Okinawa_ The Last Battle Of World War II Part 4

Kikusui 2: Kamikaze Crucible

CHAPTER THIRTEEN.

Admiral Matome Ugaki was still convinced that his April 6-7 strikes at the Americans had seriously damaged TF 58, an estimate not shared by his colleague, Lieutenant General Michio Sugahara of the Sixth Air Army. A report made by Sugahara's staff somewhat sourly concluded: "Despite many attacks, the Navy cannot block the enemy's carrier force, which still is operating east of Okinawa."

Nevertheless Sugahara was eminently cooperative in preparing for Kikusui Kikusui 2, which Ugaki hoped would so shatter Spruance's fleet that it might seek sanctuary in the open sea. But both he and the army general realized that the second Floating Chrysanthemum would never equal the strength of the first, if only because of the serious losses it had suffered. They were also concerned to learn that Marine Corsairs had indeed arrived at Yontan and Kadena, thus menacing their own aircraft with ground-based fighters that, because of their proximity to their base, were more to be feared than carrier-based interceptors. 2, which Ugaki hoped would so shatter Spruance's fleet that it might seek sanctuary in the open sea. But both he and the army general realized that the second Floating Chrysanthemum would never equal the strength of the first, if only because of the serious losses it had suffered. They were also concerned to learn that Marine Corsairs had indeed arrived at Yontan and Kadena, thus menacing their own aircraft with ground-based fighters that, because of their proximity to their base, were more to be feared than carrier-based interceptors.

Their apprehension was somewhat eased, however, with the arrival on Kyushu of a new weapon: the Oka, Oka, or "Cherry Blossom" glide bomb, a rocket-boosted, piloted suicider capable of speeds of 500 knots and carrying a huge wallop of 2,645 pounds of trinitroanisol. The or "Cherry Blossom" glide bomb, a rocket-boosted, piloted suicider capable of speeds of 500 knots and carrying a huge wallop of 2,645 pounds of trinitroanisol. The Oka Oka was slung beneath a mother plane, usually a heavy Betty or Peggy bomber, and flown to within about a dozen miles of its target, when it was released with the pilot firing its rockets and directing it toward its target. Moving at pistol-bullet speed, the was slung beneath a mother plane, usually a heavy Betty or Peggy bomber, and flown to within about a dozen miles of its target, when it was released with the pilot firing its rockets and directing it toward its target. Moving at pistol-bullet speed, the Oka Oka was believed to be almost immune to enemy gunfire, but its very velocity made it extremely difficult for its pilot to keep his 16-foot missile on target. American intelligence was aware of the appearance of this new weapon, but considered it so ineffective that it was christened was believed to be almost immune to enemy gunfire, but its very velocity made it extremely difficult for its pilot to keep his 16-foot missile on target. American intelligence was aware of the appearance of this new weapon, but considered it so ineffective that it was christened baka, baka, or "foolish." or "foolish."

Although Kikusui Kikusui 2 was scheduled for April 12, Admiral Ugaki tried to destroy "the remnant" of TF 58 on the day before, hurling a daylight suicide attack of about fifty-two planes against Admiral Mitscher's carrier force. Typically glowing reports claimed three carriers sunk, a cruiser set ablaze, another cruiser holed, and two destroyers. .h.i.t with torpedoes. The next day Ugaki's pilots, still mightier with pen than bomb, reported sinking two battles.h.i.+ps and a light cruiser. Actually very little damage was done to Mitscher's s.h.i.+ps on either day. Some damage was inflicted on the veteran flattop 2 was scheduled for April 12, Admiral Ugaki tried to destroy "the remnant" of TF 58 on the day before, hurling a daylight suicide attack of about fifty-two planes against Admiral Mitscher's carrier force. Typically glowing reports claimed three carriers sunk, a cruiser set ablaze, another cruiser holed, and two destroyers. .h.i.t with torpedoes. The next day Ugaki's pilots, still mightier with pen than bomb, reported sinking two battles.h.i.+ps and a light cruiser. Actually very little damage was done to Mitscher's s.h.i.+ps on either day. Some damage was inflicted on the veteran flattop Enterprise, Enterprise, and a and a kamikaze kamikaze crashed the majestic new battles.h.i.+p crashed the majestic new battles.h.i.+p Missouri, Missouri, but succeeded only in scratching her deck and blistering some paint. Destroyer but succeeded only in scratching her deck and blistering some paint. Destroyer Kidd Kidd was. .h.i.t on picket duty and badly hurt, with thirty-eight sailors killed and fifty-five wounded, the worst casualty of the day. Waggish bluejackets aboard another picket destroyer, exasperated by repeated strikes at their station, erected a huge sign on deck with an arrow pointing aft and reading: CARRIERS THIS WAY. was. .h.i.t on picket duty and badly hurt, with thirty-eight sailors killed and fifty-five wounded, the worst casualty of the day. Waggish bluejackets aboard another picket destroyer, exasperated by repeated strikes at their station, erected a huge sign on deck with an arrow pointing aft and reading: CARRIERS THIS WAY.

Both Ugaki and Sugahara hoped to neutralize the enemy Corsairs by planning a series of bombing raids on their airfields the night before the scheduled attacks of April 12, while Sugahara also organized a decoy flight of fighters to lure TF 58's h.e.l.lcats and Corsairs away from the impact area. In the bombing operation, 22 j.a.panese aircraft struck Yontan and Kadena shortly before dawn of the twelfth, damaging 5 enemy planes but losing 5 of their own to American gunners of all services. Next, Sugahara's decoys attracted nothing but birds rising for dawn breakfasts, so that it was not until eleven o'clock in the morning that the Kyushu main body of about 120 late-model fighters arrived over both Kikai Jima and the Hagus.h.i.+ Anchorage to try to clear the strike area for following flights of 76 kamikaze, kamikaze, plus 20 suiciders roaring up from Formosa. plus 20 suiciders roaring up from Formosa.

Although the Nipponese fighters were more successful than usual against the more skillful Americans flying better planes-claiming a probably exaggerated 20 kills-the Navy and Marine pilots from the carriers of TF 58 reported a much higher 126 enemy planes downed during fighter sweeps. This also was probably exaggerated-not by intent like the starry-eyed enemy-but from the inevitable duplication occurring when more than one fighter was firing on the same enemy, or even when a "flamer" plunging toward a watery grave might have the winds caused by his velocity blow the fires out, enabling him to return successfully to base. "Kill" estimates like body counts were much like American taxpayers' income-tax returns: so full of deductions for charity that the churches of America would all be rich "beyond the dreams of avarice."

