The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 38

In November of this year Dilke met Rouher, the great Minister of the fallen Empire.

'He told me that he had quite dropped out of politics, and was becoming a philosopher, and that Gambetta was the only man in France, and could do anything he pleased with it.'

Sir Charles's own opinion of contemporary France was conveyed to Lord Granville in one of several despatches, which have never been printed, partly because the Queen raised objection to his writing officially from a capital at which there was an Amba.s.sador. It gives his impressions of the state of things under "the Grevy regime," some years later exposed in connection with the Wilson trial.

"Paris, _October_ 17, 1880.

"Your Lords.h.i.+p asked me to send you any general remarks that I might have to offer upon the existing state of things in Paris, so that I may perhaps be permitted to express the conviction which I feel that at this moment there is an extraordinary contrast between the strength and wealth of France and the incapacity of those who are responsible for the administration of its Government. In addition, it is impossible not to be struck with the atmosphere of jobbery which surrounds the public offices. Transactions which in England would destroy a Ministry, in Paris arouse at the most a whisper or a smile.

Something was heard in England of the terrible conversion of 'rentes'

scandal of last year, and there is reason to suppose that the administration of Algeria by the persons who surround the brother of the President of the Republic, its Governor-General (Albert Grevy), const.i.tutes a standing disgrace to France. The venality not only of the Opposition, but also of the Ministerial Press, is admitted on all sides, and the public offices are disorganised by the sudden dismissal of well-trained public servants, who are replaced by the incompetent favourites of those in power. The lightest suspicion of what is known as clericalism, even when only a suspicion, based on anonymous and calumnious denunciation, is sufficient to condemn a functionary. If it be not trivial to give a simple example, I would quote one which will, I think, remind your Lords.h.i.+p of the name of an old friend. Monsieur Tresca, who was for more than thirty years the a.s.sistant-Director of the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers, is a member of the Inst.i.tute, the most distinguished Civil Engineer in France, and not past work.

The Director having lately died, I expected to find that he had been succeeded by Monsieur Tresca, but I discovered that this was not the case. I took an opportunity while sitting next to the Prime Minister at dinner at Her Majesty's Emba.s.sy to mention M. Tresca's name, in order to see if I could discover the reason for his disgrace. 'Mais il parait qu'il est clerical,' was the phrase. Monsieur Tresca was a moderate Orleanist who followed M. Thiers when the latter gave his adhesion to the Republican form of government, and is certainly not a man who could be properly described as clerical in his views.

"Strange as it may seem, however, I am not inclined to see in the existing and increasing degradation of French politics an actual danger to the form of government which has been adopted in France. It is, on the contrary, an undoubted fact that the Imperialist, Legitimist, and Orleanist parties are continuing steadily to lose ground. But if the Government is not only to last, but to succeed, those who are responsible for its guidance will have at all hazards to abandon their present policy of suspicion and exclusion, and to adopt that of tolerance and comprehension, which, with magnificent effect upon the power of France, was followed by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1801.

If they continue in their present course, the result must be fatal to the reputation and to the influence of France."

III.

'I was rather given to interfering in the affairs of other offices, which is not as a rule a wise thing to do; but then it must be remembered that I was in the position of having to represent the interests and opinions of the men below the gangway, and that they used to come to Chamberlain and to me in order to put pressure upon our colleagues through us, and that I was the person approached in all Indian, Colonial, naval, and military questions, and Chamberlain in domestic ones.'

In the last week of May, 1880,

'I engaged in a struggle with Lord Northbrook over the proceedings of some of his s.h.i.+ps.... The town of Batanga, on the west coast of Africa, had been bombarded, sacked, and burnt for a very trifling outrage; and I succeeded in inducing Lord Northbrook to telegraph for further information. Ultimately the First Lord reported that--"The Commodore has only done what was forced upon him, but it is necessary to look very sharply after our commercial and consular people in those parts, who constantly want to use force."'

At the beginning of July hostilities between Russia and China seemed probable, and there was a rumour of a Russian defeat on the Kashgar frontier. Serious apprehensions were entertained, especially in India, as to the effect on British trade:

'I went to W. H. Smith, and asked him to ask me whether we would strengthen the China squadron in view of a possible Russian blockade of the Treaty ports. I strongly recommended this increase of force, but had been unable to get our people to agree to it; and through Smith's question the thing was done....

