My Four Years in Germany Part 19

Within a few days after my arrival, the President sent for me to visit him at Shadow Lawn, at Long Branch, and I was with him for over four hours and a quarter in our first conference. I saw him, of course, after the election, before returning to Germany, and in fact sailed on the fourth of December at his special request.

Before I left I was impressed with the idea that he desired above all things both to keep and to make peace. Of course, this question of making peace is a very delicate one. A direct offer on our part might have subjected us to the same treatment which we gave Great Britain during our Civil War when Great Britain made overtures looking towards the establishment of peace, and the North answered, practically telling the British Government that it could attend to its own business, that it would brook no interference and would regard further overtures as unfriendly acts.

The Germans started this war without any consultation with the United States, and then seemed to think that they had a right to demand that the United States make peace for them on such terms and at such time as they chose; and that the failure to do so gave them a vested right to break all the laws of warfare against their enemies and to murder the citizens of the United States on the high seas, in violation of the declared principles of international law.

Nevertheless, I think that the inclination of the President was to go very far towards the forcing of peace.

Our trip from New York to Copenhagen was uneventful, cold and dark. We were captured by a British cruiser west of the Orkneys and taken in for the usual search to the port of Kirkwall where we remained two days.

The President impressed upon me his great interest in the Belgians deported to Germany. The action of Germany in thus carrying a great part of the male population of Belgium into virtual slavery had roused great indignation in America. As the revered Cardinal Farley said to me a few days before my departure, "You have to go back to the times of the Medes and the Persians to find a like example of a whole people carried into bondage."

Mr. Grew had made representations about this to the Chancellor and, on my return, I immediately took up the question.

I was informed that it was a military measure, that Ludendorf had feared that the British would break through and overrun Belgium and that the military did not propose to have a hostile population at their backs who might cut the rail lines of communication, telephones and telegraphs; and that for this reason the deportation had been decided on. I was, however, told that I would be given permission to visit these Belgians. The pa.s.ses, nevertheless, which alone made such visiting possible were not delivered until a few days before I left Germany.

Several of these Belgians who were put at work in Berlin managed to get away and come to see me. They gave me a harrowing account of how they had been seized in Belgium and made to work in Germany at making munitions to be used probably against their own friends.

I said to the Chancellor, "There are Belgians employed in making sh.e.l.ls contrary to all rules of war and the Hague conventions."

He said, "I do not believe it." I said, "My automobile is at the door. I can take you, in four minutes, to where thirty Belgians are working on the manufacture of sh.e.l.ls." But he did not find time to go.

Americans must understand that the Germans will stop at nothing to win this war, and that the only thing they respect is force.

While I was in America von Jagow, as had been predicted by his enemies in Berlin, had fallen and Zimmermann had been given his place.

I remained a day in Copenhagen, in order to arrange for the transportation to Germany of the three tons of food which I had brought from New York, and, also, in order to lunch with Count Rantzau, the German Minister, a most able diplomat.

Therefore, the President's peace note arrived in Berlin just ahead of me and was delivered by Mr. Grew a few hours before my arrival. Joseph C. Grew, of Boston, was next in command during all my stay in Berlin. He most ably carried on the work of the Emba.s.sy during my absence on the trip to America, in the autumn of 1916; and at all times was of the greatest a.s.sistance to me. I hope to see him go far in his career. This note was dated December eighteenth, 1916, and was addressed by the Secretary of State to the American Amba.s.sadors at the capitals of the belligerent powers. It commenced as follows: "The President directs me to send you the following communication to be presented immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the government to which you are accredited.

"The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to the (here is inserted a designation of the government addressed) a course of action in regard to the present war which he hopes that the government will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit, etc."

In the note which was sent to the Central Powers it was stated: "The suggestion which I am instructed to make, the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarra.s.sed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers."

Of course, the President thus referred to the address made by Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag in December, in which, after reviewing generally the military situation, the Chancellor said: "In a deep moral and religious sense of duty towards this nation and beyond it towards humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action towards peace. His Majesty, therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our Allies decided to propose to the hostile powers to enter peace negotiations."

