Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 20

If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a year.

Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within three to six months these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.

Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an organization such as al-Qa'ida-with worldwide reach and extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a life-or-death struggle against the United States-could perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.

In such circ.u.mstances, he might decide that the extreme step of a.s.sisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a CBW [chemical or biological weapon] attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.8 American intelligence officials were joined in many of these startling a.s.sessments by intelligence services from other nations-Britain, Australia, Spain, Italy, and Poland among them-all of whom judged that Saddam's regime possessed WMD and was expanding its capabilities. Even Russia, China, Germany, and France, then skeptical of any military action against Iraq, agreed. "There is a problem-the probable possession of weapons of ma.s.s destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq," said French President Jacques Chirac. He added, "The international community is right... in having decided Iraq should be disarmed."9 On the subject of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, the German chief of intelligence actually held a grimmer view than the U.S. intelligence community: "It is our estimate that Iraq will have an atomic bomb in three years." On the subject of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, the German chief of intelligence actually held a grimmer view than the U.S. intelligence community: "It is our estimate that Iraq will have an atomic bomb in three years."10 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak cautioned General Franks that Saddam had biological weapons and would use them on American forces. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak cautioned General Franks that Saddam had biological weapons and would use them on American forces.11 A mult.i.tude of specific, seemingly credible reports, some even ill.u.s.trated with satellite photographs, provided supporting evidence. A mult.i.tude of specific, seemingly credible reports, some even ill.u.s.trated with satellite photographs, provided supporting evidence.

Early in the war, while major combat operations were still underway, I was asked on a news program if I was concerned about the failure to find WMD in Iraq. I had always tried to speak with reserve and precision on intelligence matters, but on this occasion, I made a misstatement. Recalling the CIA's designation of various "suspect" WMD sites in Iraq, I replied, "We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad."12 I should have used the phrase "suspect sites." My words have been quoted many times by critics of the war as an example of how the Bush administration misled the public. I should have used the phrase "suspect sites." My words have been quoted many times by critics of the war as an example of how the Bush administration misled the public.

One of the challenges for historians is distinguis.h.i.+ng the essential from the inessential, the predominant from the marginal, the characteristic from the exceptional. Promoters of the frequently repeated "Bush lied, people died" line have scoured a voluminous record of official statements on Iraqi WMD to compile a small string of comments-ill chosen or otherwise deficient-to try to depict the administration as purposefully misrepresenting the intelligence. While I made a few misstatements-in particular the one mentioned above-they were not common and certainly not characteristic. Other senior administration officials also did a reasonably good job of representing the intelligence community's a.s.sessments accurately in their public comments about Iraqi WMD, despite some occasionally imperfect formulations.

Intelligence evidence about WMD had a way of taking pride of place in the litany of reasons for going to war. In fact, that should have been only one of the many reasons. There was a long list of other charges against Saddam Hussein's regime-its support for terrorism, its attacks on American pilots in the no-fly zones, its violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, its history of aggression, and its crimes against its people. At one point I cautioned Torie Clarke, the a.s.sistant secretary of defense for public affairs, that the administration's spokespeople were not using all of the many arguments that had been presented against Iraq.13 Obviously the focus on WMD to the exclusion of almost all else was a public relations error that cost the administration dearly. Obviously the focus on WMD to the exclusion of almost all else was a public relations error that cost the administration dearly.

In October 2002, Congress pa.s.sed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq. This often overlooked but significant congressional action reflected a strong, broad, and bipartisan view that Saddam Hussein's regime would need to be toppled by force to protect the United States and international peace and security. Rather than focusing solely on WMD programs, the legislation listed twenty-three separate indictments against the regime. The points included: violating resolution of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population...

attempting in 1993 to a.s.sa.s.sinate former President Bush...

firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;...

members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;...

Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens.14 The House of Representatives pa.s.sed that authorization by a margin of 297 to 133. The legislation, in fact, garnered 47 more votes of support in the House than the congressional authorization of the 1991 Gulf War. The Senate vote-77 to 23-was similarly lopsided. In later years, when things got tough, some who supported the military force authorization tried to explain away their votes. They claimed they were hoodwinked and misled on the intelligence or that they didn't think the legislation had actually authorized military action. In the military there is a phrase accorded to people like that: You wouldn't want to be in a foxhole with them.

The views of a number of prominent legislators were in fact quite different before the war began than their later statements.

"We have no choice but to eliminate the threat," Senator Joe Biden said in August 2002. "This is a guy who is an extreme danger to the world."15 "In the four years since the inspectors," Senator Hillary Clinton stated, "intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program." Stepping into what would become a controversial issue, Clinton volunteered that Saddam "has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaida members."16 "When I vote to give the President of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein, it is because I believe that a deadly a.r.s.enal of weapons of ma.s.s destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat, to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region," said Ma.s.sachusetts Senator John Kerry, who later adopted a quite different tone as the Democratic Party's presidential standard-bearer in 2004.17 "Iraq's search for weapons of ma.s.s destruction has proven impossible to completely deter," said former vice president and 2000 Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore, "and we should a.s.sume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power."18 Three of the Democratic front-runners for president-from the 2000, 2004, and 2008 campaigns-made absolutely clear their conviction that Saddam Hussein was a threat to our country. Yet when opposing the Bush administration's efforts in Iraq became politically convenient, they acted as if they had never said any such thing.