'On May 31st I was asked to explain why I had taken the unusual course for a member of the Government of walking out from a Government division on the Secret Service money. I replied that I thought that there was room for reduction in the sum, that I knew nothing about what was spent in Ireland, but that what went abroad was chiefly spent in America, "in buying Fenians to write reports about other Fenians, probably at the wish of the latter, who divide the spoils." There was a Consul at Philadelphia who was perpetually writing to us with plans of infernal machines, models of bombs, specimens of new kinds of dynamite, and so forth, and we had to forward all his letters to the Home Office, and always received from Harcourt the same reply--that we were very probably being imposed on, but that the matter was so important that whether we were imposed on or not we must buy; so that naturally there was a good deal of waste.' [Footnote: In 1881 Sir Charles again abstained from voting on this question.]

Another note shows how some Secret Service money was expended:

'On December 2nd Sir Henry Thring told me that a great number of the Queen's telegrams had been sent to be pulped, and that the pulper had taken them to America, whence they were recovered by a plentiful expenditure of Secret Service money.'

Dilke maintained his practice of seeing Gambetta every time he pa.s.sed through Paris to or from Toulon. But the British Emba.s.sy now gave him another object in these visits, and he notes a pleasant story of the Amba.s.sador:

'As I was pa.s.sing through Paris on my way to Toulon for Christmas, I started with Lord Lyons negotiations for the renewal of representation by England to the Mexican Republic, [Footnote: The Mexican negotiations were not at this time successful, but in 1883 Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, who followed Sir Charles at the Foreign Office, again raised the matter, and ultimately a representative was appointed. See _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 304.] which I thought important for commercial reasons, and which was ultimately brought about. I said to Lord Lyons as we were walking together across the bridge from the Place de la Concorde to the Chamber: "If you bring about this renewal of relations, you will have the popularity in the Service of making a fresh place--for a Minister Plenipotentiary." "Yes," said he, "but if I were to jump off this bridge I should be still more popular--as that would make promotion _all the way down_."'

At the beginning of December Sir Charles received an offer from the Greek Government of the Grand Cross of the Saviour, which he was obliged, according to the English custom, to decline.

'But as I afterwards, when out of Parliament, declined the Turkish Grand Cross of the Medjidieh, I became one of the few persons, I should think, who ever had the chance of declining those two decorations.'

His home anxieties in this year had been great. He tells very sadly of the death of the grandmother who had kept house for him from his childhood.

Shortly after "her little old niece, Miss Folkard," who had always lived with them, also pa.s.sed away.

His uncle, Mr. Dilke of Chichester, and Mr. Chamberlain came often to stay with him, but he was anxious as to the care and education of his little boy. Early in the new year Mr. Chamberlain proposed that Wentworth Dilke should come and live with his own children. A year later the boy was sending messages to his father to say that 'he had made up his mind not to return to London, but proposed to reside permanently at Birmingham, and thought that I had better go to live there too.'

It was also for Sir Charles a year of change in one of the more intimate relations of political life. Mr. George Murray, his secretary at the Foreign Office, was taken 'by the Treasury, [Footnote: See mention of Mr.

George Murray, Chapter XX., p. 314.] and in his place was appointed Mr.

Henry Austin Lee, formerly a scholar and exhibitioner of Pembroke College, Oxford.' Also his private secretary, Mr. H. G. Kennedy, who had been with him for many years, was now in ill-health, and had been much away for two years. On July 27th, 1880, his place was taken by 'a volunteer from Oxford,' Mr. J. E. C. Bodley, the future author of _France_--one of the few Englishmen who has attained to the distinction of writing himself "Membre de l'Inst.i.tut."

CHAPTER XXIII

COERCION--CLOSURE--MAJUBA

In November, 1880, Mr. Forster's "resignation" had only been staved off by the Cabinet's promise to him of coercive powers in the new year, and it was certain that such a Coercion Bill, when introduced, would be met by the Irish members with obstruction outdoing all previous experience. The Land Bill, which was to accompany coercion, went far enough in limitation of the rights of property to be a grievous trial to the Whigs, and yet to Radicals such as Dilke and Chamberlain seemed complicated, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory.

