Crime And Corruption Part 6

According to their detailed paper, stocks were trading at 19 times after-tax corporate earning at the peak in 1929, a fraction of today's valuations even after the recent correction. A March 1999 "Economic Letter" published by the Federal Reserve Bank of San- Francisco wholeheartedly concurs. It notes that at the peak, prices stood at 30.5 times the dividend yield, only slightly above the long term average.

Contrast this with an article published in June 1990 issue of the "Journal of Economic History" by Robert Barsky and Bradford De Long and t.i.tled "Bull and Bear Markets in the Twentieth Century": "Major bull and bear markets were driven by s.h.i.+fts in a.s.sessments of fundamentals: investors had little knowledge of crucial factors, in particular the long run dividend growth rate, and their changing expectations of average dividend growth plausibly lie behind the major swings of this century."

Jude Waninski attributes the crash to the disintegration of the pro- free-trade coalition in the Senate which later led to the notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. He traces all the important moves in the market between March 1929 and June 1930 to the intricate protectionist danse macabre in Congress.

This argument may never be decided. Is a similar crash on the cards?

This cannot be ruled out.

The 1990's resembled the 1920's in more than one way. Are we ready for a recurrence of 1929? About as we were prepared in 1928. Human nature - the prime mover behind market meltdowns - seemed not to have changed that much in these intervening seven decades.

Will a stock market crash, should it happen, be followed by another "Great Depression"? It depends which kind of crash. The short term puncturing of a temporary bubble - e.g., in 1962 and 1987 - is usually divorced from other economic fundamentals. But a major correction to a lasting bull market invariably leads to recession or worse.

As the economist Hernan Cortes Douglas reminds us in "The Collapse of Wall Street and the Lessons of History" published by the Friedberg Mercantile Group, this was the sequence in London in 1720 (the infamous "South Sea Bubble"), and in the USA in 1835-40 and 1929-32.

The Shadowy World of International Finance Strange, penumbral, characters roam the boardrooms of banks in the countries in transition. Some of them pop apparently from nowhere, others are very well connected and equipped with the most excellent introductions. They all peddle financial transactions which are too good to be true and often are. In the unctuously perfumed propinquity of their Mercedesed, Rolex waving entourage - the polydipsic natives dissolve in their irresistible charm and the temptations of the cash: mountainous returns on capital, effulgent profits, no collaterals, track record, or business plan required.

Total security is cloyingly a.s.sured.

These Fausts roughly belong to four tribes: The Shoppers These are the shabby operators of the marginal shadows of the world of finance. They broker financial deals with meretricious sweat only to be rewarded their meagre, humiliated fees. Most of their deals do not materialize. The principle is very simple: They approach a bank, a financial inst.i.tution, or a borrower and say: "We are connected to banks or financial inst.i.tutions in the West. We can bring you money in the form of credits. But to do that - you must first express interest in getting this money. You must furnish us with a bank guarantee / promissory note / letter of intent that indicates that you desire the credit and that you are willing to provide a liquid financial instrument to back it up.".

Having obtained such instruments, the shoppers begin to "shop around". They approach banks and financial inst.i.tutions (usually, in the West). This time, they reverse their text: "We have an excellent client, a good borrower. Are you willing to lend to it?" An informal process of tendering ensues. Sometimes it ends in a transaction and the shopper collects a small commission (between one quarter of a percentage point and two percentage points - depending on the amount). Mostly it doesn't -and the Flying Dutchman resumes his wanderings looking for more venal gulosity and less legal probity.

The Con-Men These are crooks who set up elaborate schemes ("sting operations") to extract money from unsuspecting people and financial inst.i.tutions. They establish "front" or "phantom" firms and offices throughout the world. They tempt the gullible by offering them enormous, immediate, tax-free, effort-free, profits. They let the victims profit in the first round or two of the scam. Then, they sting: the victims invest money and it evaporates together with the dishonest operators.

The "offices" are deserted, the fake ident.i.ties, the forged bank references, the falsified guarantees are all exposed (often with the help of an inside informant).