Throughout 2002, General Franks briefed the National Security Council numerous times on the evolving war plan. The latest version of the plan called for a force of up to 450,000 U.S. troops for a ground invasion. During the plan's development, CENTCOM planners had come up with the idea of "on ramps" and "off ramps" that would allow Franks to increase or slow the flow of troops into Iraq depending on circ.u.mstances. Franks believed that speed was the key to success in Iraq, as it had proved to be in Afghanistan.

Before an NSC meeting at Camp David, on September 7, 2002, Colin Powell called Franks to say he intended to ask a question about troop levels for the initial invasion. I thought calling Franks beforehand was a thoughtful thing for Powell to do, so Franks would not be caught off guard.

Franks told me about Powell's phone call, and I told him to respond directly to every point that Powell or anyone else on the NSC might raise. If Powell had concerns, Franks and I wanted him to lay them out in front of everyone for a serious discussion.19 Powell was not only secretary of state, he was also a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who knew a good deal about invading Iraq. Powell was not only secretary of state, he was also a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who knew a good deal about invading Iraq.

Powell had long been a proponent of the doctrine of "overwhelming force," known variously as the Weinberger or Powell Doctrine. This approach sought to correct the problems created by President Lyndon Johnson's gradual escalation policy in Vietnam during the 1960s and the deployments of small contingents of troops to places like Lebanon and Grenada in the 1980s. I appreciated the merits of overwhelming force, but complex operations in the real world often don't adhere to hard-and-fast rules. I have found that there often seem to be exceptions even to the wisest doctrines. It is appealing to seek simplicity and relief from the burdens and risks of continually having to make difficult judgment calls. Faced with major decisions, senior officials-military and civilian-need to be careful not to follow doctrine mechanically instead of engaging their judgments.

At Camp David, despite his call to Franks, Powell did not raise any questions about troop levels, the war plan, or the numbers of troops in a postwar environment though press stories, to my great surprise, reported that Powell later indicated that he had.20 Instead, he expressed the thought that "long supply lines" might slow down the invasion. Instead, he expressed the thought that "long supply lines" might slow down the invasion.*

After everyone had an opportunity to comment, I surveyed the officials in the room from the Vice President to the Secretary of State to the National Security Adviser to the White House Chief of Staff to the Director of the CIA, and finally to the President. "I want all of you to be comfortable with this plan," I said. No one dissented. No reservations were voiced.

In addition to the 450,000 forces made available for deployment to the theater, the Iraq war plan, designated OPLAN 1003 Victor, authorized commanders to draw on thousands more U.S. forces in neighboring nations for support in logistics, intelligence, and communications. The plan called for 150,000 troops to be deployed immediately and an additional 300,000 kept in the pipeline as CENTCOM deemed necessary. Other troops would be supporting the ground forces from the air and sea. Additionally, we could count on support ranging from ground troops to overflight rights from forty-eight other nations.22 With nearly half a million ground troops available if necessary, this was not the "light footprint" war plan some critics would later claim it was. With nearly half a million ground troops available if necessary, this was not the "light footprint" war plan some critics would later claim it was.23 In the autumn of 2002, as troops and supplies were moved to the region, Franks, Myers, and I discussed a system called the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD, p.r.o.nounced "tip-fid") to manage deployments. It produced highly detailed plans for how and when specific units would be needed on overseas missions. Figuring out which reserve and active units and what supplies-literally hundreds of thousands of tons-were required for combat is an exceedingly complex task. Reserve units would have to be called up.* For every combat soldier-"the teeth" of the operation-there were large numbers of personnel needed for the support-"the tail." The TPFDD, as it existed, was an all-on or an all-off plan, with little flexibility in between. The problem was that we needed more than an on or off switch. We needed a rheostat that could ratchet up the American military presence in a way that complemented President Bush's diplomatic efforts. Our hope was that coordinated military and diplomatic pressure would persuade Saddam to back down and war could be avoided. For every combat soldier-"the teeth" of the operation-there were large numbers of personnel needed for the support-"the tail." The TPFDD, as it existed, was an all-on or an all-off plan, with little flexibility in between. The problem was that we needed more than an on or off switch. We needed a rheostat that could ratchet up the American military presence in a way that complemented President Bush's diplomatic efforts. Our hope was that coordinated military and diplomatic pressure would persuade Saddam to back down and war could be avoided.

