The Rise of the Democracy Part 16

Those who put their trust in theories of popular sovereignty, and urge the referendum and initiative as the surer instruments of democracy than Parliamentary representation, may recall that a popular plebiscite organised by Napoleon in 1802 conferred on him the Consulate for life; that Louis Napoleon was made President of the French Republic in 1848 by a popular vote, obtained a new const.i.tution by a plebiscite in 1851, and a year later arranged another plebiscite which declared him hereditary Emperor, Napoleon III. France, where naturally Rousseau's theories have made the deepest impression, has since the Revolution gloried in the right of the "sovereign people" to overthrow the government, and its elected representatives have been alternately at the mercy of dictators and social revolutionists.

On the whole, the stability of the British Government, rooted in the main on the traditional belief in the representation of the electorate, would seem to make more surely for national progress and wider political liberty than the alternation of revolution and reaction which France has known in the last hundred and twenty years.

England has not been without its popular outbursts against what the American poet called "the never-ending audacity of elected persons," but these outbursts are commonly accepted as manifestations of intolerable conditions; and while the outbursts are repressed means are taken by Government to amend the conditions. When the Government fails to amend things, the House of Commons takes the matter up; and if the Commons neglect to do so, then the electors make it plain that amendment and reform are necessary by returning men to Parliament pledged to change matters, and by rejecting those who have failed to meet the situation.

THE OBVIOUS DANGERS

The dangers that threaten democracy are obvious. Universal adult suffrage, short Parliaments, proportional representation, equal electoral districts, second ballots--none of these things can insure democracy against corruption. For a government which rests on the will of a people--a will expressed by the election of representatives--is inevitably exposed to all the evils attendant on the unruly wills and affections of the average man.

The orator can play upon the feelings of the crowd, and sway mult.i.tudes against a better judgment; and he has greater chance of working mischief when a referendum or other direct instrument of democracy is in vogue than he has when government is by elected representatives. For the party system, itself open to plenty of criticism, constantly defeats the orator by the superior power of organisation. Hence it frequently happens at Parliamentary elections that a candidate whose meetings are enthusiastic and well attended fails lamentably at the poll. His followers are a crowd; they are not a party. They do not know each other, and they have not the confidence that comes of members.h.i.+p in a large society.

PARTY GOVERNMENT

If the orator is a menace to the wise decisions of the people by a referendum, the party organiser and political "boss" can easily be a curse to representative government on party lines. By all manner of unholy devices he can secure votes for his candidate and his party, and he has raised (or lowered) the simple business of getting the people to choose their representative into the art of electioneering. The triumph of political principles by the election of persons to carry out those principles becomes of less importance than the successful working of the party machine, when the boss and the organiser are conspicuous. Patronage becomes the method for keeping the party in power, and the promise of rewards and spoils enables an opposition to defeat the Government and obtain office. To be outside the party is to lose all chance of sharing in the spoils, and to take an interest in politics means, under these circ.u.mstances, to expect some consideration in the distribution of honours.

The "spoils system" is notorious in America, but in England it has become practically impossible for a man to take any serious part in politics except by becoming part of the machine. An independent att.i.tude means isolation. To belong to a party--Liberal, Unionist, or Labour--and to criticise its policy, or differ from its leaders, is resented as impertinence. The machine is master of the man. A troublesome and dangerous critic is commonly bought or silenced. He is given office in the Government, or rewarded with a legal appointment; perhaps made a peer if his tastes are in that direction. A critic who cannot command a considerable backing among the electorate will probably be driven out of public life. The disinterested activity in politics that puts the commonwealth before party gain is naturally discouraged by the party organisers.

Yet when public interest in national affairs sinks to the merely sporting instinct of "backing your candidate" at elections as a horse is backed at race meetings, and of "shouting for your party" as men shout for their favourite football team, or sinks still lower to the mercenary speculation of personal gain or loss on election results, then another danger comes in--the indifference of the average honest citizen to all politics, and the cynical disbelief in political honesty.

