The History and Antiquities of the Doric Race Volume II Part 2

Here also the difference between the _Equals_ (?????) and _Inferiors_ (?p?e???e?) must be taken into consideration; which, if we judge only from the terms, would not appear to have been considerable, yet, though it is never mentioned in connexion with the const.i.tution of Lycurgus, it had in later times a certain degree of influence upon the government.

According to Demosthenes,(330) the prize of virtue in Sparta was to become a master of the state, together with the Equals. Whoever neglected a civil duty, lost, according to Xenophon,(331) his rank among the Equals. Cinadon wished to overthrow the government, because, although of a powerful and enterprising mind, he did not belong to the Equals.(332) About the king's person in the field there were always three of the Equals, who provided for all his wants.(333) It also appears that there were many peculiarities in the education of an Equal.(334) Whoever, during his boyhood and youth, omitted to make the exertions and endure the fatigues of the Spartan discipline, lost his rank of an Equal.(335) In like manner, exclusion from the public tables was followed by a sort of _diminutio capitis_, or civil degradation.(336) This exclusion was either adjudged by the other members of the table, or it was the consequence of inability to defray the due share of the common expense. To them the Inferiors are most naturally opposed; and if the latter were distinct from the Spartans, by the Spartans, in a more limited sense of the word, Equals are sometimes probably understood.(337) From these scanty accounts the unprejudiced reader can only infer that a distinction of rank is implied, which depended not upon any charge or office, but continued through life, without however excluding the possibility of pa.s.sing from one rank into the other, any Equal being liable to be degraded for improper conduct, and an Inferior, under certain circ.u.mstances, being enabled to procure promotion by bravery and submission to the authorities; but if this degradation did not take place, the rank then remained in the family, and was transmitted to the children, as otherwise it could not have had any effect upon education.(338)

8. After these preliminary inquiries concerning the divisions and cla.s.ses of the citizens, we have now to examine the manner in which the political power was distributed and held in Sparta and the other Doric states.

As the foundation of these inquiries, we may premise a rhetra of Lycurgus, which, given in the form of an oracle of the Pythian Apollo,(339) contains the main features of the whole const.i.tution of Sparta.(340) "_Build a temple to Zeus h.e.l.lanius and Athene h.e.l.lania; divide the tribes, and inst.i.tute thirty obas; appoint a council, with its princes; convene the a.s.sembly between Babyca and Cnacion; propose this, and then depart; and let there be a right of decision and power to the people._" Here then there is an unlimited authority given to the people to approve or to reject what the kings proposed. This full power was, however, more nearly defined and limited by a subsequent clause, the addition of which was ascribed to kings Theopompus and Polydorus: "_but if the people should follow a crooked opinion, the elders and the princes shall dissent_."(341) Plutarch interprets these words thus; "That in case the people does not either approve or reject the measure _in toto_, but alters or vitiates it in any manner, the kings and councillors should dissolve the a.s.sembly, and declare the decree to be invalid." According to this construction, indeed, the public a.s.sembly had so far the supreme power, that nothing could become a law without its consent. But it probably could not originate any legislative measure; inasmuch as such a power would have directly contravened the aristocratical spirit of the const.i.tution, which feared nothing so much as the pa.s.sionate and turbulent haste of the populace in decreeing and deciding. The sense of the rhetra of Lycurgus is also given in some verses from the Eunomia of Tyrtaeus, which, on account of their antiquity and importance, we will quote in their original language:-

F???? ????sa?te?, ???????e? ???ad? ??e??a?

a?te?a? te ?e?? ?a? te??e?t? ?pea.

???e?? ?? ????? ?e?t??t??? as???a?, ??s? ??e? Sp??t?? ?e??essa p????, p?es??e?e?? d? ?????ta?, ?pe?ta d? d??ta? ??d?a?

e??e?a?? ??t?a?? ??tapae???????.(342) d??? te p???e? ????? ?a? ???t?? ?pes?a?.(343)

By the sixth line Tyrtaeus means to say that the popular a.s.sembly could give a _direct_ answer to a law proposed by the authorities, but not depart from or alter it.