On November 26, 2002, two days before Thanksgiving, Franks came to Myers and me with what he called the "mother of all deployment orders." It would have authorized the flow of 450,000 troops to the Persian Gulf region as envisioned by the TPFDD. Franks' proposal would have put the switch to full "on." The problem was that from a diplomatic standpoint, the timing was not good. The next day, UN inspectors were reentering Iraq for another round of inspections. This was a critical component of the President's diplomatic approach. If I approved sending several hundred thousand U.S. troops to the Gulf at that moment, Bush would be accused of being intent on war no matter the result of the inspections. Though it might help convince Saddam Hussein of the President's seriousness of purpose, it could rattle potential allies.

Another consideration was the effect of the proposed deployments on military families, active duty and reserves, as we moved into the Christmas holiday season. I was concerned about having tens of thousands of our soldiers s.h.i.+pping out and leaving their families right before Christmas and New Year's Day if there was no need to do so, which at that moment there was not.

I asked Franks if the plan could be adjusted to enable him to send troops to the region more selectively. This would help the troops and their families and be more supportive of the pace of the President's diplomatic efforts. It fell to General John Handy, the commander of U.S. Transportation Command, to improvise, by breaking up the TPFDD into smaller pieces and flowing the forces in at a more measured pace. Handy recognized the problem and deftly managed the task. Redesigning the flow of forces, rather than simply turning on the TPFDD, had its costs. Some logisticians complained about having their hard work sc.r.a.pped in favor of a different flow. I could understand their frustrations. There was an important lesson to be learned, though: Military deployments not only needed to be more sensitive to the lives of those being called up, but they also needed to be more flexible so as to combine military considerations with presidential diplomatic initiatives.

To gain broader international support if the President were to decide in favor of military action against Iraq, he knew it would be desirable to have the backing of the United Nations Security Council. Though the irony was missed by most people, it was the Security Council's own resolutions on Iraq that the supposedly unilateralist Bush administration and its allies were seeking to enforce. As diplomatically and politically useful as a Security Council use-of-force resolution might have been, it was not a necessary precursor to military action. American-led coalitions had used our military abroad without the UN Security Council's approval on many occasions under both Democratic and Republican presidents dating back to the 1948 Berlin airlift.*

There was little doubt that at least some of the nations on the UN Security Council would not take part in an effort to dislodge Saddam. Russia and China, in particular, were often opposed to American proposals. France sometimes joined them.25 Saddam's agents actively worked to cultivate their friends in Paris, Berlin, and Moscow by offering lucrative oil and other contracts. The French had an especially close, longstanding relations.h.i.+p with him. "France in particular," as Saddam put it when I met with him in 1983, "understood the Iraqi view." Saddam's agents actively worked to cultivate their friends in Paris, Berlin, and Moscow by offering lucrative oil and other contracts. The French had an especially close, longstanding relations.h.i.+p with him. "France in particular," as Saddam put it when I met with him in 1983, "understood the Iraqi view."26 French leaders in industry, and perhaps some in politics, not only "understood" Iraq; they came to profit handsomely from it. President Jacques Chirac, for one, seemed comfortable with Saddam, whom he had shown around French nuclear power facilities in the 1970s. He had also negotiated an agreement to sell Iraq a nuclear reactor. In the decades that followed, France sold some $1. 5 billion of military equipment to Iraq. French leaders in industry, and perhaps some in politics, not only "understood" Iraq; they came to profit handsomely from it. President Jacques Chirac, for one, seemed comfortable with Saddam, whom he had shown around French nuclear power facilities in the 1970s. He had also negotiated an agreement to sell Iraq a nuclear reactor. In the decades that followed, France sold some $1. 5 billion of military equipment to Iraq.27 I don't doubt that Iraq's intransigence in defying the United Nations had been at least in part a result of Saddam's belief that the UN Security Council was ineffective, and that his friends there would continue to give him political cover. He was right-almost. I don't doubt that Iraq's intransigence in defying the United Nations had been at least in part a result of Saddam's belief that the UN Security Council was ineffective, and that his friends there would continue to give him political cover. He was right-almost.

By the end of 2002, the United Nations had reached a new low. The organization's members seemed to have abandoned judgment and elected Libya, one of the world's most backward dictators.h.i.+ps, to chair the UN Commission on Human Rights. To top that, the UN made Iraq the chair of the UN Disarmament Commission. This put Saddam in the driver's seat of a body responsible for examining whether he was complying with disarmament obligations to the UN. And when it came to Iraq, the UN Oil-for-Food program had become a sad story of corruption and lies, as a later independent investigation established.*

