A Journal of the Expedition to Carthagena Part 3

That many of the Bomb-Sh.e.l.ls broke in the Air, from some Defect in their Fusees, or never broke at all, is undoubtedly Fact; which probably was occasioned by Damage they had received at Sea, and which could not be repaired, as we had neither Time nor Convenience for it, before their being wanted for Service. The Grenado-Sh.e.l.ls were of the same Sort, of the very same Dimensions with those usually issued out from the Office of Ordnance; nor was there ever before the least mention made of their having been deficient. The Reason given for their not breaking is no great Proof of the Author's Skill, as an Engineer; for it is well known, that one single Ounce of Gunpowder is sufficient (if properly confined) to rend in Pieces a Stone weighting several Tuns.

The eight twenty-four Pounders, put on board for the Use of the Expedition, were all landed at _Boca-Chica_ fit for Service, and were there actually made use of upon the Battery, where two of them were rendered unserviceable.

One hundred Baulks, and three hundred Battery Planks, were by an Order from the Board of Ordnance, bearing date, _May_ 1740, issued out of the Stores, and imbark'd for the Use of the Expedition; but Lord _Cathcart_, having after the Imbarkation of the Troops, been informed that no further Supply could be had in the _West-Indies_, tho' the contrary had been represented to the Board of Ordnance; He applied for an Addition of one hundred Baulks, and 300 Planks, which were put on board before the Fleet sailed; as were likewise 4050 Hand-bills, his Lords.h.i.+p deeming the 1000 already provided not to be sufficient.

Upon the whole, nothing could more demonstrate the Goodness of this Army, than the Service they performed, not only amidst the almost insuperable Difficulties, which arose from the Climate, but labouring under the utmost Distresses and Discouragements from a Quarter, whence the Reverse ought justly to have been expected. Were the Instruments imploy'd on the late Expedition such as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to describe, there would be no great Difficulty in accounting for its Miscarriage; the which, Lord _Cathcart_ (had he lived) could probably not have prevented: but as it does, I think, evidently appear, that what the Author has advanced to the Prejudice of the Land Forces, is false and groundless, and that they performed whatever was possible for them to do in their Situation, our Misfortunes are to be ascribed to some other Cause; they were, without Doubt, princ.i.p.ally occasioned by the Climate. What further may have contributed, nothing would set in a more clear Light, than an exact and faithful Account of every Transaction, not only during the Time of the Troops lying before _Carthagena_, but to that of their being recalled. Such an Account cannot but be very acceptable to all those who had a Share in that unfortunate Expedition, and had no other End in View but the publick Service. And, I am well a.s.sured, to none more than to the Gentleman, on whom the Command devolved by the Death of Lord _Cathcart_, who has all possible Reason to desire, that his whole Conduct may undergo the strictest Scrutiny.

I cannot conclude without remarking, as something extraordinary, the Justice done by the Author in his last Paragraph to the common Soldiers; but which is surely no less due to the Officers, who led them on, and by following whose brave Example, they gave evident Proofs, that they wanted not for Courage and Resolution becoming _Englishmen_.

_FINIS._

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: The princ.i.p.al Council of War, consisted of the two eldest Officers of the Army, of the two eldest Officers of the Navy, and of the Governor of _Jamaica_, whenever he could be present. It was the Province of this Council to determine what Enterprizes should be undertaken.]

[Footnote 2: _Vide_ Note (_a_) in the late Pamphlet, ent.i.tuled, _An Account of the Expedition to_ Carthagena.]

