Superstition In All Ages (1732) Part 5

LIV.--NO! THE WORLD IS NOT GOVERNED BY AN INTELLIGENT BEING.

The logic of common sense teaches us that we should judge a cause but by its effects. A cause can not be reputed as constantly good, except when it constantly produces good, useful, and agreeable effects. A cause which produces good at one time, and evil at another, is a cause which is sometimes good and sometimes bad. But the logic of Theology destroys all this. According to it, the phenomena of nature, or the effects which we see in this world, prove to us the existence of an infinitely good Cause, and this Cause is G.o.d. Although this world is full of evils, although disorder reigns here very often, although men groan every moment under the fate which oppresses them, we ought to be convinced that these effects are due to a benevolent and immutable Cause; and many people believe it, or pretend to believe it!

Everything which takes place in the world proves to us in the clearest way that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can judge of the intelligence of a being but by the means which he employs to accomplish his proposed design. The aim of G.o.d, it is said, is the happiness of our race; however, the same necessity regulates the fate of all sentient beings--which are born to suffer much, to enjoy little, and to die. Man's cup is full of joy and of bitterness; everywhere good is side by side with evil; order is replaced by disorder; generation is followed by destruction. If you tell me that the designs of G.o.d are mysteries, and that His views are impossible to understand, I will answer, that in this case it is impossible for me to judge whether G.o.d is intelligent.

LV.--G.o.d CAN NOT BE CALLED IMMUTABLE.

You pretend that G.o.d is immutable! But what is it that occasions the continual instability in this world, which you claim as His empire? Is any state subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions than that of this unknown monarch? How can we attribute to an immutable G.o.d, powerful enough to give solidity to His works, the government of a world where everything is in a continual vicissitude? If I think to see a G.o.d unchanging in all the effects advantageous to my kind, what G.o.d can I discover in the continual misfortunes by which my kind is oppressed? You tell me that it is our sins that force Him to punish us. I will answer that G.o.d, according to yourselves, is not immutable, because the sins of men compel Him to change His conduct in regard to them. Can a being who is sometimes irritated, and sometimes appeased, be constantly the same?

LVI.--EVIL AND GOOD ARE THE NECESSARY EFFECTS OF NATURAL CAUSES. WHAT IS A G.o.d WHO CAN CHANGE NOTHING?

The universe is but what it can be; all sentient beings enjoy and suffer here: that is to say, they are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and at other times in a disagreeable way. These effects are necessary; they result from causes that act according to their inherent tendencies., These effects necessarily please or displease me, according to my own nature. This same nature compels me to avoid, to remove, and to combat the one, and to seek, to desire, and to procure the other. In a world where everything is from necessity, a G.o.d who remedies nothing, and allows things to follow their own course, is He anything else but destiny or necessity personified? It is a deaf G.o.d who can effect no change on the general laws to which He is subjected Himself. What do I care for the infinite power of a being who can do but a very few things to please me? Where is the infinite kindness of a being who is indifferent to my happiness? What good to me is the favor of a being who, able to bestow upon me infinite good, does not even give me a finite one?

LVII.--THE VANITY OF THEOLOGICAL CONSOLATIONS IN THE TROUBLES OF THIS LIFE. THE HOPE OF A HEAVEN, OF A FUTURE LIFE, IS BUT IMAGINARY.

When we ask why, under a good G.o.d, so many are wretched, we are reminded that the present world is but a pa.s.s-way, designed to conduct man to a happier sphere; we are a.s.sured that our sojourn on the earth, where we live, is for trial; they silence us by saying that G.o.d would not impart to His creatures either the indifference to the sufferings of others, or the infinite happiness which He reserved for Himself alone. How can we be satisfied with these answers?

1. The existence of another life has no other guaranty than the imagination of men, who, in supposing it, have but manifested their desire to live again, in order to enter upon a purer and more durable state of happiness than that which they enjoy at present.

2. How can we conceive of a G.o.d who, knowing all things, must know to their depths the nature of His creatures, and yet must have so many proofs in order to a.s.sure Himself of their proclivities?

3. According to the calculations of our chronologists, the earth which we inhabit has existed for six or seven thousand years; during this time the nations have, under different forms, experienced many vicissitudes and calamities; history shows us that the human race in all ages has been tormented and devastated by tyrants, conquerors, heroes; by wars, inundations, famines, epidemics, etc. Is this long catalogue of proofs of such a nature as to inspire us with great confidence in the hidden views of the Divinity? Do such constant evils give us an exalted idea of the future fate which His kindness is preparing for us?

4. If G.o.d is as well-disposed as they a.s.sure us He is, could He not at least, without bestowing an infinite happiness upon men, communicate to them that degree of happiness of which finite beings are susceptible? In order to be happy, do we need an Infinite or Divine happiness?