As frustrating as the organization could be, it was not in America's interests to see the United Nations follow the path of its predecessor, the League of Nations, the organization that watched as Italy's Fascist forces invaded Abyssinia in 1935. President Bush wanted to rally the United Nations to support a U.S.-led effort to enforce the Security Council's resolutions on Iraq. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a persuasive advocate, b.u.t.tressed Bush's efforts. Bush and Blair, Powell and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw coaxed and cajoled the members of the UN Security Council on the matter. Finally, on November 8, 2002, the Security Council voted 15-0 to support Resolution 1441. The resolution condemned Iraq's weapons programs, demanded that Iraq reopen suspected weapons facilities for inspection, and threatened "serious consequences" if Iraq failed to provide the UN a comprehensive list of the WMD it retained. The resolution stated that this was Iraq's "final opportunity" to comply with the international community.29 There had been no fewer than seventeen UN resolutions demanding that Saddam comply with various requirements since 1991. They specified that his regime demonstrate that it had: destroyed its WMD a.r.s.enal; ended support for international terrorists; stopped threatening neighbors; and ceased oppressing Kurds and s.h.i.+tes. Because nothing seemed to result from their noncompliance with the earlier resolutions, Iraq concluded, not unreasonably, that it could safely respond to this latest, UN Resolution 1441, with still another shrug.

Weeks later Saddam Hussein's regime produced a contemptuously incomplete declaration of their weapons programs. In December 2002, President Bush concluded that Iraq was in "material breach" of UN Resolution 1441.30 United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix reported to the UN that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." Blix also said that based on an Iraqi Air Force doc.u.ment and Iraq's former claims, one thousand tons of toxic nerve gas, one of the most lethal chemical weapons, remained "unaccounted for." Since Iraq had actually used nerve gas before in the Iran-Iraq War, there was every reason to believe the regime still possessed it. United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix reported to the UN that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." Blix also said that based on an Iraqi Air Force doc.u.ment and Iraq's former claims, one thousand tons of toxic nerve gas, one of the most lethal chemical weapons, remained "unaccounted for." Since Iraq had actually used nerve gas before in the Iran-Iraq War, there was every reason to believe the regime still possessed it.31 Though Resolution 1441 was written as Iraq's last chance to come into compliance with its obligations to the United Nations-the tip-off to most people was the phrase "final opportunity"-some members of the Security Council proceeded to insist that there needed to be still another vote on an additional "this time we really mean it" resolution before they would sign onto any military action. Prime Minister Blair seemed to believe that it might be possible to obtain such a resolution and, along with it, additional international support, most notably from France and Germany. The other way to look at it-and perhaps the way Saddam did-was that this was an opportunity to further drag out the process.

Seeing the disappointing state of play, at one point Bush told me with a rueful smile, "This is a quagmire of my own making." In fact the diplomatic efforts surrounding the final months before combat operations began proved to not be anyone's finest hour.

CHAPTER 32

A Failure of Diplomacy"War is a failure of diplomacy."-source unknown

President Bush believed that the key to successful diplomacy with Saddam was a credible threat of military action. We hoped that the process of moving an increasing number of American forces into a position where they could attack Iraq might convince the Iraqis to end their defiance. On January 11, 2003, I approved the deployment of an additional thirty-five thousand troops, with aircraft and wars.h.i.+ps, to the Gulf region, sending still another signal that the time for cooperation was dwindling.

For a year, officials from both France and Germany had said they were looking for a diplomatic compromise with the United States that would open the way for them to support the use of force in Iraq, if it proved necessary. On January 22, President Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announced that they would oppose ousting the regime.

It was a regrettable position for two longtime U.S. allies, not to mention historic rivals themselves, to oppose America's diplomatic and possible military effort as strongly as they did. In the United States critics used France and Germany to claim that "Europe" was opposed to the administration's stance on Iraq. That, of course, was not true. A large majority of European countries were supportive. More troubling, the French and Germans were, intentionally or not, giving Saddam's regime the impression that they could stop a military confrontation. By giving Saddam a false sense of security, and thereby reducing the incentive for him to comply with the UN's demands, the French and Germans undoubtedly made a war more likely, not less.

Hours after the French and German declaration, I traveled to the Foreign Press Center for a scheduled briefing of foreign reporters. One questioner a.s.serted that the att.i.tudes of the French and Germans were representative of "the mood among European allies."

