The Crisis of the Naval War Part 11

Gibraltar Every 4 days. Alternately to E. & W. c'ts.

Sierra Leone Every 8 days. Either coast.

Dakar Every 8 days. Either coast.

Hampton Roads (U.S.A.) Every 4 days. Alternately to E. & W. c'ts.

New York Every 8 days. Alternately to E. & W. c'ts.

Halifax, N.S. Every 8 days. West coast.

Sydney (Cape Breton) Every 8 days. Alternately to E. & W. c'ts.

Each port served a certain area of trade, and vessels engaged in that trade met at the port of a.s.sembly for convoy to the United Kingdom or to France.

The total number of merchant s.h.i.+ps sailing thus in convoy every eight days in September, 1917, was about 150, in convoys comprising from 12 to 30 s.h.i.+ps, and the total escorting forces comprised:

50 ocean escort vessels (old battles.h.i.+ps, cruisers, armed merchant s.h.i.+ps and armed escort s.h.i.+ps), 90 sloops and destroyers, 15 vessels of the "P" cla.s.s (small destroyers), 50 trawlers, in addition to a considerable force for local escort near Gibraltar, consisting of sloops, yachts, torpedo boats, U.S. revenue cruisers, U.S. tugs, etc.

At this period (September, 1917) outward convoys were also in operation, the arrangement being that the outward convoy was escorted by destroyers or sloops to a position 300 to 400 miles from the coast clear of the known submarine area, and there dispersed to proceed independently, there being insufficient ocean escort vessels to take the convoy on; about twelve more were needed for this work. The escorting vessels used for the outward convoys were destroyers or sloops which were due to proceed to sea to meet a homeward convoy, the routine being that the outward convoy should sail at such a time as would ensure the homeward convoy being met by the escort without undue delay at the rendezvous, since any long period of waiting about at a rendezvous was impossible for the escorting vessels as they would have run short of fuel. It was also undesirable, as it revealed to any submarine in the neighbourhood the approach of a convoy.

It will be realized by seamen that this procedure (which was forced upon us by the shortage of escorting vessels) led to many difficulties. In the first place the homeward convoys were frequently delayed by bad weather, etc., on pa.s.sage across the Atlantic, and, owing to the insufficient range of the wireless installations, it was often not possible for the commodore to acquaint the Admiralty of this delay in time to stop the sailing of the outward convoys. Again, outward convoys were often delayed by bad weather, resulting in the homeward convoy not being met before entering the submarine zone. As the winter drew near this was a source of constant anxiety, since so many of the vessels outward bound were in ballast (empty), and their speed was consequently quickly reduced in bad weather. The s.h.i.+ps under these conditions became in some cases almost unmanageable in a convoy, and the responsibilities of the escorts were much intensified.

In September, 1917, the following was the position in respect to outward bound convoys:

Port of a.s.sembly. Frequency of Sailing. Destination.

Lamlash Every 4 days. Atlantic ports.

Milford Haven Every 4 days. Gibraltar.

Queenstown Every 4 days. Atlantic ports.

Falmouth Every 8 days. Gibraltar.

Plymouth Every 4 days. Atlantic ports.

About 150 vessels sailed every eight days in convoys varying in strength from 12 to 30 s.h.i.+ps.

There was still a good deal of Atlantic trade that was not sailing under convoy. This comprised trade between Gibraltar and North and South America, between the Cape, South America and Dakar, and the coastal trade between North and South America. It was estimated that an additional twenty-five to thirty ocean escorts and eleven destroyers would be needed to include the above trade in convoy.

The Mediterranean trade is dealt with later.

The question of speed was naturally one of great importance in the convoy system. As has been stated earlier, the speed of a convoy like that of a squadron or fleet is necessarily that of the slowest s.h.i.+p, and in order to prevent delay to s.h.i.+pping, which was equivalent to serious loss of its carrying power, it was very necessary that convoys should be composed of s.h.i.+ps of approximately the same speed. In order to achieve this careful organization was needed, and the matter was not made easier by the uncertainty that frequently prevailed as to the actual sea speed of particular merchant s.h.i.+ps. Some masters, no doubt from legitimate pride in their vessels, credited them with speeds in excess of those actually attained. Frequently coal of poor quality or the fact that a s.h.i.+p had a dirty bottom reduced her speed to a very appreciable extent, and convoy commodores had occasionally to direct s.h.i.+ps under such conditions to drop out of the convoy altogether and make their pa.s.sage alone. Obviously this action was not taken lightly owing to the risk involved. Decision as to the sea speed of convoys was taken by the convoy officer at the collecting port, and he based this on the result of an examination of the records in the different s.h.i.+ps. As a rule convoys were cla.s.sed as "slow" and "fast." Slow convoys comprised vessels of a speed between 8 and 12- knots. Fast convoys included s.h.i.+ps with a speed between 12- and 16 knots. s.h.i.+ps of higher speed than 16 knots did not as a rule sail in convoys, but trusted to their speed and dark hours for protection in the submarine area. The Gibraltar convoy (an exception to the general rule) contained s.h.i.+ps of only 7 knots speed.