Bad as was the Irish trouble, South Africa was worse. Finding no attempt made by Liberal statesmen to fulfil the expectations of free inst.i.tutions which had been held out even by the Tory Government, the Boers rose for independence in December, 1880. War followed--a half-hearted war accompanied by negotiations. All was in train for the day of Majuba.

Sir Charles's Memoir shows this ferment working. By January 6th, 1881, he was back in London from his Christmas at Toulon.

'The Radicals were angry with the weakness of the Land Bill, which, however, was Mr. Gladstone's own. Oddly enough, both Hartington and Forster would have gone further, and Hartington certainly even for the "three F's," though he would have preferred to have had no Bill at all; but then Hartington did not care about stepping in, and Gladstone did, and feared the Lords. Chamberlain thought that the Land Bill was sure to be vastly strengthened in pa.s.sing through the House....

'I noted on January 7th that I was very restive under Mr. Gladstone's Irish policy, but I found that if I were to go I should have to go alone, for Chamberlain at this moment was not in a resigning humour.'

A second element of discord lay in the preparations for the struggle on the Coercion Bill.

'On January 8th Chamberlain gave me a minute by Hartington, which I still have (dated the 3rd), proposing a summary method of dealing with Irish obstruction. Hartington thought that the Speaker, "by a stretch of the rule against wilful obstruction, might, if a.s.sured of the support of the great majority of the House, take upon himself the responsibility of declaring that he would consider any member rising to prolong the debate as guilty of wilful obstruction, and thus liable to be silenced." If the Speaker exceeded his power, he would (Hartington thought) only render himself liable to censure by the House, and if previously a.s.sured of its support there was hardly any limit to the authority which he might not a.s.sume. Chamberlain wrote strongly to Hartington against this proposal. He was convinced that with a stretch of authority the number of opponents would be increased. He added: "I believe the time has pa.s.sed when Ireland can be ruled by force. If justice also fails, the position is hopeless, but this is a remedy which has never yet been tried fairly."

Hartington wrote in reply, on January 10th: "If we cannot pa.s.s the Coercion Bill without locking up fifty or sixty members, they must be locked up." Hartington's view was accepted by the Speaker, and led to the wholesale expulsion from the body of the House of the Irish members....

'On January 12th I somewhat unwillingly made up my mind that I must remain in the Government, as Chamberlain insisted on remaining. I feared that if I came out by myself I should be represented as encouraging disorder, and to some extent should encourage it, and should be driven to act with mere fanatics. In coming out with Chamberlain I always felt safe that we could carry a large section of the party with us. Coming out by myself, I feared that that was not so. Chamberlain's position at this moment was that he personally did not believe in coercion, but that the feeling in the country was such that any Government would be forced to propose it, and he was not sufficiently clear that it was certain to fail to be bound as an honest man to necessarily oppose it. I received on this day a letter from a const.i.tuent upon the point, and answered that, agreeing generally as regarded pending Irish questions with Bright and Chamberlain, I should follow them if they remained united. [Footnote: The phrase 'pending Irish questions' is important. It excluded Home Rule.] Should they at any point differ from Mr. Gladstone, or the one with the other, as to the course to be adopted, I should have to reconsider my position.

'On January 14th I had a full talk with Bright, trying to get him to go with me. Bright told me that the outrages had got much worse in Ireland since the middle of December, as for example that of firing into houses. He had come round a great deal in the coercion direction.

He now distinctly favoured suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act--that is to say, did not unwillingly yield to it, like Chamberlain, but supported it almost willingly, and he evidently had been converted by Forster to the view that things had grown to be very bad, and that by locking up a small number of the chiefs the rule of law might be restored. I did not agree, but his opinion showed me how completely I was isolated. I seemed trying to put people a point beyond themselves before they were naturally ready to go, and risked only being followed by those who are always ready to run on any fresh scent and whose support is but a hindrance. I felt myself face to face with the necessity for self-sacrifice of the hardest kind, the sacrifice of my own judgment as to the right course in the attempt to work with others. It was clear that few men thought at this time that coercion was so inexpedient that a single member of the Government would be justified in venturing on a course which would weaken the hands of Government itself, increase Mr. Gladstone's difficulties, and r.e.t.a.r.d or hamper the remedial legislation which I myself thought most desirable. Moreover, we had weakened the Irish executive in past years by continually teaching them to rely on unconst.i.tutional expedients, and it seemed very difficult to choose a moment of great outrage to refuse them the support which we had long accustomed them to look for in every similar stress of circ.u.mstances.

