Superstition In All Ages (1732) Part 2

XVII.--IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE CONVINCED OF THE EXISTENCE OF G.o.d.

Can one honestly say that he is convinced of the existence of a being whose nature is not known, who remains inaccessible to all our senses, and of whose qualities we are constantly a.s.sured that they are incomprehensible to us? In order to persuade me that a being exists, or can exist, he must begin by telling me what this being is; in order to make me believe the existence or the possibility of such a being, he must tell me things about him which are not contradictory, and which do not destroy one another; finally, in order to convince me fully of the existence of this being, he must tell me things about him which I can comprehend, and prove to me that it is impossible that the being to whom he attributes these qualities does not exist.

XVIII.--CONTINUATION.

A thing is impossible when it is composed of two ideas so antagonistic, that we can not think of them at the same time. Evidence can be relied on only when confirmed by the constant testimony of our senses, which alone give birth to ideas, and enable us to judge of their conformity or of their incompatibility. That which exists necessarily, is that of which the non-existence would imply contradiction. These principles, universally recognized, are at fault when the question of the existence of G.o.d is considered; what has been said of Him is either unintelligible or perfectly contradictory; and for this reason must appear impossible to every man of common sense.

XIX.--THE EXISTENCE OF G.o.d IS NOT PROVED.

All human intelligences are more or less enlightened and cultivated. By what fatality is it that the science of G.o.d has never been explained?

The most civilized nations and the most profound thinkers are of the same opinion in regard to the matter as the most barbarous nations and the most ignorant and rustic people. As we examine the subject more closely, we will find that the science of divinity by means of reveries and subtleties has but obscured it more and more. Thus far, all religion has been founded on what is called in logic, a "begging of the question;" it supposes freely, and then proves, finally, by the suppositions it has made.

XX.--TO SAY THAT G.o.d IS A SPIRIT, IS TO SPEAK WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING AT ALL.

By metaphysics, G.o.d is made a pure spirit, but has modern theology advanced one step further than the theology of the barbarians? They recognized a grand spirit as master of the world. The barbarians, like all ignorant men, attribute to spirits all the effects of which their inexperience prevents them from discovering the true causes. Ask a barbarian what causes your watch to move, he will answer, "a spirit!"

Ask our philosophers what moves the universe, they will tell you "it is a spirit."

XXI.--SPIRITUALITY IS A CHIMERA.

The barbarian, when he speaks of a spirit, attaches at least some sense to this word; he understands by it an agent similar to the wind, to the agitated air, to the breath, which produces, invisibly, effects that we perceive. By subtilizing, the modern theologian becomes as little intelligible to himself as to others. Ask him what he means by a spirit?

He will answer, that it is an unknown substance, which is perfectly simple, which has nothing tangible, nothing in common with matter. In good faith, is there any mortal who can form the least idea of such a substance? A spirit in the language of modern theology is then but an absence of ideas. The idea of spirituality is another idea without a model.

XXII.--ALL WHICH EXISTS SPRINGS FROM THE BOSOM OF MATTER.

Is it not more natural and more intelligible to deduce all which exists, from the bosom of matter, whose existence is demonstrated by all our senses, whose effects we feel at every moment, which we see act, move, communicate, motion, and constantly bring living beings into existence, than to attribute the formation of things to an unknown force, to a spiritual being, who can not draw from his ground that which he has not himself, and who, by the spiritual essence claimed for him, is incapable of making anything, and of putting anything in motion? Nothing is plainer than that they would have us believe that an intangible spirit can act upon matter.

XXIII.--WHAT IS THE METAPHYSICAL G.o.d OF MODERN THEOLOGY?

The material Jupiter of the ancients could move, build up, destroy, and propagate beings similar to himself; but the G.o.d of modern theology is a sterile being. According to his supposed nature he can neither occupy any place, nor move matter, nor produce a visible world, nor propagate either men or G.o.ds. The metaphysical G.o.d is a workman without hands; he is able but to produce clouds, suspicions, reveries, follies, and quarrels.

XXIV.--IT WOULD BE MORE RATIONAL TO WORs.h.i.+P THE SUN THAN A SPIRITUAL G.o.d.