And the Chancellor continued, saying that a note to this effect had been transmitted that morning to all hostile powers, through the representatives of these powers to whom the interests and rights of Germany in the enemy States had been entrusted; and that, therefore, the representatives of Spain, the United States and Switzerland had been asked to forward the note.

Coincidently with this speech of the Chancellor's, which was December twelfth, 1916, the Emperor sent a message to the commanding generals reading as follows: "Soldiers! In agreement with the sovereigns of my Allies and with the consciousness of victory, I have made an offer of peace to the enemy. Whether it will be accepted is still uncertain. Until that moment arrives you will fight on."

I return to the President's note.

The President suggested that early occasion be sought to callout from all the nations now at war an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded, and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal.

He called the attention of the world to the fact that according to the statements of the statesmen of the belligerent powers, the objects which all sides had in mind seemed to be the same.

And the President finally said that he was not proposing peace, not even offering mediation; but merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that all nations might know how near might be the haven of peace for which all mankind longed.

Shortly after the publication of this note Secretary Lansing gave an interview to the representatives of the American press in which he stated that America was very near war. This interview he later explained.

As soon as possible after my return to Berlin I had interviews with Zimmermann and the Chancellor. Zimmermann said that we were such personal friends that he was sure we could continue to work, as we had in the past, in a frank and open manner, putting all the cards upon the table and working together in the interests of peace. I, of course, agreed to this and it seemed, on the surface, as if everything would go smoothly.

Although the torpedoing without warning of the _Marina_, while I was in the United States, had resulted in the death of a number of Americans on board, nevertheless there seemed to be an inclination on the part of the government and people of the United States to forget this incident provided Germany would continue to keep her pledges given in the _Suss.e.x_ Note. During all the period of the war in Germany I had been on good terms with the members of the government, namely, the Chancellor, von Jagow, Zimmermann and the other officials of the Foreign Office, as well as with Helfferich, Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, Kaempf, the President of the Reichstag and a number of the influential men of Germany such as von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, Gutmann of the Dresdener Bank, Dr. Walter Rathenau, who for a long time was at the head of the department for the supply and conservation of raw materials, General von Kessel, Over-Commander of the Mark of Brandenburg, in spite of many tiffs with him over the treatment of prisoners, Theodor Wolff, editor of the _Tageblatt_, Professor Stein, Maximilian Harden and many others.

For a long time the fight waged by the Chancellor was America's fight and a fight for peace, so much so that the newspapers which attacked the Chancellor were the same ones which had attacked President Wilson, America and Americans in general, and which had very often included me in their attacks. During every crisis between America and Germany I had acted with von Jagow and Zimmermann in a most confidential way, looking forward always to one object, namely, the preservation of peace between our respective countries.

Many suggestions were made which, I think, materially aided up to that time in the preservation of peace.

The Chancellor and the Foreign Office, however, through sheer weakness did nothing to prevent the insults to our flag and President perpetrated by the "League of Truth"; although both under the law and the regulations of the "State of Siege" this gang could not operate without the consent of the authorities. So far as I was concerned personally, a few extra attacks from tooth carpenters and snake dancers meant nothing, but certainly aroused my interest in the workings of the Teutonic official brain.

On my return everyone in official life,--the Chancellor, Zimmermann, von Stumm who succeeded Zimmermann, von der Busche, formerly German Minister in the Argentine, who had equal rank with Stumm in the Foreign Office--all without exception and in the most convincing language a.s.sured me that cases like that of the _Marina_, for example, were only accidents and that there was every desire on the part of Germany to maintain the pledges given in the _Suss.e.x_ Note.

And the great question to be solved is whether the Germans in making their offers of peace, in begging me to go to America to talk peace to the President, were sincerely anxious for peace, or were only making these general offers of peace in order to excuse in the eyes of the world a resumption of ruthless submarine warfare and to win to their side public opinion in the United States, in case such warfare should be resumed.

Had the decision rested with the Chancellor and with the Foreign Office, instead of with the military, I am sure that the decision would have been against the resumption of this ruthless war.

But Germany is not ruled in war time by the civilian power.

Hindenburg at the time I left for America was at the head of the General Staff and Ludendorf, who had been Chief of Staff, had been made the Quartermaster General in order that he might follow Hindenburg to General Headquarters.

