The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 49

'so belligerent was the Prime Minister that he had now decided, in face of the prospect of Lord Salisbury throwing out the Arrears Bill, unless Lord Waterford on behalf of the Irish landlords begged him not to do so, to prorogue, have another Session a week after, and pa.s.s the Bill again.'

This quarrel between the Houses remained open till August 8th, when Lord Salisbury, under pressure from the Irish landlords, was forced to content himself with acquiescence under angry protest. But in the meanwhile the Government were in other difficulties. After the bombardment of Alexandria it was still necessary to deal with the rebellion against the Khedive, whose authority England was seeking to support; and the Tories, allied with a section of the peace party, offered strong resistance to any military expedition.

'On Wednesday, August 2nd, I had a conversation with Mr. Gladstone, who agreed in my view that if beaten we should force the county franchise, and dissolve only if the Lords would carry that. It began to look as if we should sit till Christmas.

'On Monday, August 7th, I had an interesting talk with Brett. Knowing his great influence with Hartington, I complained to him of his chief's folly in always acting as the leader of a Whig section instead of as deputy-leader of the whole party. Brett agreed that it was foolish in the particular case of franchise, "as he must give in at last." I replied: "But he has given in already, and gone back again."

Brett answered: "He declares he never voted for it." This is a curious example of Hartington's complete detachment from politics and want of interest in them, for he had not only voted, but had made a long, strong, and elaborate speech, explaining his reasons for so doing, and then absolutely forgotten the whole thing, and thought that he was still committed to opposition. At the Cabinet of the 5th he had declared against a Franchise Bill.'

When the Session ended on August 27th the question of Sir Charles Dilke's personal position came up. Neither his refusal of the Chief Secretarys.h.i.+p nor his att.i.tude of opposition to Mr. Gladstone's own wishes as to Egypt had in the least impaired his standing, and promotion was felt to be his due. The old difficulties, however, were still in the way, and Sir Charles refused to buy his way into the Cabinet by a sham recantation. The matter accordingly stood over, as appears from this entry:

'At this moment there were fresh discussions as to my saying something to the Queen to get over her difficulty about receiving me into the Cabinet. Lord Granville, in congratulating me upon the way in which I had done the Foreign Office work, said that Mr. Gladstone had been unable to say anything to the Queen because I had hot given him enough upon which to go. Mr. Gladstone then wrote to me a long letter in favour of my making some statement to my const.i.tuents, but he went on to admit in writing what he had previously admitted in conversation-- namely, that a Committee' (to inquire into the Civil List) 'would be wise. Therefore I at once insisted that I should have the distinct promise of this Committee before I said anything. Mr. Gladstone's letter came very near a promise, as he said that when any new set of cases came forward the question of a Committee would naturally come up, and would, he hoped, be favourably entertained. I again called in Chamberlain, and acting with him, declined to make any statement, as I had in no way changed my opinion, but I pressed the appointment of the Committee, or at least the promise of one. Mr. Gladstone again promised to communicate with the Queen.'

CHAPTER XXIX

EGYPT JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER, 1882

I.

At the beginning of 1881 the form of government which Europe had set up in Egypt was but young. Tewfik, the Khedive chosen by the French and British Governments to replace Ismail, had occupied his position for less than two years. Riaz Pasha, head of the Ministry after the fall of his predecessor Nubar, [Footnote: There is a note of October 13th, 1880: 'I saw Nubar Pasha about Egypt, and I had received an extremely able long letter from Rivers Wilson asking me to interfere to restore Nubar to power, but I did not as a fact discuss Egypt with the French.'] had brought about a mutiny of officers early in 1879, and was carrying on public affairs with difficulty. He had been forced to sacrifice his War Minister to the second mutiny (of February, 1881) which followed on the arrest and secured the release of Arabi. In the spring of the year the smouldering discontent of the army was fanned into flame by the advance of the French to Tunis.

