A Journal of the Expedition to Carthagena Part 2

The Troops were under great Difficulties, not only from the Sickness, which hourly encreased, but from their Provisions not being regularly landed.

_April_ the 11th, the two Mortars began to fire from the advanced Guard upon the Castle of St. _Lazar_, and with very good Effect.

A Council of War was a.s.sembled, composed of Land Officers, who having carefully inquired into the State of the Forces on Sh.o.r.e, found them to be so much diminished by Sickness, and by the late Loss; and those, who were return'd, as fit for Duty, so much exhausted by the excessive Heat, and by Fatigue, that without a considerable Reinforcement from the Fleet, it would not be possible to go on with the Enterprize: This their Resolution was immediately communicated to the Admiral.

_April_ the 12th, the Sickness amongst the Troops still encreasing, several of the princ.i.p.al Officers were seized with it, and the Water in the Cisterns began to be very low. The Admiral return'd an Answer to the Resolution of the Council of War of yesterday; which having been taken into Consideration by the princ.i.p.al Land Officers, a.s.sembled for that Purpose, they observed with great Surprize, that no mention was made of any Reinforcement to be sent from the Fleet; of which, having taken the proper Notice in their Answer, they desired, that the Admiral would issue out his Directions for imbarking the Cannon, _&c._ concluding from his Silence in so material a Point, that no Reinforcement was to be expected. But no mention was at that time made of bringing in s.h.i.+ps to cannonade the Town; as the Manner, in which a former Proposal of that Nature had been answered, gave little Room to hope for Success in repeating of it: Tho' perhaps it may not be difficult to make appear, that our great s.h.i.+ps lying unactive at a time when they might have been usefully employ'd,[29] was the princ.i.p.al Occasion of our not possessing ourselves of the City of _Carthagena_, and not the Miscarriage of the Attack of St. _Lazar_. For had we got Possession of it (as would probably have been the Case, if the Scheme for the Attack had been punctually executed) it does not follow, that the Town would have on Course surrender'd, or that they could have been compelled to it, without the Admirals a.s.sisting us with his whole Force; except we are to suppose, that the _Spaniards_, with a Garrison not inferior in Numbers to the Besiegers, would have tamely given it up into our Hands: for it is morally certain, that the Corps of Troops, which were then on Sh.o.r.e, must, by Sickness only, in a few Days have been reduced so low, as not to be able to bring off their Cannon.

_April_ the 13th, great Numbers of Sick, both Officers and Soldiers, were sent on board the Transports.

A Council of War was a.s.sembled on Sh.o.r.e, who took into Consideration a Letter from the Admiral, in Answer to their late Representation, and resolved, to desire without Delay to meet the Sea Officers in a general Council of War; which being signified to the Admiral, it was agreed to a.s.semble the Day following on board the Admiral's s.h.i.+p.

_April_ the 14th, the Council of War being a.s.sembled, the General laid before the Members the real State of the Troops,[30] and declared, that he deemed it to be impracticable to go on with the Enterprize, without a.s.sistance from the Fleet. The princ.i.p.al Engineer being called in, and examined, signify'd to the Council of War, the Places which he thought would be the most proper for erecting Batteries; to which he added, that no less than a Fortnight would be required for raising them, considering the many interruptions which must be expected from the Enemy, and the Sickness hourly increasing amongst the Troops; and that 1500 Men would be wanting for the proper Reliefs for that Service only; he further declared it to be his Opinion, that with the Troops now on Sh.o.r.e, the Siege could not be undertaken with any Probability of Success.

The Admiral, without further Deliberation, going to put the Question, whether the Troops should be reimbark'd or not, Mr. _Wentworth_ declared, that he could not give his Vote, till he should be informed what a.s.sistance they were to expect from the Fleet; who, being interrupted by the Admiral with great Heat and Pa.s.sion, and not with the most polite Language, made a proper Reply; to which the Admiral not being pleased to return any Answer, immediately left the Cabbin.

