Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 19

At the outset, expectations were low, but when major military operations in Afghanistan ended in five weeks, expectations heightened dramatically. Typical was the well-meaning comment of a 10th Mountain Division soldier reported in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post: "We got hit three months ago and in less than three months we've toppled this regime. And within a week from now, we've got an interim government that's stepping in. What more can you ask for than a splendid little war over here?"29 The sentiment was understandable, but I did not think the long struggle against terrorism could or should be viewed as a series of quick, relatively painless, "splendid little wars." I was convinced that that was not going to be the case. Though the deep-seated pessimism at the outset of the war proved to be misplaced, I knew too that the buoyant optimism after the Taliban was toppled would prove to be just as mistaken. Ending the Taliban's rule over Afghanistan would be only the opening of a long, sustained campaign that would require patience and grit. Taking the fight to the terrorists would mean our military men and women would have to be deployed elsewhere. To keep the pressure on, we would need to continue to pursue the terrorists wherever they took refuge and isolate the regimes that harbored them and could give them the weapons of ma.s.s destruction they desperately sought. The President had told me privately what he had in mind.

PART X

Saddam's Miscalculation

Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.JANUARY 16, 1991 In a televised address from the Oval Office, President Bush announced the start of military operations in Iraq. He set forth the reasons for his decision to go to war. It was a long list. He and the national security officials in his administration-d.i.c.k Cheney, Colin Powell, and Paul Wolfowitz among them-believed that the United States and its allies had exhausted all reasonable diplomatic efforts to force Saddam Hussein's regime to comply with its obligations to the UN Security Council and, further, the UN's economic sanctions were not accomplis.h.i.+ng their objectives. According to American intelligence officials, Saddam was working to add a nuclear bomb to Iraq's a.r.s.enal, which the CIA judged already contained chemical weapons.1 "Saddam Hussein started this cruel war," the President said. "Tonight, the battle has been joined." "Saddam Hussein started this cruel war," the President said. "Tonight, the battle has been joined."2 The date was January 16, 1991. And the president was George Herbert Walker Bush.

During that first Gulf War, I had been out of government for nearly fifteen years and living back home in Chicago. I watched the war from afar. I was impressed with the combination of air power and tank warfare in the southern Iraqi desert that decimated Saddam's army. Television images showed the wreckage of Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers, and trucks littering what became known as the highway of death.

With Saddam's forces on the run, the Bush team faced a crucial decision, one that would have lasting consequences. The war's initial goal had been achieved: Saddam's forces had been driven from Kuwait. The question then was whether the United States should end the conflict or move to Baghdad to topple Saddam Hussein's regime.

"I remember very clearly Colin Powell saying that this thing was turning into a ma.s.sacre," Robert Gates, then the deputy national security adviser, later recalled. "And that to continue it beyond a certain point would be un-American, and he even used the word unchivalrous."3 Others in the administration, including Secretary of State James Baker, said they believed Saddam had suffered such a thorough defeat that he would not be able to retain power. Others in the administration, including Secretary of State James Baker, said they believed Saddam had suffered such a thorough defeat that he would not be able to retain power.4 Bush agreed, and drew the war to a quick close. After the war ended, President Bush urged Iraqis to "take matters into their own hands" when it came to the supposedly defeated dictator. With the administration's encouragement, pro-democracy elements in Iraq twice rose up in an effort to topple Saddam's regime. Bush agreed, and drew the war to a quick close. After the war ended, President Bush urged Iraqis to "take matters into their own hands" when it came to the supposedly defeated dictator. With the administration's encouragement, pro-democracy elements in Iraq twice rose up in an effort to topple Saddam's regime.*

As part of the U.S.-Iraqi cease-fire agreement, General Norman Schwarzkopf allowed the Iraqis to operate helicopters, supposedly for the purpose of withdrawing their troops. Saddam proceeded to use his helicopter guns.h.i.+ps to put down both of the revolts against his regime, ma.s.sacring tens of thousands of s.h.i.+a in the south and Kurdish Iraqis in the north. In Was.h.i.+ngton, some in the administration, including Wolfowitz, urged the Bush national security team to intervene and stop the ma.s.sacres. The President decided otherwise. "[I]t was not clear what purpose would have been achieved by getting ourselves mixed up in the middle of that," said Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.5 The rebels were quickly crushed by Saddam's forces in the spring of 1991, creating among many Iraqi dissidents a lasting sense of betrayal and distrust. The rebels were quickly crushed by Saddam's forces in the spring of 1991, creating among many Iraqi dissidents a lasting sense of betrayal and distrust.

For his part, Saddam Hussein came to believe that the United States lacked the commitment to follow through on its rhetoric. He saw America as unwilling to take the risks necessary for an invasion of Iraq. As he would explain to his interrogators after his capture in December 2003, Saddam had concluded that America was a paper tiger. He interpreted the first Bush administration's decision not to march into Baghdad as proof that he had triumphed in what he called the "mother of all battles" against the mightiest military power in world history. Looking back, an opportunity to take care of the problem before it turned into a larger crisis was missed and the tyrant was emboldened.

