The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 35

Sir Charles met the King repeatedly during the next fortnight, to follow out, with the maps, the military details of the proposed new frontier. As soon as the French and Austrian Governments had accepted the British proposal for a Conference at Berlin to settle the question of the frontiers, and Bismarck had consented to call it, Lord Odo Russell wrote that he would have to "act on the Greek Frontier Commission, in which Dilke was better versed than anyone," and begged Sir Charles to "lend him his lights," 'which,' says the Memoir, 'I had to proceed to do' by an exhaustive letter.

A naval demonstration in the Adriatic now followed, generally known as 'the Dulcigno demonstration,' carried out by s.h.i.+ps of the concerted Powers, under command of the senior Admiral present, and acting under a _protocole de desinteress.e.m.e.nt_. It was imposing rather than formidable, since France and Italy both instructed their officers in no case to fire a shot. But it was powerfully reinforced by the threat of independent British action, on the lines which Sir Charles Dilke suggested, and, so helped, it did its work, so far as the Montenegrin question was concerned.

The Greek question still remained for settlement.

Phases in the development of this situation are thus chronicled:

'On June 23rd I went to the State Ball, and had a good deal of talk with Musurus, to try and find out about a curious business which I noted in my diary as follows: "The Russians and Turks are working together. The Russians came yesterday to propose to send 20,000 Russian men in English s.h.i.+ps to coerce Turkey, and the Turks tell us to-day that they will yield to an occupation by a European force, but not to a mere naval demonstration. Both want to raise the difficulties which this will cause, and to fish in troubled waters."

'On Wednesday, June 30th, at three o'clock, an interview took place between Lord Granville, Lord Northbrook' (First Lord of the Admiralty), 'Childers' (Secretary of State for War), 'Sir John Adye'

(Childers' adviser), 'and myself at the Foreign Office as to the means of coercing Turkey. The War Office wished to place an army corps in Greece, which, if they were to send a full complement of guns, would take a month. I suggested the far cheaper plan of a naval occupation of the port of Smyrna, and the collection and stoppage of customs and dues. Mr. Gladstone came in a little late, and took up my idea. But, preferring his Montenegrins to my Greeks, he insisted that we should first deal by the fleet with the Montenegrin question at Dulcigno.

Both ideas went forward. The Dulcigno demonstration took place, and produced the cession of territory to the Montenegrins; and we afterwards let out to the Turks our intentions with regard to Smyrna, and produced by this means the cession of territory to Greece.

[Footnote: _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 231.]

'On Thursday, July 1st, we had a further interview with the Admiralty to arrange our naval demonstrations. On this day there came to see me Professor Panarietoff, a secret agent of the Prince of Bulgaria. He informed me that his Government intended to press on a union between Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. They did not see any reason why they should wait. It might suit the English Liberal Cabinet that they should wait; but from their point of view, why wait? At a party in the evening I met Borthwick, who playfully a.s.sured me that he knew that our policy was to send one army corps to Greece to support the Greeks against the Turks, and another to Eastern Roumelia to support the Turks in maintaining the Treaty of Berlin. The two, after each of them had accomplished its mission, would probably, he thought, come into hostilities with one another in Macedonia.'

On July 5th the Austrian Amba.s.sador, Count Karolyi, told Sir Charles that the Turkish representative at Vienna had been solemnly warned to reckon no longer upon the possibility of disagreement among the Powers, and to consider 'the danger which would result if the Powers became convinced that the Porte had no respect either for their pledges or its own.' This Dilke hailed as 'a great step in advance on Austria's part,' and on July 7th he called at the Austrian Emba.s.sy, at the wish of the Amba.s.sador, who explained the views of his Government:

'It would send two s.h.i.+ps to meet two s.h.i.+ps of each Power that chose to send any, to watch the Montenegro coast with a view to carrying out the Dulcigno proposal if the Porte would not give effect to the Corti compromise within three weeks.' Count Karolyi 'then went on to speak warmly in favour of the future of Greece, and to say that as regarded the Greek frontier Austria would be willing even to send troops.'

Public feeling in Austria, it appeared, was willing to sanction much stronger measures in support of Greece than it would tolerate on behalf of Montenegro. The British Foreign Office now proceeded to utilize the position of vantage which had been gained.

'On July 16th I noted that, Lord Granville having urged the Queen to write an autograph letter to the Sultan of a nature to induce him to give in, the Queen very naturally refused, on the ground that she dissented from every proposition in the draft sent her. She offered to write a mild word of advice or recommendation to him to yield without bloodshed, and this proposal was accepted by the Government. A telegram based on it was despatched on the 17th, and it asked in the name of united Europe for a complete fulfilment of the conditions of the Treaty of Berlin. The Sultan had at this moment despatched a secret agent, a French advocate at Constantinople, to Gambetta, who a.s.sured him that it was because France was interested in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire that it was absolutely necessary to force Turkey to allow herself to be saved.