The Debate was afterwards decently carry'd on, and the General having repeated his Question, Sir _Chaloner Ogle_, and the other Sea Officers, who were Members of the Council of War, unanimously declared, that it would by no means, be adviseable to trust the Sailors on Sh.o.r.e, as they could be kept under no Command, and would soon disperse themselves in the Woods; to which Mr. _Vernon_ (who sat in the Gallery within hearing) added aloud, that some of them would soon ramble into _Carthagena_.

The Admiral being returned to his Place at the Board, it was unanimously resolved to reimbark the Cannon and Land Forces with all possible Expedition.

The Admiral, as President, drew up the Resolution of the Council of War, when it was observable, that he carefully avoided making the least mention of a.s.sistance having been demanded from the Fleet.

The Battery[31] of two ten inch Mortars, which was raised by Captain _Knowles_ on the Sh.o.r.e near to his s.h.i.+p, began this Morning to Fire upon Fort St. _Lazar_, but was placed at so great a Distance as to have little or no Effect.

_April_ the 15th, the Cannon, Stores and heavy Baggage, were put on Board.

A Council of War of Land Officers being a.s.sembled, a Disposition was laid before them, for the Retreat,[32] which was approved of.

_April_ the 16th, About Five in the Morning, the _Galicia_, commanded by Captain _h.o.a.re_, began to canonade the Town with tolerable good Success; but he being exposed to a superior Fire, was obliged to cut her Cable; after having received several Shots in her Hull, had six Men killed, and 56 wounded, she drove upon a Shoal, and was there burnt by the Admiral's Order.

At Seven in the Evening, the Tents were struck, at Eight the Troops march'd from their Ground, and embarked in three Divisions on the Boats prepared to receive them. The Sickness amongst the Troops increased to so great a Degree, that any longer Continuance in that unhealthy Situation, seemed to threaten no less than their total Ruin; the General therefore, and the princ.i.p.al Land Officers, agreed to the Admiral's Proposal, for demolis.h.i.+ng the Forts, _&c._ which commanded the Harbour; that being done, and Water taken in for the Voyage, the whole Fleet set sail for _Jamaica_.

THE APPENDIX.

I Shall only here remark some Mistakes, which the Author of the Pamphlet has been guilty of in his Appendix, both with regard to the Circ.u.mstances of the City of _Carthagena_, and to the Conduct of the Officers of the Army, whom he has been pleased basely to asperse, without any Grounds whatsoever. And I do appeal to the Gentlemen of the Navy, for the Truth of what I have advanced; which must be so evident to every impartial Person, who was there present, and gave the least Attention to what pa.s.sed, that I should not have employed one Moment's Time, in replying to a Pamphlet, made up of glaring Falsehoods, Facts misrepresented, and mean personal Reflections, to which the Author does not put his Name; was I not in Hopes, that by laying before the Publick an exact Account of the Transactions before _Carthagena_, in some Measure to remove (from those who cannot otherwise be informed of the Truth) the Prejudices which are so industriously propagated in that scurrilous Libel; not solely with a View to calumniate a few brave Men, who after many Hazards are return'd home to their native Country; but by invidious Distinctions, to set at variance the Army and the Navy, which can have no other End but to obstruct his Majesty's Service, whenever the Fleet and Land Forces shall act in Conjunction.

As for the City itself (says the Author) Nature has fortified it against any Attempt by Sea, the Water shoaling near a League off, and being plentifully bounded with Rocks; besides the Sea is very seldom smooth, so that it is difficult at all times landing.

There are Pilots, who have been long accustomed to that Coast, who affirm that there is depth of Water sufficient for large s.h.i.+ps to anchor (even on that Side) near enough to batter the Town: The only Difficulty arises from the Swell of the Sea; but that much abates, whenever the Wind blows for any Time off Sh.o.r.e.

The Ravelin here mention'd can only subsist in the Author's Imagination; there is no other Defence between the two Bastions, (which are very distant from each other,) excepting a low Wall not flank'd; a Circ.u.mstance of which very good Use might be made, if upon the Swell's being abated, Boats could be sent in there to put Troops on Sh.o.r.e.

There were two large Men of War moored to defend the Entrance of _Boca-grande_, but that there was a Fascine Battery begun upon each Point, seems to be a Secret only known to the Author; for no Mention was made of any such during our Stay upon that Coast, nor upon reconnoitring that Entrance into the Harbour, could the least Traces of them be perceiv'd.

The little _Fort de Chamba_ was not finish'd, nor had upon it one Gun; nor was there the least Appearance of one, on what the Author is pleased (Page 49.) to call a Fascine Battery of twelve Guns: From same Fascines being placed in order upon the Sh.o.r.e, it was believed that the Enemy had Thoughts of erecting a Battery on that Place.

The Author's Description of _Boca-Chica_ Castle, _&c._ seems to be tolerably exact, and I cannot omit to remark the justness of his Expression, when he mentions the Bomb Vessels being got near enough to divert the Town; for in Truth they were posted at so great a Distance, that they seem'd to be sent in with no other Intention.

That the City of _Carthagena_ is to the Land-side, fortify'd by double Walls, and double Ditches, flank'd by strong Bastions, is an undoubted Truth; but I must dissent from what the Author alledges, of the Water at the Head of the Harbour, being shoal so far off, that s.h.i.+ps cannot come near enough to do Execution with their Guns. Experienced Pilots, and Masters of trading Vessels, who have been much conversant in that Harbour, do (and will when Occasion requires it) testify the contrary; but nothing can be a stronger Proof of there being sufficient depth of Water for our largest s.h.i.+ps, than that the Station of the _Spanish_ Galleons, is very near the Walls, for the Convenience of taking in their Lading. It is well known, that Monsieur _Ponti_ sent in his Men of War (amongst which was the _Sceptre_ of eighty-four Guns) to batter the City, and with so good an Effect, as in a short Time to oblige them to surrender.

But a still more recent Proof of there being sufficient depth of Water, is the celebrated Admiral _Vernon_'s having ordered in the _Galicia_, a _Spanish_ Man of War of sixty-six Guns: This Vessel was fitted up for battering in a very extraordinary Manner: _Merlons, or Cases, six Feet thick, rammed with Earth, or Sand, were formed between the Port-holes_, which occasioned her drawing more Water, than any of our eighty Gun s.h.i.+ps; notwithstanding, with her sixteen Guns mounted, _only_, she did considerable damage to the City, before she could be demolished.

That the _Spaniards_ have no great Dependance upon this supposed Shoalness of the Water, is very evident from their having lately erected a Battery of forty large Pieces of Cannon, for the defence of the Town on the Side towards the Harbour; a very unnecessary Expence, if the Water is there so shoal as to prevent the near Approach of our large Men of War.

From the Author's own Description, the Fort of St. _Lazar_ appears to be no such trifling Redoubt, as he would insinuate; had he approached near enough to take an exact View of it (which probably he did not) he must have observed that the Hill is near double the Height he mentions, and that the Eminence opposite to it (which, if Cannon could have been convey'd thither, was certainly a very proper Place for the erecting a Battery) is pretty much upon a Level with the Ground upon which the Castle stands.

That the Enemy began their Works upon the Hill, immediately after we were in Possession of _Boca-Chica_ (if not upon the first Appearance of the Fleet,) is a Fact well known, both to the Army and to the Navy; nor was it in the power of the Former to interrupt their Progress till the proper Materials were landed; but how far that might have been done, by sending in two or three of his Majesty's large s.h.i.+ps, the Gentlemen of the Sea are the most proper Judges.

That the Side of the Castle of _St. Lazar_, which is next the Town, could not be defenceless, must be evident to every Reader, from the Circ.u.mstance of its being next the Town, and consequently defended by all the Works on that Quarter, particularly by an Half-moon, which is erected about half Musket-Shot from it.

If the Enemy's Numbers (as the Author alledges, page 54.) amounted to 4000 Men, the Troops which were landed, and never exceeded 4350 Rank and File, could but have little Prospect of forcing them amidst their strong Fortifications; nor did the General and Princ.i.p.al Officers ever propose it to themselves, otherwise than by the help of the whole Force on board the Fleet, which was actually promised, as soon as a Pa.s.sage should be opened for the s.h.i.+ps into the Harbour; how performed, the unhappy Issue but too plainly makes appear.

The Enemy's Engineers, Cannoniers, _&c._ acquitted themselves very well, and ours did the same, nor was there amongst them one single instance of Cowardice or Desertion; would the Author be pleased to put his Name to so base an Aspersion cast upon them, there are of the few surviving, who are well able to convince him of his Mistake.

It is roundly alledged, that excepting two Regiments, the whole body of Troops which came from _England_, were quite raw and undisciplined; how far this is a Fact known to every one, will appear, by minutely entering into their Circ.u.mstances.

As a Foundation for forming a Corps of Troops fit for immediate Service, his Majesty was pleased to direct a Draught to be made from the Foot Guards, of the best disciplined Corporals and private Men, to be appointed Marine Serjeants, as likewise 300 private Centinels well instructed in the Use of their Arms, to be placed to every Marine Regiment, who were for that Purpose draughted from all the old Corps in _Britain_; by which Means each of the Marine Regiments was actually supply'd with a Number of well-disciplin'd Men, not much short of the _Irish_ Corps before the Augmentation.

The Colonels of the six Regiments of Marines were old Officers, who had all (excepting one) served abroad in the last War.

Such were the greatest Part of the Lieutenant Colonels and Majors. The Captains were either Gentlemen of Service taken from the Half-Pay, or from the Independent Companies at _Jamaica_; such as had been long inured to the Climate of the _West-Indies_, or Subaltern Officers of long standing in the old Corps, whom his Majesty honour'd with the Command of Marine Companies. The first and second Lieutenants were either Ensigns taken out of the old Corps, Cadets, who had for some time carry'd Arms, or young Gentlemen, whose Quality and Interest very justly ent.i.tuled them to Preferment. To these the Author has added a third imaginary Cla.s.s, of _abandoned Wretches of the Town, whose Prost.i.tution had made them useful on some dirty Occasion, and by Way of Reward were provided for in the Army_. I call upon the _Author_ to point out one single Man, who was sent out in those Corps, deserving of that Character; if he does not (as I am well a.s.sured he cannot) what Character he himself richly deserves, will easily occur to the Reader.

That few of the Inferior Officers had ever before served against an Enemy, is undoubtedly Fact, nor after thirty Years Peace, could it possibly be otherwise; but their Behaviour during the Incampment in the Isle of _Wight_, evidently made it appear that they were not deficient in Discipline; nor when they came to face the Enemy, could the oldest, and most experienced Officers expose their Persons with greater Gallantry and Chearfulness.

That most of the Officers, who had served long and well, got themselves knock'd on the Head by teaching a young and raw Army, is in Fact false; for both old and young equally shared the Hazard and Fatigue; nor did one single Officer or Soldier loose his Life, excepting in the Performance of his own Duty.

What an Heap of _Billingsgate_ does the Author employ (pag. 56.) to vilify the _American_ Regiment? _The Officers_ (he affirms) _were in particular composed of Blacksmiths, Taylors, and all the Banditti that the Country affords_. Had he been so candid as to have informed himself of those Gentlemens true Characters, he would have known, that the Field Officers were all Men of long Service, named by his Majesty, and sent from _Britain_: That the Companies were chiefly raised by the Interest, and at the Charge of their respective Captains; of whom some were Members of the a.s.semblies in the Provinces where they resided; others liv'd upon their own Plantations, and had Commands in the Militia; and some few of them had been concerned in Traffick. His Majesty was pleased to send to _North-America_ thirty young Gentlemen, under the Direction of Brigadier _Blakeney_, who were to serve in that Corps as Lieutenants; they had carried Arms either in the old Corps at home, or in the _Scotish_ Regiments in the _Dutch_ Service, and were most of them Cadets of good Families in _North Britain_.

The rest of the Subaltern Officers were recommended by the Governors, and by the Gentlemen of the first Rank in the Provinces where the Companies were raised; and were either younger Sons of the princ.i.p.al Families, bred to no particular Profession, or such of them as had been brought up to the Law, to Merchandize, or who had served at Sea.

It is certain, that the greatest Part of the private Soldiers, who were inlisted in _North-America_, were either _Irish_ (and many of those suspected to be Papists) or _English_, who had been under a Necessity of quitting their Native Country. As the Levy was made in Haste, there was neither Time for strictly examining into their respective Circ.u.mstances, nor for their being well-disciplin'd before they joined the Army; whence it became in a great Measure, necessary to employ them chiefly on board the Fleet.

Tho' this infamous Libel appears to be levell'd against that Corps of _Land Forces in general_, yet the Author is pleased more eminently to distinguish the Engineers, _&c._ belonging to the Train; he very roundly affirms, that _worse never bore the Name, nor could be pick'd out of all_ Europe.

The princ.i.p.al Engineer (Mr. _Moor_) was deservedly esteemed for his Bravery, his Capacity and Skill in his Profession; the Battery, on which he was killed, viewing the Effects of the Shot thro' an Embrasure, was well constructed, and fully answered the End for which it was raised: He had served with Applause in the Defence of _Gibraltar_, one of the princ.i.p.al Fortresses in _Europe_, which was attacked by an Army of 40,000 Men, composed of the best Troops in _Spain_, and batter'd by 100 Pieces of large Cannon; yet this Army was by the gallant Defence of the Garrison obliged to retire, after having been almost totally ruin'd at this _simple_ Siege, as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to stile it.

Mr. _Armstrong_, the Gentleman who succeeded as princ.i.p.al Engineer on the Death of Mr. _Moor_, had all the Experience, which could possibly be acquired in Time of Peace, having been continually employ'd during sixteen Years in the different Works about this Kingdom; nor could any Person whatsoever perform his Duty, with greater Attention, or more chearfully expose his Person, whenever he thought his Presence could in any wise contribute to the publick Service.

It is certain, that no more than two of the Sub-Engineers had ever served in the Face of an Enemy; which surely ought not to be imputed to them as a Fault, when, after so long a Peace, few or none so qualified were remaining: But nothing had been omitted by those Gentlemen to repair their Want of Experience both by their Application to the Study of their Profession at home, and by visiting the Fortifications in Foreign Parts; and when on real Service, it was very evident that they spared no Endeavours to make up that Deficiency by their Diligence and gallant Behaviour: Nor is there the least Room to doubt, but that the few who have returned from that fatal Expedition, will, whenever they shall be called upon, be found qualified to do effectual Service to their Country.

Colonel _Watson_'s Merit and long Services very justly ent.i.tuled him to the Command of the Train on the late Expedition; nor did his Age (as the Author insinuates) ever prevent his Attendance upon his Duty; in the Performance of which he lost his Life by a Shot which glanced from a Tree, at some Distance from the Battery.

His Successor, a brave blunt Soldier (who can never be pardoned for boldly speaking the Truth) was so far from being rendered unfit for his Duty, that no Man attended it with more Diligence; from the first Opening the Battery before _Boca-Chica_, he scarcely ever left it, even for necessary Refreshment, till the Castle was taken.

Who could be so proper to be inlisted for Cannoniers, Bombardiers, _&c._ as Country Fellows? but those Country Fellows (as the Author is pleased to call them) were disciplin'd Men, capable of doing their Duty; in which they wanted no Aid, till Death and Sickness had reduced them so low, that it was necessary they should be reinforced both from the Army and the Fleet. The extraordinary Conference mentioned by the Author (page 56.) to have been held between the General and them, I can safely affirm, has not the least Foundation.