By 1992, a U.S. presidential election year, Bill Clinton, the politically astute young governor of Arkansas, accused President George H. W. Bush and his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, of being "soft" on Iraq. I was interested in this debate, as I had played a role in the drama when I met with Saddam Hussein as President Ronald Reagan's Middle East envoy. Clinton may have been looking to burnish his national security credentials by trying to appear tougher in foreign policy than the Bush administration. Clinton's running mate, Tennessee Senator Albert Gore, Jr., went even further than Clinton, accusing President George H. W. Bush of deliberately concealing the extent of Saddam's ties to terrorism, his attacks on U.S. interests, and his efforts to develop a nuclear weapon.6 Clinton and Gore pledged that their administration would be under no illusions when it came to dealing with Saddam. Supporters of the 1992 Democratic presidential ticket exploited the poor economic news of the day by distributing a b.u.mper sticker that read: saddam hussein still has his job. do you? Clinton and Gore pledged that their administration would be under no illusions when it came to dealing with Saddam. Supporters of the 1992 Democratic presidential ticket exploited the poor economic news of the day by distributing a b.u.mper sticker that read: saddam hussein still has his job. do you?

A campaign to take Baghdad and oust Saddam was a daunting notion. Saddam had options if U.S. forces had marched to Baghdad in 1991, including the use of chemical or biological weapons against our forces. The senior Bush also pointed out that regime change in Baghdad had not been among the U.S. goals when the pledge to liberate Kuwait was first made. The administration felt it would not have full coalition support if it decided to continue on to Baghdad.

Others I respected had a different view. While still British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher had famously warned President George H. W. Bush not to "go wobbly" after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. But the formidable Thatcher had been voted out of office before the war was concluded. She seemed unhappy with the result in Iraq. "There is the aggressor, Saddam Hussein, still in power," she later observed. Contrasting his fate to Bush's and hers, she noted, "There is the President of the United States, no longer in power. There is the Prime Minister of Britain, who did quite a lot to get things there, no longer in power. I wonder who won?"7 Colin Powell, who had played such a prominent role in the decision not to attempt regime change, responded to the criticism. "[I]n due course, Saddam Hussein will not be there," he predicted. "And when that happens, all this interesting second-guessing will seem quite irrelevant."8

CHAPTER 30

Out of the Box.

In the first Gulf War's aftermath, Iraq remained a festering problem. Though its army had been defeated in Kuwait, the regime remained intact. In an attempt to keep Saddam Hussein in check, and to pressure him to comply with demands by the United Nations, the Security Council imposed economic sanctions banning trade with Iraq, including in oil. The United States, Britain, and France imposed UN-sanctioned no-fly zones over the Kurdish-populated areas in northern Iraq and the s.h.i.+te-populated region in southern Iraq. American, British, and-initially-French aircraft patrolled the zones regularly.*

Undeterred, Saddam continued to use brutality on a ma.s.sive scale. After suppressing the s.h.i.+te and Kurdish uprisings in 1991, Saddam drained the marshlands of southern Iraq, turning the region into a salt-encrusted desert. His purpose was to punish the "marsh Arabs" for their support of the rebellion against him. He drove some 150,000 Iraqis from their homes. His intelligence services were merciless in torturing suspected opponents. Arbitrary arrests and unexplained disappearances were commonplace. He built rape rooms to bring "dishonor" to the female members of families suspected of opposition to him.* And before long the Iraqi military began a near daily routine of firing on coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones. And before long the Iraqi military began a near daily routine of firing on coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones.

Saddam's regime claimed it had destroyed its a.r.s.enals of proscribed weapons, but the United Nations weapons inspectors were skeptical. Iraqi officials spied on the inspectors, sanitized suspect sites before the teams arrived, and barred them from examining Saddam's vast palace complexes. He reorganized his biological weapons program creatively by closing his military-run weapons facilities while creating dual-use plants capable of making products for both civilian and military use.2 Facilities that produced fertilizer and antibiotics, for example, could be retooled quickly to create chemical and biological weapons. By 1998, Saddam had stopped cooperating with the UN inspectors altogether, effectively forcing them out of the country and ending even a pretense of complying with the UN Security Council's demands. In response, the UN adopted still more resolutions expressing outrage at Saddam's "totally unacceptable" actions. Facilities that produced fertilizer and antibiotics, for example, could be retooled quickly to create chemical and biological weapons. By 1998, Saddam had stopped cooperating with the UN inspectors altogether, effectively forcing them out of the country and ending even a pretense of complying with the UN Security Council's demands. In response, the UN adopted still more resolutions expressing outrage at Saddam's "totally unacceptable" actions.3 But few nations, other than the United States and Great Britain, appeared willing to do much, if anything, to enforce the UN resolutions. But few nations, other than the United States and Great Britain, appeared willing to do much, if anything, to enforce the UN resolutions.

In January 1998, I joined a group of former national security officials in signing a letter to President Clinton that called for stronger action against Saddam's regime.4 "The only acceptable strategy," our letter read, "is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of ma.s.s destruction." For the short term, we endorsed military strikes on suspected weapons facilities. For the long term, we called for removing Saddam and his regime. "The only acceptable strategy," our letter read, "is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of ma.s.s destruction." For the short term, we endorsed military strikes on suspected weapons facilities. For the long term, we called for removing Saddam and his regime.5 Later in 1998, large bipartisan majorities in each house of the U.S. Congress generally endorsed the policies recommended in our letter to Clinton. The Iraq Liberation Act declared that the goal of U.S. policy should be "to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power." The U.S. House of Representatives approved that legislation by a vote of 360 to 38. It pa.s.sed the Senate without a single dissenting vote. Clinton signed the legislation into law. Regime change in Iraq was now the official policy of the United States. It pa.s.sed the Senate without a single dissenting vote. Clinton signed the legislation into law. Regime change in Iraq was now the official policy of the United States.