But the American interceptors did effectively prevent the enemy fighters from protecting the kamikaze. kamikaze. Although the suiciders succeeded in damaging eight American s.h.i.+ps-mostly destroyers and destroyer-escorts of the radar picket line, as well as some smaller craft-and causing high casualities, only one wars.h.i.+p was sunk: the new picket destroyer Although the suiciders succeeded in damaging eight American s.h.i.+ps-mostly destroyers and destroyer-escorts of the radar picket line, as well as some smaller craft-and causing high casualities, only one wars.h.i.+p was sunk: the new picket destroyer Manert L. Abele, Manert L. Abele, the first kill on record by a the first kill on record by a baka baka bomb. bomb.

Abele was on Picket Station 14 about thirty miles west of Okinawa when it was jumped by a pair of suicide Vals. was on Picket Station 14 about thirty miles west of Okinawa when it was jumped by a pair of suicide Vals. Abele's Abele's AA opened up, each burst seemingly scoring a hit but with the planes reappearing through the smoke. One of the attackers was sent into the sea, but the second struck the destroyer's after engine room, spreading death and destruction and causing AA opened up, each burst seemingly scoring a hit but with the planes reappearing through the smoke. One of the attackers was sent into the sea, but the second struck the destroyer's after engine room, spreading death and destruction and causing Abele Abele to buckle visibly. Just then one of two Betty bombers circling like scavengers overhead released its to buckle visibly. Just then one of two Betty bombers circling like scavengers overhead released its baka baka bomb, which came shrieking at the stricken destroyer at five hundred knots. The pilot kept his missile perfectly on course, striking bomb, which came shrieking at the stricken destroyer at five hundred knots. The pilot kept his missile perfectly on course, striking Abele Abele exactly amids.h.i.+ps. A tremendous blast lifted the American out of the water to be slammed back again. Many men were blown overboard, among them Lieutenant s.g. George Wray, who swam back to his s.h.i.+p, clambering aboard to tear open a jammed escape hatch allowing the entire watch of the forward engine room to scramble to safety. In less than another minute, Wray might have been too late, for exactly amids.h.i.+ps. A tremendous blast lifted the American out of the water to be slammed back again. Many men were blown overboard, among them Lieutenant s.g. George Wray, who swam back to his s.h.i.+p, clambering aboard to tear open a jammed escape hatch allowing the entire watch of the forward engine room to scramble to safety. In less than another minute, Wray might have been too late, for Abele Abele sank five minutes after the sank five minutes after the baka baka struck. Most of her officers and crew were rescued by a nearby LSM, but six men were killed and seventy-three missing. struck. Most of her officers and crew were rescued by a nearby LSM, but six men were killed and seventy-three missing.

Simultaneous with the agony of Abele, Abele, a flight of conventional a flight of conventional kamikaze kamikaze found Rear Admiral Deyo's gunfire support force patrolling waters off the Motobu Peninsula. When they struck, Deyo fortunately had his s.h.i.+ps concentrated and they were ready for the Divine Winds, which could do little more than stagger a destroyer and crash a 40 mm mount aboard battles.h.i.+p found Rear Admiral Deyo's gunfire support force patrolling waters off the Motobu Peninsula. When they struck, Deyo fortunately had his s.h.i.+ps concentrated and they were ready for the Divine Winds, which could do little more than stagger a destroyer and crash a 40 mm mount aboard battles.h.i.+p Tennessee. Tennessee. One sailor who was blown into the air landed atop a five-inch gun turret, where he crouched while calmly stripping off his burning clothing to await a cold bath from the nearest fire hose. Marine Corporal W. H. Putnam either fell or was blown overboard, surfacing near a big life raft. He clambered aboard, finding unusual company in the presence of the headless torso of the One sailor who was blown into the air landed atop a five-inch gun turret, where he crouched while calmly stripping off his burning clothing to await a cold bath from the nearest fire hose. Marine Corporal W. H. Putnam either fell or was blown overboard, surfacing near a big life raft. He clambered aboard, finding unusual company in the presence of the headless torso of the kamikaze kamikaze who had crashed his s.h.i.+p. who had crashed his s.h.i.+p.

Thus the scourging of the American fleet off Okinawa continued unabated, but once again the kamikaze kamikaze had failed to strike the paralyzing blow so eagerly sought by Admiral Ugaki. Losses among the suiciders are not exactly known, although 185 of them had partic.i.p.ated in the a.s.sault-an enormous decline from the 355 making the first attacks. The decrease would continue until on June 21-22 Ugaki could sc.r.a.pe together only 45 decrepit Divine Winds-the shriveled petals remaining on the deadly Floating Chrysanthemums. had failed to strike the paralyzing blow so eagerly sought by Admiral Ugaki. Losses among the suiciders are not exactly known, although 185 of them had partic.i.p.ated in the a.s.sault-an enormous decline from the 355 making the first attacks. The decrease would continue until on June 21-22 Ugaki could sc.r.a.pe together only 45 decrepit Divine Winds-the shriveled petals remaining on the deadly Floating Chrysanthemums.

Uncle Sam: Logistics Magician

CHAPTER FOURTEEN.

Triumphs of logistics, though impressive, usually do not make "rattling good reading," as one British historian wrote of the Napoleonic Wars. Yet the industrial and logistics feat of the United States of America fighting the first great two-ocean war on record is unrivaled in the history of humankind; and at Okinawa during the culminating battle of the Island War, as well as the greatest amphibious operation in military annals, the Americans had to overcome two unprecedented challenges.

First, it had to supply this unrivaled sea invasion at a distance of seventy-five hundred miles from its western sh.o.r.es. Second, it had to keep a fleet unsurpa.s.sed in numbers of s.h.i.+ps and firepower constantly at sea for weeks at a time while feeding it with ammunition, food, fuel, airplanes, and those myriad lesser demands of an invader engaged on land and sea and in the air.

Even more than Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet and Mitscher's Task Force Fifty-eight, General Buckner's Tenth Army was a monster of consumption. Between April 1 and 16 alone, no less than 577,000 tons of supplies were landed on the Hagus.h.i.+ Beaches, a record achieved in the face of two destructive storms and the attacks of the kamikaze. kamikaze. A difficulty unsuspected by the A difficulty unsuspected by the Iceberg Iceberg planners-though actually a happy one-was the incredible speed of the advance of Buckner's attacking divisions, so rapid that Ducks and amphibious tractors expecting to haul their supplies no farther than the beaches were obliged to roll far inland to unload. planners-though actually a happy one-was the incredible speed of the advance of Buckner's attacking divisions, so rapid that Ducks and amphibious tractors expecting to haul their supplies no farther than the beaches were obliged to roll far inland to unload.

