The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 26

Schouvalof, the Russian Amba.s.sador, had on March 4th summed up the situation in an epigram: "England has challenged Russia to a duel, and has chosen for her weapon swords at fifteen paces" (_l'epee a quinze pas_).

But the preparations for this combat were menacing.

'On March 29th the Eastern Question blazed up again with Lord Derby's resignation, the discussion of which enlivened a party at Lady Waldegrave's, there being before us a Queen's Message alleging the existence of imminent national danger and great emergency as a reason for calling out the reserves. On Sat.u.r.day the 30th Trevelyan ...

informed me of a resolution which had been prepared by Lubbock on behalf of those Whigs who had not gone with Gladstone, but wished to make some movement of their own. Later in the evening I saw Childers, who proposed a better motion in the form of an addition to the Message in the sense of a strong desire for peace. The object of both suggestions, of course, was by a moderate middle course to prevent a division for and against the Message in which Gladstone and Bright and eighty others would vote No, while eighty would follow Hartington in voting Yes, and the majority of the party run away, thus destroying the Liberal party, as it was destroyed in the time of Pitt and the war with France. Later, again, in the evening I saw Montgelas (who told me that Russia had held different language to Austria and to England, and that she had drawn back and did not mean war) [Footnote: 'On February 9th I went to a party at the Austrian Emba.s.sy "to meet the Archduke Rudolf." Beust was gone away and Montgelas was host. ... On February 12th I met again the Crown Prince of Austria.'] and Randolph Churchill, who made an appointment to come to me on Sunday about the papers, which he agreed with me in thinking damaging to the Government, and full of evidence of their total isolation. When he came, we decided only that the Government ought to be asked for further papers.'

This demand Sir Charles accordingly made on April 1st. His position was at this point extremely difficult. He was not prepared to acquiesce in the aggrandis.e.m.e.nt of Russia, and therefore could not go with his habitual a.s.sociates, who had formed a Committee upon the Eastern Question. On the other hand, he was determined to join with them in opposing the calling out of the reserves, because this step implied that England would go to war alone, and he did not believe either that England was likely to do so, or that she ought, as a member of the European Concert, to take such a step.

'There was a moment after the fall of Lord Derby when I became a supporter of the Government in their Eastern policy, for they appeared to me to adopt my own, but it did not last long. "Lord Salisbury's circular" (so-called, but written by Lord Cairns), issued upon the accession of Lord Salisbury to the Foreign Office, contained the statement of this policy. ... Speaking in the House on April 9th ..., I repudiated the defence which came from some on the Liberal side, of the conduct of Russia, and, looking upon the Government despatch as a vindication primarily of general European interests, and, in the second place, of h.e.l.lenic interests, against Russian violence and universal Slav dominion throughout the Levant, I separated myself from my party and praised the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. I was afterwards bitterly disappointed at finding the policy of the April circular abandoned by its authors in the Congress of Berlin. ...

'On April 4th Gennadius, the Greek Charge d'Affaires (afterwards Minister), the American Minister, Matthew Arnold, W. E. Forster, Grant Duff, Lubbock, George Sheffield (Lord Lyons' factotum), Tom Hughes, and my old friend Sir David Wedderburn dined with me. And in this Whig and h.e.l.lenic party a general agreement with my views was met with; but the same was not the case amongst my brother Radicals of "Mr.

Dillwyn's Committee upon the Eastern Question."'

This Radical organization got into difficulties of its own while contemplating a motion to condemn explicitly the calling out of the reserves.

'On April 5th Dillwyn's Committee had had before it a letter from Lord Hartington, saying that Mr. Gladstone on Monday wished to speak next after Sir Stafford Northcote, and to deprecate the moving of an amendment. It was in consequence resolved by a majority that no amendment should be moved. Courtney then said that the intimation of Mr. Gladstone's opinion had been obtained from him by gross pressure, and that he himself should move an amendment if no one else did.

Wilfrid Lawson then said that he would move; and there were seven in favour of an amendment. This broke up the Committee, and on Dillwyn reporting to Hartington its dissolution, the latter said: "Well, Mr.

Dillwyn, you see it is not so easy to lead."

'On Sunday, April 7th, there dined with me, among others, Hartington, Harcourt, Goschen, Lord Granville, and Lord Ripon, and we discussed the position, on which Lord Ripon was far from agreement with me. I warmly supported to them the Government circular (issued by Lord Salisbury), as putting British action on European rather than on British-interests grounds, and only differed from the policy of calling out the reserves because this was an action of isolation.'

When Sir Wilfrid Lawson's amendment was moved, Sir Charles voted with the Radical minority of sixty-four against calling out the reserves, but 'differed from every word in which the Radical speakers supported their view.'