Even as Clinton endorsed regime change, some administration officials contended that the existing UN economic sanctions had kept Saddam reasonably under control-"in a box," as Clinton's Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, put it.6 However, the sanctions administered through the UN's Oil-for-Food program had loopholes big enough to drive trucks through. The UN was generating billions of dollars in illicit, unrestricted funds for Saddam Hussein, who used the cash to finance, among other things, his dual-use weapons facilities. However, the sanctions administered through the UN's Oil-for-Food program had loopholes big enough to drive trucks through. The UN was generating billions of dollars in illicit, unrestricted funds for Saddam Hussein, who used the cash to finance, among other things, his dual-use weapons facilities.7 The so-called Oil-for-Food program became one of the greatest scams perpetrated in the six decades of the United Nation's existence. The so-called Oil-for-Food program became one of the greatest scams perpetrated in the six decades of the United Nation's existence.8 When the second Bush administration came into office in January 2001, the Iraqi "containment" policy was in tatters. When the second Bush administration came into office in January 2001, the Iraqi "containment" policy was in tatters.

Various commentators a.s.serted that Clinton's successor, George W. Bush, was intent on "fixing" his father's error of leaving Saddam in power.9 From what I saw, that was not the case. Before his inauguration, when I met with the President-elect in Austin, Texas to discuss defense policy, the subject of Iraq did not even come up. The first person I remember mentioning the issue to me in 2001 was Clinton's outgoing Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen. He and the senior military officers in the Clinton administration were fully aware of the dangers our aircraft crews faced in the skies over Iraq. Despite the risks, Cohen believed that discontinuing our patrols of the no-fly zones was not an option. It would be a victory for Saddam and further erode an already fraying coalition of nations committed to containment of his brutal regime. From what I saw, that was not the case. Before his inauguration, when I met with the President-elect in Austin, Texas to discuss defense policy, the subject of Iraq did not even come up. The first person I remember mentioning the issue to me in 2001 was Clinton's outgoing Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen. He and the senior military officers in the Clinton administration were fully aware of the dangers our aircraft crews faced in the skies over Iraq. Despite the risks, Cohen believed that discontinuing our patrols of the no-fly zones was not an option. It would be a victory for Saddam and further erode an already fraying coalition of nations committed to containment of his brutal regime.

Iraq's repeated efforts to shoot down our aircraft weighed heavily on my mind. Iraq was the only nation in the world that was attacking the U.S. military on a daily basis-in fact, more than two thousand times from January 2000 to September 2002.10 I was concerned, as were the CENTCOM commander and the Joint Chiefs, that one of our aircraft would soon be shot down and its crew killed or captured. I was concerned, as were the CENTCOM commander and the Joint Chiefs, that one of our aircraft would soon be shot down and its crew killed or captured.* In my first months back at the Pentagon, I asked General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to brief me on CENTCOM's plans in the event Iraq successfully brought down one of our planes. The plan, code-named Desert Badger, was seriously limited. Its goal was to rescue the crew of a downed aircraft-but it had no component to inflict any damage or to send any kind of message to Saddam Hussein that such provocations were unacceptable. Our friends in the region had criticized previous American responses to Iraqi aggression as weak and indecisive and had advised us that our enemies had taken comfort from America's timidity. The Desert Badger plan was clear evidence of that problem. I asked Shelton and General Franks to have their planners come up with a range of other options the President could consider. If an aircraft was downed, I wanted to be sure we had ideas for the President that would enable him to inflict a memorable cost. The new proposals I ordered included attacks on Iraq's air defense systems and their command-and-control facilities to enable us to cripple the regime's abilities to attack our planes. In my first months back at the Pentagon, I asked General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to brief me on CENTCOM's plans in the event Iraq successfully brought down one of our planes. The plan, code-named Desert Badger, was seriously limited. Its goal was to rescue the crew of a downed aircraft-but it had no component to inflict any damage or to send any kind of message to Saddam Hussein that such provocations were unacceptable. Our friends in the region had criticized previous American responses to Iraqi aggression as weak and indecisive and had advised us that our enemies had taken comfort from America's timidity. The Desert Badger plan was clear evidence of that problem. I asked Shelton and General Franks to have their planners come up with a range of other options the President could consider. If an aircraft was downed, I wanted to be sure we had ideas for the President that would enable him to inflict a memorable cost. The new proposals I ordered included attacks on Iraq's air defense systems and their command-and-control facilities to enable us to cripple the regime's abilities to attack our planes.

Several weeks into the administration we had reason to signal to Baghdad that the days of mild and ineffective U.S. responses to their repeated provocations were coming to a close. Iraq was working to strengthen its air defense and radar capabilities in the no-fly zones by installing fixing-optic cables to make it more difficult for us to monitor their communications. The network was a direct challenge to the UN no-fly zones. On February 16, 2001, after Iraqi ground units had again targeted our aircraft, twenty-four American and British aircraft launched a coordinated attack on five Iraqi air defense sites, destroying them.*

Though Iraq was discussed occasionally at the senior levels of the administration, by the summer of 2001, U.S. policy remained essentially what it had been at the end of the Clinton administration-adrift. I decided to bring my questions about our inherited Iraq strategy to the members of the National Security Council to seek some clarity and presidential guidance.