Another problem caused by unforeseen success was that because planners had placed the unloading priority of spare vehicles lower than such vital supplies as ammunition, barbed wire, fuel, and food, these first-priority supplies had to be heaped on the beaches to get at the now-sorely-needed jeeps and trucks. This caused the breakdown of an elaborate plan for supply dumps to be established at carefully selected points. Night unloading under floodlights, suspended only during air-raid alerts, helped to unload waiting s.h.i.+ps speedily, but also added to beach congestion.

On April 13 General Buckner was dismayed to learn that during the past twenty-four hours only 640 tons of artillery ammunition had crossed the beaches, not nearly enough to supply guns expending more sh.e.l.ls than planners had antic.i.p.ated. Buckner immediately gave priority to artillery sh.e.l.ls, and in the next few days 3,000 tons daily were deposited ash.o.r.e-enough not only for those tireless guns but also to begin building a reserve.

Okinawa's "excellent network of bad roads"-all narrow and lightly surfaced-could not be traversed by American armored tractors and six-by-six trucks. Those early April rainstorms that had delayed unloading of s.h.i.+ps also made the roads softer, compelling American engineers to try to harden them with sand mixed with coral. But the coral was not easy to dig and had to be blasted frequently. Without a rock crusher, the engineers sometimes dumped coral fragments as big as boulders on the roads, turning some of them into obstacle courses.

Erection of numerous pontoon causeways from the reefs to solid ground helped ease the continuing problem of moving supplies from s.h.i.+p to sh.o.r.e. LCTs-Landing Craft, Tank-and LSMs could tie up to the small ones, transferring their cargo directly into trucks. The bigger s.h.i.+ps at the bigger causeways used cranes. Red Beach 1 opposite Yontan Airfield had the largest causeway: 1,428 feet long with a pierhead 45 by 175 feet. During the first few days sixty thousand men and 110,000 tons of cargo crossed the piers.

The most serious shortage was in sh.e.l.ls for the 81 mm mortars-those unlovely "stovepipes" that probably have killed more soldiers than any other weapon devised-caused by the loss to kamikaze kamikaze April 6 of those two ammunition s.h.i.+ps. But the ever-resourceful Admiral Turner quickly put in an emergency request to Guam, and 117 tons of mortar sh.e.l.ls were airlifted to Okinawa, enough to keep the stovepipes firing until many more tons could arrive by s.h.i.+p. Yontan and Kadena Airfields were kept so well supplied that not a single plane was grounded for lack of fuel during the entire campaign. April 6 of those two ammunition s.h.i.+ps. But the ever-resourceful Admiral Turner quickly put in an emergency request to Guam, and 117 tons of mortar sh.e.l.ls were airlifted to Okinawa, enough to keep the stovepipes firing until many more tons could arrive by s.h.i.+p. Yontan and Kadena Airfields were kept so well supplied that not a single plane was grounded for lack of fuel during the entire campaign.

Fifth Fleet and TF 58 were supplied by a force of cargo s.h.i.+ps and oilers commanded by Rear Admiral D. G. Beary from his flags.h.i.+p in the old light cruiser Detroit. Detroit. When Beary received requests from carrier groups for oil and/or ammunition, he would send formations of the necessary s.h.i.+ps hurrying to the flattop fleets to begin replenishment at dawn and complete it by dusk. Long before Okinawa, the Navy had perfected the system of refueling at sea, and eventually replacement s.h.i.+ps were trained to fill the carriers' every need-even such bulky items as crated airplane engines or jeeps for use on flight decks. Weapons, bombs, and bullets were soon added, and thus at Okinawa TF 58 could remain almost indefinitely at sea-a fact that might be a boon to Admiral Mitscher, but a bore to his "swab-jockeys" weary of sea duty and eager for a little fun ash.o.r.e. In the immemorial rhythm of "for want of a nail a shoe was lost," the most serious problem was inadequate supplies of 3- and 4-inch Manila line, and this would not be solved until the Philippines were completely reconquered. When Beary received requests from carrier groups for oil and/or ammunition, he would send formations of the necessary s.h.i.+ps hurrying to the flattop fleets to begin replenishment at dawn and complete it by dusk. Long before Okinawa, the Navy had perfected the system of refueling at sea, and eventually replacement s.h.i.+ps were trained to fill the carriers' every need-even such bulky items as crated airplane engines or jeeps for use on flight decks. Weapons, bombs, and bullets were soon added, and thus at Okinawa TF 58 could remain almost indefinitely at sea-a fact that might be a boon to Admiral Mitscher, but a bore to his "swab-jockeys" weary of sea duty and eager for a little fun ash.o.r.e. In the immemorial rhythm of "for want of a nail a shoe was lost," the most serious problem was inadequate supplies of 3- and 4-inch Manila line, and this would not be solved until the Philippines were completely reconquered.

Supply of the bombardment wars.h.i.+ps off Okinawa was made easy by Admiral Turner's foresight in seizing the Keramas not only for a s.h.i.+p's hospital but also to keep the big naval guns bellowing. A new cla.s.s of LST ammunition s.h.i.+ps equipped with mobile cranes shuttling between the Keramas and Ulithi and the Marianas was able to deposit cargos directly onto the decks of bombardment wars.h.i.+ps. They also were "type loaded," that is, carrying ammunition for just one cla.s.s of s.h.i.+p-say, five-inchers and 40 mm for destroyers.

Fuel for all these s.h.i.+ps together with about a thousand carrier aircraft was supplied both by Admiral Beary and fleet tankers sailing from Guam to Okinawa or meeting thirsty s.h.i.+ps at sea. Two huge fleet tankers left Guam every three days. Every day during the peak period of April 4-24 an average of 167,000 42-gallon barrels of fuel oil was consumed by the s.h.i.+ps at and around Okinawa, plus 385,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. By May 27 nearly 9,000,000 barrels of oil had been consumed and 21,000,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, to say nothing of the delivery of less-vital but still-important items as 2,700,000 packages of cigarettes, 1,200,000 candy bars, and over 24,000,000 pieces of mail-to "gladden the heart" of American servicemen there. Suggestive of the extent of the logistical triumph occurring at the Great Loo Choo was the fact that four escort carriers were employed to protect replacement planes and pilots being ferried to the battle area, with seventeen more on the same mission between the West Coast and the Marianas.

Aside from the loss of those two ammunition s.h.i.+ps, j.a.pan's naval and air forces did next to nothing to interfere with this enormous supply pipeline. Because Admiral Beary's fleet operated about two hundred miles south of Okinawa with air cover from two escort carriers, it was rarely attacked. One lone kamikaze kamikaze did score a hit on the fleet oiler did score a hit on the fleet oiler Taluga, Taluga, but this minor damage was quickly repaired. but this minor damage was quickly repaired.

