The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 34

"CHAMBRE DES DePUTeS, "PARIS, "_le 7 Mai_, 1880.

"CHER AMI,

"Les dernieres elections Cantonales m'avaient si vivement absorbe que je n'ai pu trouver la minute de liberte necessaire pour repondre a vos deux lettres.

"Permettez-moi d'ailleurs, apres m'etre excuse du r.e.t.a.r.d, de vous dire que je ne partageais ni votre emotion ni votre point d'impatience. Je crois fermement que la solution grecque sera prochainement obtenue, en depit des resistances et des tergiversations qui peuvent se produire chez les Turcs ou ailleurs. L'important est de maintenir le concert de l'Europe, de le manifester par l'action commune d'une demonstration navale; et d'apres tout ce que je sais, j'ai confiance que le gouvernement de la Republique est reste dans la ligne de conduite et qu'il y perseverera.

"Quant a la Grece, il convient qu'elle attende aussi, sans faire mesure, l'effet de cette demonstration. Je suis peut-etre optimiste, mais je crois a une issue favorable.

"En ce qui touche le traite de Commerce votre lettre m'a fort surpris, et je ne peux m'expliquer une att.i.tude si contraire aux preliminaires pris par M. L. Say: je vous prie de ne pas trop vous hater de la porter a la connaissance du public. Je crois qu'il y a la quelque malentendu que je serai bien aise de faire disparaitre, si vous voulez m'y donner le temps.

"Je vais demain a Cherbourg, ou je verrai vos amis qui sont invites par la Ville, et au retour je vous manderai ce que j'aurai appris sur les negociations du traite de Commerce qu'il serait si bon de voir conclure.

"Bien cordialement,

"L. GAMBETTA."

"CHAMBRE DES DePUTeS, "PARIS, "_le 8 Mai_, 1880.

"MON CHER AMI,

"Je profite de l'intermediaire d'un jeune ami, M. Auguste Gerard, que vous avez deja rencontre, pour vous envoyer quelques lignes de reponse a votre aimable derniere communication.

"J'ai vu le President de notre cabinet au sujet de la question Grecque, et comme vous pensez, le gouvernement est unanime pour reprendre la question de Janina integralement, en ecartant definitivement la derniere proposition de Waddington; on accepte la formation de la commission internationale, chargee de reprendre le trace au double point de vue diplomatique et technique. On y defendra le trace qui englobe Janina. Ce qui importerait aujourd'hui serait d'agir promptement, et de concert. On commettrait une lourde faute en laissant la Porte atermoyer plus longtemps et epuiser toutes les forces des diverses nationalites auxquelles elle refuse de donner les maigres satisfactions fixees par le traite de Berlin.

"M. Leon Say doit avoir recu d'ailleurs a ce sujet les instructions les plus nettes, et vous l'avez probablement deja vu.

"A bientot, je l'espere, "Votre devoue,

"LeON GAMBETTA."]

Such a step had already been taken by Great Britain on May 8th, when the Cabinet--

'wrote a despatch to the Courts proposing a Conference at Berlin or Paris as to the Greek frontier, which led, in fact, to the Conference summoned at Berlin to consider the fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty.'

On May 10th this activity was resented by the Sultan, who 'telegraphed his unwillingness to receive Goschen, and great pressure had to be brought to bear upon him during the next few days to induce him to consent.'

There was another matter arising out of the Russo-Turkish War which had occupied Sir Charles much while in Opposition--namely, the government of Cyprus. He did not think that the Foreign Office was the proper department to administer dependencies, and accordingly, within a few days of taking office, he raised the question whether there was any ground for keeping Cyprus under the Foreign Office, and suggested its transfer to the Colonial Office. In this Lord Granville concurred. But--

'Philip Currie, who as head of the Turkish department was managing the affairs of Cyprus, did not want to lose it, and asked to be allowed to prepare a memorandum in the opposite sense, and Lord Granville wrote, "I do not expect to be converted by Currie's memorandum. Do you? If not, the Colonial Office will have to bolt it." The Colonial Office did have to bolt it, for the island was soon handed over to them!'

By the close of the year, as has been seen, Sir Charles was able to report to his const.i.tuents "that, acting under the instructions of Lord Granville, he had secured a greatly improved administration for this island."

On May 21st--

'Egypt began to trouble me, and I was not to be clear of the embarra.s.sment which it caused for several years. I wrote to Lord Granville to say that I had been sounded through Rivers Wilson as to how the Government would take the appointment of a Nubar Ministry with an English Finance Minister,' and Sir Charles again warned Lord Granville of dissensions between the English representatives in Egypt.

It became the most serious of all the embarra.s.sments which involved Mr.

Gladstone's Government. On May 8th--

'I had to see Lord Ripon, who had appointed Colonel Gordon to be his private secretary, and to inform him privately that the Foreign Office feared that he would find him too excitable to be possible as a secretary, which, indeed, very speedily proved to be the case.'

Gordon resigned before Lord Ripon reached India, and on June 14th telegraphed to Sir Charles--

'to know whether we would let him take service again with the Chinese.

I saw a friend of his in London, one of the Chinese Commissioners of Customs, and asked whether Gordon could be got to telegraph that he would refuse any military command in the event of war between China and Russia. He said he thought so, and I told Lord Granville, who wrote back, "I have told the Duke of Cambridge that on these conditions he might have leave."'

Lord Ripon wrote on his arrival:

"... So, you see, your warnings about Gordon came true. It is fortunate that the arrangement came to an end before I got here. As it is, there is no real harm done; we parted the best of friends, and I learned to my astonishment, after I left him at Bombay, that he was off for China."