In July, I sent a memo to Cheney, Powell, and Rice asking that we hold a princ.i.p.als committee meeting to discuss Iraq. In the doc.u.ment I raised two scenarios that could have the effect of forcing the President to make a decision on Iraq under unfavorable circ.u.mstances. The first involved its neighbor Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon, which would dramatically change the balance in the region and possibly spark a regionwide arms buildup. Second was the possibility that "Somebody, whether Iran, Iraq, or Usama Bin Laden, could take out the royal family in one or more of the Gulf states and change the regime and the balance, perhaps inviting Iranian or Iraqi troops in to protect them." I also noted that some event totally unforeseen by us and out of our control could force a U.S. decision on Iraq. I argued that we would be better off developing a policy well ahead of events that could overtake us. On the broader subject of Iraq, I outlined a range of possibilities for consideration: We can publicly acknowledge that sanctions don't work over extended periods and stop the pretense of having a policy that is keeping Saddam "in the box..."A second option would be to go to our moderate Arab friends, have a reappraisal and see whether they are willing to engage in a more robust policy. We would have to a.s.sert strong leaders.h.i.+p and convince them that we will see the project through and not leave them later to face a provoked, but still inc.u.mbent, Saddam. The risks of a serious regime-change policy must be weighed against the certainty of the danger of an increasingly bold and nuclear-armed Saddam in the near future.A third possibility perhaps is to take a crack at initiating contact with Saddam Hussein. He has his own interests. It may be that, for whatever reason, at his stage in life he might prefer to not have the hostility of the United States and the West and might be willing to make some accommodation. Opening a dialogue with Saddam would be an astonis.h.i.+ng departure for the USG, [U.S. government] although I did it for President Reagan [in] the mid-1980s. It would win praise from certain quarters, but might cause friends, especially those in the region, to question our strength, steadiness and judgment. And the likelihood of Saddam making and respecting an acceptable accommodation of our interests over a long period may be small.12 I thought a diplomatic overture on Iraq from the Bush administration-a "Nixon goes to China" approach-was worth suggesting to the President. As I wrote in my memo to the NSC princ.i.p.als, echoing my thoughts of some twenty years earlier when I visited Baghdad, "There ought to be a way for the U.S. to not be at loggerheads with both of the two most powerful nations in the Gulf-Iran and Iraq." Though the Iran-Iraq War had ended more than a decade earlier, the regimes in Tehran and Baghdad still viewed each other with hostility. Despite that animosity, both still had poor relations with the United States. I wondered if the right combination of blandishments and pressures might lead or compel Saddam Hussein toward an improved arrangement with America.* While a long shot, it was not out of the question. While a long shot, it was not out of the question.

The National Security Council never organized the comprehensive review of U.S.-Iraq policy I requested in the summer of 2001. We can't know how the Bush administration's Iraq policy might have evolved if 9/11 had not occurred, but that event compelled our government to make terrorism a focus of intense attention. It demanded that American officials reexamine national security policy comprehensively in light of the vulnerabilities the attack exposed. It forced the still new administration to recognize the special danger posed by nations that both supported terrorist groups and possessed or pursued weapons of ma.s.s destruction.

Though intelligence did not report that Saddam was tightly connected to al-Qaida or that he was involved in the 9/11 attack, Iraq was included in almost any a.n.a.lysis of state supporters of terrorism. Iraq had been on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terror since 1990. The regime's links to individual terrorists and terrorist groups earned Iraq its place on the "axis of evil" list.14 When I was queried by reporters on links between Iraq and terrorists, I referred to an uncla.s.sified written statement I had requested of George Tenet and that was subsequently prepared by the CIA. The paper was taken directly from Tenet's uncla.s.sified conclusions provided to Congress, which stated: We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa'ida going back a decade.

Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa'ida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression.

Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa'ida members, including some that have been in Baghdad.

We have credible reporting that al-Qa'ida leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qa'ida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.15 Tenet, the CIA, and members of the Bush administration were certainly not the only ones thinking about possible linkages. A few hours after the 9/11 attack, James Woolsey, CIA director under President Clinton, raised the question of whether Saddam was involved.16 ABC News, the ABC News, the Guardian Guardian newspaper, and other media outlets floated similar questions prominently. Their queries were not unreasonable. At the time Saddam was offering twenty-five-thousand-dollar bonuses to the families of suicide bombers to encourage them to attack Israel. He allowed terrorist groups such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Palestine Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Arab Liberation Front to operate within Iraq's borders. newspaper, and other media outlets floated similar questions prominently. Their queries were not unreasonable. At the time Saddam was offering twenty-five-thousand-dollar bonuses to the families of suicide bombers to encourage them to attack Israel. He allowed terrorist groups such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Palestine Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Arab Liberation Front to operate within Iraq's borders.17 During the 1990s, terrorists supported by Saddam struck in Rome and Vienna, killing Americans and Israelis. Saddam gave refuge to terrorists on the run, like Abu Nidal, whose group was responsible for some nine hundred deaths and casualties, including a number of Americans, in attacks in more than twenty countries. During the 1990s, terrorists supported by Saddam struck in Rome and Vienna, killing Americans and Israelis. Saddam gave refuge to terrorists on the run, like Abu Nidal, whose group was responsible for some nine hundred deaths and casualties, including a number of Americans, in attacks in more than twenty countries.18 Abu Abbas, who hijacked the cruise liner Abu Abbas, who hijacked the cruise liner Achille Lauro Achille Lauro and murdered an American citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, was living openly and safely in Baghdad. and murdered an American citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, was living openly and safely in Baghdad.