With the introduction of convoys the provision of efficient signal arrangements became a matter of importance. The issue of printed instructions to each master and the custom introduced of a.s.sembling the masters to meet the captain of the escorting cruiser before sailing, so that the conduct of the convoy might be explained, had the effect of reducing signalling to a minimum, but it was necessary that each s.h.i.+p should have a signalman on board, and the provision of the number of signalmen required was no easy matter. A good wireless installation was essential in the escorting cruiser and in the Commodore's s.h.i.+p in order that the course of the convoy could be diverted by the Admiralty if the known or suspected presence of submarines rendered it necessary, and also for the purpose of giving to the Admiralty early information of the position of a convoy approaching the coast, so that the escorting destroyers could be dispatched in time.

Fortunately for us, German submarines constantly used their wireless installations when operating at sea, and as a consequence our wireless directional stations were able to fix their positions by cross bearings. This practice on the part of the enemy undoubtedly went far to a.s.sist us both in anti-submarine measures and in diverting trade to a safe course.

The introduction of the convoy system rendered the provision of anti-submarine protection at ports of a.s.sembly a matter of great importance, owing to the very large number of vessels that were collected in them. Some of the ports were already in possession of these defences, but amongst those for which net protection was prepared and laid during 1917 were Halifax, Sydney (Cape Breton), Falmouth, Lamlash, Rosslare (on the south-east coast of Ireland), Milford Haven, Sierra Leone and Dakar. This involved extensive work, and was undertaken and carried out with great rapidity by Captain F.C. Learmonth and his staff, whose work in the production of net defences during the war was of inestimable value, not only to ourselves, but to our Allies, for whom large supplies of net defences were also provided. The U.S.A. also adopted our system of net defence for their harbours on entry into the war. Many anxious months were pa.s.sed at the Admiralty and at the ports named until the anti-submarine defences were completed.

The escort of the convoys through the submarine zone imposed very heavy work upon the destroyers, sloops and other screening vessels. This was due partly to the fact that there were not sufficient vessels to admit of adequate time being spent in harbour to rest the crews and effect necessary repairs, and partly to the nature of the work itself and the weather conditions under which so much of it was carried out. It will be realized by those who have been at sea in these small craft that little rest was obtainable in the Atlantic between the west coast of Ireland and the mouth of the Channel and positions 800 to 400 miles to the westward, except in the finest weather. When to this is added the constant strain imposed by watching for the momentary appearance of a periscope or the track of a torpedo, and the vigilance needed, especially on dark and stormy nights, to keep touch with a large convoy of merchant s.h.i.+ps showing no lights, with the inevitable whipping up of occasional stragglers from the convoy, some idea may be gathered of the arduous and unceasing work accomplished by the anti-submarine escorts.

It had been my practice during 1917 to call for returns from all commands of the number of hours that vessels of the destroyer and light cruiser type were actually under way per month, and these returns showed how heavy was the strain on the destroyers, particularly those engaged in convoy work.

For several months, for instance, the destroyers in the flotillas stationed at Devonport were under way on an average for just under 50 per cent. of the month.

This meant that several destroyers in these flotillas averaged quite 60 per cent. or even 70 per cent. of their time under way, as other vessels of the flotilla were laid up during the periods under review for long refits due to collision or other damage, in addition to the necessary four-monthly refit.

Anyone familiar with the delicate nature of the machinery of destroyers-which needs constant attention-and the conditions of life at sea in them will appreciate the significance of these figures and the strain which the conditions imposed on those on board as well as on the machinery.

It was evident in November, 1917, that the personnel and the machinery, whilst standing the strain in a wonderful manner, were approaching the limit of endurance, and anxiety was felt as to the situation during the winter.

Reports came in from the Grand Fleet indicating that the work of the destroyers engaged in protecting the s.h.i.+ps of the Scandinavian convoy was telling heavily on the personnel, particularly on the commanding officers, and one report stated that the convoy work produced far greater strain than any other duty carried out by destroyers. No mean proportion of the officers were suffering from a breakdown in health, and since the whole of the work of the Devonport, Queenstown and North of Ireland flotillas consisted of convoy duty, whilst only a portion of the Grand Fleet destroyers was engaged in this work, the opinions expressed were very disquieting in their relation to the work of the southern flotillas.

