watchers, and all told not a dozen British and American sea fighters, of whatever cla.s.s, were sunk as a result of submarine attack.

In the battle of Heligoland Bight early in the war, as a matter of fact, a squadron of British battles.h.i.+ps pa.s.sed right through a nest of submarines and were not harmed. The most spectacular submarine success, the sinking of the three fine cruisers, _Aboukir_ and _Cressy_ and _Hawke_, was the result of an attack delivered upon unsuspecting craft, which were lying at anchor, or at all events under deliberate headway.

The American Navy, as already pointed out, lost the _Jacob Jones_, a destroyer, the coast cutter _Tampa_, and the _Alcedo_, together with one or two smaller craft, but that is all.

It will surprise many when the statement is made that, of all the Atlantic convoys, east or west bound, in the four years of the war, aggregating a gross tonnage of some eighty-odd millions, only 654,288 tons were lost through submarine attack, considerably less than 1 per cent of the total tonnage crossing the war zone during the war--0.83 per cent, to be exact. Here are some specific figures:

Atlantic convoys between July 26, 1917, and October 15, 1918, a total of 1,027 convoys, comprising 14,968 s.h.i.+ps east and west bound, were carried with a loss of 118 s.h.i.+ps--0.79 of 1 per cent.

For all seas, 85,772 vessels, 433 lost--0.51 per cent.

It really boils down to the fact that the greatest feat of the submarine was in its success in _slowing up oversea freight traffic and in keeping neutral freighters in port_. In this respect the submarine most certainly was dangerously pernicious. But as a positive agency, as said, the undersea craft was not a decisive factor in the war.

All of which, most naturally, is a graphic commentary upon the inadequacy of the submarine as a check to the manifestations of sea power. In truth, there is a vast deal of popular misconception about the submarine, a name which is really a misnomer. The French are more precise in their term, a submersible; for, as a matter of fact, the submarine, or submersible, is in essence a surface craft which is able to descend beneath the water, proceeding thus for a limited time.

The amount of time which a submersible may run beneath the waves depends upon her speed. The best of the German undersea boats, it has been estimated, could not remain under more than three hours at high speed.

They then had to come up, as the navy saying has it, for "more juice."

To be more explicit, a submersible has a mechanical process, a combination motor and dynamo between the engine, which drives the boat when it is on the surface, and the thrust block through which the shaft runs to the propeller. This motor-dynamo, serving as a motor, drives the boat when she is beneath the water. When the electric power is exhausted the boat comes to the surface, the motor is disconnected from the shaft and is run as a dynamo generating power. Twelve hours are required in which to produce the amount of electricity required for use when the vessel next submerges. Thus, a great proportion of the time the submarine is a surface craft.

Again, there are important defects in the lead battery system, which was generally used in the war. First of all, they are very heavy, and secondly the sulphuric acid in the containers is liable to escape--in fact, does escape--when the boat rolls heavily. Sulphuric acid mingling with salt water in the bilges produces a chlorine gas, which, as every one knows, is most deadly. Not only this: the acid eats out the steel plates of a hull.

There is talk of using dry batteries, but these are heavy, too, and there are evils arising from their use which have made the lead batteries, objectionable though they may be, preferable in a great majority of cases. The British have a type of submersible propelled on the surface by steam.

The Peace Conference at this writing is talking of the advisability of eliminating the submarine as a weapon of war. Whether by the time this is read such action will have been taken, the fact remains that before the submarine could hope to approach in formidability the surface fighter, she will have to experience a development which at the present time has not been attained. The vital need seems to be a single propulsive agency for progress on the surface and when submerged.

An interesting table showing the success of the convoy system is herewith presented:

---------------------------------------------------------------------- | Convoy Atlantic convoys |No. of |No. of mer-|Losses in| P.C. | | Homeward |convoys|chant s.h.i.+ps| convoy | | |-----------------------------|-------|-----------|---------|--------| | North Atlantic | 306 | 5,416 | 40 | 0.74 | | Gibraltar | 133 | 1,979 | 30 | 1.5 | | West African ports | 105 | 944 | 6 | 0.64 | | Rio de Janeiro | 22 | 307 | 1 | 0.32 | | | ----- | --------- | ------- | ------ | | Total | 566 | 8,646 | 77 | 0.89 | | | | | | | | Outward | | | | | | Various sailings from | | | | | | British ports | 508 | 7,110 | 45 | 0.63 | | | | | | | | Other convoys | | | | | | Scandinavian (old system) | ... | 6,475 | 75 | 1.15 | | Scandinavian (new system) | ... | 3,923 | 16 | 0.41 | | French coal trade | ... | 37,221 | 53 | 0.14 | | Local Mediterranean | ... | 10,275 | 127 | 1.24 | | East Coast | ... | 12,122 | 40 | 0.33 | | | ----- | --------- | ------- | ------ | | Grand total | ... | 85,772 | 433 | 0.51 | |====================================================================| | STATEMENT OF s.h.i.+PS IN ORGANIZED ATLANTIC CONVOYS | | July 26, 1917-October 5, 1918 | | s.h.i.+PS | |--------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Homeward | Outward | Total | | | bound | bound | | |-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------| | Convoys | 539 | 488 | 1,027 | | s.h.i.+ps convoyed | 8,194 | 6,774 | 14,968 | | Casualties | 74 | 44 | 118 | | Per cent of casualties | 0.9 | 0.65 | 0.79 | |====================================================================| | TONNAGES | |--------------------------------------------------------------------| | | (GROSS DEADWEIGHT) | | |--------------------------------------| | | Homeward | Outward | Total | | | bound | bound | | |-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------| | Convoyed | 59,062,200| 47,491,950| 106,554,150 | | Lost | 510,600| 378,100| 888,700 | | Per cent of losses | 0.86| 0.8| 0.83 | | |--------------------------------------| | | (GROSS TONNAGE) | | |--------------------------------------| | Convoyed | 43,196,740| 33,860,491| 77,057,231 | | Lost | 364,842| 289,446| 654,288 | | Per cent of losses | 0.84| 0.85| 0.85 | ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Fifteen cargo s.h.i.+ps with a deadweight tonnage of 103,692, were lost during 1918 by the Naval Overseas Transportation Service. The removal of the ban of secrecy, vital during the war as a protection to vessels and their crews, discloses that 6 s.h.i.+ps, aggregating 42,627 tons, were destroyed by enemy activity, 5 vessels, representing a tonnage of 44,071 tons, were sunk in collisions, and 4 vessels, totalling 16,994 tons, were destroyed by fire and explosion. Seventy-two s.h.i.+ps were originally a.s.signed to this service late in 1917, and when the armistice was signed, November 11, 1918, the cargo fleet numbered 453 vessels, including 106 s.h.i.+ps ready to be taken over.

Crews of naval cargo s.h.i.+ps faced many perils, including the menace of an unseen foe, the danger of collision, and the liability to death by accidents from inflammable cargoes.

Not only were these crews confronted with the normal perils of the sea, says the report, but they faced destruction from torpedo, collision, and other unforeseen accidents that might cause fire in inflammable cargoes.

It took brave men to steam week in and week out through submarine and mine infested waters at eight knots an hour in a s.h.i.+p loaded with several thousand tons of depth charges, TNT, or poison gas, not knowing what minute the entire vessel was going to be blown to matchwood.

It is on record that a convoy of fifty s.h.i.+ps from New York was disintegrated by a violent storm in mid-Atlantic, and that only two of the number reached France under convoy. "Every s.h.i.+p for herself," the forty-eight others by luck, pluck, and constant vigil, all finally dropped their anchors in the protected harbors of their destination.

The value of a cargo s.h.i.+p is realized when it is known that under existing war conditions each s.h.i.+p cost to operate $100 every hour. Good, bad, and indifferent s.h.i.+ps, old or new, fast or slow, were transformed into serviceable craft. The personnel of the Naval Overseas Transportation Service at the time of the armistice included 5,000 officers and 45,000 enlisted men.

The world has been so deeply occupied with figures and facts relating to the havoc by the German submarine that little thought has been centred upon the work of the Allied submersibles. Yet in the way of accounting for war-s.h.i.+ps one may fancy that they rivalled the Teutonic craft.

Details may be given of the part which British submarines played during the war. This service destroyed 2 battles.h.i.+ps, 2 armed cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 7 destroyers, 5 gunboats, 20 submarines, and 5 armed auxiliary vessels. In addition 3 battles.h.i.+ps and 1 light cruiser were torpedoed, but reached port badly damaged. One Zeppelin also got back to port badly damaged after having been attacked by a submarine.