Doc.u.ments discovered after the coalition's invasion of Iraq in 2003 shed more light on the depth of the regime's linkages with terrorism. As far back as January 1993, for example, Saddam had ordered the formation of "a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil; especially Somalia."19 Saddam used his paramilitary group, the Fedayeen Saddam, to train thousands of terrorists to be deployed both inside and outside of Iraq's borders. Saddam used his paramilitary group, the Fedayeen Saddam, to train thousands of terrorists to be deployed both inside and outside of Iraq's borders.20 While the idea of Iraq working with al-Qaida to inflict harm on the United States did not seem to be much of a stretch, in my public remarks I stayed close to the CIA's official a.s.sessment. While the idea of Iraq working with al-Qaida to inflict harm on the United States did not seem to be much of a stretch, in my public remarks I stayed close to the CIA's official a.s.sessment.

My concerns about Iraq went beyond Saddam's support of terrorism or any involvement with al-Qaida. It went beyond his savage oppression and genocidal acts against his own people. My view rested on the fact that previous attempts to reduce the risks Saddam posed had failed. The UN sanctions that had checked Iraqi ambitions in the 1990s were crumbling. Further, the sanctions were punis.h.i.+ng the Iraqi people more than they were disadvantaging Saddam Hussein and, as a result, international support for the sanctions had waned. Saddam's belligerence was one of the main reasons we had kept U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, which had fueled bin Laden's propaganda. Saddam's long record of aggression and regional ambition were not in doubt, and there were no indications that he had changed. If anything, Saddam seemed emboldened by a decade of UN and American acquiescence. It was increasingly clear that Iraq's continued defiance of the United Nations would further weaken that inst.i.tution and encourage other dangerous regimes to follow suit.

In the aftermath of 9/11 and our changed global environment, I wanted updated thinking about U.S. interests and options. I asked Douglas Feith, the undersecretary of defense for policy, to consider the broader principles involved, not just Iraq's history under Saddam. Among other questions, I asked: What steps should the United States consider taking-when, and with whom? Is it proper to act alone? What about the argument that we should try to obtain approval from the UN Security Council? When is it reasonable to conclude that all means short of war have been tried and have failed? Is preemptive action to forestall the threat then justified?

Feith was the right person for the a.s.signment. He listened carefully to views contrary to his own and could reformulate them and present them respectfully and accurately. He advised that even those friendly to the United States and sensitive to our security interests worried about a world in which the American president could decide to bring about regime change by force in country after country. I understood that concern. The Bush doctrine of preemption, or more precisely, antic.i.p.atory self-defense, could not be seen as a license for an American president to exercise unchecked military power on a whim. After all, the Founding Fathers saw unchecked power as the greatest danger to human liberty. Our Const.i.tution created a system of checks and balances in the hope of ensuring that no president, legislative body, or court could accrue enough power to overwhelm the others. Feith and his policy team formulated these thoughts in a 2002 memo t.i.tled "Sovereignty and Antic.i.p.atory Self-Defense."21 In the twenty-first century, the idea that countries could be left alone unless and until they actually launched an aggressive war had to have exceptions. The lethality of modern weapons and the stated intent of terrorists to use them made it difficult to sustain that traditional view. Regimes with records of aggression and dishonesty, and which had or were working toward WMD capabilities, could inflict far more ma.s.sive damage than ever before. An Iranian nuclear strike on the small state of Israel, for example, could destroy so much of the nation that Israel might be unable to survive as a viable state. Could a responsible Israeli prime minister allow that to occur by waiting until after a nuclear missile was launched? Nuclear or biological material covertly pa.s.sed to a terrorist organization could be detonated or released in one or more of our cities, killing millions, bringing our economy to a halt, and effectively suspending our country's cherished civil liberties. Could an American president sit back, wait, and take that risk?

In our system of governance, U.S. presidents, even when invoking preemption, are still accountable to the American people and subject to the internal checks inherent in the American political system. A president has to make decisions with an eye to the powers of the Congress and the courts, as well as the increasingly large role of the media, the internet, and other nongovernmental actors.22 Most importantly, a U.S. president must face public opinion and the consequences that come with elections. Preemptive military action or antic.i.p.atory self-defense undertaken by the United States also requires allies-including bases, overflight rights, transit routes, shared intelligence, and logistical support. While not legal checks, these were practical checks we all needed to keep in mind. Most importantly, a U.S. president must face public opinion and the consequences that come with elections. Preemptive military action or antic.i.p.atory self-defense undertaken by the United States also requires allies-including bases, overflight rights, transit routes, shared intelligence, and logistical support. While not legal checks, these were practical checks we all needed to keep in mind.

A secretary of defense and senior military officials in the chain of command are often considered by outsiders to be the most vocal advocates of the use of military force. I've found that more often the opposite is true. Since those in a position of responsibility for the troops understand well the costs of war, they can often be reluctant war fighters. I supported military action against al-Qaida and the Taliban because they had left us no alternative. Saddam, to my mind, was different. I thought we might be able to find other ways of bringing about regime change in Iraq.

On September 21, 2001, I wrote myself a note. "At the right moment," I stated, "we may want to give Saddam Hussein a way out for his family to live in comfort."23 I thought an aggressive diplomatic effort, coupled by a threat of military force, just might convince Saddam and those around him to seek exile. By 2002, the Iraqi regime had seen what we were able to do in Afghanistan. If there were enough rational individuals around Saddam, they might be convinced that George W. Bush was not bluffing and was committed to the disarmament of Saddam Hussein. I hoped the world could stand united in that message. That hope was doomed to disappointment. I thought an aggressive diplomatic effort, coupled by a threat of military force, just might convince Saddam and those around him to seek exile. By 2002, the Iraqi regime had seen what we were able to do in Afghanistan. If there were enough rational individuals around Saddam, they might be convinced that George W. Bush was not bluffing and was committed to the disarmament of Saddam Hussein. I hoped the world could stand united in that message. That hope was doomed to disappointment.