5. If G.o.d has not been able to render men happier than they are here below, what will become of the hope of a Paradise, where it is pretended that the elect or chosen few will rejoice forever in ineffable happiness? If G.o.d could not or would not remove evil from the earth (the only sojourning place we know of), what reason could we have to presume that He can or will remove it from another world, of which we know nothing? More than two thousand years ago, according to Lactance, the wise epicure said: "Either G.o.d wants to prevent evil, and can not, or He can and will not; or He neither can nor will, or He will and can. If He wants to, without the power, He is impotent; if He can, and will not, He is guilty of malice which we can not attribute to Him; if He neither can nor will, He is both impotent and wicked, and consequently can not be G.o.d; if He wishes to and can, whence then comes evil, or why does He not prevent it?" For more than two thousand years honest minds have waited for a rational solution of these difficulties; and our theologians teach us that they will not be revealed to us until the future life.

LVIII.--ANOTHER IDLE FANCY.

We are told of a pretended scale for human beings; it is supposed that G.o.d has divided His creatures into different cla.s.ses, each one enjoying the degree of happiness of which he is susceptible. According to this romantic arrangement, all beings, from the oyster to the angel, enjoy the happiness which belongs to them. Experience contradicts this sublime revery. In the world where we are, we see all sentient beings living and suffering in the midst of dangers. Man can not step without wounding, tormenting, crus.h.i.+ng a mult.i.tude of sentient beings which he finds in his path, while he himself, at every step, is exposed to a throng of evils seen or unseen, which may lead to his destruction. Is not the very thought of death sufficient to mar his greatest enjoyment? During the whole course of his life he is subject to sufferings; there is not a moment when he feels sure of preserving his existence, to which he is so strongly attached, and which he regards as the greatest gift of Divinity.

LIX.--IN VAIN DOES THEOLOGY EXERT ITSELF TO ACQUIT G.o.d OF MAN'S DEFECTS.

EITHER THIS G.o.d IS NOT FREE, OR HE IS MORE WICKED THAN GOOD.

The world, it will be said, has all the perfection of which it was susceptible; by the very reason that the world was not the G.o.d who made it, it was necessary that it should have great qualities and great defects. But we will answer, that the world necessarily having great defects, it would have been better suited to the nature of a good G.o.d not to create a world which He could not render completely happy. If G.o.d, who was, according to you, supremely happy before the world was created, had continued to be supremely happy in the created world, why did He not remain in peace? Why must man suffer? Why must man exist What is his existence to G.o.d? Nothing or something. If his existence is not useful or necessary to G.o.d, why did He not leave him in nothingness? If man's existence is necessary to His glory, He then needed man, He lacked something before this man existed!

We can forgive an unskillful workman for doing imperfect work, because he must work, well or ill, or starve; this workman is excusable; but your G.o.d is not. According to you, He is self-sufficient; in this case, why does He create men? He has, according to you, all that is necessary to render man happy; why, then, does He not do it? You must conclude that your G.o.d has more malice than goodness, or you must admit that G.o.d was compelled to do what He has done, without being able to do otherwise. However, you a.s.sure us that your G.o.d is free; you say also that He is immutable, although beginning in time and ceasing in time to exercise His power, like all the inconstant beings of this world. Oh, theologians! you have made vain efforts to acquit your G.o.d of all the defects of man; there is always visible in this G.o.d so perfect, "a tip of the [human] ear."

LX.--WE CAN NOT BELIEVE IN A DIVINE PROVIDENCE, IN AN INFINITELY GOOD AND POWERFUL G.o.d.

Is not G.o.d the master of His favors? Has He not the right to dispense His benefits? Can He not take them back again? His creature has no right to ask the reason of His conduct; He can dispose at will of the works of His hands. Absolute sovereign of mortals, He distributes happiness or unhappiness, according to His pleasure. These are the solutions which theologians give in order to console us for the evils which G.o.d inflicts upon us. We would tell them that a G.o.d who was infinitely good, would not be the master of His favors, but would be by His own nature obliged to distribute them among His creatures; we would tell them that a truly benevolent being would not believe he had the right to abstain from doing good; we would tell them that a truly generous being does not take back what he has given, and any man who does it, forfeits grat.i.tude, and has no right to complain of ingrat.i.tude. How can the arbitrary and whimsical conduct which theologians ascribe to G.o.d, be reconciled with the religion which supposes a compact or mutual agreement between this G.o.d and men? If G.o.d owes nothing to His creatures, they, on their part, can not owe anything to their G.o.d. All religion is founded upon the happiness which men believe they have a right to expect from the Divinity, who is supposed to tell them: "Love, adore, obey me, and I will render you happy!" Men on their side say to Him: "Make us happy, be faithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you, we will obey your laws!" In neglecting the happiness of His creatures, in distributing His favors and His graces according to His caprice, and taking back His gifts, does not G.o.d violate the contract which serves as a base for all religion?