The pith of his speech was a powerful plea for allowing Greece to secure the emanc.i.p.ation of Greek populations, then under a Turkish rule heavy as that from which Russia claimed to liberate the Slavs of Bulgaria.

So far, the action of the Government had not united the Liberal party in any concentrated att.i.tude of resistance. But during the Easter recess, which Sir Charles spent in France, meeting Gambetta, politics took a more dramatic turn.

'When Parliament adjourned for the holidays, not one word had been said of an act long previously determined, which was announced the next day. The fact that Parliament was allowed to learn from the newspapers that it was intended by the Government for the first time to employ Indian troops within the European dominions of the Crown in time of peace, without the previous consent of Parliament, [Footnote: By despatching 7,000 Sepoys to Malta.] was a singular commentary upon the Government declaration at the beginning of the Session that Parliament had been called together at an unusually early date in order that under circ.u.mstances of delicacy the Ministry might have the advantage of its advice.... Public feeling, I found from Chamberlain, had gone round a good deal during my absence, and to satisfy the opinion of our Radicals he was determined to move something. I suggested to him (on May 6th) a resolution condemning "the policy of menace and warlike demonstration which has been pursued by the Government," and expressing the belief "that an honourable and peaceful settlement of existing difficulties will be best promoted by their consenting to state frankly the changes in the Treaty of San Stefano which they consider necessary for the general good of Europe and the interests of this country."'

But already the Government were in secret negotiation with Russia, and had entered into an agreement as to the modification of the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. Amongst other changes it was proposed to curtail the limits of Bulgaria by a division severing South from North, and to allow Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

'On Tuesday, May 7th, after the Radical Club, at a party at the Harcourts', I learned what the Government intended to do at the Conference or Congress--namely, limit Bulgaria on the south by the Balkans. But I was informed at the same time that they would themselves propose to give Thessaly and Epirus to Greece, an undertaking which I think they did give to the King of Greece, but from which, if so, they afterwards departed. The Greek Patriarch from Constantinople came over at this time, as did the Armenian Patriarch shortly afterwards, and I met both, although conversation with these dignitaries was not easy, for their French was about as feeble as my Greek; but through Gennadius I, of course, knew the views of the Greeks, and in the Armenian question I took no special part.'

The question of employing the Indian troops was debated on May 20th. Lord Hartington opened; and Sir Charles replied to Sir Michael Hicks Beach, who followed Lord Hartington. Concerning the discussion, he says:

'The technical point which we argued was a narrow one. Had Cyprus been in Asia, our arguments would not have applied to Cyprus; and it is very likely that the Government thought Cyprus was in Asia, and did not like to say that they had made a mistake, and having first ordered the troops to Cyprus, and then ordered them to Malta (which was undoubtedly in Europe), had forgotten the distinction. The real objection to the bringing of the Sepoys was the same as the objection to the calling out of the reserves--that it was isolated action, and that these military measures and the expenditure which they involved were mere bunk.u.m, and mere waste if the Government intended to give up, as they were secretly telling Russia they did intend to give up, the main points of dispute. Moreover, Russia could do us hurt in India, and Indian troops could not touch her at all....

'The Government were said to have only "conquered by giving way," for they agreed to put the number of men into the Estimate, and thus avoid making a precedent, according to our contention, absolutely unconst.i.tutional. On the other hand, Lord Beaconsfield's speech in the House of Lords was defiant in the extreme, and Holker's [Footnote: The Attorney-General.] in the Lower House was an a.s.sertion of higher prerogative doctrine than had been heard in Parliament since the days of Elizabeth.'

'On May 30th I dined with Baron Ferdinand de Rothschild, and met Lord Northbrook (the former Viceroy of India) and his daughter, Lady Emma Baring, Lord Rosebery, Lord and Lady Napier (he a most distinguished man, the best of Amba.s.sadors to Russia and the best of Governors of Madras, too little known),[Footnote: Baron Napier and Ettrick.] Lord Macduff (afterwards Duke of Fife), and Monty Corry, afterwards Lord Rowton, Lord Beaconsfield's private secretary.' Corry 'told me what was at the moment a startling secret--that Lord Beaconsfield was going to the Congress himself. "Can he speak French?" I asked with wonder, to which he shook his head.'

On the day after the meeting of the Congress a sensational disclosure revealed to the world that it met; only to register foregone conclusions.

'At the end of the month (May) the secret agreement was signed with Russia, and revealed to us by the _Globe_ [Footnote: The Globe disclosure came from Mr. Marvin, a civil servant in temporary employ.