"[Y]ou're thinking of Europe as Germany and France," I replied. "I don't. I think that's old Europe." I pointed out that if the reporters looked at the entire composition of NATO today, the center of gravity had s.h.i.+fted east with its new members. Those countries, I a.s.serted, were "not with France and Germany on this. They're with the United States."1 I had no sense that anything I had said was anything other than blindingly obvious. But I soon learned that my "old Europe" comment had touched a raw nerve. It caused an uproar, especially from those who felt they were on the receiving end of my remark. The French Finance Minister called the comment "deeply irritating."2 Ironically, my comment was unintentional. I had meant to say France and Germany represented "old NATO" not "old Europe." As a former amba.s.sador to NATO, I had been thinking of the alliance that existed when I served in Brussels. In the 1970s, when there were fifteen countries in the alliance, France and Germany played a large role. But after the Cold War's end, NATO extended members.h.i.+p to a dozen Eastern European nations, changing its size and outlook. While serving as secretary of defense in the Bush administration, I took a particular interest in visiting Eastern Europe and its leaders. I was comfortable with those countries, since Chicago has a large representation of Eastern Europeans.* This s.h.i.+ft in the center of gravity of NATO eastward naturally reduced the role of France and Germany. Having been liberated from the Soviet Union only a short time earlier, the nations of Eastern Europe had a recent understanding of the nature of dictators, whether a Stalin, a Ceausescu, or a Saddam Hussein. This s.h.i.+ft in the center of gravity of NATO eastward naturally reduced the role of France and Germany. Having been liberated from the Soviet Union only a short time earlier, the nations of Eastern Europe had a recent understanding of the nature of dictators, whether a Stalin, a Ceausescu, or a Saddam Hussein.

Shortly after my "old Europe" comment, and to counter France and Germany's negative position on Iraq, ten Eastern European nations jointly declared their support for military action. "Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values," their leaders declared jointly. "[W]e are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce [UN Resolution 1441] and the disarmament of Iraq."4 In any event, the phrase "old Europe" entered the vernacular. The segment of Americans that preferred calling french fries "freedom fries" loved it. The elites in Paris and Bonn who thought themselves the guardians of a sophisticated, new world order did not. All in all I was amused by the ruckus.

Nearly fifty nations would join the American and Britishled coalition willing to change the regime in Iraq-with thirty members committed to concrete, visible support and the others preferring to provide a.s.sistance more discreetly. As far as everyone on the NSC was concerned, the more nations involved in the invasion and in the postwar period, the better. It would mean less burden would fall on the United States and, in particular, on our military. I agreed with Churchill's formulation. "There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies," he observed, "and that is to fight without them."

Yet even this impressive achievement did not prevent critics from accusing Bush of "acting alone." It was harmful, to say the least, when Senator John Kerry publicly denigrated the forty-five nations that were supporting the coalition effort in Iraq. He acidly referred to them as members of the "coalition of the coerced and the bribed."5 This was an especially peculiar charge for two reasons. The first was that Kerry, like most of the Democrats in the Senate, had supported the decision to go to war-at least, when things seemed to be going well. Second, he presented himself as an internationalist, yet he was insulting our friends and allies and purposefully harming our coalition, simply to score a domestic political point. This was an especially peculiar charge for two reasons. The first was that Kerry, like most of the Democrats in the Senate, had supported the decision to go to war-at least, when things seemed to be going well. Second, he presented himself as an internationalist, yet he was insulting our friends and allies and purposefully harming our coalition, simply to score a domestic political point.

The deeper irony was that his charge was perfectly misdirected. It was true that some nations in the coalition provided only a little help, but in some cases that was all they could afford to offer. Others, particularly the British, Polish, Spanish, and Australians, extended substantial help, in the form of military and civilian personnel and materiel. Given all we now know about the deep corruption in the Oil-for-Food program, if any nations might have been charged with having been bribed or coerced to take a position on the war in Iraq, it should have been some of the nations that opposed military action, not those that supported it.

In February 2003, to further rally international support and increase pressure on Saddam, President Bush decided that the United States would make a major presentation to the UN Security Council on the threat Iraq posed and its defiance of UN resolutions. The point person for that presentation was an obvious choice. Secretary of State Colin Powell was not only America's senior foreign policy official, he also carried substantial credibility at home and abroad.

As he prepared to make his case for military action against Saddam, Powell worked closely with Tenet and other senior CIA officials, traveling to CIA headquarters, meeting with a.n.a.lysts over several days, and working late into the night. Powell went over his presentation extensively with Condoleezza Rice to be certain they had a.n.a.lyzed all of the facts and information, and had raised every conceivable question, to hone America's case. Powell and his aides considered how to achieve an Adlai Stevenson moment-a reprise of the UN amba.s.sador's forceful 1962 presentation to the UN during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which turned the tables on the Soviet Union.6 On February 3, two days before Powell was to go to New York, he sketched out his briefing to the President at an NSC meeting. "We have sources for everything," Powell confidently told the President. If Powell felt duped or misled about any aspect of his presentation, as some would later claim, there was no sign of it two days before he delivered it.7 Powell would touch on Iraq's links to terrorists and mention the small Kurdish town of Khurmal, which, the CIA had been reporting since early 2002 housed an underground facility for testing chemical weapons, including ricin and cyanide.8 The site was operated by Ansar al-Islam, a Sunni extremist group with ties to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian member of al-Qaida. A number of al-Qaida terrorists, including Zarqawi, were believed to be present at the Khurmal facility, having recently fled from combat in Afghanistan. The site was operated by Ansar al-Islam, a Sunni extremist group with ties to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian member of al-Qaida. A number of al-Qaida terrorists, including Zarqawi, were believed to be present at the Khurmal facility, having recently fled from combat in Afghanistan.9 Some in the intelligence community believed elements of Ansar al-Islam were funded by al-Qaida and could be colluding with Saddam's regime. The reach of the Iraqi intelligence services was extensive in the country, with a vast network of informants, so it was not unreasonable to conclude that the Iraqi government knew of this fairly sizable terrorist operation. Some in the intelligence community believed elements of Ansar al-Islam were funded by al-Qaida and could be colluding with Saddam's regime. The reach of the Iraqi intelligence services was extensive in the country, with a vast network of informants, so it was not unreasonable to conclude that the Iraqi government knew of this fairly sizable terrorist operation.*

