The Classical World Part 8

34.

The Rise of Julius Caesar I have had a visit from Cornelius Balbus, I mean, the intimate of Julius Caesar. He a.s.sured me that Caesar will follow my advice and Pompey's in all things and will try to bring Pompey and Cra.s.sus together. This course offers the following advantages: an intimate a.s.sociation for me with Pompey, with Caesar too if I want it, a return to favour with my enemies, peace with the populace, tranquillity in my old age...

Cicero, Letters to Atticus Letters to Atticus 2.3 (late 60 BC) 2.3 (late 60 BC) The truth is that the present regime is the most infamous, most disgraceful and uniformly odious to all sorts and cla.s.ses and ages of men that ever was, more so upon my word than I could ever have wished, let alone expected. Those 'populist' politicians have taught even quiet folk to hiss...

Cicero, Letters to Atticus Letters to Atticus 2.19, between 7 and 14 July 59 BC, on Caesar's consuls.h.i.+p and its deal with Pompey and Cra.s.sus 2.19, between 7 and 14 July 59 BC, on Caesar's consuls.h.i.+p and its deal with Pompey and Cra.s.sus Julius Caesar, the most famous Roman, proved to be the most masterly populist in Roman politics. For more than twenty years he pursued this line, yet by birth and manners he was a true patrician, descended from the oldest n.o.bility in Roman history. The founding father, Aeneas, was claimed as his family's ancestor and beyond him, the G.o.ddess Venus herself. The 'traditions' of ordinary senators were latecomers in the long view of such an ultimate aristocrat. He stands in sharp contrast to the a.s.sumed traditionalism of Cicero, the man made good.

Caesar had a proud, patrician sense of his own high worth, or dignitas dignitas, but, first as a consul, then ten years later as a dictator, he forced through detailed populist laws which 'traditional' senators had resisted and continued to obstruct. They ranged from curbs on extortion by provincial governors and checks on the use of violence in public life to the granting of plots of land to tens of thousands of settlers, not all of whom were veteran soldiers. There were values behind such laws, a sense of justice which made them more than personal bids for preeminence. Yet Caesar, the 'people's politician', ended by limiting the urban poor's right of free a.s.sociation in their clubs and colleges in Rome. They might be a threat to his own preeminence, not least during his absence from the city. Until the years of his dictators.h.i.+ps, he correctlyrelied on tribunes, the popular magistrates, to propose his legislation to the people's a.s.semblies and to veto proposals against his interests. Yet he ended by deposing holders of the tribunate simply because their actions displeased him. Eventually he nominated Rome's magistrates himself.

Artfully, Caesar had encouraged 'open government'. In 59, as consul, he caused the business of the Senate to be published and made accessible for the first time: Hadrian, nearly two hundred years later, would be 'curator' of the published senatorial 'acts'. Those senators like Cicero who spoke contemptuously of the people as 'cattle' or the 'dregs' in the Senate house, but praised them before their a.s.semblies, would not exactly welcome the new publications. Caesar himself spoke clearly and forcefully, dictated letters freely (even while on horseback) and became the first Roman n.o.bleman to make a real contribution to Latin literature. For, as a general abroad, Caesar sent lucidly written 'commentaries' back from his prolonged command in Gaul. 'Avoid an unfamiliar word,' he used to say, 'as a sailor avoids the rocks.'1 His prose works are unusually clear in structure and form, but they are also highly economical with the truth. They were composed so that a wider public in Rome, in Italy, and perhaps even in southern Gaul, could read of his prowess. Probably, they were issued year by year, but they ended in 52, long before Caesar's return to Rome. Publication of these exercises in 'spin' had important political relevance for his career at that time. These artful 'commentaries' presented a Roman Caesar who was more than the equal of Pompey the great conqueror. Whereas Pompey was glorified by Greek historians and Greek orators around him, Caesar was now glorified by his own clear Latin. Written in the third person, the commentaries use the word 'Caesar' 775 times. His prose works are unusually clear in structure and form, but they are also highly economical with the truth. They were composed so that a wider public in Rome, in Italy, and perhaps even in southern Gaul, could read of his prowess. Probably, they were issued year by year, but they ended in 52, long before Caesar's return to Rome. Publication of these exercises in 'spin' had important political relevance for his career at that time. These artful 'commentaries' presented a Roman Caesar who was more than the equal of Pompey the great conqueror. Whereas Pompey was glorified by Greek historians and Greek orators around him, Caesar was now glorified by his own clear Latin. Written in the third person, the commentaries use the word 'Caesar' 775 times.

In Julius Caesar, charm and ruthlessness, daring and deceit were intertwined. Above all, he proved to be a superb general. He was indifferent to personal comforts or luxuries and he was a fine horseman who could even ride fast with both hands clasped behind his back. From 58 to 50 he was the conqueror of vast territories in the West, all of which he identified as Gaul. In 55 he crossed the Channel and became the first invader of Britain, 'beyond the Ocean's limit' which had bounded Alexander the Great. Yet the British invasion failed and the conquests in Gaul went far beyond a strict interpretation of the commands which had been given to him. When these commands ended he reckoned to have caused the death in battle of no less than 1,192,000 enemies in his Gallic campaigns. Even so, civilian casualties were excluded from this total, so glorious to him, but not to us.

Caesar also showed stunning daring in further wars between 49 and 45, fought in Greece, Egypt, Asia, north Africa and Spain at places which Hadrian's peaceful touring would later encompa.s.s. However, he never published the casualties for these battles, because they were fought in a civil war against fellow Roman citizens. For, in 49, Caesar embarked on civil war inside Italy, like a 'new Hannibal', while professing the need to defend the 'liberty' of the 'Roman people', the 'sanct.i.ty of the tribunes' and, more honestly, his own 'dignity'. For nearly five years political life became subjected to the personal will of Caesar himself. He was certainly not the inevitable consequence of the times in which he lived. The Roman Republic could, indeed should, have survived him. Ultimately, he overthrew it for his own impressive 'dignity', to which all else, the populism, the inclusiveness, the much-advertised 'clemency', were secondary. He overthrew a flexible const.i.tution which had evolved over more than four centuries, and in due course he was murdered by some sixty conspirators in Rome. But his example, and his fate, coloured the next acts in the long-running drama of the Roman Republic. These acts did then prove to be its end, a turning point for liberty.

Julius Caesar was born six years after Cicero, in the year 100 in the month which was later named July in his honour. Historians of his early years are at risk from hindsight: could contemporaries really have feared his cool ability very early in his life? Most of his historians would now postpone the 'making of Caesar' until his late thirties or forties, but contemporaries may have seen the signs much earlier. Aged (probably) fifteen, Caesar was chosen to be the ceremonial Priest of Jupiter, a job for patricians only. Since the Priest was not allowed so much as to look at troops under arms, was the offer of this priesthood an early attempt to block this feared young n.o.ble from any public career? These years were those of Sulla's awful rise to power, and Caesar was married to the n.o.ble young daughter of Sulla's enemy, Cinna. Through his aunt, he was a nephew of the great Marius, Sulla's greatest foe. In fact, Sulla refused to let Caesar hold on to the priesthood (as if he saw no immobilizing purpose in it) but he is also said to have warned against the casually dressed young Caesar's potential. Is this story, too, only the creation of hindsight?