Hindenburg, shortly before his battle of the Masurian Lakes, was a General living in retirement at Hanover. Because he had for years specialised in the study of this region he was suddenly called to the command of the German army which was opposing the Russian invasions. Ludendorf, who had been Colonel of a regiment at the attack on Liege, was sent with him as his Chief of Staff.

The success of Hindenburg in his campaigns is too well known to require recapitulation here. He became the popular idol of Germany, the one general-in fact the one man--whom the people felt that they could idolise. But shortly before my trip to America an idea was creeping through the mind of the German people leading them to believe that Hindenburg was but the front, and that the brains of the combination had been furnished by Ludendorf. Many Germans in a position to know told me that the real dictator of Germany was Ludendorf.

My trip to America was made princ.i.p.ally at the instance of von Jagow and the Chancellor, and, in my farewell talk with the Chancellor a few days before leaving, I asked if it could not be arranged, since he was always saying that the civilian power was inferior to that of the military, that I should see Hindenburg and Ludendorf before I left. This proposed meeting he either could not or would not arrange, and shortly after my return I again asked the Chancellor if I could not see, if not the Emperor, at least Hindenburg and Ludendorf, who the Chancellor himself had said were the leaders of the military, and, therefore, the leaders of Germany. Again I was put off.

In the meantime and in spite of the official a.s.surance given to me certain men in Germany, in a position to know, warned me that the government intended to resume ruthless submarine war.

Ludendorf, they said, had declared in favour of this war and, according to them, that meant its adoption.

At first I thought that Germany would approach the resumption of ruthless submarine war _via_ the armed merchantman issue.

The case of the _Yarrowdale_ prisoners seemed to bear out this theory. A German raider captured and sunk a number of enemy vessels and sent one of the captured boats, the _Yarrowdale_, with a prize crew to Swinemunde. On board, held as prisoners, were a number of the crews of the captured vessels; and among those men I learned "under the rose," were some Americans. The arrival of the _Yarrowdale_ was kept secret for some time, but as soon as I received information of its arrival, I sent note after note to the Foreign Office demanding to know if there were any Americans among the prisoner crews.

For a long time I received no answer, but finally Germany admitted what I knew already, that Americans taken with the crews of captured s.h.i.+ps were being held as prisoners of war, the theory of the Germans being that all employed on armed enemy merchant s.h.i.+ps were enemy combatants. I supposed that possibly Germany might therefore approach the submarine controversy by this route and claim that armed merchantmen were liable to be sunk without notice.

Instructed by the State Department, I demanded the immediate release of the _Yarrowdale_ prisoners. This was accorded by Germany, but, after the breaking of relations, the prisoners were held back; and it was not until after we left Germany that they were finally released.

I asked permission to visit these prisoners and sent Mr. Ayrault and Mr. Osborne to the place where I knew they were interned.

The permission to visit them arrived, but on the same day orders were given to remove the prisoners to other camps. Mr. Osborne and Mr. Ayrault, however, being on the ground, saw the prisoners before their removal and reported on their conditions.

On January sixth the American a.s.sociation of Commerce and Trade gave me a dinner at the Hotel Adlon. This was made the occasion of a sort of German-American love-feast. Zimmermann, although he had to go early in the evening to meet the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, was present; Helfferich, Vice-Chancellor and Secretary of the Interior; Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister; Sydow, Minister of Commerce; Dernburg; von Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank; Gutmann of the Dresdener Bank; Under Secretary von der Busche of the Foreign Office; the Mayor and the Police President of Berlin; the President of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce; Under Secretary von Stumm of the Foreign Office; and many others of that office. There were present also Under Secretary Richter of the Interior Department; Lieutenant Colonel Doeutelmoser of the General Staff; the editors and proprietors of the princ.i.p.al newspapers in Berlin; Count Montgelas, who had charge of American affairs in the Foreign Office; naval officers like Captain Lans; the American correspondents in Germany; and Prince Isenburg; rubbing shoulders with the brewers, George Ehret and Krueger, of New York and Newark. There were literary lights like Ludwig Fulda, Captain Persius, Professor Hans Delbruck, Dr. Paasche, Vice-President of the Reichstag, and many others equally celebrated as the ones that I have named. Speeches were made by Mr. Wolf, President of the American a.s.sociation of Commerce and Trade, Helfferich, Zimmermann, von Gwinner and me. A tone of the greatest friendliness prevailed. Zimmermann referred to our personal friends.h.i.+p and said that he was sure that we should be able to manage everything together. Helfferich in his speech said that I, by learning German and studying the life of the German people, was one of the few diplomats that had come to Germany who had learned something of the real life and psychology of the Germans.