'The att.i.tude of the French Government had begun to embarra.s.s us a good deal. On July 28th I wrote to Gambetta that we could not understand the hesitations of the French Government, which was continually putting in reserves. All this was known at Constantinople, and augmented the resistance of the Porte; the Prime Minister's paper was attacking us, and Gambetta's paper (the _Republique Francaise_) giving us no support.... In his telegraphic reply Gambetta used words of encouragement with regard to the att.i.tude of his Government, as to which, no doubt, he was himself finding a good deal of trouble. A little later he sent over one of his private secretaries with a fuller letter.'

A conversation with Gambetta would have been valuable to Sir Charles at this moment, and he regretted having to forgo an opportunity which offered. He had procured invitations for--

'the Bra.s.seys and Samuelson to the Cherbourg banquet, [Footnote: This banquet was the occasion of Gambetta's famous Cherbourg speech, a pa.s.sage from which is inscribed on his monument in Paris.] which was to be given to the President of the Republic and the Presidents of the two Chambers (that is, Grevy, Gambetta, and Leon Say). Bra.s.sey asked me to go with him in the _Sunbeam_. Although I should like to have gone, I was under engagements in London; and I spent the Sunday dismally ... instead of at Cherbourg with Gambetta.'

But he sent him messages by Mr. Bernhard Samuelson [Footnote: M.P. for Banbury; afterwards Sir Bernhard Samuelson.] which were quickly effective.

Also, although public opinion in Austria favoured Greece, Sir Charles had ground for believing that Italian Ministers kept the Turks perfectly informed, and that even while advising concession upon Montenegro, they did so with the suggestion that the Greek claims might be the more easily resisted. Austria's concern was, of course, with the northern part of the Illyrian coast; Italy's with the southern. As he noted later in the year, 'the European Concert was about as easy to manage as six horses to drive tandem.' Nevertheless, by the first week in August, 1880, he was able to write:

'A collective note had now been presented by the Powers to the Porte, so that we had carried the Powers with us as fully in our Montenegrin policy, represented by the collective note, as in our Greek policy, represented by the previous Identic note--a most considerable success, contrasting strongly with the failure which our foreign policy met with two or three years later.'

These impressions were shared by Lord Ripon, who followed European and domestic affairs keenly, from India. He wrote on August 17th:

"I rejoice to see that the F.O. seems to be distancing all compet.i.tors in the race of success, ... which" (he added) "in regard to some parliamentary proceedings is not very high praise, you will be perhaps inclined to say."

II.

Even after the collective note had been presented, the European situation remained delicate and difficult through the mutual distrust of the Powers.

On August 9th Lord Granville, who through all these negotiations was exerting his greatest diplomatic skill in keeping Germany in the Concert, expressed to Sir Charles his conviction that 'Bismarck had spies in the Queen's household, and knew everything that went on.' On the side of France matters improved. [Footnote: See _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., chapter vi.]

'On the 8th I received, at last, a reply from Gambetta to my letters-- a reply in which he showed that he fully agreed with me, but that he was not as a fact all-powerful with the Prime Minister (Freycinet).

The same post, however, brought me a letter from Lord Houghton, who was at Vichy, and who complained that it was an unhealthy state of things that Gambetta (who had talked freely to him while in Paris) "should exercise so much irresponsible power." ... The result of my attempts to stir up Gambetta upon our side was seen in the report by Bernhard Samuelson of Gambetta's conversation with him at Cherbourg on Monday, August 9th, and in an article which appeared on Wednesday, August 11th, and another on Friday, the 13th, in Gambetta's paper on the coercion of the Turks. These articles were from the pen of Barrere, who had been over in the previous week to see me, and were written at the personal direction of Gambetta; and Adams (Secretary to the Emba.s.sy) wrote from Paris on the 13th that the tone of the French Government had correspondingly improved.'

But even while France a.s.sisted in one direction, she introduced fresh complications in another by her quickly maturing designs on Tunis--which had been mentioned to Sir Charles by the French Amba.s.sador, M. Leon Say, as early as June 8th. French diplomatists claimed an authorization from Lord Salisbury. [Footnote: See Crispi's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., pp. 98-109 and 121; _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 215, 270, 436, as to Tunis and Tripoli.] "How can you," he was reported to have said, during the conversations which attended the Congress of Berlin, "leave Carthage to the barbarians?"

'It was on this day (June 8th, 1880) that I became fully aware of the terms of Lord Salisbury's offer of Tunis to France, as to which he misled the public, Lord Salisbury having, when reminded of the statement, said privately that it was "a private conversation," and publicly that there was "no foundation for the statement."'

Later Sir Charles made inquiries of M. Say, who gave the dates of the two conversations as July 21st and 26th, 1878.

'Lord Salisbury made a denial which is on record at the Foreign Office in his own handwriting in red ink, but this denial is dated July 16th --_i.e._, before the conversations.'