'On May 12th' (1881--the very date on which the French Expeditionary Force constrained the Bey of Tunis to accept French suzerainty) 'steps were taken on behalf of Lord Hartington, Lord Granville, and myself to see whether, now that France had knocked another bit out of the bottom of the Ottoman Empire by her attack on Tunis, we ought to try to get any compensation in Egypt for ourselves. Hartington was to consult the India Office upon the question, and I wrote to Sir Edward Hertslet, asking him to consider how we stood with reference to the despatch of troops through Egypt in the event of (1) a rising in India, (2) an invasion of India by Russia.'

On July 28th, 1881, there took place at the Foreign Office the first meeting of a Committee 'to consider the affairs of Egypt, consisting of Tenterden, myself, Pauncefote, Malet, Scott the Judge, young Maine, and Reilly.' Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, who had been Finance Minister under Ismail, was called in from time to time.

'My own endeavours on this Committee were directed against increasing internationally in Egypt, as I thought the Governments of England and France would be driven sooner or later to occupy the country with a joint force, and that internationality (which would mean German influence) would then be a great difficulty in the way.'

The need for intervention soon grew urgent. On September 9th, 1881, a large body of troops, headed by Arabi, threatened the Khedive's palace, demanding the dismissal of all the Ministers, the convocation of a parliament, and a great increase of the army. Again the mutiny succeeded, and this time, in Sir Edward Malet's words, "it was more than a mutiny, it was a revolution." Riaz Pasha was replaced by Cherif, but all real power was in the hands of the soldiery.

The question now came to be, Who should step in to establish order? The Sultan of Turkey, who saw a chance of making his nominal suzerainty real, proposed to despatch troops, but confined himself to sending envoys. As a counter-demonstration, France and England each sent a wars.h.i.+p to Alexandria; and Gambetta's accession to power in November meant a great reinforcement to the policy of joint intervention.

Sir Charles was then in Paris engaged in the commercial negotiations already described, and he chronicled in his diary a sporting suggestion:

"_September 19th_, 1881.--After the seventeenth sitting of the Treaty Joint Commission I had an interview with Delia Sala, the Italian who is an Egyptian General, and governs the Soudan. He is a great fencer, and has killed his man before now. He declares himself willing to put down insubordination in the Egyptian Army by calling out three of the Colonels in succession. A more practical but hardly less bold suggestion of his is that he should be allowed to increase his anti- slavery regiment of 600 men, and then to use it as a bodyguard for Malet instead of the putting down of slavery."

'On December 27th, 1881, Lord Granville asked me by letter to discuss with Gambetta all the possible alternatives, and especially joint occupation (to which Lord Granville saw objection), and a Turkish intervention under the control of England and France (to which French opinion was opposed): "The more you can get out of Gambetta without committing us the more grateful we shall be." I have no recollection of having discussed Egypt with Gambetta.'

Shortly afterwards

'Malet wrote from Cairo to Paris, telling me that he still had confidence in the moderation of the progressist party represented by Arabi and the Colonels, and that he was managing them through Wilfrid Blunt, who was acting as a go-between; but a little later on the relations between Blunt and Malet became such as to show that each had thought he was using the other as a tool.'

"Moderation" is an ambiguous term. When the Chamber of Notables met at the end of December, 1881, the army put forward through the Minister for War a demand for an increase of 18,000 men. This increase the European controllers refused to sanction, on the ground that the country could not afford it. Thus came to pa.s.s a conflict between the national movement and the joint European control upon an issue which united the interests of the military party with the aspirations of the parliamentarian Nationalists for the power of the purse. Gambetta, however, was now dominant in France, and Gambetta had no tolerance for the pretensions of what he called a "sham a.s.sembly." A Joint Note, dated January 6th, 1882, was issued by the two Powers, in which England and France declared their intention to "guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt."

Another phrase in the Note attributed the exchange of views between the Powers to "recent circ.u.mstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive," and this was naturally construed by Nationalists to mean that parliamentary inst.i.tutions were internal causes of complication.

The issue of this Note is one of the marking-points of modern Egyptian history. It a.s.serted the determination of the joint Powers to make their will obeyed in Egypt, by force if necessary. According to general admission, its issue was due to the overmastering influence of Gambetta.

Dilke, whom everyone knew to be Gambetta's intimate, was in France almost continuously from the time when Gambetta became Prime Minister on November 10th, 1881, till the eve of the issue of the Joint Note. In 1878, while in Opposition, he had publicly advocated a policy of annexation in Egypt, and it was inevitable that critics should fasten upon him a special responsibility for the course pursued.