[Footnote 3: Upon its being first debated, whether an Attempt should be made on _Carthagena_, the General declared, that, as he was a Stranger in those Seas, he had no Knowledge of the then present State of that City; and that he should join with the Admiral in his Opinion; not doubting of his being well inform'd of every Circ.u.mstance relating to the Entry into the Harbour, the Strength of the Garrison, _&c._]

[Footnote 4: In relating this Transaction (_vide_ P. 7. note Letter _c_) the very candid Author of the Account of the Siege of _Carthagena_, is pleas'd to affirm, that _the General landed with a Body of 800 Grenadiers, but not thinking them sufficient, reimbark'd, and sent for more_: There was not the least Step taken, which could give Colour for such an a.s.sertion; excepting that Capt. _Dennet_, who commanded General _Harrison_'s Grenadiers, being apprehensive, that the General would give those of his own Regiment the Honour of landing first, push'd forward without Orders, and leaped on Sh.o.r.e with five or six Men: which the General perceiving, and that the rest of the Boats began to move in Confusion towards the Beach; he order'd those who had landed, (who were only _Dennet_, and the few Men abovementioned) to reimbark, and with the rest of the Boats to lay along-side of the _Norfolk_ and _Russel_, there to wait for the Arrival of the Companies, which were still wanting: Nor, had all the Companies of Grenadiers, been compleat to a Man, could they have exceeded 648 Officers included: but that was far from being the Case; for not only _Robinson_'s Grenadiers were then absent, having been separated from the Fleet, but the rest were at that Time so far reduced by Sickness, as not to amount to 400 Men, as it will appear from the Adjutant's Books.]

[Footnote 5: Had the Author of the Account, (_vide_ Note _d_,) been present on Sh.o.r.e, where probably he was not, he might have observed that all possible Diligence was used, to put the Men under Cover; and if he is in any wise capable of judging of military Operations at Land, he must have known that the Camp could not have been so properly formed in any other Place, for carrying on the Attack on the Castle of _Boca-Chica_; nor, if advanced higher into the Woods, could it have been supplied with Water, or the Tents pitch'd on that rocky Soil, which will not admit of the driving down a Tent Pin; but setting aside that Difficulty, how the Tents could have been pitch'd without cutting down the Trees, from whose Shade, as the Author alledges, the Soldiers would have been so much benefited, I really do not comprehend; nor would they have been less exposed to the Enemy's Shot, excepting they had incamped out of the Reach of it, which could not have answered the End proposed by their Landing.]

[Footnote 6: Mr. _Moor_ was of Opinion, that if an Opening should be made through the Wood from the Camp to the _Lagoon_, where the Enemy's s.h.i.+ps of War lay at Anchor, it might be a means of directing their fire: That the Admiral sollicited the General to continue this Coupure, is, I believe, true; but that it would have answer'd the Purposes mention'd in the latter part of the Note (_f_) in the Pamphlet, is not so evident. As the Enemy was in Possession of the _Lagoon_, they would not surely send Succours cross the _Boca-Grande_, (where s.h.i.+ps were posted to observe their Motions) thence with Hazard to pa.s.s the _Tierra Bomba_; which Succours could be conveyed by the way of the Harbour, without Danger or Interruption: nor could that Coupure be of the least Use to enable us to observe what pa.s.sed in the Harbour, of which we daily received Accounts from the abovementioned s.h.i.+ps, or from our small Parties; nor, if there was Danger to be apprehended from the Enemy's Incursions, (which there was not) could this Coupure have prevented them, as it was not much less than 1000 Paces from the Castle of _Boca-Chica_.]

[Footnote 7: The Communication between the Mortar-Battery and the Camp (_vide_ Letter _g_ in the Pamphlet) was covered from the Shot of the Castle by a rising Ground, nor was one Man killed during the whole Time in pa.s.sing between that and the Camp, nor did one single Shot take Place in it from the Fascine Battery, from which it was in great Measure secured by its natural Situation, which was help'd by a Parapet. Several of the Bombs most certainly broke in the Air, without any Effect; which was possibly occasioned by the splitting of the Fuzees, in driving them into the Sh.e.l.ls. Nor (notwithstanding what the Author is pleased to advance) did we suffer much from those thrown by the Enemy; one of which fell near the Mortar-Battery, and killed 6 or 7 Men; a few took Place in the Artillery-Park, (whither they were chiefly directed) damaged some Casks of working Tools, and two or three Carriages; but the greatest Part of them were either extinguished by falling into the Water, or buried themselves so deep in the Sand, as to break without any ill Effect whatsoever.]

