The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 39

'The result of this policy undoubtedly was the fabrication of plots, as exposed by Michael Davitt in the _Labour World_ in 1890.'

Later Harcourt modified his view, but 'this was like shutting the stable door when the steed was stolen.'

'On February 16th I noted in my diary my dissatisfaction with regard to the Secret Service money. In 1880 I had walked out instead of voting for it, and I proposed this year to follow the same course. I knew of nothing on which was spent the 15,000, except one sum of 40 for a service not secret at all in its nature, "and 200 spent in America on a ... panic of Harcourt's." I believe that as a fact most of the money was spent in the United States, but as I was not trusted with the information, I again walked out.'

On February 12th 'there was a great row between Fawcett and Harcourt.'

'Harcourt and Fawcett had been opening the letters of the Irish members, and when the Irishmen found it out Fawcett wanted to admit it, and Harcourt insisted on a blank refusal of information. My brother came to me with this question from the Radicals: "What is the use of having a blind Postmaster-General if he reads our letters?"'

The matter came up in the Cabinet along with a discussion on the Arms Act, which prohibited the possession of firearms in Ireland without licence from a Magistrate, and authorized the police to search. This Act had been in force before, but had been dropped by the Government on coming into office, and was now proposed as a supplement to Mr. Forster's "Protection of Property" measure.

'On February 12th Mr. Gladstone, with Bright and Chamberlain, fought hard against the Arms Bill. Harcourt, however, said that "coercion was like caviare: unpleasant at first to the palate, it becomes agreeable with use"; and, led by Harcourt, the majority insisted on having more coercion, and it was settled that the second Bill should go on. At dinner at Lord and Lady Cork's in the evening I was astonished to see in what excellent spirits Mr. Gladstone was, although he had been entirely overruled in his own Cabinet in the afternoon.'

Meanwhile the Home Secretary's activity was making trouble for the Foreign Office.

'It having been stated in the House of Commons by Parnell that he had been watched and followed in Paris by persons connected with the Emba.s.sy, Lord Lyons telegraphed to me to ask me to contradict the statement. On February 19th he telegraphed again: "No one known to or in communication with the Emba.s.sy followed Parnell or watched him in any way in Paris, and n.o.body reported to the Emba.s.sy about him." I wrote to Harcourt and told him that Lord Lyons wished a contradiction made, and that Lord Granville wished me to make the contradiction "if Harcourt sees no objection." I afterwards wrote to Harcourt, "From what you said, I imagine that you do see objection; but if we can, it is better to keep the Emba.s.sies out of police matters." Harcourt, however, would not allow a contradiction to be given; and the fact was that Parnell had been watched, but watched by the Home Office, through the police, without the knowledge of the Emba.s.sy. Through this watching of the Irish leaders, Parnell's relations with Mrs. O'Shea were known to some of those who afterwards professed to be amazed by the discovery.'

Another subject produced open symptoms of a "split." On January 21st, 1881, during the debate on the Address, Mr. Rylands proposed a resolution condemning the annexation of the Transvaal as impolitic and unjustifiable, which was tantamount to declaring that the Boers had been justified in their revolt.

'After my dinner party on the 21st, I went down to the House of Commons and deliberately walked out on the Transvaal division, as did three other members of the Government--Bright, Chamberlain, and Courtney. We had all along been opposed to the annexation.'

This was only the beginning. In South Africa difficulties acc.u.mulated for the British Government. General Colley was repulsed at Laing's Nek on January 28th, and on February 8th at the Ingogo River. But in this war there was a real anxiety on both sides to negotiate, and President Kruger despatched an offer to submit the whole dispute to an English Royal Commission if troops were withdrawn from the Transvaal. On Wednesday, February 16th, Sir Charles learnt from Mr. Chamberlain that there had been a special Cabinet that afternoon 'to consider proposals from President Kruger of the Transvaal, which Mr. Gladstone was most anxious to accept.'

