New York Times Current History The European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 Part 4

"that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair,"

claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged

"either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations";

but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the role of the wicked partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory activity," (so says the German "White Paper" with sardonic humor,) replied to this proposition that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, "_it was too late_."

Does any reasonable man question for a moment that, if Germany had done something more than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?

On the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any possibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs

"said, quietly but firmly, _that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would be declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned."

To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of Austria's quarrel the British Amba.s.sador suggested "the larger aspect of the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger aspect,"

which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he

"had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be postponed."

[English "White Paper," No. 62.]

The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve its peace. Its Amba.s.sador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with Berchtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of Europe and the desirability of good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

To this Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet at St. Petersburg.

"He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, _could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."_

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 45.]

On the same day, July 28, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the English Amba.s.sador and excused his failure to accept the proposal of conference of the neutral powers, on the ground that he did not think it would be effective,

"because such a conference would in his opinion have the appearance of an 'Areopagus' consisting of two powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers."

After engaging in this pitiful and insincere quibble, and when reminded of Servia's conciliatory reply, amounting to a virtual surrender,

"his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_."

[English "White Paper," No. 71.]

At this point the rules of the countries intervened in the dispute. The Kaiser, having returned from Norway, telegraphed the Czar, under date of July 28, that he was

"exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia,"

and invoked the Czar's aid.

[German "White Paper," Annex 20.]

If the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been, _his att.i.tude was not that of his Foreign Office_. Upon the face of the record we have only his own a.s.surance that he was doing everything to preserve peace, but the steps that he took or the communications he made to influence Austria _are not found in the formal defense which the German Government has given to the world_. The Kaiser can only convince the world of his innocence of the crime of his Potsdam camarilla by giving the world _the text_ of any advice he gave the Austrian officials. He has produced his telegrams to the Czar. _Where are those he presumably sent to Francis Joseph or Count Berchtold? Where are the instructions he gave his own Amba.s.sadors or Foreign Minister?_

It is significant that on the same day Sazonof telegraphed to Count Benckendorff:

"My conversations with the German Amba.s.sador confirm my impression that Germany is rather favorable to the uncompromising att.i.tude adopted by Austria,"

and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that

"the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action on its ally."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 43.]

On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had that night seen the German Chancellor, who had "just returned from Potsdam," where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor then showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When asked about the French colonies, no a.s.surance was given.

[English "White Paper," No. 85.]

Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Amba.s.sador, and expressed regret

"that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's]

suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion."

[English "White Paper," No. 75.]

On the same day the Amba.s.sador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof a.s.sented. [Russian "Orange Paper," No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German Government

"_to suggest any form of procedure_ under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, _could be applied_."

To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like pressure it might "_cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and present a fait accompli_." [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 29--English "White Paper," No. 70.]

This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It a.s.sumes that Austria might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war, as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and expected from the first.

As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Amba.s.sador at Berlin then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications.

To this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced, but, as usual, _nothing whatever was done_. [English "White Paper," No.

76.] It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was a.s.sured by the German Amba.s.sador that the German Foreign Office was

"endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia,"

but again the communications which the German Foreign Office sent to Vienna on this point _have never yet been disclosed to the world_.

[English "White Paper," No. 84.]

In this same conference Sir Edward Grey

"urged that the _German Government should suggest any method_ by which the influence of the four powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method that Germany could suggest_ if mine were not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press the b.u.t.ton' in the interests of peace."

[English "White Paper," No. 84.]

The difficulty was, however, that Germany never "pressed the b.u.t.ton,"

although obviously it would have been easy for her to do so, as the stronger and more influential member of the Double Alliance.

On the same day the Austrian Government left a memorandum with Sir Edward Grey to the effect that Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must proceed.