Since it was necessary for men to have a G.o.d, why did they not have the sun, the visible G.o.d, adored by so many nations? What being had more right to the homage of mortals than the star of the day, which gives light and heat; which invigorates all beings; whose presence reanimates and rejuvenates nature; whose absence seems to plunge her into sadness and languor? If some being bestowed upon men power, activity, benevolence, strength, it was no doubt the sun, which should be recognized as the father of nature, as the soul of the world, as Divinity. At least one could not without folly dispute his existence, or refuse to recognize his influence and his benefits.

XXV.--A SPIRITUAL G.o.d IS INCAPABLE OF WILLING AND OF ACTING.

The theologian tells us that G.o.d does not need hands or arms to act, and that He acts by His will alone. But what is this G.o.d who has a will? And what can be the subject of this divine will? Is it more ridiculous or more difficult to believe in fairies, in sylphs, in ghosts, in witches, in were-wolfs, than to believe in the magical or impossible action of the spirit upon the body? As soon as we admit of such a G.o.d, there are no longer fables or visions which can not be believed. The theologians treat men like children, who never cavil about the possibilities of the tales which they listen to.

XXVI.--WHAT IS G.o.d?

To unsettle the existence of a G.o.d, it is only necessary to ask a theologian to speak of Him; as soon as he utters one word about Him, the least reflection makes us discover at once that what he says is incompatible with the essence which he attributes to his G.o.d. Therefore, what is G.o.d? It is an abstract word, coined to designate the hidden forces of nature; or, it is a mathematical point, which has neither length, breadth, nor thickness. A philosopher [David Hume] has very ingeniously said in speaking of theologians, that they have found the solution to the famous problem of Archimedes; a point in the heavens from which they move the world.

XXVII.--REMARKABLE CONTRADICTIONS OF THEOLOGY.

Religion puts men on their knees before a being without extension, and who, notwithstanding, is infinite, and fills all s.p.a.ce with his immensity; before an almighty being, who never executes that which he desires; before a being supremely good, and who causes but displeasure; before a being, the friend of order, and in whose government everything is in disorder. After all this, let us conjecture what this G.o.d of theology is.

XXVIII.--TO ADORE G.o.d IS TO ADORE A FICTION.

In order to avoid all embarra.s.sment, they tell us that it is not necessary to know what G.o.d is; that we must adore without knowing; that it is not permitted us to turn an eye of temerity upon His attributes.

But if we must adore a G.o.d without knowing Him, should we not be a.s.sured that He exists? Moreover, how be a.s.sured that He exists without having examined whether it is possible that the diverse qualities claimed for Him, meet in Him? In truth, to adore G.o.d is to adore nothing but fictions of one's own brain, or rather, it is to adore nothing.

XXIX.--THE INFINITY OF G.o.d AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF KNOWING THE DIVINE ESSENCE, OCCASIONS AND JUSTIFIES ATHEISM.

Without doubt the more to perplex matters, theologians have chosen to say nothing about what their G.o.d is; they tell us what He is not. By negations and abstractions they imagine themselves composing a real and perfect being, while there can result from it but a being of human reason. A spirit has no body; an infinite being is a being which is not finite; a perfect being is a being which is not imperfect. Can any one form any real notions of such a mult.i.tude of deficiencies or absence of ideas? That which excludes all idea, can it be anything but nothingness?

To pretend that the divine attributes are beyond the understanding of the human mind is to render G.o.d unfit for men. If we are a.s.sured that G.o.d is infinite, we admit that there can be nothing in common between Him and His creatures. To say that G.o.d is infinite, is to destroy Him for men, or at least render Him useless to them.

G.o.d, we are told, created men intelligent, but He did not create them omniscient: that is to say, capable of knowing all things. We conclude that He was not able to endow him with intelligence sufficient to understand the divine essence. In this case it is demonstrated that G.o.d has neither the power nor the wish to be known by men. By what right could this G.o.d become angry with beings whose own essence makes it impossible to have any idea of the divine essence? G.o.d would evidently be the most unjust and the most unaccountable of tyrants if He should punish an atheist for not knowing that which his nature made it impossible for him to know.

x.x.x.--IT IS NEITHER LESS NOR MORE CRIMINAL TO BELIEVE IN G.o.d THAN NOT TO BELIEVE IN HIM.