CHAPTER 31

The Case for Regime Change.

Fifteen days after 9/11, the President asked me to join him in the Oval Office alone. Our meetings almost always included some combination of the vice president, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of state, the national security adviser, or the White House chief of staff-but not on the morning of September 26.

The President leaned back in the black leather chair behind his desk. He asked that I take a look at the shape of our military plans on Iraq. He knew the Joint Chiefs and I were concerned about Saddam Hussein's attacks on our aircraft in the northern and southern no-fly zones, but two weeks after the worst terrorist attack in our nation's history, those of us in the Department of Defense were fully occupied.

He wanted the options to be "creative," which I took to mean that he wanted something different from the ma.s.sive land force a.s.sembled during the 1991 Gulf War. I certainly did not get the impression the President had made up his mind on the merits of toppling Saddam Hussein's regime. In fact, at the September 15 NSC meeting at Camp David days earlier when Iraq had been raised, he had specifically kept the focus on Afghanistan.

I told him I would review CENTCOM's existing Iraq plan and speak to General Franks about updating it.

There was another matter President Bush wanted to discuss with me that morning. "d.i.c.k told me about your son," he said. "Are you and Joyce doing okay?"

Although Nick had been in recovery from drug addiction at the time of Bush's inauguration, his condition had been fragile, and he had relapsed. He had tried several times to turn his life around, but by the late summer of 2001, he was bottoming out again. He would disappear for periods, turning up occasionally in various towns across the West. Joyce and I had left Was.h.i.+ngton at the end of August to spend Labor Day weekend in New Mexico. After being out of touch for weeks, Nick reappeared in Taos while we were there.

In a long, painful visit, we again tried to convince him to seek treatment. My inclination was to do whatever it took to get him clean, even if it was against his wishes. Joyce understood better than I did that addiction was a disease that people eventually have to overcome on their own. As parents we could only offer support, encouragement, and a direction. Nick was weighing heavily on my mind when I returned to Was.h.i.+ngton in early September. One part of me was always thinking of him and the terrible state he was in. But in the days after 9/11, being distracted wasn't an option.

On September 18, a week before my meeting with President Bush, Nick had called Joyce from Taos. "Happy birthday, Mom," he said. He then told her he was leaving to check into a treatment center. Valerie's husband, our son-in-law Paul Richard, and a friend of ours in Taos had agreed to take him. Nick said they had convinced him, and he was ready.

I had shared the information on Nick with Cheney, who had apparently pa.s.sed it on to Bush. Because I knew the President had a great deal confronting him, I was surprised that he was mentioning our son, but he spoke with such concern that my family troubles seemed to be the only thing on his mind.

I told the President the activity surrounding 9/11 had not given me much time to think about our situation. But Joyce and I desperately wanted Nick's treatment to be successful this time.

"I love Nick so much," I said.

"You have my full support and prayers," Bush said.

What had happened to Nick-coupled with the wounds to our country and the Pentagon-all started to hit me. At that moment, I couldn't speak. And I was unable to hold back the emotions that until then I had shared only with Joyce. I had not imagined I might choke up in a meeting with the President of the United States, but at that moment George W. Bush wasn't just the President. He was a compa.s.sionate human being who had a sense of what Joyce and I were going through.

Bush rose from his chair, walked around his desk, and put his arm around me.*

Because I had been reviewing the various war plans regularly, I knew no one would think it out of the ordinary for me to request a briefing on our existing options on Iraq. As a precaution, however, I asked for briefings to cover several contingencies in various parts of the world.

As the CENTCOM briefers moved through their PowerPoint slides on the on-the-shelf Iraq war plan, it quickly became clear that it was only a slightly modified version of the one used during the first Gulf War. It called for roughly the same number of forces used then-nearly half a million U.S. troops to be marshaled into the region over many months. They were to invade through Iraq's southern desert, much as they had in 1991. Because the firepower and precision of U.S. forces had increased substantially since then, the plan would represent a vastly more lethal force in 2003. Someone in the briefing described the plan, appropriately I thought, as "Desert Storm on Steroids." Someone in the briefing described the plan, appropriately I thought, as "Desert Storm on Steroids."

This was not what the Commander in Chief had told me he was looking for. It was a stale, slow-building, and dated plan that Iraqi forces would expect. A decade had come and gone since the Gulf War, yet the war plan seemed to have been frozen in time. Everyone in the briefing recognized that CENTCOM and Joint Staff planners would need to do a major overhaul.

I did not hear any more about Iraq for two months. Then, on November 21, 2001, a week after coalition forces had driven the Taliban from Kabul, the President called me aside at the end of an NSC meeting. He led me into a small, unoccupied office a few feet from the Situation Room, closed the door, and sat down.

"Where do we stand on the Iraq planning?" he asked.

I told him I had been briefed on the existing plan, and that it was very much like one for the Gulf War a decade ago. As I expected, it was not what the President was seeking. "To make progress," I said, "I need to engage others in the Pentagon and at CENTCOM to update the Iraq plan. It will need a good deal of work."

"That's fine," Bush replied. I told him that CENTCOM could update it in the normal order of things, but that they would need to work with intelligence officials as well. The latest intelligence on Iraqi military capabilities, suspected WMD sites, and other targets would shape how CENTCOM refas.h.i.+oned the plan. That meant I would need to talk to Tenet, and senior military officials would need to have discussions with their counterparts at the Agency.

The President said he didn't want me to communicate with people outside of DoD for the time being, and that he would personally talk to Tenet and others at the right moment.