Dilke noted: "Besides the 'Marvin Memorandum' and an annex, there was a curious stipulation insisted on by Russia, that the annex should never be published, even if No. 1--that is, the 'Marvin Memorandum'-- should become public; and this looks very much as though Marvin was really the Russian Government, which I have always suspected. They had this to gain by publis.h.i.+ng the Memorandum--that they showed themselves the real victors in the Congress of Berlin, in spite of all our bl.u.s.ter, and they damaged Lord Beaconsfield, who was their enemy.

Marvin could never have got a copy, and always pretended that he had learned the whole doc.u.ment by heart, which, considering its length and the total absence in the copy published in the _Globe_ of the slightest error, even of punctuation, is incredible. The annex, which was dated May 31st, only said that the Russians had no intention of extending their conquests in Asiatic Turkey: 'The Emperor of Russia ... not having the intention of extending Ids conquests in Asia ...

the Imperial Government does not refuse to conclude with the British Government a secret engagement for the purpose of rea.s.suring it upon this point.'"] on June 14th; and it then appeared that the military preparations of the country must have been intended to keep up the spirits of the Jingoes while their cherished principles were being sacrificed behind their backs. The _Daily Telegraph_, which was the Jingo organ, said: "If _such_ a compact has been concluded, this country has fatally descended from the lofty position occupied by the Salisbury despatch." Not only was the compact authentic, but there were two other secret compacts of the same date which did not come out. What the Government had done was to give up all the points for which they had made their enthusiastic followers believe that they would fight, and at the same time in the Anglo-Turkish Convention to declare that their successors should fight for what was left. This may have been a prudent policy, but it was not a policy which carried with it the necessity for bringing Indian troops to Europe or spending eight or nine millions sterling upon apparent preparations for immediate war. The third agreement, in addition to the Salisbury- Schouvalof agreement and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the first of which came out by chance and the second of which was ultimately published by the Government, was an Anglo-Austrian secret agreement which has never been printed, the character of which is revealed by the fact that the English plenipotentiaries themselves proposed at Berlin, in spite of the strong dissent of Turkey, to make to Austria the gift of Bosnia and Herzegovina.'

To this note, written in 1890, there is added in the margin of the ma.n.u.script: 'There was also a secret supplementary agreement with Russia, of which later.' And also this: "The compact giving Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria is now (1908) known to Lucien Wolf." [Footnote: See Thomas Erskine Holland, _The European Concert in the Eastern Question_, 292, 293.]

Before the Berlin Congress met, Sir Charles had pressed by way of questions to secure if possible a representation for Greece at the Congress, and failed; and the speech which he made in the debate (opened on July 29th) on the Treaty of Berlin was mainly a censure on Great Britain for having failed to support the h.e.l.lenic claims. He dwelt specially on Crete, the government of which by Turkey was, he said, "a perpetual menace to European peace."

Replying in the debate for the Liberal party to Mr. David Plunket (afterwards Lord Rathmore), he notes that he

'spoke, and spoke well, making the best of my debating speeches, but was overshadowed by one speech which would have caused better speeches than mine to have been easily forgotten. Mr. Gladstone's speech on this occasion, like all his speeches, does not read; but it was the finest that I ever heard him make with one exception--the Bradlaugh speech in the next Parliament.'

CHAPTER XVII

POLITICS AND PERSONS

I.

Sir Charles Dilke's first concern was with foreign affairs, but he was also of high authority in whatever related to the business and management of the House of Commons; and at this period the question of remodelling forms which lent themselves to the arts of delay began to be urgent, and threatened to become paramount. Here, early in 1878, is the first considerable mention of the man whose relentless use of obstruction has affected parliamentary procedure all over the world:

'On February 20th I was asked by Lord Hartington to serve upon the Government Select Committee on the business and forms of the House, upon which Parnell was asked to represent the obstructive element. It was somewhat a distinction, as I was to be the sole representative of the English independent members, and in consequence I gave up the Standing Committee on Commons, upon which I asked Fitzmaurice to replace me. The proceedings of Sir Stafford Northcote's Committee, as the Committee on Public Business was called, presented only one singularity--namely, the examination of the Speaker--a prolonged one-- by Parnell. Both of them were in a way able men; but both were extraordinarily slow of intellect--that is, slow in appreciating a point or catching a new idea--and Mr. Brand (as he then was) and Parnell used to face one another in inarticulate despair in the attempt to understand each the other's meaning. There were a good many fairly stupid men on the Committee, but there was not a single member of it who did not understand what Parnell meant by a question more quickly than could the Speaker, and not a man who could not understand what the Speaker meant by a reply more quickly than Parnell.'

'With Speaker Brand I afterwards had a singular connection.