Hodge's Hurricane Attack Hurled Back

CHAPTER FIFTEEN.

The failure of the j.a.panese counter-attack on April 12-13 had convinced Major General John Hodge that the time had come for a major breakthrough in Us.h.i.+jima's Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru line. It was scheduled for April 19.

In the interval, the Seventy-seventh Infantry Division landed on Ie s.h.i.+ma just off the western tip of Motobu Peninsula, about to fall to the Sixth Marine Division. Ie was a fair-sized island with a completed airfield. Landing on April 16, the Seventy-seventh fought a savage four-day battle, killing 4,706 j.a.panese-many or perhaps even most of them uniformed civilians-while losing 258 soldiers killed or missing and 879 wounded. Marching with the Seventy-seventh was Ernie Pyle.

Before Pyle left Ulithi to join the First Marine Division, another correspondent yelled at him jokingly, "Keep your head down, Ernie." Snorting in disdain, the GI's Friend replied: "Listen, you b.a.s.t.a.r.ds-I'll take a drink over every one of your graves." But it was Ernie's last resting place that was dug on Ie s.h.i.+ma. As it always was with Pyle, he was at the front-driving there with a battalion commander. Suddenly a j.a.panese machine gun opened up, and the driver with his two pa.s.sengers dived into a ditch. After the machine gun fell silent, the commander and Pyle raised their heads-and the gun chattered again. Pyle slumped back into the ditch. Bullets had entered his forehead just below his helmet. Over his grave his new comrades in the Pacific placed a monument with the inscription: "On this spot, the 77th Infantry Division lost a buddy, Ernie Pyle, 18 April, 1945."

Two days later the defending j.a.panese mounted a desperate counter-attack in an effort to recover ground lost during April 20 to the Americans. After dark that night infiltrators in company strength and in small groups-a total of about 500 men-launched a screeching a.s.sault on the front of the 307th Infantry's G Company. Many of them penetrated, actually overrunning a battalion command post, and might have broken through but for the efforts of two machine gunners: Staff Sgt. Anthony Cernawsky and Pfc. Martin May. Both men emptied their heavy machine guns repeatedly until they had no more belts left, after which they struck at the enemy with grenades and carbines, until May was wounded by a mortar sh.e.l.l and the enemy driven off. They returned to the attack, and once again May fought them off-but this time he received his mortal wound, and his Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously.

On the following day General Hodge's bellowing, three-division a.s.sault began. Its objective was to penetrate defenses around Shuri to seize the low valley and highway linking Yonabaru on the east coast with the capital of Naha on the west. Admirals Spruance and Turner were eager to seize Naha with its excellent port, the very harbor in which Commodore Perry had cast his anchors en route to opening j.a.pan to world trade.

Even though General Hodge was hopeful, he had no illusions about the formidable positions that his troops would be attacking. "It is going to be really tough," he said. "There are sixty-five thousand to seventy thousand fighting j.a.ps holed up in the south end of the island, and I see no way to get them out except blast them out yard by yard." He also said that because he faced a bristling front without flanks stretching from the Pacific Ocean on the east to the East China Sea on the west, there was simply no opportunity for large-scale maneuver. Instead, Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru had to be cracked by weight of metal.

All previous Pacific War bombardments were surpa.s.sed by the concentration of explosives-land, sea, and air-that preceded the attack. Twenty-seven battalions of Army and Marine artillery ranging from 105 mm to 8-inch howitzers-354 pieces in all-produced a barrage of 75 pieces per mile, the proportion increasing as the array moved from east to west. Bursting on the enemy with a horrible roar at dawn of the nineteenth, a rain of howling sh.e.l.ls struck j.a.panese emplacements for twenty minutes to the front of the Seventh and Ninety-sixth Divisions. Six battles.h.i.+ps, six cruisers, and nine destroyers firing on call thickened the cannonade with projectiles ranging up to one thousand eight hundred pounds, while 650 Navy and Marine aircraft either flew close-up air support for the waiting troops or punished the enemy's outposts and Us.h.i.+jima's Shuri headquarters with rockets and one-thousand-pound bombs. Meanwhile, troops boated in transports covered by planes and wars.h.i.+ps made another feint at the Minatoga Beaches in the south, hoping to draw off some of the enemy's strength. But Us.h.i.+jima was not deceived and gave no such orders. Instead, he reiterated his instructions to all commanders to keep their men safely below ground. Needless to say, they were strictly obeyed even when, after its opening twenty-minute explosions, the American artillery lifted its fire to begin pummeling the rear areas for ten minutes, while American troops feinted at the j.a.panese front, hoping to deceive the j.a.panese into believing the bombardment had ceased and thus lure them above ground. But they still remained invisible, so that when their enemy's fire returned to their front again, no one was caught above ground.

Actually, few j.a.panese were killed and wounded by this ma.s.sive artillery a.s.sault, even though nineteen thousand sh.e.l.ls had been fired at them. Brigadier General Joseph Sheetz commanding Twenty-fourth Corps artillery said that he doubted that as many as 190 j.a.panese-one for every one hundred sh.e.l.ls-had been killed in the bombardment.

Nevertheless, the a.s.sault went forward-and began to measure its gains in yards.

At the outset all seemed well. Major General George Griner's Twenty-seventh Division, entering Okinawa combat for the first time, had been a.s.signed a pre-dawn a.s.sault on the extreme right flank of the Twenty-fourth's front. Griner hoped to outflank the enemy by a night attack, having read a captured 62nd Division intelligence report stating "the enemy generally fires during the night, but very seldom takes offensive action [then]." In his night attack Griner would have to cross Machinato Inlet and to do this would need to construct bridges and improve the road leading to the water. This could not be done by day, for the j.a.panese had complete observation of the terrain north of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. So the bridges were built farther back, and the engineers trained in a.s.sembling them and breaking them down. Meanwhile, a bulldozer was a.s.signed to widen and repair the narrow, sh.e.l.l-pocked little jeep road leading to the inlet.

By day, in full view of the enemy, the bulldozer retrieved upended or mired jeeps, by night the driver worked tirelessly to make the road pa.s.sable for Griner's troops. Thus, before dawn of the Nineteenth the Twenty-seventh's spearheads did indeed cross Machinato Inlet unseen. With dawn, however, they were detected, and a rain of fire struck them to the ground and kept them there. This was the high point of Hodge's ma.s.sive, three-division a.s.sault. All that the night attack had achieved was to allow the Americans to move undetected over the low ground intervening between their jump-off point and their objective.