However, the destroyers held on here as elsewhere, but it is only just to the splendid endurance of the young officers and the men who manned them to emphasize as strongly as I can the magnificent work they carried out in the face of every difficulty, and without even the incentive of the prospect of a fight with a foe that could be seen, this being the compensation given in their work to the gallant personnel of the Dover, Harwich and Grand Fleet flotillas. The convoy flotillas knew that their only chance of action was with a submarine submerged, a form of warfare in which the result was so very frequently unknown and therefore unsatisfactory.

Under the new conditions the Admiralty took upon itself responsibility for the control of the s.h.i.+ps of the Mercantile Marine in addition to its control of the movements of the Fleet. Indeed the control of convoys was even more directly under the Admiralty than was the control of the Fleet. In the latter case the proper system is for the Admiralty to indicate to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, or to other Commands the objective, and to supply all the information possible regarding the strength of the enemy, his intentions and movements and such other information as can be of use to the Commander-in-Chief, but to leave the handling of the force to the Commander-in-Chief concerned. This is the course which was usually followed during the late war. It was my invariable practice when at the Admiralty.

In the case of convoys, however, a different system was necessary owing to the difficulty of transmitting information, the great delay that would be caused were this attempted, and the impossibility of control being exercised over all convoys at sea except by the Admiralty. Consequently the actual movements of convoys for the greater part of their pa.s.sage were directed by the Naval Staff. Owing to s.h.i.+ps not showing lights at night, convoys were diverted clear of one another by wireless signal if they were getting into dangerous proximity; they were directed to alter course as necessary to avoid areas in which submarines had been located, and occasionally it became necessary to alter the destination of some s.h.i.+ps as they approached home waters. The movements of all convoys were "plotted" from day to day, indeed from hour to hour, on a large-scale chart at the Admiralty, and it was easy to see at a glance the position of all the s.h.i.+ps at any given time.

As the convoy approached home waters the s.h.i.+ps came within the areas of the Commanders-in-Chief, Coast of Ireland, Devonport, and Portsmouth, and the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol, and were taken in charge by one or other of them. At each port a staff existed which kept a constant record of the movements of s.h.i.+ps pa.s.sing through or working in the Command, and enabled the Commander-in-Chief to take instant action if occasion arose.

The success of the convoy system in protecting trade is best shown by the figures relating to the year 1917 on the succeeding page (p. 144). In considering these figures the loose station-keeping of the s.h.i.+ps in the Scandinavian convoy must be borne in mind. A large proportion of the s.h.i.+ps in this convoy were neutrals, and it was naturally not possible to bring these vessels under discipline as was the case with convoys composed of purely British s.h.i.+ps. Consequently there was much straggling, and the losses were proportionately heavier than in most of the Atlantic convoys. The comparatively heavy losses in the Gibraltar convoys were probably due to these convoys traversing two dangerous submarine zones. The extraordinary immunity of the French coal trade convoy from serious losses is remarkable and is probably due to the short pa.s.sage which enabled most of the distance to be traversed at night and to the s.h.i.+ps being of light draught.

The table on the following page would not be complete were no reference made to the heavy losses which were experienced during the year amongst s.h.i.+ps which were unescorted through the danger zones, owing to the fact that no escorting vessels were available for the work.

LOSSES IN HOMEWARD BOUND CONVOYS, 1917.

PORTS OF DEPARTURE OF CONVOYS.

|------------------------------------------------------------------ | | No. of | No. lost | Percentage | | Particulars | s.h.i.+ps | in | of | | of Convoys. | convoyed | convoys | losses | | | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | NEW YORK AND | of | 447 | 5 | 1 | | HAMPTON ROADS | Aug. | | | | | Started in May. |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 1,000 | 11 | 1 | | | Oct. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 1,280 | 11 | .93 | | | Nov. | | | | |------------------|----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | GIBRALTAR | of | 122 | 2 | 1.6 | | Started in July | Aug. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 359 | 8 | 2.2 | | | Oct. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 484 | 12 | 2.5 | | | Nov. | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | SCANDINAVIAN. | of | 3,372 | 42 | 1.2 | | Started in April.| Aug. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 4,800 | 6 | 1.3 | | | Oct. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 5,560 | 3.63 | 1.1 | | | Nov. | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | FRENCH COAL | of | 8,871 | 16 | .18 | | TRADE | Aug. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 12,446 | 20 | .16 | | | Oct. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 14,416 | 24 | .16 | | | Nov. | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the Dakar convoy at the end of November and in the Halifax convoy 150 s.h.i.+ps had been brought home without loss, whilst in the Sierra Leone convoy 1 s.h.i.+p had been lost out of 90 convoyed.