The trouble developed rapidly. By August 14th, 1880, Italy was threatening to withdraw her Amba.s.sador from Paris, 'on account of the receipt of information showing that the French intended to occupy Tunis under Lord Salisbury's permission.'

At this moment Sir Charles's health broke down. Two notes from his chief, Lord Granville, are preserved, the first evidently sent across in the office:

"MY DEAR DILKE,

"Please don't be a d--d fool. Go home and do exactly what your doctor tells you.

"Yrs. G."

And again on August 18th Lord Granville wrote:

"I must formally request you not to leave the house till you send me the doctor's written statement that he has advised you to do so. I consider myself an honorary member of the gouty faction, and ent.i.tled to speak with weight on the folly of trying to bully the disorder."

To this friendly dictation the patient submitted till the 23rd, when he insisted on going to the House to answer questions, but returned to bed, and next morning underwent an operation. [Footnote: He worked hard during his enforced confinement to the house, and one of his visitors was M.

Joseph Arnaud, one of Gambetta's secretaries, who was sent by his friend to rea.s.sure him as to the pressure he was using in the Frontier Question.

It is of M. Arnaud that Sir Charles tells a Gambetta story: 'G. was jovial to-day, November 12th, 1880. Arnaud having said that all the people to whom tickets were given for the presidential tribune were grateful to Gambetta, and all who were angry were angry with him--Arnaud--the reply was: "Tu ne comprends donc pas que tu es inst.i.tue pour ca?"'] In a few days he was again in Parliament, where the peace party, headed by Sir Wilfrid Lawson, had begun to denounce the naval demonstration against Turkey. In this they were backed by the Fourth Party, who spoke of it as "the combined filibustering." However, on September 7th, the general question was raised on the motion for adjournment of the House, and Sir Charles, 'replying to the peace party on the one hand, and on the other to Cowen, who attacked them in the name of Albanian nationality,' drew from Lord Granville this compliment:

"My mother once said that Clarendon--with a slight headache--was the pleasantest man she knew. I will not say that an operation makes you speak better, but it certainly does not prevent your speaking as well as usual."

The Fourth Party [Footnote: Dilke dates the birth of the Fourth Party at the beginning of the Gladstone Ministry, and says: 'Gorst was its real brain, the other two members (for Arthur Balfour hardly belonged to it) contributing "bra.s.s."'] were also busy in denunciation of the Government's policy in Afghanistan, which had been finally determined on August 7th, when--

'the Cabinet directed Lord Hartington and Lord Ripon to retire from Kandahar, although we had now heard of the intention of the Russians to occupy Merv, a step on their part which was certain to make our retirement from Kandahar unpopular with those who did not know its necessity.'

Another circ.u.mstance even more certain to add to the unpopularity of the retirement was not then known to the Home Government. On July 26th, Lord Ripon, writing to Sir Charles, complained of the "embarra.s.sing engagements" with which "Lytton's reckless proceedings" had hampered him.

One of these engagements bound him to maintain Shere Ali as Wali of Kandahar; and on July 27th, Ayub Khan, Shere Ali's rival, defeated at Maiwand the force under General Burrows which was supporting Great Britains' nominee. The policy of evacuation met with resistance in a quarter where such policies were always opposed. On September 7th Sir Charles left London to stay with Lord Granville at Walmer Castle, and Lord Hartington joined them on the 9th.

'The Queen had written for the second time to Hartington urging with great warmth that we should retain Kandahar, although, as Hartington said, this meant, to India, an expenditure of four millions sterling a year, on local troops, for no military return.... The Queen ... at this moment was not only protesting strongly with regard to Kandahar, but also, in cipher telegrams, against the naval demonstration....

'On September 20th Lord Granville, just starting for Balmoral, came to see me. He told me that he thought of sending Dufferin to Constantinople at the end of Goschen's special mission, and Paget to Petersburg, and Layard to Rome if he could not get a pension out of the Treasury for Layard.'

The Queen conceived the interests of England as Lord Beaconsfield had presented them. But Mr. Gladstone did not conceive of English interests as bound up with Turkish success, and wrote on September 21st:

"If Turkey befools Europe at Dulcigno, we may as well shut up shop altogether."

About the same time Chamberlain expressed his mind on questions of foreign policy in their bearing on party politics:

"Kandahar will have to be given up.... I only hope Hartington will have the pluck to do it at once and before we get into some fresh sc.r.a.pe. I observe the papers generally speak well of the session, the Government, and especially of the Radicals. So far so good. We have scored very well up to this time."

'In another letter Chamberlain added:

'"What about the Concert of Europe? Will it last through a bombardment of Dulcigno? I don't much like concerts. Our party of two, with Dillwyn as chorus, was about as numerous as is consistent with harmony, and I fear five great Powers are too many to make a happy family."'