Caesar escaped execution and left for military service in the East. Here, hostile gossip later claimed that he became a s.e.xual favourite of the king of Bithynia. There was nothing in it, but when Caesar was later insulted as 'womanish' he retorted brilliantly that Amazons had once ruled most of Asia and so his threat to dance on the heads of his senatorial enemies was not an empty one.2 In 80 In 80 BC BC a brave exploit in the Aegean won him the 'civic crown', a very high military distinction for saving a citizen's life in battle: its oak wreath could then be worn in public and even senators would have to stand up in his presence at public games, a privilege which cannot have been lost on his high sense of dignity. He returned to Rome and gained fame, and hostility, for prosecuting a respected ex-consul for plundering his province. He then returned to the Greek East to study and let the hostility cool at Rome. Unlike the rising star, Pompey, Caesar had a quick, educated mind which was always interested in literature. But he too was a born fighter. He took a sweet, swift revenge on some pirates in the Aegean who tried to hold him to ransom. Aged twenty-six, he took troops back into Bithynia to stop defections there to Rome's great enemy, Mithridates. Already, he was acting without orders. a brave exploit in the Aegean won him the 'civic crown', a very high military distinction for saving a citizen's life in battle: its oak wreath could then be worn in public and even senators would have to stand up in his presence at public games, a privilege which cannot have been lost on his high sense of dignity. He returned to Rome and gained fame, and hostility, for prosecuting a respected ex-consul for plundering his province. He then returned to the Greek East to study and let the hostility cool at Rome. Unlike the rising star, Pompey, Caesar had a quick, educated mind which was always interested in literature. But he too was a born fighter. He took a sweet, swift revenge on some pirates in the Aegean who tried to hold him to ransom. Aged twenty-six, he took troops back into Bithynia to stop defections there to Rome's great enemy, Mithridates. Already, he was acting without orders.

Back at Rome, as Sulla's reactionary settlement broke up, Caesar held fast to the alternative populist line. His aunt was the widow of the popular hero Marius, and when she died he gave a funeral speech in the Forum which dwelt on her (and therefore his) very n.o.ble descent from G.o.ds and kings. The words would eventually seem prophetic when he himself seemed to rival both these types of dangerous ancestor. People noticed him, as they did when he displayed the insignia of Marius, the long-suppressed popular hero, in his aunt's funeral procession. He even displayed Marius' trophies, long concealed, up on the Capitol. Then, later in 69, Caesar left to serve as a junior magistrate in southern Spain. Here, he went on the usual a.s.size-tour, hearing cases. In Cadiz, he is said to have seen a statue of Alexander the Great in the town's main temple, and to have wept that he had done nothing memorable, although at his same age Alexander had already conquered the world.3 Again, historians mostly doubt this story, but perhaps unwisely; it is a less likely story that Caesar also dreamed that he was raping his mother, signifying a wish to dominate (mother) Earth, the world. In Spain, at any rate, occasional attacks of epilepsy are specifically attested as beginning to afflict him. Again, historians mostly doubt this story, but perhaps unwisely; it is a less likely story that Caesar also dreamed that he was raping his mother, signifying a wish to dominate (mother) Earth, the world. In Spain, at any rate, occasional attacks of epilepsy are specifically attested as beginning to afflict him.

At Rome, this ambitious young man was still very far indeed from global prominence. That honour went to the great all-conquering Pompey, whose exceptional command against the Mediterranean pirates had been supported by Caesar, the one senator to vote for it in 67 (a victory over the pirates would help the people by reducing the price of grain imports). Nonetheless, as an aedile (a citymagistrate) in 65, it was Caesar who was the greater showman. He paid for the customarygames, but added hugelyto their popular appeal by offering 320 pairs of gladiators in public combat, to be dressed with silver weaponry. They were intended, he said, as a funerary honour for his dead father. But his father had died twenty years earlier and this enormous show caused an anxious Senate to 'recommend' a prompt limit on the number of gladiators which anyone could present. Like the games, the cost of Caesar's show would have been enormous. The higher reaches of a public career at Rome required huge expense, and never more so than in the intensely compet.i.tive late 60s. But Caesar borrowed hugely to pay for the costs and in the absence of glorious Pompey he borrowed from the vastly rich Cra.s.sus. Amid charges of corruption and conspiracy, the two of them were even suspected of plotting a coup in 65, so that Cra.s.sus could sort out the highly rewarding kingdom of Egypt and Caesar, still only an aedile, could serve as Cra.s.sus the dictator's second-in-command. Pompey, indeed, was absent and Egypt was certainly the great unresolved prize, whose grain and treasure would make its 'captors' uniquely powerful. Other partners were wrongly alleged later to have been in on the deal, but in 64 Cicero did hint that Cra.s.sus had been up to something.4 We can only guess or reject the story (as most scholars do), not least because such a role for a humble aedile seems wholly incredible. But was Caesar a typical aedile? We can only guess or reject the story (as most scholars do), not least because such a role for a humble aedile seems wholly incredible. But was Caesar a typical aedile?

What we do know is that he played prominent roles in the year 63, the fateful pinnacle of Cicero's career. At the start, it was Caesar who promoted a sham trial in public to warn Cicero and others about abuse of the Senate's so-called 'ultimate decree'. In December, when Cicero then abused precisely this decree against living citizens who were already under arrest, it was Caesar who spoke so forcefully in the Senate in favour of imprisoning the offenders but not killing them. Here, too, he took a populist approach in support of 'freedom', one which he, but not Cicero, would never regret. In Cicero's unpublished 'inside story', Caesar would later be roundly blamed (with Cra.s.sus) for backing Catiline in the first place and causing a near-revolution. Was this charge only the old Cicero's sour hindsight or had there once again been more to Caesar's early discredit than we know? Whatever the truth, it did not stop Caesar from two fine successes in this same year. He won the immensely prestigious 'High Priesthood' (as Pontifex Maximus he had an office, henceforward, in the heart of the Roman Forum and a house on the adjoining Sacred Way) and he was also elected to the praetors.h.i.+p, the next career step, for the year 62. The priesthood cost him a fortune in bribery and the praetors.h.i.+p began with his controversial support for the returning hero, Pompey: it did not stop Caesar gaining a command in Further Spain for 61 BC BC.