9. The usual name of a public a.s.sembly in the Doric states was ???a. This is the name by which the Spartan a.s.sembly is called in Herodotus;(344) and it is used also in official doc.u.ments for those of Byzantium,(345) of Gela, Agrigentum,(346) Corcyra,(347) and Heraclea;(348) ???a?a was the term employed by the Tarentines(349) and Epid.a.m.nians;(350) the place of a.s.sembly among the Sicilian Dorians was called ???a?t??.(351) In Crete it was known by the ancient Homeric expression of ?????.(352) In Sparta the ancient name of an a.s.sembly of the people was ?p???a, whence the word ?pe????e?? in the rhetra quoted above. In later times the names ?????s?a and ?? ?????t?? appear to have been chiefly in use, which do not, more than at Athens, signify a select body, or a committee of the citizens;(353) although in other Doric states select a.s.semblies sometimes occur under similar names.(354) There was also an a.s.sembly of this last kind at Sparta, but it is expressly called the _small ecclesia_;(355) and, according to a pa.s.sage in which it was mentioned, was chiefly occupied concerning the state of the const.i.tution, and perhaps consisted only of Equals; for it can hardly be supposed that an a.s.sembly was convened of magistrates alone.(356) To the regular a.s.sembly, however, all citizens above the age of thirty were doubtless admitted, who had not been deprived of their rights by law.(357) The place of meeting was in Sparta, between the brook Cnacion(358) and the bridge Babyca, where afterwards was a place called nus, near to Pitana, and therefore situated to the west of the city;(359) but, whatever might have been the precise spot, it was in the open air.(360) The time for the regular a.s.sembly was each full moon;(361) yet, for business of emergency, extraordinary meetings were held, often succeeding one another at short intervals.(362)

Our chief object now is to ascertain what were the subjects which, according to the customs of Sparta, required the immediate decision of the people. In the first place, with regard to the external relations of the state, we know that the whole people alone could proclaim war, conclude a peace, enter into an armistice for any length of time, &c.;(363) and that all negociations with foreign states, although conducted by the kings and ephors, could alone be ratified by the same authority. With regard to internal affairs, the highest offices, particularly the councillors, were filled by the votes of the people;(364) a disputed succession to the throne was decided by the same tribunal;(365) changes in the const.i.tution were proposed and explained, and all new laws (as often as this rare event took place), after previous examination in the council, were confirmed in the a.s.sembly.(366) Legally also it required the authority of the a.s.sembled people to liberate any considerable number of Helots, as being their collective owner.(367) In short, the popular a.s.sembly possessed the supreme legislative authority; but it was so hampered and restrained by the spirit of the const.i.tution, that it could only exert its authority within certain prescribed limits.

10. This circ.u.mstance was shown in an especial manner in the method of its proceedings. None but public magistrates, chiefly the ephors and kings, together with the sons of the latter,(368) addressed the people without being called upon, and put the question to the vote;(369) foreign amba.s.sadors also being permitted to enter and speak concerning war and peace;(370) but that citizens ever came forward upon their own impulse to speak on public affairs, is neither probable, nor do any examples of such a practice occur. A privilege of this kind could, according to Spartan principles, only be obtained by holding a public office.(371) As therefore the magistrates alone, (t???, ???a?) were the leaders and speakers of the a.s.sembly, so we often find that stated as a decree of the authorities (especially in foreign affairs),(372) which had been discussed before the whole community, and approved by it.(373) The occasional speeches were short, and spoken extempore; Lysander first delivered before the people a prepared speech, which he procured from Cleon of Halicarna.s.sus.(374) The method of voting by acclamation has indeed something rude and barbarous; but it has the advantage of expressing not only the number of approving and negative voices, but also the eagerness of the voters, accurately enough, according to the ancient simplicity of manners.

11. The public a.s.sembly of CRETE was, if we may judge from some imperfect accounts, similar to the Lacedaemonian. It included all the citizens, strictly so called; and likewise had only power to answer the decree of the chief officers (cosmi or gerontes) in the negative or affirmative.(375) In the other Doric states the influence of the a.s.sembly is too closely connected with the historical epoch to allow the collection of the scattered accounts in this place to form an uniform whole. There were everywhere popular a.s.semblies, as long as they were not suppressed by tyrants; nor indeed did every tyrant suppress them; in every state also they represented the supreme power and sovereignty of the people; its will was the only law. That this will, however, should be properly directed, and that the supreme decision should not be intrusted to the blind impulse of an ignorant or excited populace, was the problem which the founders of the Doric governments undertook to solve.

Chapter VI.

-- 1. The Gerusia of Sparta, a council of elders. -- 2. The Spartan Gerontes were irresponsible. -- 3. Functions of the Spartan Gerusia. -- 4. Gerusia of Crete and of Elis. -- 5. Character of the Spartan royalty. -- 6. Honours paid to the Spartan kings, and the mode of their succession. -- 7. Powers of the Spartan kings in domestic; -- 8. and in foreign affairs. 9. Revenues of the Spartan kings. -- 10. Heraclide princes in Doric states other than Sparta.