Probably the most famous and enduring scam is the "Nigerian-type Connection". Letters - allegedly composed by very influential and highly placed officials - are sent out to unsuspecting businessmen.

The latter are asked to make their bank accounts available to the former, who profess to need the third party bank accounts through which to funnel the sweet fruits of corruption.

The account owners are promised huge financial rewards if they collaborate and if they bear some minor-by-comparison upfront costs.

The con-men pocket these "expenses" and vanish. Sometimes, they even empty the accounts of their entire balance as they evaporate.

The Launderers A lot of cash goes undeclared to tax authorities in countries in transition. The informal economy (the daughter of both criminal and legitimate parents) comprises between 15% (Slovenia) and 50% (Russia, Macedonia) of the official one. Some say these figures are a deliberate and ferocious understatement. These are mind boggling amounts, which circulate between financial centres and off sh.o.r.e havens in the world: Cyprus, the Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein (Vaduz), Panama and dozens of aspiring laundrettes.

The money thus smuggled is kept in low-yielding cash deposits. To escape the cruel fate of inflationary corrosion, it has to be reinvested. It is stealthily re-introduced to the very economy that it so sought to evade, in the form of investment capital or other financial a.s.sets (loans and credits). Its anxious owners are preoccupied with legitimising their stillborn cash through the conduit of tax-fearing enterprises, or with lending it to same. The emphasis is on the word: "legitimate". The money surges in through mysterious and anonymous foreign corporations, via off-sh.o.r.e banking centres, even through respectable financial inst.i.tutions (the Bank of New York we mentioned?). It is easy to recognize a laundering operation. Its hallmark is a p.r.o.nounced lack of selectivity.

The money is invested in anything and everything, as long as it appears legitimate. Diversification is not sought by these nouveau tyc.o.o.ns and they have no core investment strategy. They spread their illicit funds among dozens of disparate economic activities and show not the slightest interest in the putative yields on their investments, the maturity of their a.s.sets, the quality of their newly acquired businesses, their history, or real value. Never the sedulous, they pay exorbitantly for all manner of prestidigital endeavours. The future prospects and other normal investment criteria are beyond them. All they are after is a mirage of lapidarity.

The Investors This is the most intriguing group. Normative, law abiding, businessmen, who stumbled across methods to secure excessive yields on their capital and are looking to borrow their way into increasing it. By cleverly partic.i.p.ating in bond tenders, by devising ingenious option strategies, or by arbitraging - yields of up to 300% can be collected in the immature markets of transition without the normally a.s.sociated risks. This sub-species can be found mainly in Russia and in the Balkans.

Its members often buy sovereign bonds and notes at discounts of up to 80% of their face value. Russian obligations could be had for less in August 1998 and Macedonian ones during the Kosovo crisis. In cahoots with the issuing country's central bank, they then convert the obligations to local currency at par (=for 100% of their face value). The difference makes, needless to add, for an immediate and hefty profit, yet it is in (often worthless and vicissitudinal) local currency.

The latter is then hurriedly disposed of (at a discount) and sold to multinationals with operations in the country of issue, which are in need of local tender. This fast becomes an almost addictive avocation.

Intoxicated by this pecuniary nectar, the fortunate, those privy to the secret, try to raise more capital by hunting for financial instruments they can convert to cash in Western banks. A bank guarantee, a promissory note, a confirmed letter of credit, a note or a bond guaranteed by the Central Bank - all will do as deposited collateral against which a credit line is established and cash is drawn. The cash is then invested in a new cycle of inebriation to yield fantastic profits.

It is easy to identify these "investors". They eagerly seek financial instruments from almost any local bank, no matter how suspect. They offer to pay for these coveted doc.u.ments (bank guarantees, bankers' acceptances, letters of credit) either in cash or by lending to the bank's clients and this within a month or more from the date of their issuance. They agree to "cancel" the locally issued financial instruments by offering a "counter-financial- instrument" (safe keeping receipt, contra-guarantee, counter promissory note, etc.). This "counter-instrument" is issued by the very Prime World or European Bank in which the locally issued financial instruments are deposited as collateral.