Cicero has said with reason that if G.o.d does not make Himself agreeable to man, He can not be his G.o.d. [Nisi Deus homini placuerit, Deus non erit.] Goodness const.i.tutes Divinity; this Goodness can manifest itself to man only by the advantages he derives from it. As soon as he is unfortunate, this Goodness disappears and ceases to be Divinity. An infinite Goodness can be neither partial nor exclusive. If G.o.d is infinitely good, He owes happiness to all His creatures; one unfortunate being alone would be sufficient to annihilate an unlimited goodness.

Under an infinitely good and powerful G.o.d, is it possible to conceive that a single man could suffer? An animal, a mite, which suffers, furnishes invincible arguments against Divine Providence and its infinite benefactions.

LXI.--CONTINUATION.

According to theologians, the afflictions and evils of this life are chastis.e.m.e.nts which culpable men receive from Divinity. But why are men culpable? If G.o.d is Almighty, does it cost Him any more to say, "Let everything remain in order!"--"let all my subjects be good, innocent, fortunate!"--than to say, "Let everything exist?" Was it more difficult for this G.o.d to do His work well than to do it so badly? Was it any farther from the nonexistence of beings to their wise and happy existence, than from their non-existence to their insensate and miserable existence? Religion speaks to us of a h.e.l.l--that is, of a fearful place where, notwithstanding His goodness, G.o.d reserves eternal torments for the majority of men. Thus, after having rendered mortals very miserable in this world, religion teaches them that G.o.d can make them much more wretched in another. They meet our objections by saying, that otherwise the goodness of G.o.d would take the place of His justice.

But goodness which takes the place of the most terrible cruelty, is not infinite kindness. Besides, a G.o.d who, after having been infinitely good, becomes infinitely wicked, can He be regarded as an immutable being? A G.o.d filled with implacable fury, is He a G.o.d in whom we can find a shadow of charity or goodness?

LXII.--THEOLOGY MAKES OF ITS G.o.d A MONSTER OF NONSENSE, OF INJUSTICE, OF MALICE, AND ATROCITY--A BEING ABSOLUTELY HATEFUL.

Divine justice, such as our theologians paint it, is, without doubt, a quality intended to make us love Divinity. According to the notions of modern theology, it appears evident that G.o.d has created the majority of men with the view only of punis.h.i.+ng them eternally. Would it not have been more in conformity with kindness, with reason, with equity, to create but stones or plants, and not sentient beings, than to create men whose conduct in this world would cause them eternal chastis.e.m.e.nts in another? A G.o.d so perfidious and wicked as to create a single man and leave him exposed to the perils of d.a.m.nation, can not be regarded as a perfect being, but as a monster of nonsense, injustice, malice, and atrocity. Far from forming a perfect G.o.d, the theologians have made the most imperfect of beings. According to theological ideas, G.o.d resembles a tyrant who, having deprived the majority of his slaves of their eyesight, would confine them in a cell where, in order to amuse himself he could observe incognito their conduct through a trap-door, in order to have occasion to cruelly punish all those who in walking should hurt each other; but who would reward splendidly the small number of those to whom the sight was spared, for having the skill to avoid an encounter with their comrades. Such are the ideas which the dogma of gratuitous predestination gives of Divinity!

Although men repeat to us that their G.o.d is infinitely good, it is evident that in the bottom of their hearts they can believe nothing of it. How can we love anything we do not know? How can we love a being, the idea of whom is but liable to keep us in anxiety and trouble? How can we love a being of whom all that is told conspires to render him supremely hateful?

LXIII.--ALL RELIGION INSPIRES BUT A COWARDLY AND INORDINATE FEAR OF THE DIVINITY.

Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion and superst.i.tion; they tell us that the latter is but a cowardly and inordinate fear of Divinity, that the truly religious man has confidence in his G.o.d, and loves Him sincerely; while the superst.i.tious man sees in Him but an enemy, has no confidence in Him, and represents Him as a suspicious and cruel tyrant, avaricious of His benefactions and prodigal of His chastis.e.m.e.nts. But does not all religion in reality give us these same ideas of G.o.d? While we are told that G.o.d is infinitely good, is it not constantly repeated to us that He is very easily offended, that He bestows His favors but upon a few, that He chastises with fury those to whom He has not been pleased to grant them?

LXIV.--THERE IS IN REALITY NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RELIGION AND THE MOST SOMBRE AND SERVILE SUPERSt.i.tION.

If we take our ideas of G.o.d from the nature of the things where we find a mixture of good and evil, this G.o.d, according to the good and evil which we experience, does naturally appear to us capricious, inconstant, sometimes good, sometimes wicked, and in this way, instead of exciting our love, He must produce suspicion, fear, and uncertainty in our hearts. There is no real difference between natural religion and the most sombre and servile superst.i.tion. If the Theist sees G.o.d but on the beautiful side, the superst.i.tious man looks upon Him from the most hideous side. The folly of the one is gay of the other is lugubrious; but both are equally delirious.