Elsewhere the a.s.sault did not even get that close. It had been hoped that the new flamethrowing tank a.s.signed to the Seventh Division on the left flank would easily destroy Us.h.i.+jima's outposts. In essence, the new weapon was an old Sherman tank with a flame spout projecting from inside the barrel of its 75 mm cannon. It fired a stream of fiery fluid of mixed napalm and gasoline. The napalm was a soapy, granular flammable substance that would stick like jelly to whatever it hit: tanks, pillboxes-and men. The flamethrower was the only weapon that terrified the j.a.panese. First widely used on Peleliu, it was usually carried by a big strong man firing a tube connected to a tank on his back. It sometimes backfired, for a bullet could ignite the tank, incinerating everyone in the vicinity, while charring the man who fired it. Adapted to a tank, it was thought to be much harder to stop than a man.

It seemed so when three of these flame-belching monsters and two regular tanks joined the Seventh's attack and clanked toward the coastal flats dotted with fortified tombs and pillboxes beneath Skyline Ridge. Long, hissing jets of orange flame issued from the mouths of the 75s directed into every opening. Soon clouds of greasy black smoke billowed skyward, and the GIs who had been watching in fascination at this incineration of their enemies cheered wildly. Now possessing a foothold below, the Americans began climbing the ridge-straight into an enemy hurricane. First, preregistered mortars fell upon them flas.h.i.+ng and cras.h.i.+ng, and then, boiling over the crest of the ridge, charging up from the reverse slope, and even rus.h.i.+ng into their own mortars to close with the enemy, came a horde of screaming j.a.panese hurling grenades and satchel charges. Twice they came in counter-attacks, and each time the GIs clung desperately to their weakening hold on the forward slope.

Higher up on Skyline Ridge other soldiers of the Seventh advanced unmolested for five hundred yards-an ominously easy ascent that should have warned them-but when they moved into ground also preregistered, the same rain of enemy fire stopped them cold. Pinned down throughout the day, all formations of the Seventh were retreating into their former positions by shortly after four o'clock.

They had gained not a yard.

In the center of Hodge's a.s.sault the Ninety-sixth Division found its experience even more frustrating than the Seventh's. The objective was the Tanabaru-Nis.h.i.+baru ridge line, which joined Skyline Ridge, Hill 178, and Kakazu Ridge to form the zone defended by General Fujioka's Sixty-second Division. Repeated local attacks gained no more than outpost ground. Only one serious attempt to penetrate enemy defenses was made: by a platoon led by First Lieutenant Lawrence O'Brien of Colonel Mickey Finn's Thirty-second Regiment. O'Brien tried to move onto Skyline Ridge and thence westward to the towering ma.s.s of Hill 178. Apart from an exploding sh.e.l.l that killed one man and wounded three others, O'Brien's men moved rapidly up Skyline's steep forward slope, then swung right toward 178. A j.a.panese machine gun chattered, and the Americans took refuge in an abandoned pillbox. From a ridge above, the j.a.panese hurled grenades and fired knee mortars. O'Brien was pinned down. Major John Connor, the battalion commander, sent a platoon to the rescue, but this unit also came under enemy fire so scourging that only six men of the platoon returned to base alive and unwounded. With this Connor recalled O'Brien. In another demonstration of how dangerous the forward slopes of the ridges could be with the rear slopes unconquered, Connor had lost eighty men and gained not an inch.

After that first quick nighttime surge over unoccupied ground on the Twenty-fourth's right flank, the Twenty-seventh Division's sector became a burial ground for American armor. Because the division's foot soldiers failed to penetrate Kakazu's defenses, the tanks-thirty of them including three armored flamethrowers and self-propelled 105 mm howitzers-had no supporting infantry. This left them exposed to the plunging fire of enemy 47 mm ant.i.tank guns above them, and the infiltration tactics of Nipponese suicide squads hurling satchel charges, usually against the vehicle's bottom plate. Unfortunately for the Yankee tankers, the j.a.panese at Kakazu were actually waiting for them-praying for them. One 47 mm gunner named Fujio Takeda knocked out five tanks with six shots at four hundred yards. In all, of the thirty American tanks that attacked, only eight survived. Many of the tankers lived, most of them digging holes beneath their disabled steel monsters and remaining in them undetected for as long as three days. Others were killed when the j.a.panese pried open their turret lids and dropped grenades in.

It was thus that General Hodge's hurricane attack was hurled back. Failing utterly to break through, it did not obtain a single lodgment or foothold in the enemy's defenses, from which further a.s.saults might be mounted. Possibly worse, General Griner in his decision to bypa.s.s Kakazu Ridge had left a gap of almost a mile between his Twenty-seventh Division and the Ninety-sixth in the center. No American troops were there to blunt any enemy counter-attack, and so General Hodge worried that a j.a.panese counter-strike could slip through to trap the entire Twenty-seventh, pressing it against the iron enemy defenses it had failed to pierce and there destroy it. Fortunately, those well-entrenched j.a.panese were as blind as the moles they resembled, having no idea of their foe's whereabouts, and no enemy counter-attack was launched. Nevertheless, General Griner the next day reiterated his belief that the j.a.panese strongpoints should be bypa.s.sed and mopped up. In reply, Colonel "Screaming Mike" Halloran, commander of the 381st Infantry, gave a more accurate estimate of the enemy's troops: "You cannot bypa.s.s a j.a.panese because a j.a.p does not know when he is bypa.s.sed."

Thus ended the hurricane a.s.sault with Twenty-fourth Corps losses totaling 750 killed, missing, and wounded.

Outer Line Cracked/ us.h.i.+jima Retreats

CHAPTER SIXTEEN.

It was an entirely different American infantryman who wearily and warily greeted the dawn of April 20 on Okinawa. Up until the fiery failure at Kakazu during April 12-13 and the b.l.o.o.d.y repulse of April 19 at Shuri's outer defenses, the Army infantry in the Pacific-apart from a few isolated instances and during only two major battles, Saipan and Guam-had been fighting a war in which maneuver was possible.

These were on the great land ma.s.s of New Guinea, the second largest island in the world, and the Philippine archipelago with its thousands of islands big and small. In these campaigns, maneuver was not only possible but mandatory if casualties were to be kept minimal, and the enemy being attacked was usually fighting from log-and-mud fortifications, half naked and half starved by the effectiveness with which the submarines and wars.h.i.+ps of the United States Navy had severed their supply lines. The casualties were indeed minimal-as the boastful Douglas MacArthur would trumpet to the world in his tireless pursuit of supreme command in the Pacific-and the Army infantry had few if any days such as the crucibles at Kakazu and before Shuri.