The warnings of John Stuart Mill against leaving politics to the politicians and against the professional position may be quoted:

"Representative inst.i.tutions are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government to give their vote; or, if they vote at all, do not bestow their suffrages on public grounds, but sell them for money, or vote at the beck of some one who has control over them, or whom for private reasons they desire to propitiate. Popular elections as thus practised, instead of a security against misgovernment, are but an additional wheel in its machinery."

Mill himself was a striking example of the entirely disinterested politician, who, caring a great deal more for principles than for party, finds little favour with the electors, and less with the party managers, and retires from politics to the relief of his fellows.

A general lack of interest in politics can prove fatal to democracy. The party managers, without the fear of the electorate before their eyes, will increase the number of salaried officials and strengthen their position by judicious appointments. Nominally, these inspectors and officers will be required for the public service, and the appointments will be justified on patriotic grounds. There will be little criticism in Parliament, because the party not in power will be anxious to create similar "jobs" when its own turn comes. Besides, as the public pays for these officials, there is no drain on the party funds; and this is a matter of congratulation to party managers, who are always anxious not to spend more than they can help on the political machinery.

BUREAUCRACY

But the horde of officials and inspectors will change democracy into bureaucracy, and the discovery is sometimes made too late that a land is ruled by permanent officials, and not by elected representatives. The elected representatives may sit and pa.s.s laws, but the bureaucracy which administers them will be the real authority.

It may be an entirely honest and efficient bureaucracy, as free from political partisans.h.i.+p as our British Civil Service and police-court magistracy are, but if it is admitted to be outside the jurisdiction of the House of Commons, and to be under no obedience to local councils, and if its powers involve a close inquisition into the lives of the people, and include the right to interfere daily with these lives, then bureaucracy and not democracy is the actual government.

A host of salaried political workers--agents, organisers, secretaries, etc.--will make popular representative government a mere matter of political rivalry, an affair of "ins and outs," and by this development of the party system will exclude from active politics all who are not loyal to the "machine," and are not strong enough to break it. But a host of public officers--inspectors, clerks, etc.--paid out of the public funds will do more than pervert representative government: they will make it subordinate to the permanent official cla.s.s; and bureaucracy, once firmly in the saddle, is harder to get rid of than the absolutism of kings, or the rule of an aristocracy.

Yet a permanent Civil Service is better in every way in a democracy than a Civil Service which lives and dies with a political party, and is changed with the Cabinet.

On the whole, the best thing for democracy is that the paid workers in politics should be as few as possible, and the number of salaried state officials strictly limited. The fewer the paid political workers, the fewer people will be concerned to maintain the efficiency of the political machine, and the more freely will the electorate act in the choice of its representatives. The fewer the salaried officials of State, the less inspection and restriction, and the less encouragement to habits of submission in the people. Democracy must depend on a healthy, robust sense of personal responsibility in its citizens, and every increase in the inspectorate tends to diminish this personal responsibility, and to breed a "servile state" that will fall a willing prey to tyranny and bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, whilst in self-defence democracy will avoid increasing its officials, it will distinguish between officials and employees. It is bound to add to the number of its employees every year, as its munic.i.p.al and imperial responsibilities grow steadily larger, and these employees, rightly regarded as public servants, cannot threaten to become our masters.

WORKING-CLa.s.s ASCENDANCY

Still one more danger to democracy may be mentioned, and that is the notion that from the working cla.s.s must necessarily come our best rulers.

"Rulers are not wise by reason of their number or their poverty, or their reception of a weekly wage instead of a monthly salary or yearly income. It is worse and more unpleasant and more dangerous to be ruled by many fools than by one fool, or a few fools. The tyranny of an ignorant and cowardly mob is a worse tyranny than the tyranny of an ignorant and cowardly clique or individual.

"Workers are not respectable or to be considered because they work more with their hands or feet than with their brains, but because the work they do is good. If it is not good work they do, they are as unprofitable as any other wasters. A plumber is not a useful or admirable creature because he plumbs (if he plumbs ignorantly or dishonestly, he is often either a manslayer or a murderer), but because he plumbs well, and saves the community from danger and damp, disease, and fire and water. Makers of useless machine-made ornaments are, however 'h.o.r.n.y-handed,' really 'anti-social persons,' baneful to the community as far as their bad work goes; more baneful, possibly, than the consumers of these bad articles, quite as baneful as the _entrepreneurs_ who employ them.