[Footnote 8: Fascines and Pickets (_vide_ the beginning of the Note _f_) had not only been cut during the Fleet's watering at _Hispaniola_, but after our landing on _Tierra Bomba_, all possible Diligence was daily used, to compleat the Number required for erecting the Batteries.

Nothing can be more absurd than to imagine that so skilful an Engineer, as was Mr. _Moor_, could be so widely mistaken as to the Quant.i.ty. As soon as the Ground was cleared, and proper Works thrown up to cover the Workmen, he began with such Materials as were ready, and had from the Fleet no other a.s.sistance than 18 Carpenters for laying the Platforms; the Seamen were employed, (and that was properly their Province) in landing the Stores and Cannon; in getting the latter up to the Battery, and they afterwards a.s.sisted in firing of it; (most of the Gunners being at that time either Dead, or disabled by Sickness) besides 150 of them were for one or two Days employed to cut Fascines, but were so ungovernable as to be of little Service.

How far the Author may be qualified to judge of the Knowledge of the Sub-Engineers, Time may discover; was Mr. _Moor_ still living, he could well answer for the Construction of his Battery. He rais'd it not exactly parallel to the Face where the Breach was made, for a very powerful Reason: to prevent its being flank'd from the _Barradera_ Battery, and by that means preserved the Lives of a great many Men, who must otherwise have been lost. It is not improbable, that the Author believ'd the Line of Communication, between the great Gun-Battery and the Camp, to have been expos'd to the Enemy's Shot, and therefore never came near it; or he must have known that it was neither enfiladed from the Castle, nor the s.h.i.+pping, and that the few Men who were killed there, fell by Shot which glanced from the Trees, and did not exceed 7 or 8 during the whole Time the Troops lay before the Castle. (_vide_ Note _b_)]

[Footnote 9: The Troops were certainly annoyed in their Camp by the Enemy's Cannon, and particularly by the Fascine Battery: an Inconvenience which, in their Circ.u.mstances, was absolutely necessary to be supported, as by their removing to so great a Distance, as to be out of the reach of their Shot, the great Gun-Battery must have been expos'd to be insulted, which would at least have for some Time r.e.t.a.r.ded the taking of the Castle, if not oblig'd us to retire.

The base Insinuation relating to the Troops being moved without regular Orders, is absolutely groundless: The Independants from _Jamaica_, not arriving till after the Camp was formed, they were ordered to clear the Ground upon the Left, and there to pitch their Tents; where 200 _Americans_, and part of Lord _James Cavendish_'s and of Col. _Bland_'s Regiments, joined them from the Fleet. To make the more Room for the Artillery-Park, _Harrison_'s Regiment was, by Order, removed to the same Ground; as afterwards were those Regiments, which were the most exposed to the Fire from the Fascine Battery, and had suffered greatly in their Tents, Arms, _&c._ Nor, till then, did any of the General Officers remove to the new Encampment; which was indeed in some Measure covered by a Rock from the Fire of the Fascine Battery, but was not the less exposed to that from the s.h.i.+pping and the Castle, by which Lieutenant Col. _Sandford_ and several others there lost their Lives.]

[Footnote 10: Nothing can be more false than what the Author of the Pamphlet a.s.serts in his Note (_e_) of no Application having been made, nor any particular Scheme form'd for landing the Cannon and Stores.

_March_ the 10th, the Day after the Grenadiers had taken Possession of the two Forts, the General went in Person on board the Admiral to concert Measures with him for putting on Sh.o.r.e the Cannon, Ammunition, _&c._ and was by him, the Admiral, informed, that a Captain of a Man of War appointed for that Service, was gone on board the Ordnance s.h.i.+ps to give the proper Directions; the General, without Delay, order'd his Barge to row thither, and signify'd to the said Captain (who is since dead) both the Quant.i.ty and Species of Stores proper to be landed; and at the same time particularly mentioned to him the Inconvenience which would attend the putting on Sh.o.r.e more than were necessary for present Service. Notwithstanding (probably from the Want of Time and Means for sorting the Stores, _&c._) whatever first came to hand, was thrown into the Boats, sent to Sh.o.r.e, and confusedly cast upon the Beach. Whence they were removed by Matrosses and Soldiers appointed for that Service, and secured in the best Manner our Circ.u.mstances would admit of; but (excepting that some of the Powder received Damage from its having been placed by the Sailors upon the Sh.o.r.e within the Reach of the Surf of the Sea) none of the Stores were wash'd away, which indeed might possibly have happen'd, if timely Care had not been taken to prevent it.]