'At the time when the President of the Free State, whose name was also Brand, had rendered important services to the British Government, I made one of the briefest of my brief minutes and put it in a box, and sent it round the Cabinet: "I think Brand should be knighted.--Ch's W.

D." Nearly all the members of the Cabinet having added their initials in approval, Brand was knighted, but the wrong Brand, for they gave the G.C.B. to the Speaker, and it was only some time afterwards that the G.C.M.G. was conferred on the South African statesman. I had not thought of the Speaker, and Mr. Gladstone or his private secretary, Edward Hamilton, had forgotten the Free State. What may have been the frame of mind of the various members of the Cabinet who approved my suggestion I do not know, but some probably meant the one and some probably meant the other, and no one remembered that there were two.'

Concerning the proposals which Sir Stafford Northcote was contemplating as the result of the Committee on Public Business, but not in exact accordance with its decisions, Sir Charles notes, under June 25th, that he was not in agreement with the ma.s.s of the Liberal party.

'Our men were inclined to oppose all proposals for closure by majorities, and for investing the Speaker with large powers, while I was beginning to feel as strongly favourable to such proposals as I afterwards became. My "record" upon this subject const.i.tuted, therefore, almost as "sharp a curve" as that of others. As a rule I have not greatly changed my mind upon political subjects, but upon this one (as upon Africa [Footnote: See Chapter XVI., p. 238, and also Chapter XLVIII, (Vol. II., pp. 251-2).]) I undoubtedly turned round, and did so in consequence of the full consideration which I had to give it in the course of this single year.'

In the same year Sir Charles had secured support of Tory metropolitan members, whose const.i.tuents were affected, for his Bill to extend the hours of polling in London; and it pa.s.sed before the end of January as an agreed measure. Then came another advance:

'On February 27th, at the most important sitting of my Committee on the Registration Bills, which had three Bills before it, mine being one; and Martin, who had charge of the Conservative Bill, being in the Chair, with a Conservative majority on the Committee, Martin's Bill was rejected, and mine adopted by the Committee on a division as a base for its proceedings. I at once decided that I would hand over my Bill to Martin, so as to let him have charge of it, as Chairman of the Committee, as the Bill of the Committee.'

This was designed not so much to insure the pa.s.sage of his own Bill as 'to prevent Martin from carrying a mere bit of a Bill with some of the things in it which we wanted.' But, 'to the amazement of everyone,' Sir Charles's measure, under its new sponsors.h.i.+p, actually pa.s.sed, and 'became law in 1878, and ultimately added an enormous number of voters to the franchise rolls.'

By June 7th the Registration Bill was read a third time, and

'My Hours of Polling Bill had now become "Dilke's Act," and I felt as though I was making such progress towards the political reforms I had long advocated that there might be some faint chance that one day redistribution itself might be accomplished.'

Six years later he himself carried out redistribution and extension of the suffrage on a scale hardly dreamed of by politicians in 1878. Already, in the debate of February 22nd, when Sir Charles, as usual, seconded Mr.

Trevelyan's annual motion on the equalization of voting power, the division was better than ever before, and the _Annual Register_, which a few years earlier had known nothing but contempt and aversion for this Radical group, devoted considerable s.p.a.ce to the arguments by which reform was supported, with full reference to Sir Charles's speech. Mr. Goschen and Mr. Lowe were the only Liberals of note who opposed the motion--if, indeed, Mr. Lowe could still be called a Liberal--and Lord Hartington spoke for it.

One of Sir Charles's preoccupations at this moment was the choice of a Liberal candidate to stand for Chelsea with him, and the matter presented difficulties.

'Horace Davey ... was wishful to stand with us, and I had asked him to a dinner at which he met some of the leading men, and later he called on me to see whether he would "do." In the meantime I had sounded our best people, and found that he would not.... I told him at once that he must vote against fresh dowries to the Royal Family until a Civil List inquiry had been held, which ... sent him away.'

Another lawyer followed, and was shown off at several dinners, but 'the borough did not seem inclined to welcome Queen's Counsel,' and ultimately settled, very much to its own satisfaction and Sir Charles's, on a great friend, Mr. Firth.

The campaign in defence of open s.p.a.ces was actively carried on this year, and in March Sir Charles was fighting on behalf of the Commons Preservation Society to resist the erection of a new cottage with an enclosure for the Deputy Ranger in Hyde Park. The cottage was erected, but Sir Charles and his allies 'were ultimately able to get back a large part of the land which had been enclosed near it.' Another encroachment was resisted more successfully, and by other means. In Fulham 'the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had made an enclosure shutting out the public from Eelbrook Common, the use of which it had enjoyed for many years.'