On the 18th 'the Transvaal question came up again on a Dutch pet.i.tion brought over by delegates, as to which Lord Granville wrote to me: "I suppose it would not be right for you or me to see them. We shall probably bear with fort.i.tude the sacrifice."' But the Government were trying to meet Kruger's advances in a reasonable spirit, and they instructed Colley by telegram to suspend hostilities if the Boers abandoned armed opposition. Colley telegraphed back for more precise instructions. The Boers hold Laing's Nek, which was in Natal territory. Was he to insist on their evacuating it--and thus opening the pa.s.s into the Transvaal--before he suspended hostilities? The answer sent back on February 19th was that he should forward to the Boers the British proposal, and fix a reasonable time within which they must reply. During that time he was not to attempt to occupy Laing's Nek. Sir Charles's Memoir makes it plain that the decision to negotiate with the Boers was due to Mr. Gladstone and Mr.

Chamberlain:

'At the Cabinet of Sat.u.r.day, February 19th, Mr. Gladstone and Chamberlain, for a wonder, were in the majority, and it was decided to drop the Arms Bill and to negotiate with the Boers; but at a further Cabinet on the 26th, Mr. Gladstone being in bed... the decision of the previous week was reversed, and it was decided to go forward with the Arms Bill.'

No reply came from the Boers within the time appointed, and on the night of February 26th Colley seized the height of Majuba, which commanded Laing's Nek. By noon on the 27th he was a dead man, and his force defeated. The stated time had expired, and Colley did his duty as a soldier. [Footnote: See an article in the _Nineteenth Century_ (March, 1904) by Lady Pomeroy Colley (Lady Allendale) in reply to some points in the account of these events in the _Life of Gladstone_, iii., pp. 36-38.]

But it is none the less true that the Boers, even after the action, still believed themselves to be in negotiation. On the 28th Kruger, ignorant of what had befallen, was writing a grateful acknowledgment of the proposal to suspend hostilities, and was suggesting a meeting of representatives from both sides.

It was urged, of course, that a disgrace to the British Army must be wiped out before there could be any further talk of parleying. Yet in Mr.

Gladstone's Government there had been from the first an element which plainly thought the war unjustified, and with that element Mr. Gladstone had some sympathy. The Radicals now a.s.serted themselves.

'On Wednesday, March 2nd, after a long interview between me and Chamberlain on the state of affairs, Chamberlain had an hour and a half with Bright, and got him to write a strong letter to Gladstone about the Transvaal, which we put forward as the ground for a proposed resignation, although of course the strength of the Coercion measures, the weakness of the Land measures, and the predominance of the Whigs in the Cabinet were the reasons which weighed chiefly with Chamberlain and myself. In the Transvaal matter, however, we should not be two, but four, for Bright and Courtney must go out with us, and Lefevre might do so. On the other hand, we had reason to think that if the Whigs yielded to us on the Transvaal, Kimberley would go. On the next day, Thursday the 3rd, Bright was sent for by Mr. Gladstone on his letter. Bright found him in entire harmony with our views. Kimberley at once gave in, and telegraphed what he was told; so the difficulty was over before the Cabinet was able to meet, and we as far from resignation as ever.

'On March 5th, I noted in my diary that the Land Bill was unsatisfactory. Chamberlain told me of a scene between Bright and Dodson which amused me much. Says Bright to Dodson: "You were put into the Cabinet to vote with Gladstone. Surely you ought not to oppose him." Says Dodson indignantly, "A man may have an opinion." "But why express it?" said the old Quaker.'

In the middle of March

'Things looked bad again at this moment, for on the 14th I wrote a draft address to the electors of Chelsea, prepared in view of my resignation along with Bright and Chamberlain. I alluded in it to "the non-reversal in the Transvaal of an act of high-handed aggression, which at the time of its inception I had condemned by vote and speech," and also condemned the resort to coercive measures for Ireland.'

So far as the Transvaal was concerned, the sympathies of Chamberlain and Dilke with the Boers prevailed; negotiations proceeded, and a Commission was named, which finally recommended a reversal of the annexation. The selection of Chamberlain--whose department had no connection with South Africa--to justify this step in debate indicated how strong was his opinion in favour of the Boers. But the Duke of Argyll, who was leaving the Government from disapproval of their Irish Land Bill, nevertheless on this matter defended the action of his former colleagues.