Yet, as the Memoir makes clear, in 'this weighty affair' Dilke had virtually no voice. He was not in the Cabinet, and he was absent from Paris for nearly the whole of December, taking a holiday in Provence from commercial negotiations. Only on his return, on December 27th, did he receive Lord Granville's letter--which was dated December 21st--asking him to discuss with Gambetta the possible alternatives. But although the two men met repeatedly between December 27th and January 2nd, when Dilke left Paris, Gambetta refrained from discussing Egypt. The Memoir says, under date January 7th, 1882:

'The Cabinet had before it the state of affairs in Egypt, and resolved upon agreeing on Gambetta's policy of a Joint Note on the part of England and of France in support of the Khedive against the revolutionary party. Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, misled by the dates of interviews, has a.s.serted from that time to this (1890) that the Joint Note was arranged in Paris between Gambetta and myself. I have repeatedly denied that statement, for curiously enough it so happens that the Joint Note was the only important matter relating to Foreign Affairs which happened while I was at the Foreign Office in which I was not consulted. Gambetta never broached the subject with me, and I knew nothing of it until it was done. As we talked a little about Egypt, I suppose that he had reasons for not wis.h.i.+ng to speak of the Joint Note to me, but I do not know what they were.'

II.

Sir Charles Dilke's policy for Egypt differed from that of his chief, who always inclined to leave Turkey to undertake the necessary coercion, under the surveillance of England and France. Dilke, with Gambetta, desired joint intervention. [Footnote: Lord Cromer wrote to Sir Charles Dilke asking him about a letter of M. Joseph Reinach's of July 28th, 1909, in which the latter spoke of his doubts as to the complete sincerity of the English Government at the time of the Gambetta Ministry. At that moment Dilke, in whose company he had breakfasted at Gambetta's with MM. Rouvier, Spuller, and other guests, did not, in spite of his great friends.h.i.+p for Gambetta, believe in the duration of his Ministry, any more than the English Government did. M. Reinach thought that Sir Charles Dilke's Diary would throw an interesting light on the point as to whether, foreseeing Gambetta's fall, the English Government did not foresee the probability of their sole intervention in Egypt.

Sir Charles's comment was as follows:

"My diary (agreed to by Chamberlain after he had changed the opinions he held at the time described) shows that permanent occupation was not thought consistent with British interests by any who took a leading part in the Cabinet action. I was not in the Cabinet until after Tel- el-Kebir, but, as you know, I was--from the time of the riots at Alexandria--of the 'inner Cabinet' for such purposes. Of course, all men knew that the Gambetta Cabinet was dead before its birth. Hanotaux ... is right on this. But we wanted the Turk to go for us, and, failing the Turk (under our lead), then Italy in place of France, after France backed out....

"There was no moment up to '96--or perhaps '98--when if France had known her mind and meant business she could not have had her way-- 'reasonably.'

"Gambetta's policy was dominated by hatred of Russia. 'I will seek my alliances--n'importe ou, meme a Berlin'--meant anywhere except at St.

Petersburg.... Say to Reinach that I tell you that I don't mind _showing_ him the governing pa.s.sages in my diaries if he wants to _see_ them, but that they are dead against him."]

'On January 15th, 1882, I started the idea that England and France should not act as England and France only, but should ask Europe for a mandate, and on the 16th Lord Granville took it up, and wrote to Lord Lyons in its favour on the 17th. I sent to Lord Granville notes of what I proposed to say in a speech on Egypt. I pointed out that I had been one of those who had opposed the creation of the Anglo-French control, but that it was the invention of our predecessors. Lord Derby had created, when Conservative Foreign Secretary, a mild form of control, which had been raised into the sharper form of control by Lord Salisbury, who had refused successively to Germany, to Austria, and to Italy, any share in the control. Lord Salisbury was wholly responsible for it; but, however great its political dangers, from the Egyptian and the economical point of view it had worked well, and, being there, must be maintained, as it was the only thing between us and anarchy. It was due to the controllers that the country had been relieved from arbitrary rule. The co-operation with France deliberately created by Lord Salisbury must be loyally maintained.