This provincial command did not make him by first awakening his ambition (it was surelythere from his adolescence) but it was certainly crucial to his survival. On his return, a failure to pay his debts would be terminal, obliging him to become an exile. The recognized wayfor Romans to repay such debts was to soak a province for spoils, bribes and booty. By late 61 Caesar had done just that, byattacking enough outlying tribes in Spain, and so he could start to think of the ultimate honours, a triumph and then a consuls.h.i.+p back in Rome. This prospect really alarmed his traditionalist contemporaries, especially Cato, the arch-conservative who would never give Caesar the benefit of any doubt. Cato therefore obliged Caesar to choose between a triumph (already voted, in principle) or standing as consul. Coolly, Caesar chose to go for the consuls.h.i.+p, obliging Cato to compromise and try to beat him at his own game by ama.s.sing a big fund for electoral bribery and ensuring that his own reliable kinsman, Bibulus, would be elected as Caesar's fellow consul.

Both of them were dulyelected for the year 59, but, unlike Bibulus, Caesar prepared for his year of office by the artful 'gentlemen's agreement' with Pompey and Cra.s.sus, a couple hitherto divided by personal enmity. Cunningly, Caesar saw they both had needs which he, as consul, could help them meet. As a major financier, Cra.s.sus needed a renegotiation of the tax-collecting contract in the province of Asia. Pompey needed two things, the ratification of the arrangements which he had personally imposed on Asia and the settlement of his veteran soldiers, who were still unrewarded from their victories in the East in the 60s. As for Caesar himself, he had a populist programme which would lead (so he hoped) to an ever greater and more profitable provincial command. Economic tension in Rome was running very high. Seeing trouble coming, surely, the senators had already allotted humdrum commands to these consuls after their year of office: not a Spain or Gaul, but 'woods and tracks' in Italy itself.

The year 59, Caesar's consuls.h.i.+p, is a climactic moment in Roman history. Previous 'populists' had fallen prey to the same weakness, their failure to escape reprisals from 'traditionalists' either during or after their hated year of office. Caesar's plan was brutally simple: to carry Pompey and Cra.s.sus with him in a mutual balance of favours; to put laws directly to the people's a.s.semblies, despite the Senate's opposition; to work with and through supportive tribunes who could veto such opposition; to 'fix' supportive tribunes for the following year and supportive consuls too, if possible; to be voted a major provincial command and then to leave Rome with the powers to carry it out, thus being untouchable by prosecution as he left the city. But his fellow consul, Bibulus, was flatly against him, and Caesar's 'populist' legislation would have to go straight to the people to become law, because the senators would surely never recommend it. Traditionalists, as usual, would hate the tactic.

The ensuing manoeuvres are unforgettable in Roman public and political life: the addresses to public meetings; the gangs and cliques in the Forum; the parade of 'imprisoning' the intransigent Cato, although he was a tribune; the hara.s.sment of the obstructive consul Bibulus (a bucket of dung was once poured publicly over his head). Attempted 'intercession' byother hostile tribunes was evaded byviolence; it all sounds chaotic, but already in 62 even the man of principle, young Cato, had prevented a tribune from reciting an unwanted bill by having a fellow tribune jam his hand over the man's mouth. In 59 Caesar's colleague Bibulus countered by withdrawing to his house and claiming that irregularities in the heavens (observed only by him) made each possible day in the calendar unfit for the due course of public business. He also distributed posters with such scandalous attacks on Caesar that the common people crowded round to find out their fascinating contents, thereby blocking traffic in Rome's streets.

Nonetheless, sufficient laws in Caesar's programme were forced through. One, long planned, set out an eminently reasonable programme for the settlement of Pompey's veteran soldiers and other needy citizens on land in Italy. Cleverly, the proposals would not involve confiscations from any private owner. Another law lowered the Asian tax contract to suit Cra.s.sus' interests: Cato was still bitterly opposed to it. In April a second law then proposed the allotment of rich lands in Campania, behind the Bay of Naples, lands which had been first taken as 'public' after Roman victories over Hannibal in 211. It was deeply contentious. One aim was to give land to some 20,000 poor citizens in Rome and their families, part of the 'dregs', in the traditionalists' view of them, who were such a distress and a possible danger in the city. To Cicero, this fine proposal seemed an outrage.

Even as late as August good legislation was still being brought forward, especially a complex law against unchecked extortion by Roman governors abroad. But to go so far Caesar had had to play extremely hard. Not only had Cato continued to oppose him, especially on the proposed a.s.sistance to Cra.s.sus and the tax-contractors. There was a real danger that once Pompey's main needs were met he too would veer off to join the conservative senators' groupings, his more natural resting place. In the spring Pompey had married Caesar's beloved only daughter, Julia, but even a tie by marriage was very fragile. In summer 59 Caesar therefore promoted an informer (it seems) to warn the ever-nervous Pompey of a high-grade plot against his life. The final allegations included the names of almost every 'traditional' senatorial opponent, whereupon the informer was conveniently killed while in prison.5 Cicero was surelyright to see Caesar's hand behind the affair: it scared Pompey, sure enough, and so it kept the 'gentlemen's agreement' in existence. But once again, it stank. Cicero was surelyright to see Caesar's hand behind the affair: it scared Pompey, sure enough, and so it kept the 'gentlemen's agreement' in existence. But once again, it stank.

Friendly consuls could not, after all, be fixed for the following year, but a friendly tribune (Clodius) and a provincial command were forthcoming. Overturning the Senate's earlier proposals of 'woods and tracks', Caesar obtained for himself by popular vote the far greater provinces of Cisalpine Gaul (nowadays north Italy) and Illyric.u.m (what is now the Dalmatian coast), a promising base for conquests inland. Furthermore, they were voted for five whole years. To his great good fortune, the allotted commander for Transalpine Gaul had died in April and on news of danger from the surrounding tribes, even the senators panicked and anxiously added Transalpine Gaul to Caesar's provinces. He was, after all, a proven general for what might be a major crisis and the combined commands would certainly preoccupy him.

What had shocked senatorial conservatives so far was Caesar's sheer forcefulness, his contempt for their opposition (and themselves) and the populism of the laws for which he would now receive great public credit. The political footling of Bibulus and his obstructions were basically irrelevant but it was at least arguable that Caesar's entire legislation was technically invalid as a result: if the matter was judged in court, the senators would probably'fix' a juryto uphold their view of 'illegality'. Meanwhile, senators had seen their old, once-famous general Lucullus forced to grovel at Caesar's feet. They were not above making a counter-proposal: could not Caesar wait and bring forward his legislation in the following year when they might no longer oppose him or even not threaten prosecution? But Caesar did not trust them and his dignity would never permit it. This time, the customary 'concord' among senators after a crisis could not be cosilyrea.s.serted.

In the first weeks of 58, following his consuls.h.i.+p, Caesar was outside Rome's city-boundary, recruiting troops for his provincial command, but he was still accessible to the senators and daily news of politics within the city. It was imperative that attempts to undo his legislation in the new year did not succeed. In fact, Clodius (his supportive tribune) proved well up to the challenge. The incoming consuls were cleverly bought off with the offer of valuable provincial commands; populist laws continued to be brought forward, and there was even a fear that Clodius would become too powerful in his own right. Certainly Clodius had one grudge to settle, against Cicero, who (he felt) had let him down in 63 BC BC. As neither Pompey nor Caesar was willing to intervene, Cicero antic.i.p.ated his fate by leaving the city. By mid-March Caesar, too, was off on his way to Gaul.

