Okinawa_ The Last Battle Of World War II Part 7

Casualties in the Ninety-sixth had been far from light as the division ground south on the honeycomb of caves and fortified peaks that was the Yaeju-Yuza. Its rifle battalions were so reduced in strength that General Hodge, to maintain the division's momentum, transferred the Seventy-seventh's 305th Infantry to the Ninety-sixth.

When the GIs of the Twenty-fourth Corps began to penetrate the enemy cave strongholds, many of them were sickened with what they found. The caves were full of men and misery. There were many sick and dying. Some caves had become reeking pest-holes. As many as forty men lay in some of these hillside warrens. At times a doctor or a corpsman came around to ask how they felt. They could do little more. They had no supplies. Men died from wounds not considered serious. Filth acc.u.mulated. The rain drummed outside, water streamed into the caves, and the wounded nearly drowned. The smell was so overpowering that men could hardly breathe.

Still Us.h.i.+jima was determined to fight on. He shared the fanaticism of those Army diehards who were even then, in that month of June, attempting to wreck the peace party that the new premier, Baron Kantaro Suzuki, was forming with the secret encouragement of Emperor Hirohito. Tokyo had been savaged twice more, on May 23 and 25, and the emperor was now genuinely dismayed by the slaughter among his people.

But General Us.h.i.+jima and General Cho, resuming their old relations.h.i.+p, were capable of no such dismay. The fight was to be to the finish, and on June 4 the Tenth Army shuddered and drove forward.

On that date the Sixth Marine Division's spearheads shoved off from Naha to make the last Marine amphibious a.s.sault of World War II. Again the amtracks, wallowing in the sea waves, the naval gunfire thundering overhead, the sh.o.r.es of the objective winking and spouting smoke-and in they went to conquer three-by-two Oroku Peninsula in a whirling ten-day battle. Again beaches, coral pinnacles, caves, hills, tunnel systems, 5,000 last-ditch j.a.panese to be killed, an admiral to be driven to suicide, and again death and wounds for Marines-1,608 of them. Oroku was the Pacific War in microcosm-even in its Medals of Honor: Private Robert McTureous attacking machine guns firing on stretcher-bearers and losing his life to save his buddies; Corpsman Fred Lester continuing to treat wounded Marines while dying of his own wounds. But Oroku ended in a rout after Admiral Ota committed hara-kiri. hara-kiri. On June 13 the j.a.panese threw down their arms and fled toward the mainland in the southeast. They could not escape. The First Marine Division had driven past the base of the peninsula and sealed it off. The j.a.panese began surrendering. On June 13 the j.a.panese threw down their arms and fled toward the mainland in the southeast. They could not escape. The First Marine Division had driven past the base of the peninsula and sealed it off. The j.a.panese began surrendering.

Beneath Oroku, the First had broken through to the south coast. Okinawa had been sliced down the middle, but more important to those weary, hungry Marines who did it was the sea outlet to which amtracks could now bring supplies. The men had been a week on reduced rations, slogging through the mud that made supply nearly impossible.

On the eastern flank the Seventh and Ninety-sixth Infantry Divisions were also nearing the southern coast. Lieutenant General Buckner had already made a surrender appeal to Us.h.i.+jima. He had had a letter dropped behind the lines. It said: The forces under your command have fought bravely and well, and your infantry tactics have merited the respect of your opponents... Like myself, you are an infantry general long schooled and practiced in infantry warfare... I believe, therefore, that you understand as clearly as I, that the destruction of all j.a.panese resistance on the island is merely a matter of days...

The letter was dropped on June 10. It reached Us.h.i.+jima and Cho on June 17. They thought it hilarious. How could a Samurai Samurai surrender? A surrender? A Samurai Samurai can only kill himself. can only kill himself.

Us.h.i.+jima and Cho had already resigned themselves to hara-kiri hara-kiri by that seventeenth of June, for by then all was over. On the west flank the First Marine Division was battling through Kunis.h.i.+ Ridge while the Sixth had again come into line on the right and was racing for Ara Point, the southernmost tip of Okinawa. In the east, the Ninety-sixth Division was finis.h.i.+ng off resistance in the Yaeju-Yuza Peaks, and the Seventh Division's soldiers were closing in on the Thirty-second Army's very headquarters. by that seventeenth of June, for by then all was over. On the west flank the First Marine Division was battling through Kunis.h.i.+ Ridge while the Sixth had again come into line on the right and was racing for Ara Point, the southernmost tip of Okinawa. In the east, the Ninety-sixth Division was finis.h.i.+ng off resistance in the Yaeju-Yuza Peaks, and the Seventh Division's soldiers were closing in on the Thirty-second Army's very headquarters.

There was nothing left for Us.h.i.+jima and Cho, save the satisfying news the next day that the American who had insulted them with a surrender offer was himself dead.

Simon Bolivar Buckner had come down to Mezado Ridge to see the fresh Eighth Marine Regiment enter battle. The Eighth had come to Okinawa on June 15, after seizing Admiral Turner's radar outposts, and was attached to the First Division. As had happened in the beginning at Guadalca.n.a.l, when another regiment of the Second Division was attached to the First, so it was happening in the end at Okinawa.

Colonel Clarence Wallace sent the Eighth Marines in at Kunis.h.i.+ Ridge. They were to attack in columns of battalions to seize a road, to split the enemy in two, to carry out General del Valle's plans for a decisive thrust to the sea. Lieutenant General Buckner joined Colonel Wallace on Mezado Ridge at noon. He watched the Marines for about an hour. They moved swiftly on their objective. Buckner said: "Things are going so well here, I think I'll move on to another unit."

Five j.a.panese sh.e.l.ls struck Mezado Ridge. They exploded and filled the air with flying coral. A shard pierced General Buckner's chest and he died within ten minutes-knowing, at least, that his Tenth Army was winning.

Command went to Roy Geiger, senior officer and about to be promoted to lieutenant general. The grizzled white bear who had been at Guadalca.n.a.l in the beginning was leading at the end on Okinawa.

That came three days later.

On June 21 a patrol from the Sixth Marine Division reached a small mound atop a spiky coral cliff. It was the tip of Ara Point. Beneath them were the mingling waters of the Pacific Ocean and the East China Sea.

A few more days of skirmis.h.i.+ng and a reverse mop-up drive to the north remained. When these were over, and the last of the kamikaze kamikaze had been shot down, the j.a.panese Thirty-second Army was no more, with roughly 100,000 dead, and, surprisingly, another 10,000 captured. American casualties totaled 49,151, with Marine losses at 2,938 dead or missing and 13,708 wounded; the Army's at 4,675 and 18,099; and the Navy's at 4,907 and 4,824. There was little left of j.a.panese airpower after losses of about 3,000 planes had been shot down, the j.a.panese Thirty-second Army was no more, with roughly 100,000 dead, and, surprisingly, another 10,000 captured. American casualties totaled 49,151, with Marine losses at 2,938 dead or missing and 13,708 wounded; the Army's at 4,675 and 18,099; and the Navy's at 4,907 and 4,824. There was little left of j.a.panese airpower after losses of about 3,000 planes8-about 1,900 of them kamikaze kamikaze-against 763 for the Americans; and the sinking of Yamato Yamato and 15 other s.h.i.+ps meant the end of Nippon's Navy. Though the United States Navy had been staggered with 36 s.h.i.+ps sunk and another 368 damaged, there were still plenty left to mount the fall invasion of Kyushu from Okinawa. and 15 other s.h.i.+ps meant the end of Nippon's Navy. Though the United States Navy had been staggered with 36 s.h.i.+ps sunk and another 368 damaged, there were still plenty left to mount the fall invasion of Kyushu from Okinawa.

So the Great Loo Choo fell to the Americans after eighty-three days of fighting. A few hours after the Marine patrol reached Ara Point, Major General Geiger declared organized resistance to be at an end.

A Samurai Samurai Farewell Farewell

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR.

On the night of June 21-the day General Geiger declared the American victory on Okinawa-Us.h.i.+jima and Cho realized in their headquarters under Hill 95 near the Pacific Ocean that the end had come. Soldiers of Colonel John Finn's Thirty-second Infantry of the Seventh Division were still dropping hand grenades through a vertical air shaft from the top of the hill. The explosives had already killed or wounded ten officers. Neither Us.h.i.+jima nor Cho wished to meet a similar fate at the hands of the American devils. They would take their own lives in the accepted Samurai Samurai ceremony. ceremony.

Colonel Yahara had desired to join them in hara-kiri, hara-kiri, but Us.h.i.+jima had decreed that his planning officer, with his excellent memory and habit of straightforward reporting, should be the only man to attempt to escape to Tokyo with a full account of what had happened on Okinawa. Unfortunately, in his physique and bearing, Hiromichi Yahara was also the worst possible choice. No matter how he sought to disguise himself, this tall and patrician officer would stand out among the diminutive Okinawan population like a green tree in a petrified forest-and he was quickly captured. Being a but Us.h.i.+jima had decreed that his planning officer, with his excellent memory and habit of straightforward reporting, should be the only man to attempt to escape to Tokyo with a full account of what had happened on Okinawa. Unfortunately, in his physique and bearing, Hiromichi Yahara was also the worst possible choice. No matter how he sought to disguise himself, this tall and patrician officer would stand out among the diminutive Okinawan population like a green tree in a petrified forest-and he was quickly captured. Being a Samurai, Samurai, he had probably asked for a bayonet with which to make the act of expiation like so many other captured he had probably asked for a bayonet with which to make the act of expiation like so many other captured Samurai Samurai before him. If he had, he certainly would have been laughingly refused. before him. If he had, he certainly would have been laughingly refused.

That night under Hill 95 Lieutenant Generals Us.h.i.+jima and Cho, together with their ranking officers, consumed a farewell dinner prepared for them by the commander's cook, Tetsuo Nakamuta. It began with bean-curd soup, and then proceeded to a bountiful repast of rice, canned meats, potatoes, fried fish cakes, fresh cabbage, and a dessert of canned pineapple. Sake Sake flowed as freely as the lively conversation. At the meal's end Isamo Cho produced from his large stock of liquors a bottle of Black and White scotch, with which he and his chief solemnly toasted each other. It was agreed that nothing should be allowed to interfere with the ritual suicide of Us.h.i.+jima and Cho. flowed as freely as the lively conversation. At the meal's end Isamo Cho produced from his large stock of liquors a bottle of Black and White scotch, with which he and his chief solemnly toasted each other. It was agreed that nothing should be allowed to interfere with the ritual suicide of Us.h.i.+jima and Cho.

Thus, in the early morning hours just before moonrise, the officers and men of Thirty-second Army Headquarters would deliver the last Banzai of World War II: a climbing charge up Hill 95, and after that, if there were any survivors, the town of Mabuni.

At about 3 A.M. of June 22, 1945, with a glowing white moon polis.h.i.+ng the gleaming black waters of the Pacific-and with Us.h.i.+jima's staff singing "Umi.Yukaba"- "Umi.Yukaba"-the members of the last Banzai began climbing the cliff.

Behind them at his desk Us.h.i.+jima wrote his last message to Tokyo: "Our strategy, tactics and techniques all were used to the utmost. We fought valiantly, but it was as nothing before the material strength of the enemy." Cho wrote: "22nd day, 6th month, 20th year of the Showa Era. I depart without regret, fear, shame or obligations. Army Chief of Staff Cho; Army Lieutenant General Cho, Isamu, age of departure 52 years. At this time and place I hereby certify the foregoing."

Bowing to his chief, Cho said: "Well, Commanding General Us.h.i.+jima, as the way may be dark, I, Cho, will lead the way."

Returning the bow, Us.h.i.+jima replied: "Please do so, I will take along my fan since it is getting warm."

An hour later Us.h.i.+jima and Cho stepped through a fissure in the cliff face overlooking the ocean.9 It was about six feet high and six feet wide, opening upon a small ledge above the water. Both wore their dress uniforms, complete with medals and saber. A white quilt and a white sheet symbolizing death were laid over the ledge. Above them the moon had begun its descent. It was about six feet high and six feet wide, opening upon a small ledge above the water. Both wore their dress uniforms, complete with medals and saber. A white quilt and a white sheet symbolizing death were laid over the ledge. Above them the moon had begun its descent.

They strolled out to the ledge, Us.h.i.+jima calmly fanning himself. They bowed in reverence to the eastern sky, the customary obeisance to the emperor, and sat together on the white sheet and quilt. Only a hundred feet behind them were the approaching American soldiers. Having heard voices, they began hurling grenades, unaware that the j.a.panese generals were so close to them.

First Us.h.i.+jima and then Cho bared their bellies to the upward thrust of the ceremonial knives in their hands. Upon the sight of blood the adjutant standing by with unsheathed saber delivered the coup de grace.

Two shouts, two saber flashes-and it was done. And the moon began sinking into an obsidian sea.

Epilogue: The Value of Okinawa

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE.

Truth trying to overtake falsehood is like the sound of an explosion seeking to catch up with the flash, and this seems to be especially true of that greatest myth of World War II: the belief that the atomic bombs dropped on Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki in early August 1945 compelled j.a.pan to surrender.

There is no question that these dreadful fireb.a.l.l.s ushering in the Age of the Mushroom Cloud had much to do with Emperor Hirohito's decision to order his Imperial Conference to accept the Allied surrender offer. But before they were dropped-as has been suggested at the beginning of this narrative-j.a.pan was already a defeated and demoralized nation, deeply divided between the diehards fiercely determined to continue the conflict regardless of the costs, and those timid members of the peace party who realized that the end had come but who still feared to risk the wrath of the firebrands. The atomic bombings, then, brought Hirohito to their side and encouraged them to defy the War Lords. But the fact remains that before then, before then, before Okinawa, j.a.pan was already beaten. before Okinawa, j.a.pan was already beaten.

This was the conclusion of the most authoritative voice on the subject, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey created by President Harry Truman to a.s.sess the effects of Allied bombing in World War II. It declared: "Based on a detailed investigation of surviving j.a.panese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31st December, 1945, and in all probability prior to 1st November, 1945, j.a.pan would have surrendered, even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." No judgment could be more unequivocal. Why, then, were the bombs dropped?

Debate still rages over whether or not j.a.pan should have been so ravaged. Harry Truman to his dying day insisted that he "never had any doubt" about the necessity of striking Nippon with atomic weapons. However, recent examination of his private papers produced a letter to his sister in which he wrote: "It was a terrible decision." Some critics claim that j.a.pan was chosen rather than Germany because it was an Oriental nation-ignoring the fact that the n.a.z.is had been destroyed in May, two months before the "Fat Boy" on its tower at Alamogordo flashed upward with a light not of this world-or that the thickening mood of savage revenge that had seized the American public had to be satisfied. Apart from such emotional conclusions, it should be obvious that the atomic bomb kept Stalin out of Western Europe and forced him to walk softly in Asia. This was indeed a strategic consideration of the highest order, one that no sincere statesman could refuse to balance against the hideous loss of life and property that would ensue under the mushroom cloud; together with the certainty that American declarations of desiring peace and prosperity for all peoples would henceforth have to be read in the light of those terrible fireb.a.l.l.s. Nevertheless, the atomic bombs did indeed keep the Soviet Union out of Western Europe and curtailed its ambitions in the Far East, even though they also presented the Soviets with a powerful psychological stick with which to beat the United States and its Free World allies.

To these considerations must be added the convictions of many high-ranking naval and air commanders-none of them members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-that j.a.pan could be bombed, sh.e.l.led, and blockaded into submission. This is probably true, but can never be proved. At best such a policy would indubitably have saved many American lives, even though it would almost certainly have caused horrible and unimaginable suffering in j.a.pan. Because it would have taken so much longer, it would have given the insatiably land-hungry Stalin the opportunity to enter the war for a much longer period than his actual six-day contribution, and thus cloak him in the customary mane of the lion roaring for his "rightful" share of the spoils. Hiros.h.i.+ma, then, did save j.a.pan from the brutal and selfish policies of her War Lords determined that the nation must die like a dutiful Samurai. Samurai. But Nagasaki was absolutely unnecessary, coming only three days after Hiros.h.i.+ma and thus too close to influence any decision. Probably it was dropped to show j.a.pan that the United States possessed more than one bomb-actually it had only two-and presumably could produce many more. But Nagasaki was absolutely unnecessary, coming only three days after Hiros.h.i.+ma and thus too close to influence any decision. Probably it was dropped to show j.a.pan that the United States possessed more than one bomb-actually it had only two-and presumably could produce many more.

From all this speculation only two probabilities seem to emerge: one, that j.a.pan was already beaten and would have surrendered before the monster Operation Olympic invasion began three months later; two, that Harry Truman dropped both bombs as much to frighten Stalin as to finish off j.a.pan.

Where, then, does this leave Okinawa?

A corollary of the myth of the atomic bombs is the other though less widespread misconception of Okinawa as an unnecessary battle. Here is one more instance of that cart-before-the-horse thinking common to those facile minds so well described by Aristotle: "Contemplating little, they have no difficulty deciding." The Battle for Okinawa was begun on April 1, 1945, more than 4 months before the bombing of Hiros.h.i.+ma and 3 months before the first bomb was exploded at Alamogordo. The Americans wanted Okinawa for a staging area only 375 miles from Kyushu, the j.a.panese hoped through its kamikaze kamikaze corps either to cripple or destroy the enemy sea power that had brought the Americans so close to j.a.pan proper. corps either to cripple or destroy the enemy sea power that had brought the Americans so close to j.a.pan proper.