Back at the Pentagon, I asked Myers to stop by my office. I knew his focus at the time was almost exclusively on Afghanistan. Once we were alone, I told him about our new guidance: "d.i.c.k, the President wants to know what kind of operations plan we have for Iraq."1 Myers showed no surprise. This was a request from the Commander in Chief, and the General's instinct was to get to work. Myers had been with me when I had been briefed on the existing Iraq plan. He agreed it needed a thorough reworking. We both knew that CENTCOM's planners were already taxed, given their ongoing work on Afghanistan. Nonetheless, I told him we should have Franks and CENTCOM bring the plan in line with the current capabilities of our military and with the latest intelligence on Iraq.

After receiving his new a.s.signment from Myers, Franks took a look at the current Iraq war plan and confirmed our opinion that it was seriously out-of-date. In fact, I knew of no military officials who believed that the "Desert Storm on Steroids" war plan would be appropriate for the current circ.u.mstances. Saddam's overall military capability had eroded since Desert Storm. At the same time, American military capabilities in precision-guided weapons had improved substantially. Also in my mind was the fact that in the 1991 Gulf War, enormous quant.i.ties of equipment and other materiel sent to the Gulf were never used.*

One thing that was clear was that Iraq would require a great many more troops on the ground than CENTCOM had marshaled in Afghanistan. Saddam's forces, unlike the Taliban's, were sizable. The Republican Guard contained formidable, well-trained armored divisions. And in Iraq, with the exception of the Kurds who kept to the north, there were no effective anti-regime forces like the Afghan Northern Alliance and Pashtun militias ready to help topple Saddam. By and large, the Iraqi opposition was disarmed, in exile, or dead-the last being Saddam's preference.

By Christmas 2001, Franks was ready to brief the President on an initial cut. Bush invited us to his ranch in Crawford, Texas, on December 28. With the President's permission, I opted to join them by video teleconference and have Franks travel to the ranch alone. The President and Franks rarely had a chance to talk to each other one-on-one. I wanted this visit to be an opportunity for them to do just that.

When Myers and I joined the teleconference, the President and Franks seemed to be getting along well. Bush's respect for him was bolstered by Franks' quick and successful military campaign in Afghanistan. It also was clear that Franks' experience in the Afghan campaign had honed his capabilities and built up his confidence.

I often thought of Dwight D. Eisenhower's insightful observation that "plans are worthless, but planning is everything," which I had adopted in my collection of Rumsfeld's Rules. With the first contact with the enemy, elements of any plan generally have to be tossed aside. Split-second improvisation, experience, and leaders.h.i.+p take over. Still, careful preparation is invaluable. Becoming acquainted with facts, terrain, people, capabilities, and possibilities helps military leaders cope and adapt, as they must, when new circ.u.mstances inevitably arise and it becomes necessary to adjust, recalibrate, or even discard the original plan.

I suggested that Franks start by focusing on the key a.s.sumptions underlying his plan-that is, what he expected to be happening inside and outside Iraq if war came. I believed that key a.s.sumptions needed to be the foundation of any contingency plan, but I had found that military planners did not always cite them or give them the probing, intense consideration they merited. In meetings at the Pentagon, I emphasized that failing to examine the a.s.sumptions on which a plan is based can start a planning process based on incorrect premises, and then proceed perfectly logically to incorrect conclusions.3 I was particularly concerned, for example, when I was shown the contingency plan for a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula. By then our intelligence community's a.s.sessment was that the North Korean regime had at least one or several nuclear weapons, yet the old war plan did not factor that absolutely essential a.s.sumption into its calculus.

Similarly, I urged the military planners to think carefully about the range of possible Iraqi responses to possible U.S. military actions. This iterative process was also happening at levels well below ours. Franks was getting input from State Department advisers and CIA a.n.a.lysts present at CENTCOM. With a continually evolving diplomatic and intelligence landscape, the Iraq plan was never fixed. Planning would take place until President Bush actually made his final decision and signed an order to execute, and on every day thereafter as new circ.u.mstances evolved.

In Texas, Franks went through each of his key a.s.sumptions, giving the President an opportunity to consider them and comment. As was usually the case, many of the major a.s.sumptions CENTCOM relied on in the political-military sphere came from the intelligence community. Military planners are not necessarily experts in the language, culture, history, and politics of the people in the Defense Department's wide and varied spheres of operation. One a.s.sumption was that Iraq possessed WMD, and that advancing U.S. troops could come under chemical or biological attack. Another of Franks' considerations was that Saddam's most loyal forces might turn the capital into "Fortress Baghdad," leading to a long and b.l.o.o.d.y standoff with substantial risk to both the city's civilian population and to American troops fighting in the urban environment. Other a.s.sumptions in the plan included: some countries in the region would give cooperation and basing rights; Iraq could attack Israel in the event of a conflict; forces would need to number at least 100,000 before combat operations could begin; and regional threats like Syria and Iran would not become directly involved.

It was also an a.s.sumption that anti-Saddam opposition groups inside and outside of Iraq would favor a U.S. and coalition military effort. Though they were unlikely to be able to offer tangible military a.s.sistance, as the Northern Alliance had in Afghanistan, the opposition, with help from the Department of State, could form part of a provisional government, much as the Bonn process had led to a broad-based interim government in Afghanistan. Myers and I directed CENTCOM planners to begin thinking through a postwar plan, even in the preliminary phases.