As he rode north, he cut a fine figure on horseback, dark-eyed, tall for a Roman and already balding. As in Spain, three years earlier, a governors.h.i.+p would more than restore his finances and ought to allow for no end of future bribes back in Rome. But what then? If Caesar laid down his command and re-entered Rome as a private citizen, his enemies would prosecute him at once for the 'illegalities' in his year as consul. If he wanted to become a consul yet again, how could he realize his aim when he had to wait a statutory ten years before standing and when he would surely be forced to return to Rome so as to campaign for his election in person? Pompey and Cra.s.sus would not a.s.sist him for nothing and Cato, certainly, would not go away. The consuls.h.i.+p of 59 BC BC had been sensational, but it had created as many problems as it had addressed. With his armies in Gaul, proud Caesar was really out on a limb. had been sensational, but it had created as many problems as it had addressed. With his armies in Gaul, proud Caesar was really out on a limb.

35.

The Spectre of Civil War So this is what their love affair, their scandalous union has come to not secret backbiting, but outright war. As for my own affairs, I don't know what plan to take, and I don't doubt that the same question is going to trouble you. I have ties of obligation and friends.h.i.+p with these people. On the other hand, I love the cause, but hate the men.I do not suppose that it escapes you that when there is a dispute about affairs in a community, men ought to take the more respectable side so long as the dispute is political and not conducted by force of arms. But when it comes to actual war and army-camps, then they should choose the stronger and reckon that the better course is the one which is safer.Caelius to Cicero, Letters to Friends Letters to Friends 8.14 ( 8.14 (c. 8 August 50 BC) Within two years of fighting beyond the Alps Caesar would become too successful, too quickly. In the name of Gallic 'freedom', he launched attacks on neighbouring tribes, including the Helvetii, who were preparing to migrate westwards into Gallic territory: 'all men', he wrote in his commentaries, 'have a natural keenness for liberty, and hate the condition of servitude'.1 But then he exploited divisions among the Gauls so as to pick off their tribes separately and make them into a vast Roman province. The last thing Caesar wanted was to be recalled, mission completed. So, 'enemies' and dangers were discovered ever further afield. But then he exploited divisions among the Gauls so as to pick off their tribes separately and make them into a vast Roman province. The last thing Caesar wanted was to be recalled, mission completed. So, 'enemies' and dangers were discovered ever further afield.

In Rome, Pompey and Cra.s.sus were still pre-eminent, but there was plenty of scope for popular legislation. For the city, as Cicero's brother had described it in the mid-60s, was still 'formed from the concourse of the peoples of the world' and contained at least 750,000 inhabitants. This huge ma.s.s of citizen-freedmen, slaves and foreigners was the setting for the upper cla.s.s's intense disputes about order, 'tradition' and legal propriety. As tribune in 58, Clodius had restored the common people's right to form social groups and a.s.sociations, the 'colleges' which the Senate had simply declared 'contrary to the interests of the Republic' and abolished back in 64. He had also made the subsequent distribution of grain into a free monthly allotment. More than 300,000 citizens would be able to claim it, but it would be a vast burden on public funds and supply, although the allotment would sustain only one person, not an entire family. To increase funds, Clodius and others looked eastwards, not least to the rich domains of the Ptolemies in Cyprus. Clodius had an old grudge against its ruler and bya brilliant manoeuvre after Caesar's departure, forced even the principled Cato to compromise in what was needed. By proposing legislation directly to the people, he had Cato appointed to take over Cyprus from its profligate Ptolemaic prince: the appointment was Cato's publiclyvoted duty, so he could not refuse it. But by accepting, Cato was also accepting, indirectly, the legality of a whole chain of similarly approved legislation which he had contested, right back (some might say) to Caesar's laws in 59: 6,000 talents came in from Cyprus's resources.

Couriers and letters kept Caesar in touch. He is even said to have sent Clodius a letter approving the neat use of tribunes and an a.s.sembly-vote to compromise his rival Cato. The new settlement for Cyprus was also, usefully, a departure from Pompey's previous dealings with a Ptolemaic prince. No doubt Caesar also heard of the amazing activities of the aedile in 58 BC BC, Aemilius Scaurus. Scaurus, the stepson of Sulla, displayed five crocodiles and the first hippopotamus Rome had ever seen at his customary games. He then built an extraordinary theatre, three storeys high (of marble, gla.s.s and gilding), packed with gold cloth and (it was later said) 3,000 statues and room for 80,000 spectators. He even displayed the vast skeleton of a dinosaur, brought back from his service in the Near East, believing it was a monster from Greek mythology.2 Popular life at Rome was really looking up, and like Clodius' laws these games and displays set a new standard in politicians' compet.i.tion for popular prestige. Popular life at Rome was really looking up, and like Clodius' laws these games and displays set a new standard in politicians' compet.i.tion for popular prestige.

What most concerned Caesar was the duration of his command 'beyond the Alps'. In 59 it had been granted, it seems, on a yearly basis. His other command, 'this side of the Alps, and Illyric.u.m', was secure, by contrast, for five years. There was the increasing danger that a senatorial rival with Gallic connections, Domitius Ahen.o.barbus, would get himself elected consul for 55 and force Caesar to be replaced. So Caesar turned again to his artful 'gentlemen's agreement'. By 56 BC BC both Pompey and Cra.s.sus were wanting consuls.h.i.+ps again, to be followed by lucrative commands abroad, but neither of them was sure of the necessary popular support. Back in Rome, the free distribution of grain inst.i.tuted by Clodius had been followed, predictably, by acute grain shortages. In autumn 57 Pompey had been given a commission to sort out the grain supply (with powers even 'greater' than those of other provincial governors, a fertile innovation), but the challenge was not easily met. Prices had stayed high and there were still shortages. Furthermore, the long-desired chance of intervening in Egypt had been denied to both him and Cra.s.sus. By early 56 neither man was the darling of the Roman populace and, in an atmosphere of violence and armed gangs, Pompey continued to fear for his life. When Caesar came south into Italy in spring 56, it was possible for a deal to be agreed. When he reached Ravenna in March, the first to come over was Cra.s.sus, because his ambitions were the more pressing. Then, byagreement at Lucca in mid-April, Pompey joined in the deal which was forming, for fear that his glorywould be eclipsed: there would be five-year commands in the provinces for each of them, preceded by consuls.h.i.+ps for Pompey and Cra.s.sus in 55. By postponing the year's elections, they could count on support from troops whom Caesar would send to Rome for the voting and so they could keep out the rival threat of Ahen.o.barbus. Then, as the new consuls, Pompey and Cra.s.sus could prolong Caesar's transalpine command for another five years in spring 55, by a law taken straight to the people. both Pompey and Cra.s.sus were wanting consuls.h.i.+ps again, to be followed by lucrative commands abroad, but neither of them was sure of the necessary popular support. Back in Rome, the free distribution of grain inst.i.tuted by Clodius had been followed, predictably, by acute grain shortages. In autumn 57 Pompey had been given a commission to sort out the grain supply (with powers even 'greater' than those of other provincial governors, a fertile innovation), but the challenge was not easily met. Prices had stayed high and there were still shortages. Furthermore, the long-desired chance of intervening in Egypt had been denied to both him and Cra.s.sus. By early 56 neither man was the darling of the Roman populace and, in an atmosphere of violence and armed gangs, Pompey continued to fear for his life. When Caesar came south into Italy in spring 56, it was possible for a deal to be agreed. When he reached Ravenna in March, the first to come over was Cra.s.sus, because his ambitions were the more pressing. Then, byagreement at Lucca in mid-April, Pompey joined in the deal which was forming, for fear that his glorywould be eclipsed: there would be five-year commands in the provinces for each of them, preceded by consuls.h.i.+ps for Pompey and Cra.s.sus in 55. By postponing the year's elections, they could count on support from troops whom Caesar would send to Rome for the voting and so they could keep out the rival threat of Ahen.o.barbus. Then, as the new consuls, Pompey and Cra.s.sus could prolong Caesar's transalpine command for another five years in spring 55, by a law taken straight to the people.

The deal worked, although Caesar's 'commentaries' never said a word about it. Previously, Caesar had even been thinking of a campaign in eastern Europe (Dacia) up to the Danube, but when his command 'beyond the Alps' was sure to be prolonged, he sought new fields in the north-west in which to exploit it. In 56 it was quite likely that he had already been planning an invasion of Britain3 and he certainly engaged in a gratuitous slaughter of two vulnerable German tribes. On receiving the news in Rome, Cato was so disgusted that he proposed that Caesar, by ancient precedent, should be handed over to the Germans in order to divert the anger of the G.o.ds from Rome. Instead, Caesar transferred himself to Britain, briefly in 55 and again in 54, when he took an elephant with him for show. Neither campaign was much of a success. The hopes of finding gold and precious metals in Britain were ill-founded and the effect was more of a raid than a solid conquest. But the publicitywas excellent: Britain was represented as 'beyond the Ocean' which had limited the ambitions of Alexander the Great. Back in Rome, Cicero had even been planning to write an epic poem on the 'glorious conquest', based on front-line reports from his brother. The news about Britain helped to stave off the danger that Caesar's enemyAhen.o.barbus would contrive to replace him in the Gallic command after the consuls.h.i.+p which would now be available to Ahen.o.barbus in 54. and he certainly engaged in a gratuitous slaughter of two vulnerable German tribes. On receiving the news in Rome, Cato was so disgusted that he proposed that Caesar, by ancient precedent, should be handed over to the Germans in order to divert the anger of the G.o.ds from Rome. Instead, Caesar transferred himself to Britain, briefly in 55 and again in 54, when he took an elephant with him for show. Neither campaign was much of a success. The hopes of finding gold and precious metals in Britain were ill-founded and the effect was more of a raid than a solid conquest. But the publicitywas excellent: Britain was represented as 'beyond the Ocean' which had limited the ambitions of Alexander the Great. Back in Rome, Cicero had even been planning to write an epic poem on the 'glorious conquest', based on front-line reports from his brother. The news about Britain helped to stave off the danger that Caesar's enemyAhen.o.barbus would contrive to replace him in the Gallic command after the consuls.h.i.+p which would now be available to Ahen.o.barbus in 54.

In the city, the summer of 54 was exceptionally hot and tension was exacerbated by continuing shortages of grain. The political setting is still a challenge to our imaginations. Rome was home to such vast numbers and the fascinating politics of the next four years include intricate briberyscandals (Ahen.o.barbus and his n.o.ble colleagues tried to nominate their successors in return for payment), localized bouts of violence (gangs erupted in the city, made up of soldiers, freed slaves, artisans, shopkeepers and trained gladiators) and, in 53 and 52, yet another crisis over the consuls.h.i.+p. And yet there was no popular uprising for a change of const.i.tution, no challenge to the total system. The main continuing question was the scope of Pompey's ambitions. After the consuls.h.i.+p of 55 he had been allotted the provinces of Spain, a chance for glory, but since 54 he had preferred to wait with troops outside Rome's boundaries and govern Spain through subordinates. His most personal link with Caesar now ended: his wife Julia, Caesar's beloved daughter, died in childbirth. The people of Rome gave her a fine funeral, but what would Pompey now choose to do? He was, after all, becoming an old man. In 53 he lost one major compet.i.tor, then in 52 another. The first to go was the elderly Cra.s.sus, now in his late fifties, whose consuls.h.i.+p had been followed by the granting of a command in the East against the hostile Parthians. At last, Cra.s.sus might return with the full glory of a military triumph, denied him after his actions against Spartacus in the late 70s: its absence had continued to needle the old man. In fact, he was too incompetent and was tricked into defeat by the Parthians in 53, costing him his life and most of his army.

In Rome, January 52 then saw the spectacular end of the most effective of the populists, Clodius. He was attacked on the Appian Way by a gang loyal to his conservative rival Milo, and what began as an accident ended with Clodius' brutal murder. His corpse was brought into the city, where his wife's impa.s.sioned mourning helped to incite the popular mood. Two of the tribunes added a eulogy over the dead man in the Forum, whereupon the crowd carried his corpse right into the Senate house and tried to cremate their champion on a bonfire of smashed furniture and doc.u.ments. The house itself caught fire and its ashes were watched by spectators until nightfall. Meanwhile crowds rampaged in Rome and attacked anyone who was seen wearing jewels or fine clothes in the streets. There was no established police force and the one option seemed to be to call on Pompey to restore order with troops. Waiting outside the city, he had already used his power as an ex-consul inside the city in 53. Now he was voted a sole consuls.h.i.+p, his third. It was a 'divine' one, according to an alarmed and thankful Cicero, and yet it was only two years since his last one. Caesar, by contrast, was still observing the proper ten-year interval between consuls.h.i.+ps and would not stand for election until summer 49, hoping to take up office in January 48. Meanwhile ambitious young men, new faces and those who simply relished a fight, were leaving Italy to seek promotions with Caesar in the West. Increasingly, he could reward them from his booty and so a real 'Caesarian clique' was building up outside Rome.

The crucial long-term question was whether Caesar would be allowed to stand as a candidate for a consuls.h.i.+p while absent: if he had to return to canva.s.s for it and laydown his power as a commander, his opponents would prosecute him inside Rome's boundaries, probably before an intimidated and bribed court. In March 52 Caesar seemed to get what he wanted: the ten tribunes, supported by Pompey, carried a law which allowed him the unusual step of a candidacy in absence. Traditionalists in the Senate were by pa.s.sed by it, but many other questions remained open: how would Caesar and Pompey coexist? Was it expected that, like Pompey, Caesar could now stand for a consuls.h.i.+p earlier than 49, in (say) 50? If he was elected consul again, whatever would he do this time?

The answers were to mark a real rupture of the Roman Republic: why had such a crisis come? Abroad, the provinces were being ruled by individual governors with powers to do much as they wished and scope to extort huge gains from their subjects. These commands inflated their resources for compet.i.tion back at Rome, but their victims, the provincials, did not bring about a crisis by rebelling against this type of rule. Nearer home, the previous bitter conflicts between senators and many of the knights and between Romans and Italians were also irrelevant: since the 70s the aftermath of the Social War and of Sulla's brief 'solution' for the jury-courts had largely settled down. In the 50s, however, Romans themselves would still think of 'luxury' as a major culprit. As consuls in 55, Pompey and Cra.s.sus, inordinately rich men, had considered introducing measures to curb it. In 51 the arch-traditionalist Cato amused the plebs by giving 'old-fas.h.i.+oned' games, in disapproval at recent ostentation: he offered simple wreaths, not gold, as prizes and gave small presents of food to the spectators.

We have a sense, here, of men with a traditional obsession, like the 'gypsies' or 'single mothers' of modern political rhetoric, which is diverting them from the real structural weaknesses. For, despite the years of rhetoric, luxury had marvellously proliferated. Upper-cla.s.s Romans were building magnificent villas as second homes along the coastline of the Bay of Naples, supporting them on piers of concrete and adorning them with the rows of pillars and terraces which we can enjoy in later paintings of them, preserved for us at Pompeii. These attacks on nature were the work of 'Xerxes in a toga', said moralists, recalling the ca.n.a.l-digging of this former Persian king. Since Pompey's conquests in Asia, fine gems had reached avid Roman buyers, prompting collections of their different types. In the kitchen, specialized local delicacies were increasingly sought and identified, whether huge snails from north Africa or home-grown dormice raised in special 'dormouse-houses' (gliraria): 'theyare fattened in jars which many keep even inside the villa; acorns, walnuts or chestnuts are put inside and when a cover is put on the jars they become fat in the dark.' There were even flocks of peac.o.c.ks, kept for display and consumption. In cla.s.sical Athens, one prominent aristocrat displayed 'Persian' peac.o.c.ks, a gift from the Persian king, and sold eggs to fascinated visitors: his son was then prosecuted for treating the birds as his own. At Rome, peac.o.c.ks began to be bred by the hundred in the early first century BC BC and, before long, a flock was reckoned to yield a small fortune of an income: 'a flock of 100' would produce a tenth of the property qualification to be an upper-cla.s.s knight. and, before long, a flock was reckoned to yield a small fortune of an income: 'a flock of 100' would produce a tenth of the property qualification to be an upper-cla.s.s knight.

We must remember Cicero's comment: what Romans disliked was private luxury, whereas public display was munificence, and not disagreeable. It was, then, alarming to political rivals, but highly popular, when Pompey paid for a spectacular theatre in 55 BC BC, including a statue of himself and fourteen nations which he had conquered. Grander, even, than Scaurus' theatre three years earlier, it led up to at least four temples (including one to Victorious Venus). At its dedication, elephants and 500 lions were staged in a beastly'hunt'. In 53 a future tribune, Curio, put up not one wooden theatre but two, built as a pair which could turn back to back, or revolve into one and become a single arena for gladiators. These luxurious displays were public, at least. What was attackable, by contrast, was the 'selfish' luxury of marble-pillared houses (the huge pillars of dark-red marble in Scaurus' hall were notorious) and when he took back the fantastic-ally rich decoration of his theatre to adorn his own Tuscan villa, the slaves at the property are said to have set fire to it in protest at his extravagance.4 To us, urban poverty and suffering at Rome seem much more relevant problems. The scarcity of food and water, the appalling housing for Rome's ma.s.ses were an intolerable negligence. Yet unlike the poor in many Greek cities in the age of Plato, Rome's poor did not unite and rebel for a new const.i.tution. Poor people rioted, certainly, for Clodius, but they were rioting for a great benefactor, now lost to them. In the process the Senate house burned down, but only byaccident, and there was no programme to abolish the Senate itself. There was no popular campaigning with a new ideology. One reason was that so many of the 'plebs' were still freed persons, dependent on their former masters; others were foreigners; by contrast, a hard core of Roman 'city-folk', persisting across the generations, was always much scarcer. The upper cla.s.s spent lavishly in the city, and it was their spending which sustained the ma.s.s of shopkeepers and builders and even the specialists in the dreaded luxuries. Many of the plebs therefore needed the rich, and as none of them could stand up and speak in their a.s.semblies or at political meetings, and few ever voted (and then in blocks), the 'popular' potential of the Roman const.i.tution was wonderfully contained. At Athens, when democracywas adopted, the members of the Athenians' supreme 'senate' had been discredited by their collaboration with the previous tyranny; the exiling of other n.o.bles by those tyrants had already taught lesser people that they could cope well enough without an aristocrat to help them along. At Rome, no such crisis had discredited the senators. Above all, in Attica the citizenry had been so much smaller; it was linked by supposed 'kins.h.i.+p', and was much more cohesive than the Roman citizenry now up and down Italy.

In the Italian countryside, the plight of the poor was certainly no better than in Rome, yet here too there were no 'peasants' revolts' in the 50s. Rather, more and more of the poor were being recruited, or forced, into the army for a long service abroad. Soldiers' wages, though meagre, did at least exist: the problem was that, once in the army, soldiers looked to their generals, not to any 'republican' values. What had 'the Republic' ever done for them anyway? Here, indeed, was a cause of crisis. It was not that Rome needed monarchyor 'stable government' in the late 50s because the scale of her empire had grown so big. Instead, tensions arose from the very conquests by which much of this empire was still being won. Generals rewarded their soldiers with spoils from their victories abroad and then won credit by proposals to settle them on plots of land and reward them on their return to Italy. The same generals fought on with the prolonged commands which were now being obtained by ignoring the Senate and going directly to the popular a.s.semblies for an enabling law. A friendly tribune would then veto the proposals to recall an important general in subsequent years. The old two-headed monster, as the Roman const.i.tution had evolved, found the limbs (the people) being used to cow what had once represented itself as the nouris.h.i.+ng, sensible stomach (the Senate). If Polybius had lived to see it, he would have considered it proof of his theory: 'oligarchy', as morals changed, would decline into 'democracy' and then into 'monarchy'. But the 'democracy' was really no such thing.

The more the generals conquered, the more their riches grew, enabling them to paymore to their troops from their own gains. They could also payback the ma.s.sive loans through which theyhad bought their way to a command in the first place. In reply, senators should have increased the soldiers' pay from state funds and somehow paid publicly for their land-settlements. But even then, the sums needed would have been huge, and would have required much more than a new inheritance tax which, understandably, the rich detested.

The 'liberty' of legislation by the 'people' (few of whom actually voted) was thus manipulated to curb the 'liberty' of senators to do, and eventually say, whatever they wanted. But personal dignity, rank and esteem also exacerbated the problem. Once Pompey had set such a dazzling new standard after his conquests in Asia, his rivals could not regard themselves as his equal or superior unless they shone even more brightly. The values of their ancestors and the entire training of their careers encouraged them to compete with Pompey's new l.u.s.tre. In Caesar's case, this 'dignity' was driving him to bring about the deaths of a million people in his Gallic provinces and to ama.s.s an increasingly incredible fortune. When Caesar returned to Rome he would not only be a consul. He would be able to triumph with the most astounding displays of gold, silver and booty. His debts would no longer be a problem. After plundering Gaul on an enormous scale he himself would be able to bribe and lend to people of influence at Rome, and eventuallyhe would 'benefit' the entire city plebs. Although the plebs would never dismantle the republican system by themselves, theyhad acute discontents, and the man who gave all of them benefits would be almost unopposable. Meanwhile Caesar's soldiers were becoming hardened experts in warfare thanks to their years of practice at the Gauls' expense. He himself could paythem, and he would duly provide for them. If he won the consuls.h.i.+p again, what might he not do for the urban plebs and for his troops, now his men of ten years' standing? Would he ever laythe office down? Opposition to one-man rule was the very lifeblood of republican values, and senators had certainly not become indifferent to it.

Despite the moralists' complaints, the gangs in the streets of Rome, the bribery and the fears of civil war did not signifyan age of decadence. In the heart of Rome, the compet.i.tion for glory was visible in the leaders' expensive public buildings. An entire new Forum was being paid for by Caesar at vast cost, rivalling the huge stone theatre which had already been paid for by Pompey. The city's architects were breaking new ground thanks to these new challenges. Above all, the years of tension were to be critical years for Latin thought and literature. Scholars.h.i.+p, philosophy and even the study of religious traditions blossomed under the spectre of the political crises. So did practical law. More interestingly, the superb poems of Catullus ranged from love-poetryto mythical narrative and personal invective, transcending their fine Greek models. At greater length, Lucretius' fine poem On the Nature of Things On the Nature of Things expressed an Epicurean philosophy of the world and society and the irrelevance to them both of the traditional G.o.ds. This masterpiece was probably composed when the crisis had just broken into open Civil War, between 49 and 48. expressed an Epicurean philosophy of the world and society and the irrelevance to them both of the traditional G.o.ds. This masterpiece was probably composed when the crisis had just broken into open Civil War, between 49 and 48.5 By the 50s most of the major partic.i.p.ants in Roman political life had studied Greek thought themselves. Even Cra.s.sus had a taste for Greek philosophy, as did Marcus Brutus, a man who had named features in his garden after features of ancient Sparta. There was also a sharpened interest in history. Works on chronology tried to interrelate Roman and Greek events and from the mid-50s onwards examples from Greek history became more prominent in Cicero's writings. Teachers (to his disgust) were even encouraging their pupils in oratory to study the historian Thucydides' horribly difficult Greek speeches. By the 50s most of the major partic.i.p.ants in Roman political life had studied Greek thought themselves. Even Cra.s.sus had a taste for Greek philosophy, as did Marcus Brutus, a man who had named features in his garden after features of ancient Sparta. There was also a sharpened interest in history. Works on chronology tried to interrelate Roman and Greek events and from the mid-50s onwards examples from Greek history became more prominent in Cicero's writings. Teachers (to his disgust) were even encouraging their pupils in oratory to study the historian Thucydides' horribly difficult Greek speeches.6 When Civil War broke out, the examples of famous Greeks from the past would become even more immediate to those who became swept up in it. When Civil War broke out, the examples of famous Greeks from the past would become even more immediate to those who became swept up in it.

Above all, there was a frankness of speech, a sharpness of wit and a magnificent scope for oratory. The wit and frankness still live for us in Cicero's letters, in sayings of Caesar or his rivals and even in letters from Cicero's lesser but educated friend, young Caelius, who favoured Caesar but wrote so vividly to Cicero on affairs at Rome in the late 50s. Here, we best catch what the 'liberty' of speech and thought reallymeant to such people. It is no coincidence that this age of great court-scenes, great addresses to the Senate and to popular meetings is also the supreme age of Roman oratory.

Not that the glitter was all male, either. Young Caelius was a fine dancer, but so was the remarkable lady Semp.r.o.nia, whom even her critics admired for her wit, her wide reading and her personal culture.7 No wife of a cla.s.sical Athenian could have compared with such a character. She was only one of several remarkable women who are known to us in the late Republic: Clodia, the desirable sister of Clodius, was probably the inspiration for Catullus' best love-poems, while Fulvia, Semp.r.o.nia's daughter, was to be the wife of three great husbands, including Clodius and then Mark Antony. Fulvia was the woman whose laments for the dead Clodius had fired a Roman crowd in the Forum. The austere ideals of the wool-working 'traditional' housewife were not to the liking of such bold spirits. They had lovers, they joked, they even advised. In autumn 52 No wife of a cla.s.sical Athenian could have compared with such a character. She was only one of several remarkable women who are known to us in the late Republic: Clodia, the desirable sister of Clodius, was probably the inspiration for Catullus' best love-poems, while Fulvia, Semp.r.o.nia's daughter, was to be the wife of three great husbands, including Clodius and then Mark Antony. Fulvia was the woman whose laments for the dead Clodius had fired a Roman crowd in the Forum. The austere ideals of the wool-working 'traditional' housewife were not to the liking of such bold spirits. They had lovers, they joked, they even advised. In autumn 52 BC BC, as the crisis loomed, one of the consuls was honoured with a party in which his house was turned into a brothel and two high-society ladies (one of them supposedly Fulvia, the other a former wife of Pompey) were said to have serviced the guests.8 For centuries, the Roman Republic had bent, regrouped and survived new tensions. It had outlived the proud Scipio, Marius even, and the ruthless conservative Sulla. The latest tensions went deep, but could it not survive both Caesar and Pompey too? Huge risks and a swathe of wonderfully unpredictable decisions would have to be taken before Caesar could ever dominate. Even then, the Republic was not dead, although Caesar's example was essential to its subsequent extinction by his successors. Out in Gaul, while the guests in Rome enjoyed their brothel-party, Caesar was beset with difficulties. His previous Gallic conquests had turned out to be not so secure after all; he still had to pacify them and he had to establish when his provincial command would end. Was it to end in 50 or 49, and if so, preciselywhen in the year? Could he run on, with the help of friendly tribunes' vetoes, until he was elected consul in absence? Back in Rome, with Clodius gone, even Cicero had begun to hope that he, perhaps, might have a second consuls.h.i.+p too. And after the crisis of Clodius' death, the elections did work again: there were consuls, n.o.ble ones, for 51 and then for 50, and for once, we hear nothing about bribery.

Through the fragmented mirror of Cicero's letters, we can follow the fascinating steps towards confrontation. In 52 Pompey was still 'friendly' to Caesar and Caesar was still said to have retained Pompey as heir to his will. ByJune 51 the question of a successor to Caesar in Gaul was to be raised explicitly in the Senate; on 29 September, however, it was decreed that discussions of the matter would not begin until 1 March 50. Remarks made by Pompey begin to make clear that he had a problem now with Caesar. The biggest problem, then and now, was when exactly Caesar's command would expire.

The probable answer is that there were two separate dates, one in March 49 for 'Gaul this side of the Alps and Illyric.u.m', and one in March 50 for 'Gaul beyond the Alps'. The former, eventually, was the command which Caesar proposed he should retain, but his rivals were not allowing it. By September 50 the articulate Caelius was writing that the 'love affair' between Caesar and Pompey had broken up and that there would soon be a 'gladiatorial' fight between the two of them.9 Nonetheless, in November the senators still voted optimistic-ally (by 370 to 22) that both Pompey and Caesar should lay down their respective armies. Overwhelmingly, the senators simply wanted peace. But as if to stiffen Pompey, the consul of the year went out of the city and put a sword in Pompey's hands. Nonetheless, in November the senators still voted optimistic-ally (by 370 to 22) that both Pompey and Caesar should lay down their respective armies. Overwhelmingly, the senators simply wanted peace. But as if to stiffen Pompey, the consul of the year went out of the city and put a sword in Pompey's hands.

During persistent meetings in early January 49 the senators heard the contents of letters in which Caesar offered, arguably correctly, to retain only 'Gaul this side of the Alps and Illyric.u.m'.10 But the n.o.ble consul Lentulus had the motion proposed that Caesar should leave his army by a fixed date. It was then blocked by the veto of tribunes: one of them was a loyal supporter of Caesar, now in his mid-thirties, Marcus Antonius ('Mark Antony'). So on 7 January Lentulus proposed the 'ultimate decree' against the vetoing tribunes. Mark Antony and his colleagues promptly fled to Caesar, ever the 'people's friend'. Caesar was already at hand on 'this side' of the Alps and had only a few of his troops with him. But he did not hesitate. He decided to attack across the river-boundary in to Italy, a frank initiation of a civil war. On 10 January he watched gladiators at exercise, bathed and dressed for dinner. Quietly, he slipped away from his guests and by a prearranged, roundabout route, reached the river Rubicon where he paused. He thought, it is said, of the enormous evils which would follow for mankind if he crossed and of the reputation of the crossing among posterity. 'The die is cast,' he said theatrically, quoting the Greek poet Menander, and then he crossed the river. But the n.o.ble consul Lentulus had the motion proposed that Caesar should leave his army by a fixed date. It was then blocked by the veto of tribunes: one of them was a loyal supporter of Caesar, now in his mid-thirties, Marcus Antonius ('Mark Antony'). So on 7 January Lentulus proposed the 'ultimate decree' against the vetoing tribunes. Mark Antony and his colleagues promptly fled to Caesar, ever the 'people's friend'. Caesar was already at hand on 'this side' of the Alps and had only a few of his troops with him. But he did not hesitate. He decided to attack across the river-boundary in to Italy, a frank initiation of a civil war. On 10 January he watched gladiators at exercise, bathed and dressed for dinner. Quietly, he slipped away from his guests and by a prearranged, roundabout route, reached the river Rubicon where he paused. He thought, it is said, of the enormous evils which would follow for mankind if he crossed and of the reputation of the crossing among posterity. 'The die is cast,' he said theatrically, quoting the Greek poet Menander, and then he crossed the river.11 He had already sent a small party of armed commanders ahead of him, but he was right that his crossing was the moment to dramatize. It was also a moment for taking auspices and for religious respect: Caesar dedicated a herd of horses to the river and set them free to run where they pleased. Five years later it would be these horses, men said, who would give him a very different omen. He had already sent a small party of armed commanders ahead of him, but he was right that his crossing was the moment to dramatize. It was also a moment for taking auspices and for religious respect: Caesar dedicated a herd of horses to the river and set them free to run where they pleased. Five years later it would be these horses, men said, who would give him a very different omen.12

36.

The Fatal Dictator Here you have a man who was ambitious to be the king of the Roman people, and he achieved it. If anyone says that this desire is morally right, he is mad, for he is approving the death of the laws and liberty and is thinking that their hideous and detestable oppression is glorious.

Cicero, De Officiis De Officiis 3.83 (late October 44 BC) 3.83 (late October 44 BC) Utterly deplorable! According to Gaius Matius, our problems are insoluble: 'for if a man of such genius as Caesar could not find a way out, who will find one now?' In short, he was saying that everything has had itI am inclined to agree, but he said it with glee... '

Cicero, Letters to Atticus Letters to Atticus 14.1.1, in April 44 BC, 14.1.1, in April 44 BC, three weeks after Caesar's murder After crossing the Rubicon, Caesar moved south with exceptional speed, helped by minimal resistance on his route through Italy. It was not that he was profiting from a continuing coolness between the Italian towns and Rome, as if it had been persisting since the Social Wars of the 80s. Rather, he had prepared his ground. For some while he had been sending funds from Gaul to supporters who were to apply them to local sympathies in Italy, here with a benefaction, there with new buildings. Back in the autumn of 50 young Caelius had already written unforgettably to Cicero that in political conflicts men should take the more honourable course unless matters came to a fight: then they 'should take the stronger course and identify the better with the safer'.1 In Italy, people agreed and received Caesar because they were terrified. Their only precedent for this sort of civil war was Sulla's, a dreadful one. The peasantry did not want to be conscripted to fight for Pompey and the property owners feared for their estates and 'darling villas', as Cicero acidly commented, 'and their lovelymoney', putting their 'fishponds' before freedom. In Italy, people agreed and received Caesar because they were terrified. Their only precedent for this sort of civil war was Sulla's, a dreadful one. The peasantry did not want to be conscripted to fight for Pompey and the property owners feared for their estates and 'darling villas', as Cicero acidly commented, 'and their lovelymoney', putting their 'fishponds' before freedom.

Caesar encouraged them by keeping up his campaign of spin. He emphasized his 'clemency' and proved it by a readiness to pardon enemies. He was the defender of 'liberty', he said, especially the 'liberty' of the Roman people's tribunes. His enemies had just hara.s.sed these tribunes with the 'ultimate decree'. Even Sulla, Caesar coolly observed, had left the tribunes a right of 'intercession' (arguably, Sulla had not left them the right of veto, but only the right to intercede against the hara.s.sment of individuals). His enemies (he said) were a minority, 'the Faction'. Caesar would have nothing to learn from modern political advisers on presentation. But he also emphasized his concern for his own 'dignity', his rank and esteem, which were driving him to stand again as consul. 'But what is dignity', Cicero aptly commented, 'if there is no honour?'2 If Caesar championed 'liberty of the people', Pompey championed 'liberty of the Senate'. Recently the towns of Italy had celebrated Pompey's recovery from an illness and perhaps this recent flattery misled him. In fact, they had faked it, in Cicero's view. For Pompey's hopes of support in Italy were far too optimistic. In mid-Januaryhe and many senators had to abandon Rome and head south to Brundisium where theywaited until 17 March. Meanwhile, offers of compromi