But now-though dimly-the GIs realized that they had come to their own Tarawa, Peleliu, or Iwo Jima with their fortifications of steel, concrete, and coral, interconnected by mazes of tunnels with interlocking fire and all approaches preregistered by every weapon. They now knew-as the Marines in the Central Pacific had learned-that enormous ma.s.sed bombardment of these truly formidable defenses from sea, air, and land was usually if not always no more effective than a smoke screen. True, they would cause some casualties, but never enough to be decisive; and the accident of a lucky hit could never be repeated on call. call. Only the impetuous foot soldier slas.h.i.+ng in with his hand weapons and using tanks, hurling explosives and aiming flame, can succeed in a war against armed and resolute moles. The naval sh.e.l.l's flat trajectory, the bomb's broad parabola, the artillery projectile's arc-even the loop of the mortar-cannot chase such moles down a tunnel. If they can occasionally collapse the whole position with a direct hit, a rare feat, they have knocked out only one spoke in the enemy's wheel. But the wheel still turns, killing and maiming, and again in the absence of that military miracle-direct hits Only the impetuous foot soldier slas.h.i.+ng in with his hand weapons and using tanks, hurling explosives and aiming flame, can succeed in a war against armed and resolute moles. The naval sh.e.l.l's flat trajectory, the bomb's broad parabola, the artillery projectile's arc-even the loop of the mortar-cannot chase such moles down a tunnel. If they can occasionally collapse the whole position with a direct hit, a rare feat, they have knocked out only one spoke in the enemy's wheel. But the wheel still turns, killing and maiming, and again in the absence of that military miracle-direct hits on call on call-the man on foot has to go in. Too often even without his tanks.

Moreover, the losses in armor and the casualties among the American GIs on that near-disastrous April 19 were not only the result of attacks made into Us.h.i.+jima's clever and sometimes-invisible defenses spouting death and destruction, but also complicated by the terrain of southern Okinawa itself. It was, as the Army's official history states: "ground utterly without pattern; it was a confusion of little, mesa-like hilltops, deep draws, rounded clay hills, gentle green valleys, bare and ragged coral ridges, lumpy mounds of earth, narrow ravines and sloping finger ridges extending downward from the hill ma.s.ses."

On April 20, General Hodge's three-division a.s.sault into Us.h.i.+jima's meat grinder was renewed: Seventh on left, Ninety-sixth in the center, and Twenty-seventh on the right. In these first two formations the GIs, now thoroughly blooded in this type of warfare, moved forward more warily and skillfully. The Thirty-second Infantry of the Seventh, or "Hour Gla.s.s," took Ouki Hill with surprising ease, and then struck at Skyline Ridge, blanketing it with smoke to blind the numerous enemy mortarmen there. The tactic worked, especially after two gallant soldiers-First Lieutenant John Holms and Staff Sergeant James McCarthy-led a final charge to seize the hill, but later perished in a fierce enemy counter-attack that was hurled back. Flamethrowing tanks were of major a.s.sistance in this action, burning out a forward mortar position that could have been troublesome.

But the Skyline's dogged defenders did not submit so tamely. One machine gunner in a pillbox was particularly tenacious until Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell, a mortar observer not expected to join a battle, entered the struggle on his own, charging the pillbox throwing grenades. Next he borrowed a BAR, and when that jammed, a carbine-rus.h.i.+ng the enemy position with this ordinarily most useless weapon in the American a.r.s.enal. At close range, however, it could do damage, and MacDonnell used it to kill all three gunners. Then, his Celtic blood aroused, he picked up the enemy gun and heaved it down the embankment, followed by a knee mortar. Without pausing to thank MacDonnell for this distinguished favor, one of Colonel Finn's companies proceeded to clear Skyline at a cost of two killed and eleven wounded. Hill 178 now came under American fire, and after two days patrols blasting enemy caves found these positions stuffed with corpses: two hundred in one, a hundred in another, fifty in a third, and forty-five in a fourth. Those who had survived had been withdrawn.

The 184th Infantry's objective was the Rocky Crags, two coral pinnacles that had to be taken before towering Hill 178 could be a.s.saulted. But no headway was made the first day. Dismayed, General Arnold came to the front to study these obstacles. Deciding that the crags could be fragmented by direct artillery fire, he ordered a 155 mm howitzer up front. Setting up on a knoll eight hundred yards away and firing over open sights, the crew's first missile-a ninety-five-pound sh.e.l.l with a hardened tip and a concrete-piercing fuse-sent a hefty chunk of coral flying into the air. Seven more destructive shots so upset the j.a.panese that they sprayed the knoll with machine-gun fire. Two men were wounded, and the survivors quickly dug a hole for their gun. Now unseen, a.s.sisted by other guns and flamethrowing tanks, the Americans literally shot both crags into smithereens until both collapsed on themselves.

To the Seventh's right the Ninety-sixth struck at three ridges: Tanabaru-Nis.h.i.+baru-Tombstone. It took two days of savage fighting to clear Tombstone and to advance to the crest of Nis.h.i.+baru. On the night of April 21-22 the j.a.panese counter-attacked three times against a battalion of the 382nd commanded by Lieutenant Franklin Hartline. In one charge Staff Sergeant David Dovel lifted his machine gun to fire it at the enemy full-trigger, severely burning his hands on the red-hot barrel. Dovel was also wounded in both legs, but survived. Meanwhile soldiers firing light or 60 mm mortars elevated their small stovepipes to a dangerously close eighty-six degrees, dropping sh.e.l.ls only thirty yards to their front. Colonel Hartline joined the battle, throwing grenades and firing the weapons of the fallen. At 3:15 A.M. the j.a.panese retreated, leaving 198 dead comrades behind.

Tanabaru now lay temporarily open, and it was Captain Hoss Mitch.e.l.l's Larda.s.ses who seized the opportunity. Its earlier losses filled by replacements, the company fought a savage hand-grenade battle that lasted nearly four hours, until Mitch.e.l.l with three grenades and a carbine rushed the crest to wipe out a machine-gun nest. By nightfall of April 23 the Ninety-sixth held its objectives securely, though it had paid a b.l.o.o.d.y price of 99 killed and 19 missing with a staggering 660 wounded. Even so, the success of the Seventh and Ninety-sixth clearly indicated to General Hodge that Us.h.i.+jima's outer line was cracking.

Soldiers of the Twenty-seventh on the twentieth-except for two companies that panicked and fled in disorder when they blundered into an enemy position-were not quite so careful as their comrades in the center and left, probably because they had had a comparatively easy time of it on April 19. Still on the right flank, the New Yorkers moved confidently against a position called Item Pocket, unaware that it was probably Us.h.i.+jima's toughest and most cleverly designed fortification. Its name derived from its presence in the I, I, or "Item," grid square on the American tactical map. It consisted of coral and limestone ridges running like spokes on a wheel from a swale at its center. or "Item," grid square on the American tactical map. It consisted of coral and limestone ridges running like spokes on a wheel from a swale at its center.