Von Gwinner made a speech in English that would have done credit to any American after-dinner speaker; and I, in my short address, said that the relations between the two countries had never been better and that so long as my personal friends like Zimmermann and other members of the government, who I named, were in office, I was sure that the good relations between the two countries would be maintained. I spoke also of the sums of money that I had brought back with me for the benefit of the widows and orphans of Germany.

The majority of the German newspapers spoke in a very kindly way about this dinner and about what was said at it. Of course, they all took what I said as an expression of friendliness, and only Reventlow claimed that, by referring to the members of the government, I was interfering in the internal affairs of Germany.

The speeches and, in fact, this dinner const.i.tuted a last desperate attempt to preserve friendly relations. Both the reasonable men present and I knew, almost to a certainty, that return to ruthless submarine war had been decided on and that only some lucky chance could prevent the military, backed by the made public opinion, from insisting on a defiance of international law and the laws of humanity.

The day after the dinner the Chancellor sent for me and expressed approval of what I said and thanked me for it and on the surface it seemed as if everything was "as merry as a marriage bell."

Unfortunately, I am afraid that all this was only on the surface, and that perhaps the orders to the submarine commanders to recommence ruthless war had been given the day preceding this love-feast.

The Germans believed that President Wilson had been elected with a mandate to keep out of war at any cost, and that America could be insulted, flouted and humiliated with impunity. Even before this dinner we had begun to get rumours of the resumption of ruthless submarine war and within a few days I was cabling to the Department information based not upon absolute facts but upon reports which seemed reliable and which had been collected through the able efforts of our very capable naval attache, Commander Gherardi.

And this information was confirmed by the hints given to me by various influential Germans. Again and again after the sixth of January, I was a.s.sured by Zimmermann and others in the Foreign Office that nothing of the kind was contemplated.

Now were the German moves in the direction of peace sincere or not?

From the time when the Chancellor first spoke of peace, I asked him and others what the peace terms of Germany were. I could never get any one to state any definite terms of peace and on several occasions when I asked the Chancellor whether Germany was willing to withdraw from Belgium, he always said, "Yes, but with guarantees." Finally in January, 1917, when he was again talking of peace, I said, "What are these peace terms to which you refer continually? Will you allow me to ask a few questions as to the specific terms of peace? First are the Germans willing to withdraw from Belgium?" The Chancellor answered, "Yes, but with guarantees." I said, "What are these guarantees?" He said, "We must possibly have the forts of Liege and Namur; we must have other forts and garrisons throughout Belgium. We must have possession of the railroad lines. We must have possession of the ports and other means of communication. The Belgians will not be allowed to maintain an army, but we must be allowed to retain a large army in Belgium. We must have the commercial control of Belgium." I said, "I do not see that you have left much for the Belgians except that King Albert will have the right to reside in Brussels with an honor guard." And the Chancellor said, "We cannot allow Belgium to be an outpost (_Vorwerk_) of England"; and I said, "I do not suppose the English, on the other hand, wish it to become an outpost of Germany, especially as von Tirpitz has said that the coast of Flanders should be retained in order to make war on England and America." I continued, "How about Northern France?" He said, "We are willing to leave Northern France, but there must be a rectification of the frontier." I said, "How about the Eastern frontier?" He said, "We must have a very substantial rectification of our frontier." I said, "How about Roumania?" He said, "We shall leave Bulgaria to deal with Roumania." I said, "How about Serbia?" He said, "A very small Serbia may be allowed to exist, but that is a question for Austria.

Austria must be left to do what she wishes to Italy, and we must have indemnities from all countries and all our s.h.i.+ps and colonies back."