1. This result was chiefly brought about by the aristocratical counterpoise to the popular a.s.sembly, the gerusia, which was never wanting in a genuine Doric state, the "council of elders," as the name signifies.(376) In this respect it is opposed to the senate (????), which represented the people; although the latter name, as being the more general term, is sometimes used for the council, but never the converse.

Thus in the Persian war a senate a.s.sembled at Argos, which had full powers to decide concerning peace and war;(377) this was therefore of an aristocratic character, since the government of Argos had not then become democratical. The Homeric a.s.sembly, which was of a purely aristocratical form, is called ???? ?e???t?? or ?e???s?a;(378) it consisted of the older men of the ruling families, and decided both public business and judicial causes conjointly with the kings, properly so called,(379) frequently, however, in connexion with an ?????. In this a.s.sembly lay, but as yet undeveloped, the political elements of the Doric gerusia. At Sparta the name was taken in the strictest sense, as the national opinion laid the greatest importance upon age in the management of public affairs; the young men were appointed for war;(380) and accordingly none but men of sixty or more years of age had admission to this council.(381) The office of a councillor was, however, according to the expression both of Aristotle and Demosthenes,(382) the prize of virtue, and attended with general honour;(383) none but men of distinguished families, blameless lives, and eminent station, could occupy it.(384) Being an office which was held for life,(385) it never could happen that more than one individual was elected at a time, and the eyes of the whole state were directed towards the choice of this one person. Distinguished men, therefore, bordering upon old age, probably always from the oba to which the person whose place was vacated had belonged,(386) offered themselves upon their own judgment(387) before the tribunal of the public voice.

Their advanced age enabled the electors to consider and examine a long public life, and ensured to the state the greatest prudence and experience in the elected. To provide against the weakness of age, which Aristotle considers as a defect attendant on this mode of election, was unnecessary for a time and a state whose inhabitants enjoyed the highest bodily health. The aristocratic tendency of the office required that the candidates should be nominated by vote, not by lot, but yet by the whole people;(388) and that they themselves should meet with the good-will of every person; which was particularly required for this dignity.

2. When they had pa.s.sed through this ordeal they were for ever relieved from all further scrutiny, and were trusted to their own conscience.(389) They were subject to no responsibility, since it was thought that the near prospect of death would give them more moderation,(390) than the fear of incurring at the cessation of their office the displeasure of the community; to whom in other states the power of calling the highest officers to account was intrusted. The spirit of this aristocratic inst.i.tution was, that the councillors were morally perfect, and hence it gave them a complete exemption from all fear as to the consequences of their actions. To later politicians it appeared still more dangerous that the councillors of Sparta acted upon their own judgment, and not according to written laws; but only because they did not take into account the power of custom and of ancient habit (the ???afa ???a, p?t???? ????),(391) which have an absolute sway, so long as the internal unity of a people is not separated and destroyed. Upon unwritten laws, which were fixed in the hearts of the citizens, and were there implanted by education, the whole public and legal transactions of the Spartans depended; and these were doubtless most correctly delivered through the mouths of the experienced old men, whom the community had voluntarily selected as its best citizens.

Thousands of written laws always leave open a door for the entrance of arbitrary decision, if they have not by their mutual connexion a complete power of supplying what is deficient; this power is, however, alone possessed by the law, connate with the people, which, in the ancient simple times, when national habits are preserved in perfect purity, is better maintained by custom fixed under the inspection of the best men, than by any writing.

To me, therefore, the gerusia appears to be a splendid monument of early Grecian customs: and, by its n.o.ble openness, simple greatness, and pure confidence, shows that it was safe to build upon the moral excellence and paternal wisdom of those who had experienced a long life, and to whom in this instance the people intrusted its safety and welfare.

3. The functions of the gerusia were double, it having at the same time an administrative and a judicial authority. In the first capacity it debated with the kings upon all important affairs, preparing them for the decision of the public a.s.sembly, and pa.s.sed a decree in its first stage by a majority of voices,(392) the influence of which was doubtless far greater than at Athens: in the latter capacity it had the supreme decision in all criminal cases, and could punish with infamy and death.(393) Since, however, in both these directions the power of the council gradually came in conflict with that of the ephors, we must first enter into an investigation concerning these officers, before it will be possible to speak of the extent of the functions of the council at different periods.

Another circ.u.mstance also, which renders a separate inquiry into the nature of the ephoralty requisite, is the inspection which it exercised over the manners of the citizens,(394) in which it manifests a great similarity with the ancient Athenian court of the Areopagus. As every old man had the right of severely censuring the habits of any youth, so every citizen was a youth in comparison with these aged fathers of the state.