'The Cabinet of January 22nd dealt with the allied questions of closure, coercion, and remedial legislation for Ireland. It was decided to produce a scheme of closure as soon as it was certain that Northcote was in favour of the principle, and it was left to Mr.

Gladstone to make sure of this, and I noted in my diary, "He had better make _very_ sure." I was right in my doubt, and this question of Parliamentary procedure led to such a breach between Mr. Gladstone and his former private secretary that the Prime Minister told me he should never in future believe a word that Northcote might say. The apparent tortuousness of Northcote's conduct was caused by the weakness of his position as leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons. He was in favour of moderate courses, and always began by agreeing with us in private, after which Randolph Churchill would send a man to him with the message: "Go and tell the old goat that I won't have it." And then the unfortunate Northcote, to avoid being denounced in public, had to turn round and say that he could not answer for his party.'

Chronicling another talk with Gladstone, in which the latter spoke of Northcote's "s.h.i.+ftiness," Sir Charles says:

'I had a high opinion of Sir Stafford, but in face of Churchill he was not a free agent....

'The Cabinet rejected Chamberlain's proposal to accompany coercion by a provision against ejectments in the sense of the Compensation Bill of 1880. In my diary I add: "By a majority they decided that there should be no declaration of the nature of the Land Bill as yet; but, as Gladstone was in the minority on this point, we shall probably not wait long for the declaration. The Land Bill was finally settled. It really gives the 'three F's,' applied by a Court, but so wrapped up that n.o.body will find them."'

Mr. Forster's Coercion Bill was introduced as the first business of the Session, and was met by obstruction which more than realized the forecast.

From Monday, January 31st, through the whole of Tuesday, February 1st, the debate was prolonged in a House possessing no recognized authority to check it; and at nine on the Wednesday morning Speaker Brand adopted the course which had been advocated by Lord Hartington. Acting in the exercise of his own discretion, he ordered the question to be put. The Irish members, having refused to submit, were removed one by one, technically by force. In face of these circ.u.mstances the Cabinet met on the Wednesday afternoon.

'The Cabinet decided not to have general closure in the form in which Chamberlain had asked for it in my name as well as in his. Gladstone wanted to have a special closure for Irish coercion, but Chamberlain presented our ultimatum against that, and won. When Chamberlain and I talked over the whole situation, I told him that I thought we had been too popular up to now for it to last. We were now unpopular with our own people in the const.i.tuencies on account of coercion, but, holding their opinions, were not really trusted by the moderates. I thought this position inevitable. The holding of strongly patriotic and national opinions in foreign affairs combined with extreme Radical opinions upon internal matters made it difficult to act with anybody for long without being attacked by some section with which it was necessary to act at other times, and made it difficult to form a solid party.'

When Dilke and Chamberlain, neither of whom was averse from the idea of closure in itself, resisted a proposal which meant treating the Irish members in a category apart from the rest of the House of Commons, they took a course which now seems simple and inevitable. But there is some difficulty in realizing to-day how Irishmen, and more especially Irish members, were viewed in England through the early eighties. Something of the public feeling towards them may be gathered from a string of extracts dealing with another source of dissension in this Cabinet. Sir William Harcourt, as Home Secretary, had adopted determined views of what may be conceded to the exigencies or the demands of detectives. Sir Charles writes on February 5th:

'It was at this moment that I first had to do with dynamite. Lord Granville had instructed me to deal with such matters at once myself without their pa.s.sing through the Office; and receiving despatches from Was.h.i.+ngton (containing despatches from our Consul at Philadelphia offering information as to plots), and having missed Harcourt, I took them to Mr. Gladstone. I said that I had no doubt a sharp Yankee was trying to get a couple of hundred pounds out of us.'

But Sir William Harcourt wished for the information, and Sir Charles adds: