The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 50

'On Friday, May 12th, I noted in my diary that the French had suddenly "caved in" to us about Egypt, and declared that a Turkish intervention at the request of England and France would not be Turkish intervention; and on Sat.u.r.day, May 13th, I found Lord Granville ten years younger than on the 12th in consequence. But the French afterwards not only got out of this, but pretended that they had never done anything of the kind.'

The decision to call in Turkey was not publicly announced, and the situation at Cairo grew daily more threatening. Sir Edward Malet telegraphed that a fanatical feeling against foreigners was being sedulously fostered. The Governments then, says Lord Cromer, "authorized their Consuls-General to take whatever steps they considered possible to insure the departure from Egypt of Arabi and his princ.i.p.al partisans, and the nomination of Cherif Pasha to be President of the Council." [Footnote: Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_, vol. i., chap, xv., p. 273.] Acting on this instruction, Sir Edward Malet and his French colleague, on May 25th, 1882, handed in an official Note to the President of the Council, which demanded, first, the temporary withdrawal of Arabi from Egypt, and, secondly, the resignation of the Ministry. On May 26th the Egyptian Ministry resigned. Thereupon the French Government decided that the need for Turkish intervention had pa.s.sed.

'Late on Tuesday afternoon, May 23rd, Lord Granville was in such a hurry to adjourn the House of Lords, and bolt out of town for Whitsuntide, that he let the French send off our Identic Note to the Powers in a form in which it would do much harm, although this was afterwards slightly altered. On the next day, Wednesday, the 24th, Mr.

Gladstone brought Lord Granville up to town again, and stopped his going to the Derby, and at 1.30 p.m. they decided to call for immediate Turkish intervention in Egypt. The necessity for it had been caused by the childish folly of the French in trying to conceal the fact that they had proposed in writing to us, through Tissot on the 12th, to send six s.h.i.+ps to Alexandria, and that if in addition troops must be employed on sh.o.r.e, they should be Turkish. The agreement between England and France was useless unless it was to be known, but if known, would have prevented the need for intervention. The most foolish course possible was that adopted by the French in first agreeing, and then concealing. On May 24th, at night, we proposed to the French to call in the Turks at once, and Freycinet went to bed to avoid answering.

'On Friday, the 26th, Tissot wrote to Lord Granville, "M. de Freycinet telegraphs to me that he is better, and will call the Cabinet together for to-morrow to submit to it your proposal"; and on Sat.u.r.day, May 27th, accordingly, the French completely sold us, and we once more realized the fact that they are not pleasant people to go tiger- hunting with.'

He quotes from his diary of the moment the comment:

'"The French tried to throw us (and themselves) over as to Turkish intervention. I wanted to say so in the House. Lord Granville agreed."'

'On May 30th I strongly urged that we should tell the truth and say so, and a Cabinet was called for the next day, and on the 31st decided that we were not to say so; but Hartington agreed with me, and made himself very disagreeable to Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone, who held the opposite opinion.'

Sir Charles's entry of the moment was--"Lord G. and Hartington fell out even rather more than usual."

'On June 1st, in the House of Commons, I half said what I meant, but Mr. Gladstone spoilt the whole debate. I noted in my diary: "When Mr.

Gladstone begins to talk on foreign affairs it is impossible to tell what he will say--witness his revelations of a c.o.c.k-and-bull telegram of Malet's to-day as to the immediate proclamation of Prince Halim by Arabi." On the same day, it having been decided on the previous day that we should send s.h.i.+ps to Egypt, Tenterden and I sent off a telegram _en clair_ to Lord Lyons about it in order that the French should know what we were doing....

'The Parliamentary difficulties of the Government upon the Egyptian Question at this moment were considerable, as the Opposition were taking with much vigour two inconsistent lines; Wolff and Chaplin violently attacking us upon Jingo grounds because we did not intervene by force in Egypt, and Bourke threatening us at every sign of intervention.'

Meanwhile the Khedive had failed to form another Ministry, and on May 28th Arabi had been reinstated, with the result that his supporters redoubled their confidence and that panic was general among the European residents.

'On June 13th we received full information with regard to the riots which had happened in Alexandria on the 11th' (there being a British and a French fleet there), 'in which several British subjects had been a.s.saulted and our Consul severely beaten. I formed a clear opinion that it was impossible for us not to take active steps in intervention after this, [Footnote: A private letter of this date gives the estimate that "there is an overwhelming public opinion here for very strong measures; that the great majority of the Cabinet share that view; that France is most unpopular; and that Lord Granville, Mr.