Against it came two battalions of Colonel Gerard Kelly's 165th Infantry, the first commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Mahoney on the left and the second under Lieutenant Colonel John McDonough on the right. Resisting them was Lieutenant Colonel Kosuke Nis.h.i.+bayas.h.i.+'s Twenty-first Independent Infantry Battalion of about six hundred soldiers together with two or three hundred Okinawan conscripts. All had been working for months on Item's defenses, which they called Gusuk.u.ma after a nearby town. There was no safe way to approach the position. Because two bridges on Highway 1 had been knocked out, tanks could not menace it. Every ridge was protected by mortars with machine guns zeroed in from others. Tunnels ran beneath the ridges with openings on either side and on the top. Thus each ridge was a Kakazu in miniature, abundantly stocked with food, ammunition, and water. Until Item fell, there could be no real progress south.

No real attempt to penetrate Item was made on the first day, but on the night of the twenty-first a detail of eight men from McDonough's battalion led by Technical Sergeant Ernest Schoeff tried to seize a ridge in a night attack, and provoked one of the wildest fights of the Okinawa campaign. Forty to fifty j.a.panese screaming "Banzai!" and hurling grenades charged them from about forty yards away. Scrambling into foxholes that they had dug, Schoeff's men fought back with grenades of their own, rifle shots, rifle b.u.t.ts-even hurling rocks. Pfc. Paul Cook took out ten of the enemy before being killed himself, and when they closed for hand-to-hand fighting, Schoeff broke his M-1 rifle over one enemy's head, grabbed an Arisaka Arisaka rifle from another's hands to bayonet him, and then shot a third mushroom-helmeted a.s.sailant. Wisely, the GIs made a fighting withdrawal, counting only two of their own dead and another missing. Such fierce local encounters would characterize the Item Pocket fighting lasting until April 25, and it was a company led by Captain Bernard Ryan that finally broke through the stubborn Item barrier. rifle from another's hands to bayonet him, and then shot a third mushroom-helmeted a.s.sailant. Wisely, the GIs made a fighting withdrawal, counting only two of their own dead and another missing. Such fierce local encounters would characterize the Item Pocket fighting lasting until April 25, and it was a company led by Captain Bernard Ryan that finally broke through the stubborn Item barrier.

On the twenty-fifth Ryan with two platoons climbed a key ridge and was savagely attacked by j.a.panese trying to drive them off. But they held, and then, a.s.sisted by other companies, began clearing the ridge to turn Item's seaward flank. Nevertheless resistance continued until April 28, when Highway 1 was finally opened to southbound American traffic. Now Griner's troops began to extend their grasp on the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment's western flank, suffering so severely that the division's losses rose above five hundred during a single day. By the morning of April 24, the western end of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment was in American hands. Only Kakazu in Us.h.i.+jima's outer defenses remained unconquered. Hoping to reduce that stubborn position, Hodge formed a special attack force under Brigadier General William Bradford, the Twenty-seventh's a.s.sistant division commander. Called "Bradford Force," it was to strike Kakazu early on the twenty-fourth. But that night during a heavy fog a powerful enemy artillery barrage struck the American forward elements. When Bradford Force attacked, its men found to their amazement that there was little or no resistance. Under cover of the fog and the bombardment, the wily Us.h.i.+jima had ordered a general retreat to preserve his remaining strength.

For five days since April 19 the j.a.panese had fought a dogged defensive battle, limiting the Americans' gains to yards and at Kakazu stopping them in their tracks. But by darkness of April 23 the line had been pierced in so many places that it was in danger of collapsing with a consequent loss of many men; either by enemy action or suicide. So General Us.h.i.+jima withdrew to his next chain of defenses.

In effect, the battle for southern Okinawa had advanced but a single, solid step-with many more steps to follow.

Kamikaze Bases Scourged/ Bases Scourged/ Kikusui Kikusui 4 4

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN.

Major General Curtis Le May had been in command of the Twentieth Air Force since the summer of 1944. At thirty-nine, this burly flier, so big he could barely fit into a fighter c.o.c.kpit, was anxious to apply his theories of incendiary bombing with the new B-29 Superfortress bomber then coming off the production lines. It was not until February 1945, however, that he had enough of these gigantic aircraft to stage a major firebombing raid-this time on Kobe and with such excellent results that an ecstatic Le May prepared for the monster March 9 strike at Tokyo that became the most destructive air raid in history.

Now believing-like all those "Bomber Barons" so detested by Dwight Eisenhower-that his command alone might bring Nippon to her knees, Le May was not happy to be ordered to concentrate on the enemy air bases on Kyushu in support of the Okinawa operation. From April 16 onward the Superforts hammered the kamikaze kamikaze airfields, while their chief-speaking in language customarily garbled by the cigar or pipe clenched between his teeth-appealed to General H. H. "Hap" Arnold, chief of the U.S. Army Air Force, for permission to resume strategic bombing. It was not granted, if only because Fleet Admiral Nimitz had been able to convince the Joint Chiefs that the immediate short-range effects of punis.h.i.+ng the suicider bases would in the long run prove more valuable than the long-range results of strategic bombing. airfields, while their chief-speaking in language customarily garbled by the cigar or pipe clenched between his teeth-appealed to General H. H. "Hap" Arnold, chief of the U.S. Army Air Force, for permission to resume strategic bombing. It was not granted, if only because Fleet Admiral Nimitz had been able to convince the Joint Chiefs that the immediate short-range effects of punis.h.i.+ng the suicider bases would in the long run prove more valuable than the long-range results of strategic bombing.

So the Superforts continued to strike the Kyushu fields, even though Admiral Ugaki frequently used all the late-model fighters at his disposal in an effort to destroy them. This was not quite possible, for his interceptors had neither the speed nor the firepower necessary to take out a Superfort. Nevertheless, some vicious aerial duels developed high in the skies. One of the most fierce erupted on April 27 when a hundred B-29s attacked Kanoya and five other airfields. There were so many j.a.panese fighters aloft and buzzing the big bombers that Lieutenant Kenneth Hornbeck later told war correspondents: "The milk run is over-the cream is curdled." Lieutenant Philip Van Schuyler reported: "They must have made a hundred attacks on the eleven B-29s that I saw, and thirty on our four-plane section." One crippled Superfort flying out of formation was pounced on by four enemy fighters releasing white phosphorous bombs across its path. By skillful maneuver, the stricken aircraft broke clear. Four fighters fell and one Superfort was lost.