"The only good inst.i.tutions are those that do good work; the only good work done is that which produces good results, whether they be direct, as the plough-man's, or navvy's, or sailor's; or indirect, as the policeman, or the schoolmaster, or the teacher of good art, or the writer of books that are worth reading. A man is no better or wiser than others by reason of his position or lack of position, but by reason of his stronger body, wiser head, better skill, greater endurance, keener courage."[89]

There it is. Democracy needs for its counsellors, legislators and ministers, strength, wisdom, skill, endurance and courage, and must get these qualities in whomsoever they are to be found. Democracy can afford the widest range of choice in the election of popular representatives, or it will never reach its full stature.

In the choice of its representatives, a democracy will do well to elect those who know the life of the working people, and who share its toils; just as it will do well to shun the mere talker, and to seek out for itself candidates for election rather than have candidates thrust upon its attention by some caucus in London. But the main thing is that it should first discern men and women of ability and of character and then elect them for its representatives, rejecting those, it may be of more dazzling qualities, who are unstable in mind and consumed with vanity. It would be well if the elected representative were always an inhabitant of the county or the borough, known to his neighbours, and of tested worth. True, the prophet is often without honour in his own country, and a const.i.tuency acts wisely in electing a representative of national repute. But to search for a man of wealth who will subsidise every club and charitable inst.i.tution in the const.i.tuency, and to rejoice when such a candidate is procured from some political headquarters, is a wretched proceeding in a democratic state. The member who buys a const.i.tuency by his gifts will always feel ent.i.tled to sell his const.i.tuents should occasion arise.

Again, the delegate theory of representation can be a danger to democracy.

A Parliamentary representative is something better than a mechanical contrivance for registering the opinions of electors on certain subjects.

Otherwise all Parliamentary debate is a mockery. A representative he is of the majority of electors, but he must act freely and with initiative. Often enough he may be constrained to vote, not as many of his const.i.tuents would prefer, but using his own judgment. Of course when the choice is between obedience to the party whip and the wishes of his const.i.tuents, and personal conviction is with the latter, then at all costs the decision should be to stand by his const.i.tuents, or popular representation is a delusion.

To-day the pressure is far greater from the party whips than from the const.i.tuents, especially when in so many cases election expenses are paid, in part at least, from the party funds. And to overcome this constant danger to popular representation a sure plan would be the payment of all necessary election expenses out of the local rates, and the prohibition by law of all payments by the candidate or by political a.s.sociations. When members are paid for their attendance in Parliament, far better would it be, too, if such payment were made by the const.i.tuents in each case, and not from the national exchequer.[90] Worse than the delegate theory is the opinion that a representative of the people is in Parliament chiefly to keep his party in power. Political parties are inevitable, and they are effective and convenient when principles divide people. But popular representation is older than a party system of government, and when it becomes utterly subordinate to the welfare of parties it is time for a democratic people to realise the possible loss of their instrument of liberty.

Great Britain is not partial to groups, it has always broadly been divided politically into two camps, but a few men of strong independent judgment are invaluable in a popular a.s.sembly. There need be no fear lest governments totter and fall at the presence of men who dare to take a line of their own, and to speak out boldly on occasion. The bulk of members of Parliament will always cleave to their party, as the bulk of electors do, and the dread of being thought singular is a potent influence on the average man, in or out of Parliament. Democracy is in danger of losing the counsel of its best men when it insists that its representatives must be merely delegates of the electors, without minds or wills of their own; but it is in greater danger if it allows its representatives to be nothing but the tools of the party in power or in opposition. For when Parliamentary representation is confined to those who are willing to be the mechanical implements of party leaders and managers, the House of Commons becomes an a.s.sembly of place-hunters and self-seekers, for whom the profession of politics affords the gratification of vanity or enrichment at the public expense. In such an a.s.sembly the self-respecting man with a laudable willingness to serve the State is conspicuous by his absence.

With a Press in the hands of party politicians, and with editors and journalists engaged to write up their party through thick and thin, and to write down every honest effort at political independence of mind, the danger of losing from all political service the few rare minds that can ill be spared is a very real and present danger.