Hence the awe and veneration with which they were commonly regarded at Sparta. That, however, to an Athenian orator of the democratic times, the gerusia should appear possessed of despotic authority, is not surprising; for it is so far true, that this inst.i.tution, if transplanted to Athens, would necessarily have caused a tyrannical dominion. In Sparta, however, so little was known of any despotic measure of the gerontes, that, on the contrary, the const.i.tution was impaired when their antagonist office, the ephors, gained the ascendency in influence and power. The inst.i.tution of the gerusia was in fact, in its main features, once established at Athens, when Lysander nominated the Thirty, who were to be a legislative body, and at the same time the supreme court of justice; with how little success is well known; so true is it, that every inst.i.tution can only flourish in the soil in which it is first planted.(395)

4. In early times every Doric state must have had a gerusia; but CRETE is the only place of whose council accounts have been preserved, and these represent it in precisely the same light as that of Sparta. It was, we are informed, armed with large political and legislative powers, and laid its decrees in a matured state before the general a.s.sembly, for its approval or rejection.(396) It decided, without appeal to written laws, upon its own judgment, and was responsible to no one.(397) The members were chosen from those persons who had before filled the supreme magistracy (the cosmi), not, however, until after a fresh examination of their fitness.(398) The office lasted for life, as at Sparta.(399) The _princeps senatus_ was styled ????? p?e???st??.(400)

In ELIS, also, whose government resembled that of Sparta, a gerusia was a very important part of the const.i.tution. It consisted of ninety members, who were chosen for their lifetime from oligarchical families;(401) but in other respects the election was the same as at Sparta, and therefore they were chosen by the whole people. Yet there was also a larger council of 600,(402) which may have been an aristocratical committee selected from the popular a.s.sembly. Thus much at least is clear, that the power of the people was very limited; and that, as Aristotle says, there was one oligarchy within another.(403)

5. To the consideration of the gerusia may be joined the inquiry concerning the kingly office in Sparta and other Doric states, as being a cognate element of the const.i.tution. The Doric royalty was a continuation of the heroic or Homeric; and neither in the one nor in the other are we to look for that despotic power, with which the Greeks were not acquainted until they had seen it in foreign countries. In those early times the king, together with his council, was supreme ruler and judge, but not without it; he was also chief commander in war, and as such possessed a large executive authority, as circ.u.mstances required. On the whole, however, his station with regard to the n.o.bles was that of an equal; and his office, although for the most part hereditary, could yet be transferred to another family of the aristocracy. He ruled over the common people either in an arbitrary manner, as the suitors in Ithaca, or as a mild father, like Ulysses.(404) His office on the whole bore an a.n.a.logy to the power of Zeus; and it received a religious confirmation from the circ.u.mstance of his presiding at and performing the great public sacrifices with the a.s.sistance of soothsayers.

6. These are the princ.i.p.al features of the kingly office at Sparta, where, according to Aristotle, as well as among the Molossi in Epirus, it acquired firmness by the limitation of its power; it also derived an additional strength from the mythical notion that the conquest of the country had originated from the royal family.(405) The main support of the dignity of the kings was doubtless the honour paid to the Heraclidae, which extended throughout the whole of Greece, and was the theme of many fables; even the claim of the Spartans to the command of the allied Grecian armies was in part founded upon it. These princes, deriving their origin from the first of the heroes of Greece, were in many respects themselves considered as heroes,(406) and enjoyed a certain religious respect. Hence also we may account for their funeral ceremonies, so splendid, when compared with the simplicity of Doric customs; for the general mourning of ten days,(407) to which a fixed number of Spartans, Perici and Helots came, together with their wives, from all parts of the country into the city, where they covered their heads with dust or ashes with great lamentation, and on each occasion praised the dead king as the best of all princes;(408) as well as for the exposure of those kings who had fallen in battle, whose images were laid upon a state-couch:(409) usages which approximate very closely to the wors.h.i.+p of an hero (t?a? ?????a?). The royal dignity was also guarded by the sanction of the sacerdotal office: for the kings were priests of Zeus Uranius and Zeus Lacedaemon, and offered public sacrifices to Apollo on every new moon and seventh day (?e?????? and ?d?a??ta?);(410) they also received the skins of all sacrificed animals as a part of their income. From this circ.u.mstance, added to the fact that in war they had a right to the back of every victim, and had liberty to sacrifice as much as they wished,(411) it follows that they presided over the entire wors.h.i.+p of the army, being both priests and princes, like the Agamemnon of Homer.(412) Their power, however, most directly required that they should maintain a constant intercourse between the state and the Delphian oracle; hence they nominated the Pythians, and, together with these officers, read and preserved the oracles.(413) As then it appears from these facts that the dignity of the kings was founded on a religious notion, so it was also limited by religion; although the account we have is rather of an ancient custom, which was retained when its meaning had been lost, than an inst.i.tution of real influence. Once in every eight years (d?? ?t?? ????a) the ephors chose a calm and moonless night, and placed themselves in the most profound silence to observe the heavens: if there was any appearance of a shooting star, it was believed that the kings had in some manner offended the Deity, and they were suspended until an oracle from Delphi, or the priests at Olympia, absolved them from the guilt.(414) If this custom (doubtless of great antiquity) is compared with the frequent occurrence of this period of nine years in early times, and especially with the tradition preserved in a verse of Homer, "of Minos, who reigned for periods of nine years, holding intercourse with Zeus,"(415) it is easy to perceive that the dominion of the ancient Doric princes determined, as it were, at the period of every eight years, and required a fresh religious ratification. So intimate in early times was the connexion between civil government and religion.