The Investors invariably confidently claim that the financial instrument issued by the local bank will never be presented or used (which is true) and that this is a risk free transaction (which is not entirely so).

If they are forced to lend to the bank's clients, they often ignore the quality of the credit takers, the yields, the maturities and other considerations which normally tend to interest lenders very much.

Whether a financial instrument cancelled by another is still valid, presentable and should be honoured by its issuer is still debated.

In some cases it is clearly so. If something goes horribly (and rarely, admittedly) wrong with these transactions - the local bank stands to suffer, too.

It all boils down to a terrible hunger, the kind of thirst that can be quelled only by the denominated liquidity of lucre. In the post nuclear landscape of this part of the world, a fantasy is shared by both predators and prey. Circling each other in marble temples, they switch their roles in dizzying progression. Tyc.o.o.ns and politicians, industrialists and bureaucrats all vie for the attention of Mammon.

The s.h.i.+fting coalitions of well groomed man in back stabbed suits, an hallucinatory carousel of avarice and guile. But every circus folds and every luna park is destined to shut down. The dying music, the frozen accounts of the deceived, the bankrupt banks, the Jura.s.sic Park of skeletal industrial beasts - a muted testimony to a wild age of mutual a.s.sured destruction and self deceit. The future of Eastern and South Europe. The present of Russia, Albania and Yugoslavia.

Treasure Island Revisited On Maritime Piracy

The rumors concerning the demise of maritime piracy back in the 19th century were a tad premature. The scourge has so resurged that the International Maritime Board (IMB), founded by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1981, is forced to broadcast daily piracy reports to all s.h.i.+pping companies by satellite from its Kuala Lumpur Piracy Reporting Center, established in 1992 and partly funded by maritime insurers. The reports carry this alarming disclaimer: "For statistical purposes, the IMB defines piracy and armed robbery as: An act of boarding or attempting to board any s.h.i.+p with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act. This definition thus covers actual or attempted attacks whether the s.h.i.+p is berthed, at anchor or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded, unless the thieves are armed."

The 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as "any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed by individuals (borne aboard a pirate vessel) for private ends against a private s.h.i.+p or aircraft (the victim vessel)." When no "pirate vessel" is involved - for instance, when criminals embark on a s.h.i.+p and capture it - the legal term is hijacking.

On July 8, seven pirates, armed with long knives attacked an officer of a cargo s.h.i.+p berthed in Chittagong port in Bangladesh, s.n.a.t.c.hed his gold chain and watch and dislocated his arm. This was the third such attack since the s.h.i.+p dropped anchor in this minacious port.

Three days earlier, in Indonesia, similarly-armed pirates escaped with the crew's valuables, having tied the hands of the duty officer. Pirates in small boats stole anodes from the stern of a bulk carrier in Bangladesh. Others, in Indonesia, absconded with a life raft.

The pirates of Guyana are either unlucky or untrained. They were consistently scared off by flares hurled at them and alarms set by vigilant hands on deck. A Colombian band, riding a high speed boat, attempted to board a container s.h.i.+p. Warring parties in Somalia hijacked yet another s.h.i.+p last month.

A particularly egregious case - and signs of growing sophistication and coordinated action - is described in the July 1-8 report of the IMB: "Six armed pirates boarded a chemical tanker from a small boat and stole s.h.i.+p's stores. Another group of pirates broke in to engine room and stole spare parts. Thefts took place in spite of the s.h.i.+p engaging three sh.o.r.e security watchmen." Piracy incidents have been reported in India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, Nigeria, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela.

According to the ICC Year 2001 Piracy Report, more than 330 attacks on seafaring vessels were reported last year - down by a quarter compared to 2000 but 10 percent higher than 1999 and four times the 1991 figure. Piracy rose 40 percent between 1998 and 1999 alone.