Gladstone, and Mr. Bright will apparently bow to the storm."] as we had been acting strictly within our rights along with France and representing joint control. If the French would not go with us in restoring order or allow the Turks to do so, I felt that we must do it for ourselves, but I was clearly of opinion, and have always remained so, that it was undesirable to embark upon a prolonged occupation of Egypt. I thought, and still think, that anarchy could have been put down, and a fairly stable state of things set up, without any necessity for a British occupation. The riots, however, were the cause on my part of a considerable error. I believed on the information furnished me from Alexandria and Cairo that they were the work of the revolutionary leaders in the capital. A long time afterwards I gradually came to think that this had not been so, and that they had been purely local and spontaneous. This does not, however, affect my judgment upon the need for intervention.

'On Wednesday, June 14th ... brought me a telegram from Wilfrid Blunt to Arabi ... "Praise G.o.d for victory." This abominable telegram naturally had much to do with exciting the suspicions that I have just mentioned as to Arabi having organized the riots. But I now believe that the English sympathizer was more extreme than the Egyptian revolutionist. In my diaries I wrote: "Our side in the Commons are very Jingo about Egypt. They badly want to kill somebody. They don't know who. Mr. G., who does not like the Stock Exchange, sent 'Egypts'

up 3 1/2 per cent. by a word in his speech." [Footnote: Mr. Gladstone on June 14th: "... The ends we have in view ... are well known to consist in the general maintenance of all established rights in Egypt, whether they be those of the Sultan, those of the Khedive, those of the people of Egypt, or _those of the foreign bondholders_."] At 6.30 in the afternoon there was a Cabinet on Egypt, Chamberlain and Hartington pressing for action, and I being most anxious that action should take place. As there was now to be a conference at Constantinople upon Egyptian affairs, I urged without success that Rivers Wilson should be sent out to a.s.sist Lord Dufferin, on account of his incomparable knowledge of Egyptian affairs, Lord Granville refusing on the ground that "there's great jealousy of him among the Egyptian English. He is under the charm of that arch-intriguer Nubar."

But we needed Nubar to get us out of our difficulties, and had ultimately to call him in as Prime Minister.

'On June 15th the French Amba.s.sador came to fence at my house at ten, and I reported to Lord Granville: "He volunteered the statement that Freycinet was 'an old woman'; in fact, talked in the sort of way in which Bourke used to talk of Lord Derby in '77-'78."

'In the evening I met Musurus Bey at the French Emba.s.sy, and had a conversation with him, which I reported and he afterwards denied, but I don't think much importance was attached to his denial. I need not discuss the matter, as the despatches were laid before Parliament.

'On the next day I wrote to Lord Granville: "The one thing we have to fear is the murder of Malet or of the Khedive. If the Khedive obeys the Sultan and returns to Cairo, it is very difficult to keep Malet at Alexandria. I think we ought to tell the Sultan that we are sorry to hear of the direction given to the Khedive to return to Cairo, and tell the Khedive and Malet that we have said so. Also privately tell the Khedive not to move." This I think was done.

'On June 17th I decided that I would resign if no steps were taken with regard to the Alexandria ma.s.sacre; but in the evening Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Ampthill: [Footnote: Lord Odo Russell had become Lord Ampthill, and was still Amba.s.sador at Berlin.] "No.

130 ... it is impossible that the present state of things should be allowed to continue, and if the Sultan is unwilling to do anything, some other means must be found." On the 18th, after much pressure and a threat of resignation from me, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Ampthill: "No. 131. Intimate to Prince Bismarck ... that sharing as he does the strong wish of H. M. G. to avoid unnecessary complications, he must feel that, even if H. M. G. did not object, as they do, public opinion would prevent them permanently acquiescing in any arrangements in Egypt, especially after the late ma.s.sacres at Alexandria, which would destroy not only the prestige of this country, but also of Europe, in the East...."

'The French having, according to Count Hatzfeldt, stated to the Germans, as reported by Lord Ampthill in his No. 214, "that to sanction Turkish intervention in Egypt would be to commit suicide," I proposed that we should direct Lord Ampthill to read to him Tissot's communication of May 12th. in which the French had agreed to the use of Turkish troops. Lord Granville a.s.sented. On June 19th Lord Granville repeated, through Lord Ampthill, to Prince Bismarck, "the strong warning contained in my 131 of yesterday." I afterwards found out, however, that at the last moment, on June 17th, Lord Granville had telegraphed withdrawing the word "must" in his No. 130, and subst.i.tuting the word "should." He afterwards telegraphed again, resubst.i.tuting "must," and wrote to me: "I have let the word stand, as Hartington and you attached importance to it, and as it had been already sent." There was great trouble about this change afterwards, for Lord Granville was not exact in saying that he had let the word "stand." What he had done was, as I say, first to withdraw it, and then to resubst.i.tute it upon our strong pressure.