The situation was summed up by an observation of the Queen's to Lord Spencer, which, says Sir Charles, amused the Cabinet on March 26th. The Queen's Speech on January 7th had contained this curt phrase: "A rising in the Transvaal has imposed upon me the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority." To this the Queen replied: "I cannot see how my 'authority' has been 'vindicated' in the Transvaal." "There was nothing else to be done, Ma'am," says Spencer. "I quite understand that," says Her Majesty, "but still I do not see how my 'authority' has been 'vindicated.'"

Mr. Gladstone was meanwhile doing the right thing in Ireland with his Land Bill, but Mr. Forster, Sir Charles thought, was destroying the effect by the free use of his new measure, which, having become law by the end of February, enabled the Irish Government to put any man into gaol on a mere suspicion and without form of trial. Members of Parliament were not at first attacked, but the officials of the Land League were seized. Mr.

Davitt had been general manager; his ticket-of-leave, as an ex-Fenian prisoner, was recalled by Sir William Harcourt, and he was re-arrested.

Mr. Dillon took Davitt's place. Sir Charles writes on Sat.u.r.day, April 30th, 1881:

'At the Cabinet, which I think was on the previous night, but of which I heard the details on this day, it was decided to arrest Dillon.

Spencer and Granville, who were both of them away, for it was not, I think, a regular Cabinet, were both against it rather than for it; Harcourt was really neutral, though Gladstone counted him for it; Kimberley, Hartington, and the Chancellor alone supported Gladstone and Forster. Bright, Chamberlain, Childers, and, wonderful to relate, Carlingford (who was present, though the newspapers said he was absent), Northbrook, and Dodson opposed the arrest. Gladstone declared that it was six to six, and gave himself a casting vote. A few days later Lord Granville spoke to me warmly against the decision of the Cabinet. He said he never knew numbers counted in the Cabinet before, and that it was absurd to count heads in a.s.semblies in which there was such a difference in the contents of the heads. This criticism, however, goes too far, and strikes at the root of the decisions of Parliament itself.'

Meanwhile the Land Bill had reached its second reading. But the Irish executive was constantly appealed to for constabulary to a.s.sist in carrying out sentences of eviction, while, on the other hand, tenants were fighting landlords by a general strike against rents.

'At the Cabinet on May 4th the chief topic discussed was the possibility of checking evictions in Ireland without preventing the payment of rent by tenants perfectly able to pay.'

In addition to the Irish trouble in Ireland, there was the Irish trouble in the House of Commons, in no way settled by the Speaker's one arbitrary imposition of closure at his own discretion. That Mr. Gladstone's mind was working towards another solution is evident from the following note:

'On June 8th I went to The Durdans to lunch with the Roseberys, and walked with Mr. Gladstone. We marched round the Derby course, and Mr.

Gladstone said that the first business after the Irish Land Bill must be procedure, and that this must be the business of next year. He said, "there must no doubt be some repression by the closure, but there must also be still more delegation."'

The discussion of the Land Bill was long almost beyond precedent, but by August it left the Commons, and Lord Salisbury, though furious in his invective, declined to advise its total rejection. The Irish landlords had their will of it in Committee, and sent it back unrecognizable. The Lords'

amendments were then reviewed by Mr. Gladstone, and, broadly speaking, rejected. There was the usual threat of a collision between the Houses.

Sir Charles's first note, in his diary of August 12th, indicates how completely Mr. Gladstone controlled this situation:

'"Harcourt is very violent against the Lords, more so than either Bright or Chamberlain, but the decision, whatever it may be, of the Cabinet, will on this occasion be Mr. Gladstone's."

'On the 14th I noted, "The claim of Lord Salisbury to force us to 'consult the country' is a claim for annual Parliaments when we are in office, and septennial Parliaments when they are in office." I did not, however, believe in this particular crisis. On the 14th Lord Houghton wrote complaining that we did not meet so often as we used to do. "This is a penalty one pays for having one's friends in power. I fear there is no hope of their ceasing to be so by the instrumentality of the House of Lords." On the 15th Lady Lytton's sister told me that Lytton had "enjoyed the fighting att.i.tude of the Lords. It seemed more worthy than talking so much and doing so little." But she added: "After it was all over they were in a most horrid fright."'