ON BEHALF OF DEMOCRACY

"The price of liberty is eternal vigilance," and often enough we sleep at our vigils. But when all the dangers and difficulties that beset democracy are enumerated, and all its weak spots are laid bare, we can still hold democracy to be the only suitable form of government for persons possessing free will, and the representation of the people the most satisfactory expression of democracy.

Government by autocrat, by despotism, benevolent or otherwise, by expert officials, or by an oligarchy of superior intelligences is irksome to the average man or woman of reasonable education, and in each case has been intolerable to the British people. They have all been tried and found wanting--royal absolutism, aristocracy, military dictators.h.i.+p, and only of late have we been threatened by an expert bureaucracy.

Parliamentary representation adapted, by the removal of disabilities of creed and rank and income, to meet the demands of the nation, has been proved by experience a clumsy but useful weapon for checking oppression.

Nowadays, we are using it less for defence against oppression, or as an instrument for removing political grievances, and are testing its worth for the provision of positive social reform. More and more it is required of Parliament that means be found for getting rid of the ills around us, for preventing disease and dest.i.tution, for promoting health and decency.

And just because legislation is, at the prompting of a social conscience, invading our homes and workshops, penetrating into prisons, workhouses, and hospitals, touching the lives of all of us from the cradle to the grave, the more imperative is it that our legislators should be chosen freely by the widest electorate of men and women. We fall back on the old maxim: "That which touches all shall be approved by all," and can perceive no other way of obtaining that general approbation for the laws than by the popular election of our representatives.

Demagogues may exploit the popular will, the cunning and unscrupulous in power may have us at their mercy, in our folly and indifference the nation may be brought to grave losses; but still there is always the means of recovery for the well-disposed while the vote remains in their hands.

So it is that, in spite of obvious failings and shortcomings, democracy by representative government remains for nations throughout the world that have not yet tried it the goal of their political striving. We are alive to the imperfections of democracy. It is no automatic machine for conferring benefits in return for taxes. It is the creation of mankind, not a revelation from heaven; and it needs, like all good human things, constant attention and can bear many improvements. It has to be adjusted from time to time to suit the growing capacities of mankind--as the popular a.s.sembly gave way to the representative a.s.sembly--and only on the failure to make the adjustment does it get rusty and out of order. It has to meet the requirements of vast empires and mighty confederations of states, and to fulfil the wants of small republics and parish councils.

What but democracy can answer to the call for political liberty that sounds from so many lands and in so many varying tongues? Did any other form of government devised by the wit of man make such universal appeal?

And when all is said and done--what does this democracy, this government by popular representatives, mean, but government by the consent of the governed--the only form of government tolerable to civilised mankind in the twentieth century?

Given a fairly good standard of common honesty in the ordinary dealings of life, and the honesty of our public life, whether in Parliament or in the Civil Service, in executive or administration, will serve. If the private and commercial life is corroded with dishonesty, then democracy will be bitten by knaves and rascals. For our chosen rulers have a way of faithfully reflecting the morality of their electors, and are not free to indulge their fancies, as kings of old were.

Politics are not, and never will be, or ought to be, the chief interest and concern of the ma.s.s of people in a healthy community where slavery is extinct. And democracy makes no demand that would involve such interest and concern. The choice of honest representatives, persons of goodwill, and reasonable intelligence, is no tremendous task in a community where honesty, goodwill, and intelligence prevail. And if these things do not prevail, if honesty is contemned in business, and goodwill between man and man despised, and intelligence frowned upon, then it is of small importance what the government of such a nation is, for that nation is doomed, and it is well for the world that it should be doomed.

But, on the whole, it seems indisputable that the common people of the great nations do cleave to honesty and goodwill, and that the desire for intelligence is being widely fostered. As long, then, as we can count on honesty, goodwill, and intelligence in our streets and market-places, as we can to-day, mankind does well to elect its representatives to council and Parliament and proclaim democracy--"Government of the people, by the people, for the people"--as the proper government for mankind.

Notes.

[1] We cannot be sure about the const.i.tution of the Witenagemot. The evidence is conflicting, and, at best, we can only offer a statement of opinion.