'On June 19th there were two meetings of the Cabinet about Egypt, to which I was called in; one at two, and another at six o'clock. I simply said, like the servants when they fall out: "Either Arabi must go or I will."

'On June 20th another meeting of the Cabinet took place at half-past three. Lord Hartington called attention to the fact that Lord Granville had altered "must" into "should" in No. 130, for the telegram had after all been printed for the Cabinet and the Emba.s.sies with the word "should." The Cabinet sat for four hours, and then adjourned to the next day, on a proposal by Northbrook and Childers to ask the French whether they would go halves with us in sending 15,000 men to guard the Ca.n.a.l. On June 21st I came down a little from my position of the previous day, and stated that I would go out with Hartington if he liked, but that if he would not, and I stood alone, then I would swallow Arabi on the ground that the oath to take him out was sworn by England and France together, and that if France would not do her half, we could not do both halves, provided that they gave me (1) protection of the Ca.n.a.l, (2) a startling reparation for the murders and the insult to our Consul at Alexandria.

'At two o'clock the Cabinet met again. Lord Granville had in the meantime written me a letter ... as to the leaving out of "must" and inserting "should." He said that if we changed our minds or had to adopt palliatives, such as the defence of the Ca.n.a.l and reparation at Alexandria, "our nose would be rubbed in 'must.'" I wrote back that our position was not the same, inasmuch as he was evidently looking forward to having to defend in Parliament a complete surrender, which I was determined I would not do. On the same day, however, we exchanged very pleasant letters about an accident to Lady Granville, of which Lord Granville wrote: "It frightened me out of my wits."

'The Cabinet decided on the instructions to Dufferin for the Conference, adopting proposals with regard to them which were made by Chamberlain, and which were, in fact, mine. Lord Granville refused to take them from Chamberlain, but Mr. Gladstone, with some slight changes, made them his own, and then Lord Granville took them directly. Northbrook went off delighted to continue his transport preparations. Hartington warned Indian troops without consulting his colleagues, but escaped censure. On June 23rd I suggested that somebody should be appointed to a.s.sess damages to property at Alexandria by the riots, as a ground for a claim against the revolutionary Government, and suggested Lord Charles Beresford for the work; but Lord Granville refused the man though he accepted the thing.

I obtained his consent to telegraph that we should insist on payment of money to the relatives of the eight British subjects killed, of money for the men hurt, of damages for the destruction of property, on the execution of the murderers, on a salute to our flag at Alexandria, and a salute to our flag at Cairo.

'On Sat.u.r.day, June 24th, as I was only getting my way from day to day upon these points by continually threatening resignation, Lord Granville wrote to me in solemn reproof: "Nothing should be so sacred as a threat of resignation." But I cannot see, and never could, why if one intends to resign if one does not get one's way about a point which one thinks vital, one should not say frankly exactly what one means. I never bl.u.s.tered, and never threatened resignation except when I fully meant it.

'On Sunday, June 25th, there came a curious telegram from Dufferin, stating that the Sultan was "quite prepared to hand over to us the exclusive control and administration of Egypt, reserving to himself only those rights of suzerainty which he now possessed. In fact, what he offered was an Egyptian convention on the lines of the Cyprus convention." Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone took upon themselves to decline this offer without laying it before the Cabinet, and on Tuesday, the 27th, the Queen sent to Hartington to express her anger that the Sultan's offer of Sunday should have been declined without consultation with her. I certainly think that a Cabinet ought to have been called, but the Cabinet would have backed the refusal, though they afterwards regretted it.

'On June 28th I was again sent for to the Cabinet, which discussed a proposal from the Sultan to send troops.

'On June 30th I dined with the German Amba.s.sador, who told me that Musurus had said to him exactly what he had said to me at the French Emba.s.sy, and that he had placed the conversation upon record. On the same day two additional British gunboats were ordered to the Ca.n.a.l.