Many months before the February NSC meeting, Chairman Myers, General Pace, the vice chairman of the Joint Staff, and CENTCOM planners, in close coordination with the CIA, had developed a range of options to attack Khurmal. They included a ground a.s.sault using CIA operatives, U.S. special operations forces, and Kurdish militia fighters known as the peshmerga. Another way was to destroy the facilities using cruise missiles and air strikes. The ground option had the advantage of collecting better evidence on the WMD operation, but given how well defended the site was, it was almost certain to entail casualties.

We were aware that the intelligence about the facility, though extensive, could not be considered conclusive. But taking all the risks into account, Myers and I were convinced that the intelligence was sufficiently persuasive to warrant military action. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also unanimous in their recommendation to strike.11 We believed that hundreds of suspected terrorists, including Ansar al-Islam's senior leaders.h.i.+p, suspected al-Qaida members, and an active chemical weapons facility were in our sights. With a military strike, we thought we would gain more clarity on the CIA's reporting on Iraqi WMD programs in short order. Myers, Tenet, and I went back to the President and the NSC several times in 2002 to urge an attack on the facility. Each time we were unpersuasive. Powell and Rice were concerned that a U.S. strike within Iraq's borders could cause Saddam to take action against the Kurds and make America's diplomatic initiatives in building a coalition and gaining support at the UN more challenging. Bush agreed with them. We believed that hundreds of suspected terrorists, including Ansar al-Islam's senior leaders.h.i.+p, suspected al-Qaida members, and an active chemical weapons facility were in our sights. With a military strike, we thought we would gain more clarity on the CIA's reporting on Iraqi WMD programs in short order. Myers, Tenet, and I went back to the President and the NSC several times in 2002 to urge an attack on the facility. Each time we were unpersuasive. Powell and Rice were concerned that a U.S. strike within Iraq's borders could cause Saddam to take action against the Kurds and make America's diplomatic initiatives in building a coalition and gaining support at the UN more challenging. Bush agreed with them.

In February 2003, as Powell briefed the National Security Council on his upcoming UN speech, I spoke up once again on Khurmal. If we were ever going to hit the facility and have a favorable result, we would have to do it at the same time, or preferably just before, Powell spoke, since he would be telling the world that we knew about the WMD facility. Once the terrorists learned from Powell's speech that we were aware of their presence, they would flee.

Before the NSC meeting ended, I offered my recommendation for the last time: "We should hit Khurmal during the speech," I said, "given that Colin will talk about it."

Powell objected. "That would wipe out my briefing," he said, adding, "We're going to get Khurmal in a few weeks anyway."12 In his dramatic address before the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003, Powell presented recordings, satellite photographs, and doc.u.ments that he argued proved that Iraq was engaged in WMD activities in defiance of the UN. "My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources," Powell told the Security Council. "These are not a.s.sertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence."13 On the subject of nuclear weapons, Powell left no room for doubt about his convictions about Saddam's intentions. "[W]e have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons," Powell said, with the authority of his years of military and diplomatic service. "Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb." He echoed the Agency's estimates about linkages between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida. "[W]hat I want to bring to your attention today," he said, "is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines cla.s.sic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder."14 Powell went on to finger Khurmal. "[T]he Zarqawi network," he said, "helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp... and this camp is located in northeastern Iraq." Powell went on to finger Khurmal. "[T]he Zarqawi network," he said, "helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp... and this camp is located in northeastern Iraq."15 As expected, shortly after Powell's speech was delivered, many of the terrorists fled Khurmal. When our troops and intelligence operatives eventually arrived there in March 2003, days after the war in Iraq began, they engaged in a firefight with the terrorists remaining.16 By then, much of the facility had been destroyed by cruise missile strikes and fighting on the ground, but clear signs of chemical weapons production were found, including chemical hazard suits, manuals to make chemical weapons in Arabic, and traces of the deadly toxins cyanide, ricin, and pota.s.sium chloride. By then, much of the facility had been destroyed by cruise missile strikes and fighting on the ground, but clear signs of chemical weapons production were found, including chemical hazard suits, manuals to make chemical weapons in Arabic, and traces of the deadly toxins cyanide, ricin, and pota.s.sium chloride.17 For whatever reason, the administration never made public these facts about an active WMD production facility run by terrorists in Iraq. Members of Ansar al-Islam would later become part of the insurgency. Ironically, had Powell not objected to the DoD and CIA proposal to attack the Khurmal site before he gave his presentation to the UN, we might have been able to gather the conclusive evidence of an active WMD facility, that he said existed in his UN speech. For whatever reason, the administration never made public these facts about an active WMD production facility run by terrorists in Iraq. Members of Ansar al-Islam would later become part of the insurgency. Ironically, had Powell not objected to the DoD and CIA proposal to attack the Khurmal site before he gave his presentation to the UN, we might have been able to gather the conclusive evidence of an active WMD facility, that he said existed in his UN speech.