[Footnote 11: This bold and surprising Enterprize (as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to stile it in his Note _i_) seems to be celebrated with all the Rhetorick he is Master of: It is observable, that he makes no mention of the two hundred Soldiers, who were detached on the same Occasion, which possibly he may have forgot; as likewise, that, tho' by the Admiral's Disposition, the Soldiers were posted in the Rear; when landed, they were called for to advance, and a Lane made for their pa.s.sing towards the Front, which probably might be occasioned by their being armed more properly than the Sailors, for returning the Fire of the Enemy's small Arms. I cannot, without doing Injustice to Capt.

_Was.h.i.+ngton_, the Honourable Mr. _Murray_, and to the rest of the Land Officers, who were detach'd on this Occasion, join with the Author in pa.s.sing over their gallant Behaviour in Silence; nor would I be wanting in the Praises due to Capt. _Boscawen_, Capt. _Watson_, Capt. _Coates_, &c. who commanded the Sailors, who, as they have ever done, performed their Duty with great Bravery and Resolution, and particularly Lieutenant, now Captain _Forrest_, who, with the foremost, enter'd the Battery Sword in Hand; the Enemy having fled with Precipitation into the Woods, and the Soldiers being posted upon the Avenues, the Seamen set about spiking the Guns, destroying the Carriages, and tearing up the Platforms; but one of them having imprudently put Fire to the Guard House, they were discovered by the Enemy, and consequently exposed to the Fire from the Castle, _&c._ the Commandant therefore thought it advisable to retire, before the Battery could be effectually demolish'd.]

[Footnote 12: Two or three Boats were observed to pa.s.s between the Castle and the _Barradera_ Battery (not hundreds of Men as the Author alledges in Note _l_) who carry'd People sufficient so far to repair the Damage, which had been done, as in a short time to renew the Fire; an evident Proof both to the Army, and to the Navy, that the Battery had not been effectually demolish'd.

That the Army had work'd to some purpose (tho' the Author insinuates the contrary) plainly appears from their having made two Coupures thro' the Woods, cut the Fascines and Pickets, raised the Battery, and conveyed thither the Stores and Ammunition; in which last they had some a.s.sistance from the Sailors, and not a great deal from the Negroes. Had the Army the least Room for Resentment before, the sixty Gun s.h.i.+p was sent in to interrupt the Enemy's repairing the Fascine Battery, any Thing she perform'd, could by no Means cool it; for the fired at so great a Distance, as to give the Enemy very little Disturbance.]

[Footnote 13: The Author of the Pamphlet, in his extraordinary Note, Letter (_m_) mentions, _five hundred Sailors to have been employed in erecting the Battery_, tho' in Fact the Navy contributed to it, only 18 Carpenters. He adds, that, "_as more Time and Men were employed in it than were necessary, much Execution may be expected therefrom_." What more could be expected from it, than forcing the Enemy to abandon the Castle? "_but the Engineers could not out-do themselves; they erected the Battery in a Wood_." They might not out-do themselves, but they certainly did perfectly well; for by erecting their Battery under the Cover of the Wood, many Mens Lives were saved, and the Work was carried on without the Enemy's being able to interrupt their Progress.