So pa.s.ses out of sight for the moment, but only for the moment, this fateful personality.

An immediate trouble, however, arose out of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878, by which Great Britain had been pledged to defend Turkey's possessions in Asia Minor on condition that necessary reforms in government were introduced. This pledge made England indirectly responsible for the character of Turkish rule in Armenia; and Sir Charles had repeatedly expressed the view that England was committed to more than she could perform, either as against Russia or on behalf of Armenia. On May 14th the Cabinet left in the draft of instructions to Mr. Goschen 'a pa.s.sage of Tenterden's, in which we recognized the Asia Minor Convention of our predecessors.... But I induced Lord Granville to strike it out after the Cabinet on his own responsibility.'

On the other hand, since the Convention existed, Sir Charles held that by abrogating it they 'might appear to invite the Russians to invade Armenia, which Russia might proceed to do in the name of humanity.' So far as Turkey was concerned, it was considered likely that the Porte would wish to see the Convention annulled, because it could then sell Cyprus to Great Britain for cash instead of leasing it in return for the Asiatic guarantee; and Turkish Pashas would be free from any interference about reforms in Asia Minor. Ultimately the fear of letting Russia in outweighed the other considerations, and the Convention was recognized, leaving England with a heavy burden of moral responsibility for all that subsequently occurred in Armenia under the protection of what Mr.

Gladstone himself had not unjustly called this "insane covenant."

Meanwhile, Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Amba.s.sador, was complaining to Lord Granville that 'the Sultan had a.s.sented to the Convention under a false impression, not knowing that a portion of his dominions would be given over to Austrian control, an alienation not contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano.' He complained, moreover, that the arrangement went, in reality, beyond temporary occupation of provinces. 'We (Lord Salisbury) had given Bosnia and Herzegovina secretly to Austria without reserve.'

The whole Eastern situation was ill-defined and full of difficulties. Mr.

Goschen, before he left England on his mission, came to Dilke to 'bewail the unwillingness of Gladstone and of Lord Granville to make up their minds how far they were going in the direction of coercion of Turkey.' On May 26th--

'Looking about to see how Turkey was to be coerced with regard to the Greek and Montenegrin questions, I discovered that all reinforcements and officials were sent, and all money received by the Constantinople Government, by the sea route, so that a blockade of the Dardanelles would cut their Empire in two until they came to terms.'

Sir Charles's aim throughout all these frontier negotiations was to support the claims of Greece, left indefinite by the Berlin Treaty. At Great Britain's instance, the Greeks had refrained from attacking Turkey when Turkey was engaged with Russia; but the Treaty of Berlin had only promised to Greece in general terms "a rectification of frontier." On the other hand, the Treaty had awarded to Montenegro certain districts of Albania, which, as already stated; showed great repugnance to accept Montenegrin rule. Sir Charles now conceived a plan--

"for combining Albanian autonomy with personal union with Greece, finding that the Albanians were willing to accept the King of the h.e.l.lenes, provided they succeeded in obtaining securities or privileges for the Roman Catholic Church, to which great numbers of them belonged."

On May 28th he learnt from the Greek Charge d'Affaires that proposals for such a personal union had been made to the King of Greece, directly and very secretly, "on the part of a Turkish statesman." The Southern Albanians, wrote M. Gennadius, are to all intents and purposes Greeks.

But, the latter added, "the initiative ought to proceed from the Albanians." A few days later Mr. Goschen wrote from Constantinople that the proposed union would be a solution "very valuable for Europe," but that the Turks would struggle hard to outbid the Greeks, and the Albanians were very strong in the Palace, and were trusted all over the Empire.

Still, autonomy, Mr. Goschen thought, the Albanians "would and must have in some shape." [Footnote: See also _Life of Goschen_, vol. ii., pp. 215, 216.]

In their attempt to reverse the Beaconsfield policy there was one influence steadily opposed to the Government.

'On June 11th there went out a despatch, which had been for several days on the stocks, as to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. It had come back on the 10th from the Queen, who had written by the side of our words: "The acquisition of Cyprus is, in their view, of no advantage to the country either in a military or political sense." "I do not in the least agree in this.--V.R.I." But we sent it, all the same.'

The King of Greece had come to London, and on June 4th Sir Charles went by his wish to Marlborough House, and had an hour's conversation, 'chiefly upon the question of personal union with Albania, but partly with regard to the past, as to which I received his thanks.' 'I thought him a very able man, an opinion which I have never changed.' All Europe confirmed this judgment when the King of the h.e.l.lenes was struck down more than thirty years later in the very achievement of his long-planned schemes. In 1880 the note of disparagement was widespread; but Sir Charles was not alone in his estimate:

'Dizzy was once, after this date, talking to me and the d.u.c.h.ess of Manchester about him, and the d.u.c.h.ess said to me: "How you Liberals have deceived that poor little King!" Whereupon Dizzy replied: "It would take a very clever Government to deceive that youth."'

Elsewhere Sir Charles wrote that the King was a "good talker, but academic," and, dining at Marlborough House on June 6th, he heard an estimate of him as the too industrious apprentice:

'A big aide-de-camp of the King of Greece took more champagne than was good for him, and was extremely funny. Pointing to his King, he said: "Now, there is my King. He is a good little King; but he is not what I call a fas.h.i.+onable King." And then, pointing to the Prince of Wales, he said: "Now, that is what I call a fas.h.i.+onable Prince--_un Prince vraiment 'chic.'_ He goes to bed late, it is true, but he gets up-- well, never. That is what I call a really fas.h.i.+onable Prince. My King gets up at six!"'