As we now know, portions of Powell's presentation about Iraq's WMD programs proved not to be accurate, but something interesting happened over the years that followed. Here was a briefing, personally developed by the Secretary of State, with the close a.s.sistance of the National Security Adviser, the CIA Director and the intelligence community. It was consistent with strong statements of congressional support for military action, including those from many prominent Democrats, as well as with the a.s.sessments of several foreign intelligence agencies. And yet, over time, a narrative developed that Powell was somehow innocently misled into making a false declaration to the Security Council and the world. Powell himself later contended, in defense of his partic.i.p.ation, "There were some people in the intelligence community who knew at that time that some of these sources were not good, and shouldn't be relied upon, and they didn't speak up. That devastated me."18 When asked why these people did not speak up, he replied, "I can't answer that." When asked why these people did not speak up, he replied, "I can't answer that."19 Powell had spent decades in uniform and had become the most senior military officer in our country, and at every level he had spent long hours dealing with intelligence. As President Reagan's national security adviser, he routinely had been exposed to reporting and a.n.a.lysis from the intelligence community. As secretary of state, his department's own intelligence agency reported to him. There was no one else in the administration who had even a fraction of his experience in intelligence matters, including CIA Director Tenet. Powell was not duped or misled by anybody, nor did he lie about Saddam's suspected WMD stockpiles. The President did not lie. The Vice President did not lie. Tenet did not lie. Rice did not lie. I did not lie. The Congress did not lie. The far less dramatic truth is that we were wrong.

Whatever those in old Europe may have thought, Iraq's neighbors took a different view of the prospect of military action. In meeting after meeting in Was.h.i.+ngton and in the region, Arab leaders confided to us that Saddam was a danger in their part of the world. Some believed he was irrational, citing reports that he had taken to writing out the verses of the Koran in his own blood. They made clear that they would be better off if Saddam were gone, though some were uneasy about publicly supporting the idea of a U.S. military invasion. They noted that the last time they had supported military action against Iraq, Saddam remained in power-angry, dangerous, and still threatening. I suspect that that must have made subsequent gatherings of the Arab League somewhat awkward.

In my visits with leaders from other countries in the Gulf and North Africa, I received another oft-repeated message: If you go after Saddam, do it quickly. The leaders were worried about the "Arab street" erupting in anger at the West's invasion of a Muslim country. I was skeptical of the idea that a monolithic Arab street existed. My experiences suggested that each Arab country was different, but I did understand that popular discontent could cause them difficulties.

During my time in the Bush administration, I went to Vice President Cheney's office only occasionally. Our positions were such that we were not working together daily, as we had thirty years earlier in the Nixon and Ford administrations. So it was somewhat unusual when Cheney asked me to come over to the White House for a confidential meeting on January 11, 2003.

Joining us were Myers, and Cheney's guest: Prince Bandar, the Saudi amba.s.sador to the United States. No voice in the region tended to be as crucial when it came to U.S. interests as Saudi Arabia. At ease in American culture-Bandar smoked, rooted for the Dallas Cowboys, and cited the Founding Fathers-he still retained the ear of the Saudi elite. Bandar's diplomatic credibility was burnished by a colorful background that included service as a Saudi Air Force pilot.

"The President has made the decision to go after Saddam Hussein," Cheney told the Prince. Of course Bush would not irrevocably decide on war until he signed the execute order for Operation Iraqi Freedom-that would come only hours before the first military actions commenced-but this was the first time I had heard a senior administration official speak with such certainty about imminent military action. The President had apparently asked Cheney to alert the Saudis that the United States was serious and would request their cooperation. The United States needed several military facilities in Saudi Arabia to accommodate coalition forces that would be taking part in the invasion.

Though Bandar did not seem surprised, the Amba.s.sador was leery. "Let's not repeat the mistake of the President's father," he said, referring to the decision in 1991 to stop short of taking Baghdad and removing Saddam Hussein. The unfortunate impression that the United States might retreat after sustaining some casualties was apparently not shared only by Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. Bandar thought Saudi support was "doable," but with caveats. The Saudi people would not support a long period of combat operations in a neighboring Arab country. He emphasized the importance of having a small American footprint in the kingdom and in Iraq once our troops toppled Saddam.20 The Saudis' position, echoed by other Arab states, was that the U.S.-led invasion should be quick and decisive, and that the U.S. troop presence in Iraq should be small and reduced rapidly. General Franks had consulted with many leaders in the region and had received similar messages.