'Lord Granville wrote back praising the proposed statement, but suggesting that I should not run down the control so much, and not initiate an attack upon our predecessors. Although I slightly toned down my observations upon this occasion, when we were afterwards attacked on the matter in the House of Commons I more than once said everything that I had proposed to say against the control and our responsibility for its existence.'

'On January 18th Sheffield' (Lord Lyons's secretary) 'came to see me.

He said that Gambetta was angry with Malet, as Malet was under the influence of Wilfrid Blunt, which meant that of Arabi Bey. I wrote a minute of our conversation upon this point, and Lord Granville replied: "Gambetta must not drag us into too arbitrary a way of dealing with the Egyptians. He is _tres autoritaire_." On the 20th Lord Granville received a private letter from Lord Lyons, who would not hear of the mandatories of Europe plan for Egypt, which, however, Mr. Gladstone had approved. It was from Lord Lyons's reply that I discovered that Lord Granville had given the credit of the scheme to Malet. I had never heard Malet mention any such idea; but on the next day, January 21st, Malet did telegraph the plan, and I could not help wondering who had sent it to him.

'On the 26th Lord Granville informed me that at the Cabinet of the previous day my Egyptian "Mandatories" proposal had been considered, and had been opposed by Lord Kimberley, but had received pretty general support.'

On January 26th an event happened which destroyed the chances of joint intervention. Gambetta fell. The policy of joint intervention in support of any menace to the established order in Egypt, to which both Powers were committed by the Joint Note of January 6th, now pa.s.sed into the hands of Lord Granville and of M. de Freycinet, concerning whom Sir Charles wrote on March 9th, 1882:

'I noted that Freycinet had begun his official career by doing what he had done when in office before--namely, asking Bismarck's consent to every act. He was so anxious to stop the Turks from going to Egypt that he was willing at this moment to agree even to Italian intervention in the name of Europe; and he was personally anxious for reconciliation with Italy.'

Meanwhile in Egypt there had been a new ministerial crisis. Cherif Pasha was deposed from the Presidency of the Council, and Arabi was made the Minister for War. The control, according to Sir Edward Malet, "existed only in name." In the provinces there was anarchy. Either the order of things established in Egypt must disappear, or intervention in some shape was inevitable.

'On February 1st there was a Cabinet upon the Egyptian Question. Lord Granville wrote to me before it met to say that the Cabinet had complained that we had not told them anything about Egypt, to which he had replied that they had received the telegrams if they had not read them.... At this day's Cabinet Hartington alone was in favour of Anglo-French intervention, and he fell out with Lord Granville over it, and they were on bad terms for some time. Some of the Cabinet wanted English intervention, and some wanted Anglo-French-Turkish intervention....

'On March 4th there was a Cabinet, at which Hartington made a great fight against all his colleagues, who were unanimous against him upon the question of Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

'On March 20th the new French Amba.s.sador Tissot came. I had previously known him when he was the Agent of the Government of National Defence inhabiting the London Emba.s.sy, virtually as Amba.s.sador but without a staff. On this occasion he immediately startled us out of our senses by proposing that we should depose the Khedive and set up Prince Halim. He had converted Freycinet to this madcap view.'

Halim, the heir by Mohammedan law, was Arabi's candidate for sovereignty.

During Sir Charles's visit to France in the middle of April this suggestion became fully official, as he learnt on returning.

'France had proposed to us to depose the Khedive and set up Halim, and we had refused on the ground of breach of faith. On April 20th the Cabinet decided absolutely and unanimously against any suggestion with regard to Halim.'

Since the policy of united intervention in the name of Europe, to which Sir Charles had sought to fix the Powers, had no longer any support in France, and since the French proposal of a new Khedive had been rejected, the plan of Turkish intervention which Lord Granville had always preferred, as being the least bad, was now formally put forward.

'On April 23rd Lord Granville invented a plan of sending three Generals to Egypt, because the French had told him that we had refused their plan without having one of our own. The idea was that a Turkish General should go with full powers, and accompanied by a French and an English General, the full powers not to be used by the Turk unless his French and English colleagues should agree.