Sixteen s.h.i.+ps - double the number in 2000 - were captured and taken over. Eighty seven attacks were reported during the first quarter of this year - up from 68 in the corresponding period last year. Seven of these were hijackings - compared to only 1 in the first quarter of 2001. Nine of every 10 hijacked s.h.i.+ps are ultimately recovered, often with the help of the IMB.

Many masters and s.h.i.+powners do not report piracy for fear of delays due to protracted investigations, increased insurance premiums, bad publicity, and stifling red tape. The number of unreported attacks in 1999 was estimated by the World Maritime Piracy Report to be 130.

According to "The Economist", the IMO believes that half of all incidents remain untold. Still, increased patrols and international collaboration among law enforcement agencies dented the clear upward trend in maritime crime - even in the piracy capital, Indonesia.

The number of incidents in the pirate-infested Malacca Straits dropped from 75 to 17 last year - though the number of crew "kidnap and ransom" operations, especially in Aceh, has increased. Owners usually pay the "reasonable" amounts demanded - c. $100,000 per s.h.i.+p. Contrary to folklore, most s.h.i.+ps are attacked while at anchor.

Twenty one people, including pa.s.sengers, were killed last year - and 210 taken hostage. a.s.saults involving guns were up 50 percent to 73 - those involving mere knives down by a quarter to 105. Piracy seems to ebb and flow with the business cycles of the host economies. The Asian crisis, triggered by the freefall of the Thai baht, gave a boost to East Asian maritime robbers. So did the debt crises of Latin America a decade earlier. Drug transporters - armed with light aircraft and high speed motorboats - sometimes double as pirates during the dry season of crop growth.

Pirates endanger s.h.i.+p and crew. But they often cause collateral damage as well. Pirates have been known to dump noxious cargo into the sea, or tie up the crew and let an oil tanker steam ahead, its navigational aides smashed, or tamper with substances dangerous to themselves and to others, or cast crew and pa.s.sengers adrift in tiny rafts with little food and water.

Many s.h.i.+powners resorted to installing on-board satellite tracking systems, such as s.h.i.+ploc, and aircraft-like "black boxes". A bulletproof life vest, replete with an integral jagged edged knife, was on display in the millennium exhibition at the Millennium Dome two years ago. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is considering to compel s.h.i.+powners to tag their vessels with visibly embossed numbers in compliance with the Safety of Life at Sea Convention.

The IMB also advises s.h.i.+pping companies to closely examine the papers of crew and masters, thousands of whom carry forged doc.u.ments.

In 54 maritime administrations surveyed last year by the Seafarers'

International Research Centre, Cardiff University in Wales, more than 12,000 cases of forged certificates of competency were unearthed.

Many issuing authorities are either careless or venal or both. The IMB recently accused the Coast Guard Office of Puerto Rico for issuing 500 such "suspicious" certificates. The Chinese customs and navy - especially along the southern coast - have often been accused of working hand in glove with pirates.

False doc.u.ments are an integral - and crucial - part of maritime piracy. The IMB says: "Many of the phantom s.h.i.+ps that set off to sea with a cargo and then disappear are sailed by crewmen with false pa.s.sports and competency certificates. They usually escape detection by the port authorities.

In a recent case of a vessel located and arrested in South-East Asia further to IMB investigations, it has emerged that all the senior officers had false pa.s.sports. The s.h.i.+p's registry doc.u.ments were also false."

As doc.u.ments go electronic and integrated in proprietary or common cargo tracking systems, such forgery will wane. Bolero - an international digital bill of lading ledger - is backed by the European Union, banks, s.h.i.+pping and insurance companies. The IMO is a proponent of a technology to apply encrypted "digital signatures"

to electronic bills of lading. Still, the industry is highly fragmented and many s.h.i.+ps and ports don't even possess rudimentary information technology.

The protection afforded by the likes of Bolero is at least a decade away.

Pirates sometimes work hand in hand with conspiring crew members (or, less often, stowaways). In many countries - in East Asia, Latin America, and Africa - Coast Guard operatives, corrupt drug agents, and other law enforcement officials, moonlight as pirates. Renegade members of British trained Indonesian anti-piracy squads are still roaming the Malacca Straits.