LOSSES IN OUTWARD BOUND CONVOYS STARTED IN AUGUST

PORTS OF COLLECTION OF CONVOYS.

|------------------------------------------------------------------ | | No. of | No. lost | Percentage | | Particulars | s.h.i.+ps | in | of | | of Convoys. | convoyed | convoys | losses | | | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | MILFORD | of | 86 | Nil. | Nil. | | HAVEN. | Aug. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 360 | Nil. | Nil. | | | Oct. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 535 | 3 | .56 | | | Nov. | | | | |------------------|----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | LAMLASH. | of | 35 | 1 | 2.8 | | | Aug. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 175 | 2 | 1.1 | | | Oct. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 284 | 2 | .7 | | | Nov. | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | PLYMOUTH. | of | 42 | Nil. | Nil. | | | Aug. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 246 | Nil. | Nil. | | | Oct. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 414 | 1 | .23 | | | Nov. | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | FALMOUTH. | of | 14 | Nil. | Nil. | | | Aug. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 146 | Nil. | Nil. | | | Oct. | | | | | |----------------------------------------------| | | To end | | | | | | of | 185 | Nil. | Nil. | | | Nov. | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the convoys starting from Queenstown 180 s.h.i.+ps had been sent out up to the end of November without loss.

There were naturally loud complaints of these losses, but these were inevitable in the absence of escorting vessels, and no one realized the dangers run more than those responsible for finding protection; every available vessel was not only working at highest possible pressure, but, as has been mentioned, breakdowns from overwork amongst escorting craft were causing very considerable anxiety.

The following figures show the dangers which were run by unescorted vessels:

Losses amongst British merchant steams.h.i.+ps in 1917 by submarine attack, under separate escort, under Period convoy or unescorted.

s.h.i.+ps under s.h.i.+ps s.h.i.+ps separate under unescorted.

escort. convoy.

Quarter ending June 30 ... 17 26 158

Quarter ending September 30 ... 14 29 148

October and November ... 12 23 90 In considering the above table it should be pointed out that a large proportion of the losses shown under the heading "s.h.i.+ps unescorted" took place amongst s.h.i.+ps which had either dispersed from a convoy or which were on their way to join up with a convoy at the port of a.s.sembly. It was unfortunately quite impossible to provide escorts for all s.h.i.+ps either to their ports of discharge or from their loading ports to the ports of a.s.sembly for the convoy, as we had so few vessels available for this work. Thus, in the month of November, 1917, out of 13 vessels engaged in the main oversea trade that were lost, 6 were in convoy, 5 had left or had not joined their convoy, and 2 were not joining a convoy and were unescorted.

November was the month of smallest British losses during the period of unrestricted warfare in 1917, and it is of interest to examine the losses for that month. The total number of s.h.i.+ps lost was 51. As many as 1,197 vessels entered or left home waters in overseas trade exclusive of the Mediterranean trade. Of this aggregate 87.5 per cent, were in convoy, and the total number of these vessels sunk (13) was divided amongst the following trades: North America, 1; Gibraltar, 5; West Africa and South America, 1; the Bay of Biscay, Portugal and Spanish ports west of Gibraltar, 5; Scandinavian, 1. In the same month there were 2,159 cross-Channel sailings and ten losses, nine of these vessels being unescorted.

Particulars of the locality of the total British losses of 51 s.h.i.+ps for the month of November are as follows:

East Coast north of St. Abb's 1 East Coast between St. Abb's and Yarmouth 4 East Coast, Yarmouth to the Downs 4 (2 by mine) English Channel 21 (7 by mine) Bristol Channel 4 Irish Sea 2 Bay of Biscay 2 South of Cape St. Vincent 1 Mediterranean 11 East of Suez 1 (by mine) In order to give some idea of the great volume of traffic on the East Coast and the consequent difficulty of affording proper protection, it may be mentioned that in the month of October, 1917, the number of vessels pa.s.sing between Spurn Head (River Humber) and St. Abb's Head (to the northward) was 740 going north and 920 going south. Of this total only 223 of the northward-and 413 of the southward-bound vessels were in convoy or under escort, the total losses being eleven, all amongst the unaccompanied s.h.i.+ps.