'On July 1st I had one of the most difficult tasks to perform that were ever laid upon me. I had wanted to get off the Cobden Club dinner fixed for that day; but, Lesseps having come over as a flaming Arabist for the express purpose of making a ferocious Arabi speech at this banquet, I had to go in order to propose his health, to sit next him at the dinner, to frighten him out of making his speech, and to make such a speech myself that he could not without provoking his audience mention Egypt at all. In all this I succeeded. I told him privately that, after the ma.s.sacre of eight British subjects at Alexandria and the promise by England and France that they would jointly keep order in Egypt, if he introduced the subject I would speak again after him and raise the audience against him. The old gentleman was very angry, but he made a different speech, and the matter pa.s.sed off successfully. Lord Derby was in the chair, and gave me great a.s.sistance, because, through Lord Granville, he allowed me to inform Lesseps that if he began to deliver the speech which he had in his pocket, he should rise and tell him that it was contrary to the rule of the Club to introduce controversial topics likely to lead to violent discussion, and, in fact, make him sit down. Lesseps brought me a telegram from his son, who was at Ismailia, stating that there could be no danger in Egypt unless there were an armed intervention, and threatening us with the destruction of the Ca.n.a.l if intervention should take place.

'On July 3rd there was a Cabinet on a proposal by Italy for the free navigation of the Ca.n.a.l. This was most unnecessary, as a virtual neutralization in practice existed, but the Italians wanted to do something, and after an enormous deal of discussion they ultimately got their way upon this unimportant point.

'On Monday, July 3rd, I received from Bourke, my predecessor, the first warning of strong Tory opposition to British intervention in Egypt.

'On the 4th Mr. Gladstone, Hartington, and Childers met to decide whether the reserves should be called out and the troops sent forward, but just before their meeting I saw Lesseps come past my door and go to Mr. Gladstone's room at the House of Commons, which was next to mine, and going in afterwards to Mr. Gladstone I saw the effect that Lesseps had produced. Lesseps had a promise from Arabi to let him make a fresh-water irrigation ca.n.a.l without payment for the concession, as I afterwards discovered.

'On this day I wrote a memorandum on the subject of intervention (I have an impression that it was based on Chamberlain's views, but I am not sure). I pointed out that many Liberals thought that intervention was only contemplated on account of financial interests--that if we intervened to protect the Ca.n.a.l and to exact reparation due to us for the Alexandria outrages, this feeling need not be taken into account; but that if we were going to Cairo, we ought to make our position clear. As far as Arabi personally was concerned, his use of the phrase "national party" was a mere prost.i.tution of the term. But there was in Egypt a very real desire to see Egyptians in office, and a certain amount of real national sentiment, and that sentiment we might conciliate. I thought that if we intervened by ourselves the control might be considered dead. The intervention must be placed on the ground either of the need for settled government at Cairo, in order to make the Ca.n.a.l safe and our route to India free, or else on that of the probable complicity of the revolutionary party in the Alexandria ma.s.sacres, or on both. But in the event of such an intervention I was of opinion that we should say that the recommendations of the Notables for the revision of existing inst.i.tutions would be favourably considered, with the proviso, however, that the army should be either disbanded or diminished, the only military force necessary in Egypt being one for the Soudan and a bodyguard for the Khedive. To these views I have always adhered, and while I strongly supported an intervention of this kind, I was always opposed to an intervention which made us in the least responsible for Egyptian finance, or to an intervention followed by an occupation.

'Late on this afternoon of July 4th I secretly informed the Khedive, through Rivers Wilson, of the instructions that had been given to Beauchamp Seymour to bombard the Alexandria forts if the construction of new earthworks erected against our s.h.i.+ps were not discontinued; for I felt that the man's life was in danger. I had been refused leave to tell him, and I did it without leave. When I saw Wilson he told me that Lesseps had officially informed him--Wilson being one of the British directors of the Suez Ca.n.a.l, and Lesseps Chairman of the Company--that we by our action were endangering the Ca.n.a.l. This was evidently a French menace on behalf of Arabi, and I took upon myself not to report it, as it would have only further weakened the minds of men already weak. Lesseps was not truthful. He told Mr. Gladstone that the Khedive had informed him that he was satisfied with the existing situation. We immediately telegraphed to the Khedive, through Sinadino, his Greek banker, who was representing him in London, to ask him whether this was true, and the Khedive answered by sending us all that had pa.s.sed between him and Lesseps, from which it was quite clear that it was not true....