It is clear, from what has been said, that the Dorians considered the kingly office as proceeding from the Deity, and not as originating from the people; which would, I believe, have seemed to them in no-wise more natural, than that the liberty of the people should be dependent on the king. But they were well aware that the elements of the const.i.tution had not been formed by a people consisting, like the American colonists after their defection from the mother-country, of individuals possessed of equal rights: but they had existed at the beginning, and grown with the growth of the nation. For this reason the people were not empowered to nominate the king (from which disputes concerning the rightful succession to the throne should be carefully distinguished;)(416) but the royal dignity pa.s.sed in a regular succession to the eldest son, with this exception, that the sons born during the reign of the father had the precedence of their elder brothers: if the eldest son died, the throne pa.s.sed to his next male descendant; and on failure of his line, to the younger brothers in succession; if there was no male issue of the king, the office went to his brother(417) (who also, during the minority of the son of the late king, was his natural guardian),(418) and his heirs; or, lastly, if the whole line was extinct, to the next of kin.(419) The anxiety of the Spartans for the legitimacy of their kings, also serves to prove the high importance which was attached to the genuineness of their birth.

Notwithstanding these large privileges, the people believed its liberty to be secured by the oath which was taken every month by the kings, that they would reign according to the laws; a custom also in force among the Molossi;(420) in return for which, the state engaged through the ephors to preserve the dominion of the kings unshaken (?st?f????t??), if they adhered to their oath.(421)

7. The const.i.tutional powers of the kings of Sparta were inconsiderable, as compared with their dignity and honours. In the first place, the two kings were members of the gerusia, and their presence was requisite to make a full council; but as such they only had single votes,(422) which in their absence were held by the councillor who was most nearly related to them, and therefore a Heraclide.(423) If they were present, they presided at the council, and accordingly, in the ancient rhetra above mentioned, they are styled _princes_ (???a??ta?) in reference to the council; it was also their especial office to speak and to propose measures in the public a.s.sembly. When the council sat as a court of justice, the kings of course presided in it; besides which, they had a distinct tribunal of their own,(424) for in Sparta all magistrates had a jurisdiction in cases which belonged to the branch of the administration with which they were intrusted: the only remnant of which custom, spared by the democracy at Athens, was, that the public officers always _introduced_ such suits into the courts. This coincidence of administrative and judicial authority also existed at Sparta in the person of their kings. They held a court in cases concerning the repair and security of the public roads, probably in their capacity of generals, and as superintendents of the intercourse with foreign nations. It is remarkable that they gave judgment in all cases of heiresses, and that all adoptions were made in their presence.(425) Both these duties regarded the maintenance of families, the basis of the ancient Greek states, the care for which was therefore intrusted to the kings. Thus in Athens also, the same duty had been transferred from the ancient kings to the archon eponymus, who accordingly had the superintendence, and a species of guardians.h.i.+p over all heiresses and orphans.(426)

8. The greater part of the king's prerogative was his power in foreign affairs. The kings of Sparta were the commanders of the Peloponnesian confederacy. They also went out as amba.s.sadors; although at times of mistrust companions were a.s.signed, who were known to be disinclined and hostile to them.(427) By the same power the kings also nominated citizens as proxeni, who entertained amba.s.sadors and citizens of foreign states in their houses,(428) and otherwise provided for them; it appears that the kings themselves were in fact the proxeni for foreign countries, and that those persons whom they nominated are only to be considered as their deputies.

As soon as the king had a.s.sumed the command of the army, and had crossed the boundaries, he became, according to ancient custom, general with unlimited power (st?at???? a?t????t??).(429) He had authority to despatch and a.s.semble armies, to collect money in foreign countries, and to lead and encamp the army according to his own judgment. Any person who dared to impede him, or to resist his authority, was outlawed.(430) He had power of life and death, and could execute without trial (?? ?e???? ???); although, from the well-known subordination of the Spartans, such cases were probably of rare occurrence. But it is manifest that the king, upon his return, was always responsible and liable to punishment, as well for an imprudent, as for a tyrannical use of his powers. His political was separated with sufficient accuracy from his military authority, and the king was not permitted to conclude treaties, or to decide the fate of cities, without communication with and permission from the state.(431) His military power was, however, thought dangerous and excessive, and was from time to time curtailed. This limitation was not indeed effected by the arrangement which originated from the dissension between Demaratus and Cleomenes, viz., that only one king should be with the army at the same time(432) (for this regulation rather increased the power of the one king who was sent out); but chiefly by the law, that the king should not go into the field without ten councillors (a rule which owed its origin to the over-hasty armistice of Agis),(433) and by the compulsory attendance of the ephors.(434)

9. The investigation concerning the revenue of the kings is not in itself so important as it is rendered interesting by the parallel with the same office in the Homeric age. In Homer the kings are represented as having three sorts of revenues; first, the produce of their lands (te???),(435) which often contained tillage ground, pastures, and plantations; secondly, the fees for judicial decisions (d??a); and, thirdly, the public banquets, which were provided at the expense of the community.(436) To these were added extraordinary gifts, shares of the booty, and other honorary presents. The case was nearly the same at Sparta, except that they received no fees for judicial decisions. But in the first place, the king in this country had his landed property, which was situated in the territory of several cities belonging to the Perici,(437) and the royal tribute (as?????? f????) was probably derived from the same source.(438) This was the foundation of the private wealth of the kings, which frequently amounted to a considerable sum; otherwise, how could it have been proposed to fine king Agis a hundred thousand drachmas,(439) that is, doubtless, aeginetan drachmas, and therefore about 5800_l._ of our money?

Also the younger Agis, the son of Eudamidas, was possessed of six hundred talents in coin;(440) and in a dialogue attributed to Plato, the king of Sparta is declared to be richer than any private individual at Athens.(441) But besides these revenues, the king received a large sum from the public property; a double portion at the public banquets,(442) an animal without blemish for sacrifice, a medimnus of wheat, and a Lacedaemonian quart of wine on the first and seventh days of each month;(443) the share in the sacrifices above mentioned, &c. It was, moreover, customary for private individuals who gave entertainments, to invite the kings, as was the practice in the Homeric times;(444) on these occasions a double portion was set before them, and when a public sacrifice took place, the kings had the same rights and preferences.(445) In war, also, the king received a large portion of the plunder; thus the share of Pausanias, after the battle of Plataea, was ten women, horses, camels, and talents:(446) in later times it appears that a third of the booty fell to the lot of the king.(447) Lastly, it is proper to mention the official residence of the two kings of Sparta, built, according to tradition, by Aristodemus the ancestor of the two royal families.(448) In addition to this dwelling, they had frequently private houses of their own,(449) and a tent was always built for them without the city, at the public expense.(450)

In taking a review of all these statements, it appears to me that the political sagacity was almost past belief, with which the ancient const.i.tution of Sparta protected the power, the dignity, and welfare of the office of king, yet without suffering it to grow into a despotism, or without placing the king in any one point either above or without the law.

Without endangering the liberty of the state, a royal race was maintained, which, blending the pride of their own family with the national feelings, produced, for a long succession of years, princes of a n.o.ble and patriotic disposition. Thus it was in fact with the two Heraclide families, to which Theopompus, Leonidas, Archidamus II., Agesilaus, Cleomenes III., and Agis III. belonged; and the greater number of the later kings retained, up to the last period, a genuine Spartan disposition, which we find expressed in many nervous and pithy apophthegms.

10. It may be inferred that it was the case in all, as we know it to have been in many Dorian states, with the exception of later colonies, that they were governed by princes of the Heraclide family. In Argos, the descendants of Temenus reigned until after the time of Phidon, and the kingly office did not expire till after the Persian war;(451) in Corinth, the successors of Aletes, and afterwards of Bacchis, reigned until about the 8th Olympiad. How long the Ctesippidae reigned in Epidaurus and Cleonae,(452) we are not informed. In Megara we find the name, but the name only, of a king at a very late period.(453) In Messenia the aepytidae ruled as kings until the subjugation of the country; and when Aristomenes was compelled to quit it, he took refuge with Damagetus, the king of Ialysus, in the island of Rhodes, of the Heraclide family of the Eratidae.(454) Also the Hippotadae at Cnidos and Lipara,(455) the Bacchiadae at Syracuse and Corcyra,(456) the Phalantidae at Tarentum,(457) probably had in early times ruled as sovereign princes, as well as the Heraclidae at Cos, who derived their origin from Phidippus and Antiphus.(458) In Crete we find but little mention of the Heraclidae, the only exceptions being Althaemenes of Argos, and Phaestus of Sicyon.(459) In this island the family of Teutamas had reigned from a remote period: with regard to the time during which kings existed in this country, it can only be conjectured from the circ.u.mstance that a king named Etearchus reigned at Oaxus not long before the building of Cyrene.(460) Cyrene, as has been already shown, was under the dominion of a Minyean, its mother-city Thera, under that of an aegide family.(461) Delphi was also at an early period under the rule of kings.(462) Of the aristocratic offices, which were subst.i.tuted in the place of the royal authority, we shall presently speak, when treating of the power of the cosmi.

Chapter VII.

-- 1. Origin of the office of Ephor in the Spartan state. -- 2.

Period of its creation. -- 3. Civil jurisdiction of the Ephors. -- 4. Increase in the powers of the Ephors. -- 5. Their transaction of business with the a.s.sembly of citizens, and with foreign powers. -- 6. The power of the Ephors, owing to their ascendency over the a.s.sembly of citizens. -- 7. Miscellaneous facts concerning the office of Ephor. -- 8. t.i.tles and duties of other magistrates at Sparta.

1. Before we treat of the powers of the cosmi, it will be necessary to inquire into an office, which is of the greatest importance in the history of the Lacedaemonian const.i.tution; for while the king, the council, and the people, preserved upon the whole the same political power and the same executive authority, the office of the ephors was the moving principle by which, in process of time, this most perfect const.i.tution was a.s.sailed, and gradually overthrown. From this remark three questions arise: first, what was the original nature of the office of ephor? secondly, what changes did it experience in the lapse of time? and, thirdly, from what causes did these changes originate?

There is an account frequently repeated by ancient writers, that Theopompus, the grandson of Charilaus the Proclid, founded this office in order to limit the authority of the Kings. "He handed down the royal power to his descendants more durable, because he had diminished it."(463) If, however, the ephoralty was an inst.i.tution of Theopompus, it is difficult to account for the existence of the same office in other Doric states. In Cyrene the ephors punished litigious people and impostors with infamy:(464) the same office existed in the mother-city Thera,(465) which island had been colonised from Laconia long before the time of Theopompus.

The Messenians also would hardly, upon the re-establishment of their state, have received the ephoralty into their government,(466) if they had thought it only an inst.i.tution of some Spartan king. The ephors of the Tarentine colony Heraclea may be more easily derived from Sparta and the time of Theopompus.(467) It is however plain that Herodotus(468) and Xenophon(469) placed the ephoralty among the inst.i.tutions of Lycurgus, with as much reason as other writers attributed it to Theopompus; and it will probably be sufficient to state that the ephors were ancient Doric magistrates.

The ephoralty, however, considered as an office opposed to the kings and to the council, is not for this reason an inst.i.tution less peculiar to the Spartans; and in no Doric, nor even in any Grecian state, is there any thing which exactly corresponds with it. It is evident, therefore, that it must have gradually obtained this peculiar character by causes which operated upon the Lacedaemonian state alone. Hence it appears, that the supposed expression of Theopompus referred rather to the powers of the ephors in later times, than to their original condition. At least Cleomenes the Third was ignorant of this account of them; since, after the abolition of these magistrates, he proposed, in a speech to the people, that the ephors should again be what they were originally (when they were elected in the first Messenian war), viz., the deputies and a.s.sistants of the king. In this proposal indeed a very partial view is displayed; for every magistrate must necessarily choose his own deputy; whereas the democratic election of the ephors was, as we shall presently see, an essential part of their office. From the accounts just adduced, we do not however wish to infer any thing further, than how variable were the opinions, and how little historical the statements, concerning the original object of the ephoralty.