Because Imperial General Headquarters had not the slightest suspicion that the Americans were close to producing an atomic bomb, General Us.h.i.+jima and his Thirty-second Army expected to defend Okinawa with conventional weapons, while General Buckner intended to seize the Great Loo Choo with the same instruments of war. Not until just before Hiros.h.i.+ma were Fleet Admiral Nimitz and General of the Armies MacArthur-the officers who would command the invasion of j.a.pan-informed that their country now possessed atomic weapons. By then, of course, Okinawa had fallen-and when it did, it so shocked Emperor Hirohito that he could echo what Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano, his personal naval advisor, had cried when he learned of the loss of Saipan: "h.e.l.l is on us!"

Until Okinawa, Hirohito had been an accomplice of the War Lords; if not a willing one, then, in the words of MacArthur, who came to know him better than any other Westerner: "a figurehead, but not quite a stooge." After its fall, he was ready to challenge them, and the atomic bombs gave him that opportunity.

So Okinawa was indeed decisive, for if the j.a.panese had won in this biggest battle of the Pacific War, the hold of the War Lords upon the nation of Nippon would have been so strengthened that even the influence of Hirohito could not have persuaded the Imperial Conference to accept the Allied surrender offer. Thus, the war would have been prolonged-hopelessly for j.a.pan, of course-and only the production and use of more atomic bombs would have avoided that t.i.tanic clash of arms upon the Tokyo Plain.

1.

When Spruance commanded this enormous concentration of naval striking power, it was called "Task Force Fifty-eight"; when Bull Halsey's flag was flown it was "Task Force Thirty-eight."

2.

Because there is no hard-and-fast rule for translating j.a.panese geographical terms-shoto, meaning various islands or group of islands; gunto gunto or or retto, retto, a group of islands; a group of islands; s.h.i.+ma s.h.i.+ma or or jima, jima, an island; or an island; or ie, ie, an islet-this narrative will use the general English words for the same. an islet-this narrative will use the general English words for the same.

3.

j.a.panese warplanes were divided into feminine names for bombers and masculine ones for fighters.

4.

This means "regiment," not division. In American military parlance a regiment formed by three battalions is known by its "arm." Thus the First Regiment of the First Marine Division is called "First Marines," or the Seventh Regiment of the First Cavalry Division "Seventh Cavalry." Too often historians with no military experience mistake these designations to mean division, a much larger formation that-whether infantry, cavalry, or Marine-is usually formed by three "line" regiments and an artillery regiment with other special troops.

5.

This comment in no way is intended to demean these gallant GIs-or anyone who has looked upon the horrid Medusa face of battle-but appears only because it might be asked why other nicknames are mentioned but not the Ninety-sixth's.

6.

This incident, reported by George McMillan in The Old Breed, his history of the First Marine Division in World War II, does not ring true. Marines are trained to keep their weapons on safety lock even during an invasion, and not to unlock them until a firefight is about to erupt or until receipt of enemy fire. "Let one go" is also untypical. "Got his gun off" is the proper slang. I can remember a corporal I learned to despise from Guadalca.n.a.l onward running toward the beach at Peleliu with terror on his face and holding his right hand aloft with the trigger finger missing and spouting carmine. My only comfort watching him sprint for the safety of the Battalion Aid Station on the beach was that his missing member would always remind him of his cowardice. So I doubt this episode-from the pen of a headquarters sergeant-and mention it only to show how absolutely unopposed the Okinawa invasion actually was at its beginning.

7.

Here is perhaps the most moving of all the phenomena of the war: the self-sacrifice of n.o.ble and brave young American fighting men who smothered enemy grenades with their bodies to save their buddies. Yet, discussing this once with a group of teachers, I had just begun to quote Jesus Christ's dictum "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends," when one of them angrily interrupted me. "Nonsense!" he cried in scorn. "Who would do such a crazy thing?" Glaring at me, he asked with heavy sarcasm, "Would you?" I replied, "I might. But never to save someone like you."

8.

Official and early American estimates of 7,800 j.a.panese planes lost during the Okinawa Campaign-either in combat or under enemy air raids-were much too high. A more conservative and probably more accurate figure of 3,000 was later made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

9.