On the operations side, Franks' plan called for an invasion force buildup of 145,000 troops over six months, which would be increased to 275,000 if and as needed. The President, the Joint Chiefs, and I stood ready to muster whatever number of troops Franks determined would be necessary to get the job done. He believed that Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and U.S. operations elsewhere could provide a degree of cover to allow him to bring forces forward and arrange them around the Middle East without creating a major stir. To counter the concern about a possible Fortress Baghdad scenario, Franks emphasized speed as one of his most important priorities once war began. If U.S. forces could begin an attack with an element of surprise and race to Baghdad, Saddam's forces might not have time to reinforce and arm their defensive positions there. A swift campaign would also help satisfy our Muslim friends in the region, who were concerned about domestic unrest if major combat operations against another Muslim nation were prolonged.

I thought Franks' December 2001 briefing was a solid early cut, considering the relatively short time he had had to prepare. Bush seemed satisfied as well. The President expressed the hope I shared that diplomacy would persuade the Iraqis to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. Franks, Myers, and I would happily throw many thousands of hours of work into the shredder if it meant the men and women of the U.S. military would not have to go to war. Nonetheless, we all believed, as the President did, that the intelligence about Iraq and Saddam's doc.u.mented history of aggression and deception were too unsettling to not at least be ready for a military confrontation if diplomacy were to fail.

Though the intelligence failures surrounding Iraq are now well-known, recent history is abundant with examples of flawed intelligence that have affected key national security decisions and contingency planning. They include, for example: the poor quality of the intelligence gathered on the ground in Vietnam; the underestimates of the scale of the Soviet Union's military efforts during the Cold War; a lack of awareness about the brewing Iranian revolution that forced the Shah, an American ally, to flee the country; the failure to detect preparations for India's nuclear test; and consistently underestimating the number of missiles that China had deployed along the Taiwan Straits. For Iraq, there was a similar pattern of intelligence estimates that had dangerously miscalculated Saddam's capabilities. In 1991, experts actually underestimated Saddam Hussein's nuclear capability. After the Gulf War, UN weapons inspectors were surprised to discover that Iraq had been no more than a year or two away from having enough fissile material to produce a nuclear bomb.*

Less than perfect intelligence reports are, of course, a fact of life for national security decision makers. Intelligence officials have some of the most difficult jobs in the world. Uncertainty, gaps in knowledge, and outright errors are inevitable. Targets are hostile and working to deceive and conceal the very information that is most sought after. Closed, repressive regimes and their terrorist allies can make their decisions in small, tightly controlled cliques without regard to public opinion, parliaments, or media scrutiny, making it particularly difficult to discover their intentions.

It wasn't only our enemies that compounded the intelligence community's challenges. Budget cuts during the 1990s amounting to 10 percent of the intelligence community's budget were a costly self-inflicted wound that weakened our capabilities for years, particularly in the area of human intelligence. I had worked with our intelligence agencies off and on over some three decades, and intensely when I chaired the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission in 1998. That experience was sobering. Compartmentalization hampered intelligence a.n.a.lysis. Policy makers did not engage sufficiently with intelligence professionals in setting intelligence priorities and asking informed questions about their a.n.a.lyses and conclusions.* In a unanimous letter to CIA Director Tenet, our bipartisan commission members shared our concerns about the quality of the intelligence community's products. In the letter we wrote: In a unanimous letter to CIA Director Tenet, our bipartisan commission members shared our concerns about the quality of the intelligence community's products. In the letter we wrote: Unless and until senior users take time to engage a.n.a.lysts, question their a.s.sumptions and methods, seek from them what they know, what they don't know and ask them their opinions-and do so without penalizing the a.n.a.lysts when their opinions differ from those of the user-senior users cannot have a substantial impact in improving the intelligence product they receive.5 What was unique about Iraq was that the intelligence community reported near total confidence in their conclusions. Their a.s.sessments appeared to be unusually consistent. In August 2002, Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin presented to the princ.i.p.als committee the intelligence community's judgments about Iraq's WMD activities. McLaughlin, a serious and measured career intelligence professional, described the situation in stark terms. According to my notes, his briefing concluded that: Iraq had reconst.i.tuted its facilities for biological and chemical weapons.

There were 3,200 tons of chemical weapons the regime previously had that remained unaccounted for.

Saddam had a mobile biological warfare capability, and a variety of means to deliver them, likely including UAVs.

Saddam had retained many of the same experts who had developed nuclear weapons prior to the Gulf War.

There was construction at old nuclear facilities, and Iraq was "clearly working" on fissile material, which meant that Saddam could have a nuclear weapon within one year.6 McLaughlin's briefing covered many of the same points that were emphasized in the intelligence community's a.n.a.lyses of Iraq's WMD programs, and later in Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN. As McLaughlin gave the Agency's official and authoritative briefing, I wrote a note to myself. It said "caution-strong case," but I added, "could be wrong."7 There were few qualifiers in the briefing. In the run-up to the war in Iraq, we heard a great deal about what our intelligence community knew or thought they knew, but not enough about what they knew they didn't know. There were few qualifiers in the briefing. In the run-up to the war in Iraq, we heard a great deal about what our intelligence community knew or thought they knew, but not enough about what they knew they didn't know.

Two months after McLaughlin's briefing, in October 2002, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the coordinating body for the U.S. intelligence community's a.n.a.lytical products, issued the authoritative National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. The NIE, which is now decla.s.sified, was an alarming report on Iraq's weapons systems. The report included the following: We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of ma.s.s destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.

Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.

Although we a.s.sess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies a.s.sess that Baghdad started reconst.i.tuting its nuclear program about the time that [UN] inspectors departed-December 1998.