Other enemy craft destroyed by British submarines were 14 transports, 6 ammunition and supply s.h.i.+ps, 2 store s.h.i.+ps, 53 steams.h.i.+ps, and 197 sailing s.h.i.+ps. In no case was a merchant s.h.i.+p sunk at sight. Care was taken to see that the crews of all vessels got safely away.

In addition to carrying out their attacks on enemy war-craft, the submarines played an important part in convoy work. In the third year of the war one of the British submarine commanders carried out 24 cruises, totalling 22,000 miles, which probably const.i.tutes a record for any submarine. In the first and second years of the war 7 British submarine commanders carried out a total of 120 cruises, extending for 350 days, all of which were actually spent in the enemy theatre.

Our submarines, too, acquitted themselves n.o.bly on the other side, and when the story of the navy's activities is finally presented by Mr.

Daniels, we shall have in our possession details not now to be printed.

We may, however, say that battles, submarine against submarine, have not been unknown in the war zone; the fact that in addition to moving ahead or astern the submarine has also the power of dodging up and down complicated these fights in many interesting ways.

There has been, too, a great deal of misapprehension concerning the relative showing of the United States and Great Britain in conveying our soldiers to the theatre of war. At one time in the war, it is true, the British were carrying considerably more than half of our soldiers, but in the latter stages our transport service made gigantic strides, so that now the total of percentages is such as to enlist our pride.

According to figures issued from the office of Admiral Gleaves, in charge of oversea transport for our navy, of the 2,079,880 American troops transported overseas, 46-1/2 per cent were carried in _American s.h.i.+ps, manned by Americans_; 48-1/2 per cent in British vessels, and the small balance in French and Italian craft. Of the total strength of the naval escort guarding these convoys the _United States furnished 82-3/4 per cent_, Great Britain 14-1/2 per cent, and France 2-1/8 per cent.

Figures giving some idea of the records attained by convoys carrying our soldiers may now be presented, and they are immensely interesting. In the three months of July, August, and September of 1918, 7 American soldiers with equipment arrived every minute of the day and night in England or France. The banner month was July, when 317,000 American soldiers were safely landed. In September, 311,219 American troops, 4,000 American sailors, and 5,000 Canadians were successfully transported across the Atlantic. The largest single convoy of this month carried to France 31,108, and to England 28,873. Of the troops transported in this month American vessels carried 121,547; British vessels 175,721, and French 13,951.

All in all, in patrol, in convoy duty, in actual combat, our navy in the war accomplished with utter precision a stupendous task, a task of multifarious phases--all performed in that clean-cut, vigorous, courageous, painstaking, large-minded way which we, throughout ail the years, have been proud to regard as typical of the American Navy.

SECRETARY DANIELS'S REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NAVY IN THE WAR[1]

[Footnote 1: Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, issued an official report on December 8, 1918, in which he presented the following full account of the work of the navy during the war.]

The operations of our navy during the world war have covered the widest scope in its history. Our naval forces have operated in European waters from the Mediterranean to the White Sea. At Corfu, Gibraltar, along the French Bay of Biscay ports, at the English Channel ports, on the Irish Coast, in the North Sea, at Murmansk and Archangel our naval forces have been stationed and have done creditable work. Their performance will probably form the most interesting and exciting portion of the naval history of this war, and it is the duty which has been most eagerly sought by all of the personnel, but owing to the character of the operations which our navy has been called upon to take part in it has not been possible for all of our naval forces, much as they desired it, to engage in operations at the front, and a large part of our work has been conducted quietly, but none the less effectively, in other areas.

This service, while not so brilliant, has still been necessary, and without it our forces at the front could not have carried on the successful campaign that they did.

Naval men have served on nearly 2,000 craft that plied the waters, on submarines, and in aviation, where men of vision and courage prevent surprise attacks and fight with new-found weapons. On the land, marines and sailors have helped to hold strategic points, regiments of marines have shared with the army their part of the hard-won victory, and a wonderfully trained gun crew of sailors has manned the monster 14-inch guns which marked a new departure in land warfare.

In diplomacy, in investigation at home and in all parts of the world by naval officers and civilian agents, in protecting plants and labor from spies and enemies, in promoting new industrial organizations and enlarging older ones to meet war needs, in stimulating production of needed naval craft--these are some of the outstanding operations which mark the heroic year of accomplishment.

FIGHTING CRAFT

The employment of the fighting craft of the navy may be summed up as follows:

1. Escorting troop and cargo convoys and other special vessels.