Lord Ripon wrote from India of the proceedings in the House of Lords that he thought Lord Salisbury "would succeed in blowing the inst.i.tution to pieces before long."

With a Cabinet so divided, rumour of changes was certain to be rife.

'On August 17th there occurred the Ministerial fish dinner at Greenwich, which was then a yearly inst.i.tution. Rosebery was in the chair--for on these occasions the Chairman is arbitrarily chosen, generally from among the very youngest members of the Government, and is a sort of lord of misrule. [Footnote: Lord Rosebery was Under- Secretary at the Home Office.]

'Harcourt told Chamberlain at the dinner that Mr. Gladstone had made up his mind to put Lord Frederick Cavendish into the Cabinet, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain arguing that he ought not to be put in over my head.

'On the way home Harcourt told me that there were other changes to be made besides putting in Cavendish, and that one of them was that he should become Lord Chancellor.... I did not myself believe any of these reports, but confined myself to urging that Chamberlain should be Chancellor of the Exchequer.'

This a.s.sumed continuance in office, but a little later Mr. Chamberlain, writing to Sir Charles, entered the domain of prophecy, with some hint of the 'unauthorized programme.' He thought that the Liberals would be beaten at the next election, and that their business was to try to get the farmers over to their side.

"What is the good of bothering about Bankruptcy or Local Government when our real business is to outbid Chaplin and Co. with the farmers?

But, then, what will our Whig friends say to Radical proposals as to tenant right, improvements, rating, etc.?"

While Sir Charles was in Paris Mr. Chamberlain wrote on October 4th:

"I am very uneasy about the Irish business. It does not look as if the Land Bill would do much, and meanwhile 'outrages,' exaggerated probably by the Press, are forming a large part of the information supplied by the papers for the autumn season. It is the history of last October over again, and I expect every day to hear of some proposal for further coercion. I am clear that we were right in resisting coercion last year, and I even wish we had gone further and gone out upon it. But what is to be done now? Can we go on drifting without a policy? We cannot go back. It is too late to release the 'suspects,' and, if we were to do so, the experience of the past few weeks shows that this would not make things smoother with Parnell and Co., while it would bring down a storm of denunciation from the other side. Then, can we go further in the direction of coercion? I doubt if the House of Commons would stand it. To put down the Land League would involve so many questions affecting public agitation in this country that the Radicals would surely be up in arms. It is possible the Tories might do it if they were in office, which I wish to G.o.d they were. But can the Liberals do it, and, above all, can you and I be parties to any more of such work? I should not have a moment's hesitation in saying 'No,' if I could find any alternative, but it is evident that Parnell has now got beyond us. He asks for 'No Rent,' and Separation, and I am not prepared to say that the refusal of such terms as these const.i.tutes an Irish grievance. I should like to stand aside and let the Coercionists and Parnell fight it out together, but I fear this is not now possible. Altogether it is a horrible imbroglio, and for the moment I do not see my way out of the fog. I wish I could talk it all over with you."

A little later, however, he wrote:

"'The resources of civilization'--see Mr. G.'s speech--will mean immediate and greatly extended use of the Protection Act. There will be a miraculous draught of fishes directly. In for a penny, in for a pound. I hope it will be a clean sweep. The electors will better stand a crus.h.i.+ng blow than coercion by driblets. There is no other alternative except new legislation--and from that may Heaven defend us."

On October 12th, 1881, Mr. Parnell was arrested and put into gaol. On October 17th, Sir Charles, then in the South of France, wrote to Sir M.

Grant Duff--who had become Governor of Madras--that "Bright and Chamberlain supported the proposed general _razzia_ on the Land League leaders in order to avoid fresh coercive legislation." Fresh legislation would have meant trouble in the House of Commons. But the arrest of Mr.

Parnell, which "folly" Sir Charles had tried to prevent, led to greater trouble.

The British Government now endeavoured to back up the policy of force by dividing the opposition. Ever since the trouble generated by the rejection of the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, Dublin Castle had been (not for the first time) seeking to enlist on its side the spiritual power of Rome.