He is likewise pleased to condemn them _for not clearing more Ground than was necessary_; a Circ.u.mstance, which, I should think, rather deserves his Approbation, as they avoided, improperly, to fatigue the Workmen, but this Caution, it seems was used, that the Enemy might not see the Army; if such a Sight would have given the Enemy any Satisfaction, I much doubt; or whether it would have answer'd to have obliged them at the Expence of cutting down 600 or 700 Paces of thick Wood, which intercepted their View of the Camp; but that the Army did not decline either then, or on any other Occasion, to look the Enemy in the Face, there have been too evident Proofs. No Man, who saw the Position of the Battery, could have the least Room to doubt of its bearing upon the Castle, as soon as a narrow Screen of Wood, which cover'd it, should be cut away. What is alledged, that no Guns could be brought to bear upon the Enemies s.h.i.+pping, is absolutely false; there were no less than seven, of which two were thought sufficient for that Purpose, which fir'd red hot b.a.l.l.s, and did good Execution. It is most certain, that if no Epaulment had been thrown up, the Battery might have been rak'd, which was easily foreseen, and timely prevented. The Sailors behaved well, and would have done better, had they been more under Direction; but they did no more than their Duty, either in a.s.sisting to erect the Battery, in which they had but a very small Share, or in firing of it, as they were expressly order'd so to do by his Majesty.

Without all Doubt it was Mr. _Moor_'s Intention to batter the western Face of the Bastion, and to beat down its Defences, which was evident, not only from the Construction, but from the Effect of the Battery. I must own I cannot but admire at the Author's Conclusion, that the Success was owing to Chance, because, if the Enemy had cleared more Ground round the Castle, the Undertaking would have been more difficult.

I readily join with him, that it would have been so; tho' in the Beginning of this Note, the Engineers are condemn'd for making the best Advantage of the Wood, which the Enemy had so imprudently left standing.

"The Engineers could by no Means out-do themselves; the Battery was constructed in a Wood."]

[Footnote 14: In the Note, Letter (_o_), it is alledged, that the Admiral sent in these s.h.i.+ps to oblige the General; The Truth of the Fact is this; The Ground over which the Troops were to march to attack the Breach, being flank'd both from Fort St. _Joseph_, and from the Fascine Battery, it was, _March_ the 22d, resolved in a Council of War, composed of Land Officers, to represent that Circ.u.mstance to the Admiral, and that they deem'd the Breach could not be attempted, without great Loss, from the Fire of Fort St. _Joseph_, and the Fascine Battery, if some Means could not be used by the Fleet to divert their Fire. The Day following, the Admiral signify'd to the General by Letter, "_That he had formed a Plan for bringing in the Men of War to make a general Attack on the Enemy's Forts and Batteries_"; to which he adds, "_that nothing but the Necessity of the Case can justify us in these Resolutions, as it is against our Judgment, as Seamen_." After the Opening of the great Gun Battery, the Castle Guns, which bore upon the Camp, were soon silenced; but it was apparent, even to Land-Men, that our Men of War could do little or no Damage to those of the Enemy's s.h.i.+pping, which, at that time, began to be made very uneasy by the red-hot b.a.l.l.s from the great Gun Battery.]

[Footnote 15: It may be remark'd (_Vide n. q._) though perhaps not as a Thing very extraordinary, that either the Author of the Pamphlet was, at that time on board, securely asleep in his Bed, or that he knowingly avers what is absolutely false; for that Night the Battery was, by particular Order, fired, both with Grape and round Shot, alternatively, and without any other Intermission, than was necessary to cool the Guns; for, it having been observed, that the Enemy was raising a Fascine Work behind the Breach, all possible Care was taken to r.e.t.a.r.d its Progress during the Night.]

[Footnote 16: The Author's being mistaken as to some Circ.u.mstances relating to the Attack, (_Vide_ his Note _r_) is easily to be excused; for, if he saw it at all, it must probably have been at a great Distance through a Spying Gla.s.s; but, as he is pleased in the latter Part of his Note to rea.s.sume his favourite Topick, the throwing out scurrilous Reflections upon the Land Forces, I cannot pa.s.s them over un.o.bserved.

This Success was undoubtedly, neither disagreeable to the Army, nor to the Navy; the former having undergone Hards.h.i.+ps, such as no modern Soldiers, or Sailors, had been accustomed to, nor perhaps many in former Times; nor did the Army propose any Advantage in being possessed of an Island (as the Author insinuates) but imbarked on board their Transports with all possible Expedition, in order to proceed to the Attack of the City.

That so formidable a Fleet was employ'd to little other Purpose, but to attend upon the Army, and to convoy their Transports, was with Regret observed, both by the Officers of the Army, and of the Navy; but surely so ridiculous a Thought could never enter into any Man's Imagination, as that the Soldiers should march along the Sh.o.r.e, the Fleet within Call, crying out to them for Help, or that they could not find their Way into the Castle without a Sea Pilot to conduct them: A Story, which has not the least Foundation; Lieutenant _Bennett_, the Gentleman, who led the Forlorn-Hope, and Mr. _Watson_, the Engineer, who accompanied him, are still living, and can testify, that no Sea Pilot, no _Spaniard_, no Prisoner, was upon that Attack; and I am well a.s.sured, that no such Person was ever thought of by the General to be employ'd on that Occasion.]

[Footnote 17: This Scheme (_Vide_ Note _s_) if there was any, seems to have been contrived chiefly for a Pretext to give the Sailors the Credit of whatsoever should be performed by the Land Forces; the Troops were certainly moving to the Attack, if not in Possession of the Castle, at the time, when Capt. _Knowles_'s Detachment could be first discovered by the Enemy; when it is not very probable, that they should lessen their Force by sending away large Boats full of Men (which I do not find were perceived by any body excepting the Author) to Fort St. _Joseph_; or give any Attention, but to the most pressing Danger: It is really true, that both the s.h.i.+ps and Fort St. _Joseph_ fired, but at the Troops, not at the Boats from the Fleet, which, when they came to Land, were both out of the Enemy's Sight, and out of the Reach of their Guns.]

[Footnote 18: The _Pa.s.sa-Cavallos_ is the only Creek, thro' which Provisions can be conveyed into the _Lagoon_, and from thence to the City, with which all Communication was effectually cut off, as soon as the Fleet was in Possession of the Harbour.]

[Footnote 19: Capt. _Knowles_ was appointed Governor of _Castillo Grande_; and to do him the more Honour (there could be no other End proposed, as there was no Possibility of the Enemies retaking of it) near 100 very useful Men of Lord _James Cavendish_'s, and Colonel _Bland_'s Regiments, were left in Garrison, and there continued till after the Troops reimbark'd, tho' of the Number required by the General to be landed (_Vide_ Notes in the Pamphlet _v_, and _w_).]

[Footnote 20: The most apparent Reason for the Enemy's burning the _French_ s.h.i.+p, was their concluding, that she must otherwise fall into our Hands, when our Men of War advanced to the Head of the Harbour; for they could apprehend little Danger to her from the Fire of _Castillo Grande_, as it lies only within a large random Shot from the Place, where she lay at Anchor.]

[Footnote 21: The Author of the Pamphlet in his Note (_y_) is pleased to affirm, "_That things were on this Occasion (as they had been throughout the whole) done without Order or Method; for notwithstanding the Army had been apprized of the Enemy's having made Lodgments along the Road; yet they landed without a Grenado Sh.e.l.l, or Field-Piece; and were likewise told the Road was even able to sustain the Weight of the heaviest Cannon_." Here the Author, as has been his Method thro' his whole Pamphlet, boldly a.s.serts, without the least Foundation; for, it is evident, both from the Resolutions of Councils of War, and from publick Orders, that no Step was taken here, nor indeed upon any other Occasion, without a Plan first laid down; and (where Time would admit of it) well consider'd, and approved by a Council of War.

It is very certain, that when Mr. _Macpherson_, the Guide, was conducting the Troops thro' the Defillee, he expressed no little Uneasiness on the Account of Lodgments, which he apprehended we should find upon our Route; but nothing of that Sort appeared, excepting, that a few Bushes were placed, in Order, in an Opening upon our right Flank, possibly with a Design to cover some small Party, who had retired into the Wood. But had our Landing been postponed, till the Arrival of Ordnance s.h.i.+ps from the Mouth of the Harbour, the Field-Pieces, Granado-Sh.e.l.ls, _&c._ which were then on board them, might indeed have been wanting to force such Works, as the Enemy would probably have finished during that Delay; which was prevented by boldly pus.h.i.+ng thro'

the Defillees to _La Quinta_; the Post of which, the Army was to possess themselves, "_for cutting off the Communication of the City with the Country, and for covering the Landing of the Artillery_". As Loss of Time might, on this Occasion, have been attended with the worst Consequences, the General found it necessary to advance without the _American_ Soldiers, Negroes, _&c._ which Disappointment cannot in any wise be attributed to the Officers of the Army, as the providing Boats for Landing the Forces was intirely under the Direction of the Navy.

Both our Motions, and those of the Enemy, might probably be seen from the s.h.i.+ps, their Masts being at that time crouded with Spectators; but what the Author alledges of the Execution they did upon the Enemy is not Fact. Whilst the Troops were moving along the Strand, some random Shots were made by the _Weymouth_, which killed one single _Spanish_ Negro, and were very near taking Place amongst our most advanced People; but were so far from obliging the Enemy to disperse, that they did not make the least Movement, till after being push'd by our Grenadiers.

That it was the general Opinion, that the City would have fallen into our Hands the first Day we landed, had the Troops push'd forward, is so far from being true, that had they been suffer'd to advance further, not an Officer but must, and would have condemn'd the General for exposing them without the least Probability of Success.

The Object proposed on our first Landing was the taking Post at _La Quinta_; "there to cut off the City's Communication with the Country, to cover the Landing of the rest of the Forces, and of the Artillery; and to clear Ground for the Encampment," which was mark'd out that very Day; but the Tents could not be pitched without first cutting down a thick Copse Wood; which, as soon as the Negroes and Tools were landed, was done with all possible Expedition. To have advanced further, in our Circ.u.mstances, would have been not only acting inconsistently with the Rules of War, but of common Sense, for we were entirely Strangers to the Road leading to _Carthagena_; the Guide, Mr. _Macpherson_, having, as soon as the Enemy appeared, gone on board a s.h.i.+p to view their Posture from the Main-top-mast-Head and did not return till the Affair was ended; we had neither Tools to throw up a Lodgment, nor Negroes to reconnoitre the Woods on our Flanks; besides, the Day advancing, the Heat was become so violent, that great Numbers must have fainted under the Fatigue.

From the Author's own Description of the Fort St. _Lazar_ (Page 53.) it is far from appearing to be so despicable a Redoubt, as with any Prospect of Success, to be attempted in the open Day, without Scaling-Ladders, _&c._ nor can I conceive how a Body of 1400 Men, with only their Firelocks in their hands, could (supposing the Fort to be taken) afterwards force their Way cross a Draw-bridge, commanded by Cannon, into a City fortify'd with double Walls, and two broad Ditches filled with Water, flanked by regular Bastions, and defended by a Garrison more than double the Number of the a.s.sailants; for the Body, which was drawn up on the Strand, was scarcely a fifth Part of the Garrison, and they fled thro' the Woods, where they could not be pursued, directly towards the City.]

[Footnote 22: The Stores and Ammunition which were landed at _La Quinta_, were carefully lodged in an House out of the Line of Fire, and a Guard put over them, (_vide_ Note in the Pamphlet (_a_) page 34.) The brave Officer, there so unjustly reflected upon, wants no Advocate, and will be easily able to clear himself of the Aspersions cast upon him, whenever the Author of them shall be pleased to declare himself.]

[Footnote 23: It is certain (Note _b_.) that the Enemy were very diligent in preparing for their Defence, nor was it in the power of the Army to interrupt them one Instant sooner than the Attack was made, from the want of Scaling Ladders, _&c._ being landed: What Time they employed in compleating their Works, or whether they did ever compleat them, it is not possible for the Author of the Pamphlet to judge, tho' 'tis well known they were begun upon, from the Time of our being possessed of _Boca-Chica_, if not before; but if he had been pleased candidly to have informed himself, he would have observed that our Mortar Battery at the Advanced Guard (_vide_ page 35.) play'd in 48 Hours after it was first begun upon; and that the Intrenchment there was finished in 18 Hours. I cannot but observe, that what the Author of the Pamphlet here affirms (_vide_ Note _b_, page 36) seems quite contradictory to what he advances (page 54) in the Appendix; in the one Place, _'tis declared that the Enemy had thrown up Intrenchments round about the Foot of the Castle, stronger and of more Importance than the Castle it self_: In the other, _that the Castle on the Side of the Town was quite defenseless_.]

[Footnote 24: The Communication of the city (_vide_ Note 6 page 36) with the Country on that Side, where the Army was incamp'd, was effectually cut off the very Day they landed; nor did the General (as the Author alledges) want to be prevail'd upon to do the same on the Side next to the Sea, but found it impracticable without the a.s.sistance of the Fleet, which was promised, and comply'd with, when it was too late.

The Author seems very careful to celebrate the great Attention given, to the preventing Supplies from entering the Town to Sea-ward; which was to be done without the least Difficulty or Hazard, particularly after the Fleet had got Admittance into the _Lagoon_: But pa.s.ses over in Silence, that no less Attention was given to prevent Refreshments being conveyed to the Army; it was even refused to the General to admit of sending out two or three small Vessels, to catch Turtle for the use of the Sick and Wounded: If the Army complain'd heavily, it was not without Reason; for during our Stay before _Carthagena_, the Fleet was supplied with Turtle, fresh Beef, _&c._ which the Land Forces on Sh.o.r.e laboured under the greatest Difficulties, even from the want of their Salt Provisions, which were not regularly conveyed to them.

The Author, with his usual Regard to Truth, affirms that a drove of Cattle was thro' neglect suffered to pa.s.s into the City. The Instant, the General was apprised from the Officer at the Convent, that a drove of Cattle was seen moving towards the City, he ordered out a Party to intercept them, who march'd with all the Expedition which was possible in that hot Climate, but were not so fortunate as to come up with them; of which some Part had probably dispersed in the Woods, and others, (as we were afterwards informed,) got into the Town. 'Tis not to be imagined that Men so distressed from the want of fresh Provisions, (even by the Author's own Account,) would have omitted any thing in their Power, to get such a Prey into their Hands; nor was due Encouragement wanting, a Reward of a Pistole for each Beeve, being promis'd to the Captors. Two or three small Islands lie in the Lake at about 500 Paces from the Sh.o.r.e, upon the right of the Ground where we encamped; which being observed to be sometimes frequented by the Spaniards, Application was made for a Boat, to know for what End these People came there, and to search for Goods, Provisions, _&c._ which might be lodged there; this I presume gave occasion for the pretty Story form'd by the Author. What idle Tales might be propagated in the Camp (perhaps by the Author himself) relating to raising Batteries, I cannot say; but I am well a.s.sur'd no Man in his Senses believ'd them.]

[Footnote 25: As many of the _American_ Soldiers were suspected to be _Irish_ Papists (_vide_ Note in the Pamphlet Letter (_d_) page 39) it was though adviseable both by the General and the Admiral, to employ them princ.i.p.ally on Board the Fleet; but the Regiments which came from Europe, being now reduced low in their Numbers, made it absolutely necessary, that the _Americans_ should be included in the Corps design'd for the Attempt on _Carthagena_.

This Reinforcement (as the Author stiles it) was only some Part of those Soldiers, which the General had required to be landed from the Fleet, and did not in Fact compleat the Troops on Sh.o.r.e, to numbers sufficient for proper Reliefs for the ordinary and extraordinary Duty; notwithstanding, had it been practicable to have victualled and sustained them, a Detachment had without doubt been made, even from the Numbers which were landed, to cut off the Communication on the _Eastern_ Side of the City; the General having great Reason to expect a further Supply from the Admiral.