On the following day American gunners using their electronic computing gunsights claimed to have shot down thirty-six j.a.panese fighters together with thirteen "probables." Again, a B-29 was lost. Using the tactics of pattern-bombing, the Americans blanketed the Kyushu fields with fragmentation and demolition bombs, cratering runways and taxiways, riddling everything erect and destroying revetments. They also struck at hangars and shops filled with planes under repair while mangling irreplaceable tools. j.a.panese fighters compelled to land wherever they could on Kyushu became so scattered that Ugaki and Sugahara found it almost impossible to a.s.semble them for concentrated flights intended to clear the Okinawa skies for the following kamikaze. kamikaze. Thus, many more suiciders than usual were exposed to the stuttering guns of naval and Marine flyers off the carriers, and more frequently the Marine Corsairs based at Yontan and Kadena. Thus, many more suiciders than usual were exposed to the stuttering guns of naval and Marine flyers off the carriers, and more frequently the Marine Corsairs based at Yontan and Kadena.

Nevertheless, Ugaki and Sugahara managed to put together Kikusui Kikusui 4, scheduled for two main attacks April 27 and 28, and a preliminary on April 22. Le May's attacks continued into May, and although a total of 24 Superforts were lost, with 233 damaged, the enemy's losses in fighters, though never known exactly, were certainly astronomical. Moreover, the Superforts achieved their objective in crippling the aerial fleets of Admiral Ugaki and General Sugahara. 4, scheduled for two main attacks April 27 and 28, and a preliminary on April 22. Le May's attacks continued into May, and although a total of 24 Superforts were lost, with 233 damaged, the enemy's losses in fighters, though never known exactly, were certainly astronomical. Moreover, the Superforts achieved their objective in crippling the aerial fleets of Admiral Ugaki and General Sugahara.

As often happens, either because of luck, enemy indolence, or favorable weather, the "prelim" was more destructive than the "main bout." Twenty Navy and forty-six Army kamikaze kamikaze came diving out of a haze concealing them from the gunners on the Hagus.h.i.+ s.h.i.+ps. One crashed and sank a landing craft and another capsized the minesweeper came diving out of a haze concealing them from the gunners on the Hagus.h.i.+ s.h.i.+ps. One crashed and sank a landing craft and another capsized the minesweeper Swallow. Swallow. A third struck destroyer A third struck destroyer Isherwood Isherwood among its depth charges aft, setting off a monster explosion that mangled the tin can's stern and sent it crawling slowly toward Kerama. Two other destroyers suffered minor damage. There might have been much more destruction at Hagus.h.i.+ but for the Marine pilots at Kadena and Yontan. They reported thirty-six kills, mostly among unskillful young suiciders unable to evade their attacks. Major George Axtell on his first combat mission over the Great Loo Choo became an ace in one flight, shooting down five Vals. among its depth charges aft, setting off a monster explosion that mangled the tin can's stern and sent it crawling slowly toward Kerama. Two other destroyers suffered minor damage. There might have been much more destruction at Hagus.h.i.+ but for the Marine pilots at Kadena and Yontan. They reported thirty-six kills, mostly among unskillful young suiciders unable to evade their attacks. Major George Axtell on his first combat mission over the Great Loo Choo became an ace in one flight, shooting down five Vals.

On April 27 and 28 the tireless Ugaki and Sugahara managed to put 100 kamikaze kamikaze into the air. Four of them were into the air. Four of them were baka baka bombers. On the first day they struck at dusk with fighter escort, inflicting only minor damage on four near-missed destroyers. But at 8:41 P.M. the hospital s.h.i.+p bombers. On the first day they struck at dusk with fighter escort, inflicting only minor damage on four near-missed destroyers. But at 8:41 P.M. the hospital s.h.i.+p Comfort Comfort sailing southwest of Okinawa with a full load of patients on a clear night and during a full moon with the s.h.i.+p lighted according to the Geneva Convention-which by policy and preference the j.a.panese never observed-was deliberately dive-bombed by a sailing southwest of Okinawa with a full load of patients on a clear night and during a full moon with the s.h.i.+p lighted according to the Geneva Convention-which by policy and preference the j.a.panese never observed-was deliberately dive-bombed by a kamikaze. kamikaze. The pilot was well aware of the privileged status of his target, having dived at it in a preliminary run, before pulling up and banking to dive again. His plane and bomb crashed through three superstructure decks before exploding in the surgery compartment. The pilot was well aware of the privileged status of his target, having dived at it in a preliminary run, before pulling up and banking to dive again. His plane and bomb crashed through three superstructure decks before exploding in the surgery compartment.

Comfort did not sink, nor was there any panic. By a miracle of exemplary calm and the efforts of fire-fighting and repair crews, and despite casualties of thirty killed and thirty-three wounded-some of these either sick or wounded patients-the hospital s.h.i.+p was able to remain seaworthy while the repair crews dealt successfully with fire and flooding. Captain Adin Tooker took all precautions-swinging out undamaged lifeboats on weather decks and deliberately darkening his s.h.i.+p against the possible onslaught of another predatory did not sink, nor was there any panic. By a miracle of exemplary calm and the efforts of fire-fighting and repair crews, and despite casualties of thirty killed and thirty-three wounded-some of these either sick or wounded patients-the hospital s.h.i.+p was able to remain seaworthy while the repair crews dealt successfully with fire and flooding. Captain Adin Tooker took all precautions-swinging out undamaged lifeboats on weather decks and deliberately darkening his s.h.i.+p against the possible onslaught of another predatory kamikaze kamikaze-and was thus able to make Guam in safety five days later.

The next day the B-29s-in vengeance it is to be hoped-scorched and scourged enemy fighters on Kyushu, leaving few escorts for the thirty-three suiciders bound for Task Group 58.4, one of two fast carrier groups still off Okinawa. Finding the Americans, two Zero suiciders dove out of the sun on destroyers Haggard Haggard and and Uhlmann. Uhlmann. By bad luck a 40 mm sh.e.l.l from By bad luck a 40 mm sh.e.l.l from Uhlmann Uhlmann hit hit Haggard' Haggard's main gun computer, leaving its five-inchers useless. Fortunately, both Zeros missed, but then another kamikaze kamikaze crashed crashed Haggard Haggard's starboard side, detonating a 550-pound bomb against her forward engine. A second suicider missed Haggard Haggard by ten feet, but then as by ten feet, but then as Hazelwood Hazelwood came to her a.s.sistance, a third scored a direct hit on her main deck that killed Commander Volckert Douw and forty-five officers and men. came to her a.s.sistance, a third scored a direct hit on her main deck that killed Commander Volckert Douw and forty-five officers and men. Hazelwood Hazelwood remained afloat but remained afloat but Haggard Haggard had to be towed to the Keramas. had to be towed to the Keramas.