2. In the const.i.tution of Lycurgus, as it has been hitherto developed, the ephoralty of later times would not only have been a superfluous, but a destructive addition. For in this the king, the council, and the people const.i.tuted the chief authorities; and to suppose that any part would require either check or a.s.sistance, would have been inconsistent with the plans of the legislator. A counter-authority, such as the ephoralty, in which the mistrust of the people was expressed in a tyrannical manner, was far removed from the innocence and simplicity of the original const.i.tution, and could not have been introduced, until the connexion and firmness arising from the first laws had been loosened and enfeebled. The Roman office of tribune had, doubtless, a certain similarity in its first origin with the ephoralty;(470) yet the former was more imperatively required, as by it an entire people, the _plebs Romana_, obtained a necessary and fair representation; whereas in Sparta the gerusia, although chosen from the most distinguished citizens, belonged nevertheless to the whole Spartan people, and the democratic influence of the popular a.s.sembly served as the basis of the whole const.i.tution.(471)

If then the extended political power of the ephors did not belong to the const.i.tution of Lycurgus, neither can we suppose that it originated in the time of Theopompus. For the statement is worthy of credit, that Theopompus and Polydorus added the following words to the rhetra above quoted: "_If however the people should follow a crooked opinion, the councillors and princes shall dissent._" Now in the first place, the ephors are here wholly omitted, although in the Peloponnesian war they put the vote to the people, and frequently made proposals in the a.s.sembly; and, secondly, the tendency of this clause is manifestly to diminish the power of the people; whereas it will be more clearly shown below, that the authority of the ephors rested upon democratical principles.

It is evident that these supposed historical traditions, instead of affording any clear explanation, lead to contradictions; and in order to obtain any distinct knowledge of the history of the ephoralty, we must proceed rather upon the evidence furnished by the nature of the office itself, and the a.n.a.logy of similar offices in other states.

3. For this reason we will first consider the judicial authority of the ephors, a power which we know to have belonged also to the ephors of Cyrene. Now Aristotle(472) describes their judicial powers by saying, that they decided causes relating to contracts, while the council decided causes of homicide.(473) The latter was therefore a supreme criminal court, with power of life and death; the former a civil court, which gave judgment concerning contracts and property. Its influence upon the Spartans would appear to have been inconsiderable, from the opinions entertained by them on the division of property and exchange of money, perhaps less than it really was; but however this may be, the Perici and Helots, when they were in Sparta, were under its jurisdiction. Now we have already shown, that it was a principle of the Lacedaemonian government so to divide the jurisdiction amongst the different magistrates, that the administration and jurisdiction belonged to the same officers.(474) Hence a superintendence over sales and over the market must have been the original duty of the ephors, forming the basis of their judicial authority.(475) The market, as being the central point of exchange, was no unimportant object of care:(476) every Spartan here brought a part of the corn produced by his estate, in order to exchange it for other commodities: it was in a certain manner disgraceful not to have the power of buying and selling;(477) a privilege which was also interdicted to youths: moreover, in the days of mourning for the king, the market was shut up and scattered with chaff.(478) The day upon which Cinadon, according to the description of Xenophon,(479) secretly endeavoured to inflame the minds of the lower cla.s.ses, was evidently a market-day, and also, in my opinion, a great day of justice. A king, the ephors, the councillors, and about forty Spartans (?????), were in the market-place, all probably in a judicial capacity: besides whom, there were about four thousand men, chiefly occupied in buying and selling, as is seen from the fact that in one part of the market a large quant.i.ty of iron fabrics was heaped up. The ephors were therefore ?f???? (inspectors) over the market, and for this reason they met regularly in this place,(480) where was also situated their office.

The number of the college of ephors (five),(481) which it had in common with some other magistrates of Sparta,(482) appears, as I conjectured above,(483) to imply a democratic election-a fact which is also stated by the ancients. We know from Aristotle, that persons from the people, without property or distinction, could fill this office:(484) in what manner, indeed, is not quite manifest. Properly indeed, no magistrate in Sparta was chosen by lot;(485) but it appears that election by choice and by lot were combined.(486) In this case we see displayed a principle of the ancient Greek states, which administered the criminal jurisdiction on aristocratic principles, while civil causes were decided by the whole community, or its representatives. At Athens, Solon gave the popular courts a jurisdiction only in civil suits; all criminal cases were decided by the timocratic Areopagus, and the aristocratic Ephetae. In Heraclea on the Pontus, the chief officers were chosen from a small number of the citizens, the courts of justice from the rest of the people.(487) And in Sparta also the civil judges were the deputies of the a.s.sembly-the ???a?a,(488) which in Athens itself acted as a court of justice under the name of ???a?a.

4. From the view of this office now taken, the continued extension of the powers of the ephors may be more easily accounted for. It was the regular course of events in the Grecian states, that the civil courts enlarged their influence, while the power of the criminal courts was continually on the decline. As in Athens, the Helaeeea rose, as compared with the Areopagus, so in Sparta the power of the ephors increased in comparison with that of the gerusia.