Pirates also enjoy the support of an insidious and vast network of suborned judges and bureaucrats. Local villagers along the coasts of Indonesia and Malaysia - and Africa - welcome pirate business and provide the perpetrators with food and shelter.

Moreover, large tankers, container s.h.i.+ps, and cargo vessels are largely computerized and their crew members few. The value of an average vessel's freight has increased dramatically with improvements in container and oil storage technologies. "Flag of convenience" registration has a.s.sumed monstrous proportions, allowing s.h.i.+p owners and managers to conceal their ident.i.ty effectively. Belize, Honduras, and Panama are the most notorious, no questions asked, havens.

Piracy has matured into a branch of organized crime. Hijacking requires money, equipment, weapons, planning, experience and contacts with corrupt officials. The loot per vessel ranges from $8 million to $200 million.

Pottengal Mukundan, Director of ICC's Commercial Crime Services states, in a recent IMB press release: "(Piracy) typically involves a mother s.h.i.+p from which to launch the attacks, a supply of automatic weapons, false ident.i.ty papers for the crew and vessel, fake cargo doc.u.ments, and a broker network to sell the stolen goods illegally. Individual pirates don't have these resources. Hijackings are the work of organized crime rings."

The IMB describes the aftermath of a typical hijacking: "The Global Mars has probably been given a new name and repainted.

Armed with false registration papers and bills of lading, the pirates - or more likely the mafia bosses pulling the strings - will then try to dispose of their booty. The vessel has probably put in to a port where the false ident.i.ty of vessel and cargo may escape detection. Even when identified, the gangs have been known to bribe local officials to allow them to sell the cargo and leave the port."

Such a s.h.i.+p is often "recycled" a few times. It earns its operators an average of $40-50 million per "cycle", according to "The Economist". The pirates contract with sellers or s.h.i.+pping agents to load it with a legitimate consignment of goods or commodities. The sellers and agents are unaware of the true ident.i.ty of the s.h.i.+p, or of its unsavory "owners/managers".

The pirates invariably produce an authentic vessel registration certificate that they acquired from crooked officials - and provide the sellers or agents with a bill of lading. The payload is then sold to networks of traders in stolen merchandise or to gullible buyers in a different port of destination - and the s.h.i.+p is ready for yet another round.

This January, the Indonesian Navy has permanently stationed six battles.h.i.+ps in the Malacca Straits, three of them off the coast of the secessionist region of Aceh. A further 20-30 s.h.i.+ps and 10 aircraft conduct daily patrols of the treacherous traffic lane. Some 200-600 s.h.i.+ps cross the Straits daily. A mere 50 s.h.i.+ps or so are boarded and searched every month.

The Greek government has gunboats patrolling the 2 miles wide Corfu Channel, where yachts frequently fall prey to Albanian pirates.

Brazil has imposed an unpopular anti-piracy inspection fee on berthing vessels and used the proceeds to finance a SWAT team to protect s.h.i.+ps and their crews while in port. Both India and Thailand have similar units.

International cooperation is also on the rise. About one third of the world's s.h.i.+pping traffic goes through the South China Sea. A conference convened by j.a.pan in March 2000 - j.a.panese vessels have become favored targets of piracy in the last few years - pushed for the ratification of the International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) 1988 Rome Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation by Asian and ASEAN countries.

The Convention makes piracy an extraterritorial crime and, thus, removes the th.o.r.n.y issue of jurisdiction in cases of piracy carried in another country's territorial waters or out on the high seas. The Comite Maritime International - the umbrella organization of national maritime law a.s.sociations - promulgated a model anti-piracy law last year.

Though it rejected j.a.pan's offer for collaboration, in a sharp reversal of its previous policy, China started handing down death sentences against murderous pirates. The 13 marauders who seized the Cheung Son and ma.s.sacred its 23 Chinese sailors were executed two years ago in the southern city of Shanwei. Another 25 people received long prison sentences. The - declared - booty amounted to a mere $300,000.