'On July 5th there was a Cabinet as to the sending forward of troops, at which it was decided to somewhat "strengthen our garrisons in the Mediterranean." Chamberlain afterwards told me that before this Cabinet Lord Granville had begged his colleagues to remember who Mr.

Gladstone was, and not push him too hard. On this day, however, Mr.

Bright, Lord Granville, and Mr. Gladstone stood alone against the rest of the Cabinet in supporting a let-alone policy.'

On the 7th, as has been told in the last chapter, Mr. Gladstone, under the combined irritation of Irish and Egyptian difficulties, used words in debate which indicated his intention to resign, and "the two representative Radicals," Dilke and Chamberlain, had to consider what their course would be if he went out.

They agreed, as has been seen, to go with Mr. Gladstone and Bright; to refuse to join a new Administration should Mr. Gladstone be outside it; to reconsider their position if--Mr. Gladstone going to the Lords or quitting political life--they were satisfied with the new Government's programme; but the storm blew over. [Footnote: The full diary dealing with the difficulties of this moment has been given in the chapter on Ireland of this date (see supra. Chapter XXVIII., pp. 446, 447).]

'On Monday, the 10th, it again seemed probable that Mr. Gladstone would resign,' but this time it was in consequence of the loudly expressed intention of the Lords to throw out the Arrears Bill.

Mr. Gladstone, however, decided not to go; the majority prevailed, and Sir Charles was able to write on Monday, July 10th:

'I had now given the reply which informed the House exactly of the steps which would be taken. Guns having been again mounted on the 9th, the Admiral told the Commander of the troops at daylight on July 10th of his intention to open fire on the forts at daylight on July 11th.

Exactly one month after the Alexandria riots reparation for those riots was tardily exacted at the same spot.'

Sir Charles's personal att.i.tude cost him some friends in France. His brother Ashton wrote to him from La Bourboule a letter (received on July 9th), in which he said: "To judge by the French newspapers, you are as popular in France as Pitt at the height of the great war." A note from the Memoir renders this state of feeling explicable: [Footnote: A very different current in French opinion from that of the newspapers found outlet in this letter from M. emile Ollivier:

"SAINT TROPEZ, "_4 Aout_, 1882.

"MON CHER MONSIEUR,

"Vous avez ete si aimable lorsque j'ai eu la bonne fortune de faire votre connaissance, que vous ne pouvez douter de l'interet sympathique avec lequel j'ai suivi le brillant developpement de votre carriere politique. Aujourd'hui je tiens a sortir de mon adhesion muette et a vous exprimer combien j'admire et combien j'approuve la politique actuelle de votre gouvernement en egypte. Commissaire du gouvernement egyptien aupres de la compagnie de Suez depuis pres de vingt ans, j'ai etudie de pres ce qui se pa.s.sait sur le Nil, et je ne crois pas ceder a un mouvement d'amitie pour le Khedive, en pensant que c'est de son cote que se trouvent le Droit, la justice, la civilisation. Apres l'avoir intronise, lui avoir promis de l'appui; l'avoir pousse contre Arabi, le laisser entre les mains d'une grossiere soldatesque, ce serait une felonie doublee d'une sottise, car on perdrait ainsi ce qui a ete gagne sur la barbarie par les efforts de plusieurs generations.

Aucune paix ne vaut qu'on l'achete aussi cher. Votre pays s'honore et se grandit en le comprenant, et sa victoire sera celle de la civilisation autant que la sienne propre. En se separant de vous, nos seuls amis, en ce moment, en abandonnant le Khedive malgre tant d'engagements repetes, les personnages qui nous gouvernent consomment la premiere des consequences qu'il etait dans la logique de leurs idees d'attirer sur nous--l'aneantiss.e.m.e.nt a l'exterieur. Les autres suivront. Nous ferons une fois de plus la triste experience qu'on ne supprime pas impunement de l'ame d'une nation l'idee de sacrifice, de devouement, d'herosme, pour reduire son ideal aux jouissances de la vie materielle et a l'amour b.e.s.t.i.a.l des gras paturages. Vous etes bien heureux de n'en etre pas la.

"Je vous felicite chaleureus.e.m.e.nt de la part que vous avez prise aux males resolutions de votre gouvernement, et je vous prie de croire a mes sentiments les plus sincerement cordiaux.

"emile Ollivier."]

'The French Government having ordered their s.h.i.+ps to leave Alexandria in the event of a bombardment of the forts, I suggested that our sailors ought to pursue them with ironical cheers, such as those with which in the House of Commons we were given to pursue those who walked out to avoid a division.'