U.S. diplomatic efforts with another key ally in the region were foundering. Despite optimistic a.s.surances from our diplomatic corps, the United States was having trouble persuading Turkey to permit transit across their country, from the north into Iraq. In the months leading up to the critical vote of Turkey's parliament, the administration had confidence that they would grant us the approval we sought. No one had antic.i.p.ated that the vote might fail. I remembered thinking in the early months of Bush's presidency that it was important for us to work closely with the Turks, because we might need their cooperation.21 That day had come. But the Turkish parliament did not approve the U.S. transit request, by a razor-thin margin. That day had come. But the Turkish parliament did not approve the U.S. transit request, by a razor-thin margin.*

The lack of support by a key NATO ally in the region was a serious operational setback, as well as a political embarra.s.sment-and very likely an avoidable one. Powell might have aided our efforts by traveling to Ankara to make our case personally. I also might have visited Turkey in those crucial weeks, or encouraged President Bush or Vice President Cheney to make a personal appeal to the Turkish leaders.h.i.+p.

Without a threat to Saddam's forces in the north and west from U.S.troops advancing from Turkish soil, enemy fighters would have an opportunity to escape to the north and operate in the Sunni-dominated provinces where there would be no coalition presence early on. Our inability to invade Iraq from Turkey may well have been a key factor in the rise of a Sunni-backed insurgency after major combat operations ended. Turkey's decision made it essential that Franks find other ways to get coalition forces to Baghdad and the north of Iraq as quickly as possible, to close off the Iraqi military's escape routes.

As harmful as all of this was, there was a modest upside. In the summer of 2002, I received word that a New York Times New York Times reporter had detailed information about a version of CENTCOM's cla.s.sified war plan for Iraq, and that his paper was going to run a story on it. I asked General Pace to call the reporter had detailed information about a version of CENTCOM's cla.s.sified war plan for Iraq, and that his paper was going to run a story on it. I asked General Pace to call the Times Times to urge the paper to not run the story. We did not want Saddam's forces to be better prepared against us and put more American lives at risk. Pace made the call, but the to urge the paper to not run the story. We did not want Saddam's forces to be better prepared against us and put more American lives at risk. Pace made the call, but the Times Times published the story anyway, though with some modifications. published the story anyway, though with some modifications.22 At the time I dictated a note to myself. "It would be wonderful if everyone who likes to leak memos and everyone who likes to publish cla.s.sified material had a daughter or son in the advanced party of every military operation," I said. "I suspect it would get their attention." At the time I dictated a note to myself. "It would be wonderful if everyone who likes to leak memos and everyone who likes to publish cla.s.sified material had a daughter or son in the advanced party of every military operation," I said. "I suspect it would get their attention."23 The newspaper reported that CENTCOM's plan was to send American forces into Iraq from the north and west through Turkey, and to use another invasion force that would enter Iraq from the south, thereby creating a vise around Baghdad that might trigger a quick Iraqi surrender. Even though on the eve of military action, the Iraqis knew, like everyone else, that Turkey had voted against helping our military effort, the New York Times New York Times had said otherwise. Because of that article, Saddam's generals prepared to repel an attack from the north anyway. Apparently they had not yet learned that you can't believe everything you read in the press. had said otherwise. Because of that article, Saddam's generals prepared to repel an attack from the north anyway. Apparently they had not yet learned that you can't believe everything you read in the press.

A major story line about the invasion of Iraq has been the debate about troop levels-whether the U.S. invasion force or stabilization force should have been larger. major story line about the invasion of Iraq has been the debate about troop levels-whether the U.S. invasion force or stabilization force should have been larger.24 In reality, there was full debate and discussion, but there was no disagreement among those of us responsible for the planning. The officer in charge of preparing the Iraq war plan was General Franks. The chief military adviser to the President and the NSC was General Myers. Among Myers, Franks, and me, there was no conflict whatsoever regarding force levels. If anyone suggested to Franks or Myers that the war plan lacked sufficient troops, they never informed me. Moreover, if anyone did do so, they were unsuccessful, since they did not dissuade Franks from his view, nor Myers from his, nor, to my knowledge, any of the chiefs from theirs. In reality, there was full debate and discussion, but there was no disagreement among those of us responsible for the planning. The officer in charge of preparing the Iraq war plan was General Franks. The chief military adviser to the President and the NSC was General Myers. Among Myers, Franks, and me, there was no conflict whatsoever regarding force levels. If anyone suggested to Franks or Myers that the war plan lacked sufficient troops, they never informed me. Moreover, if anyone did do so, they were unsuccessful, since they did not dissuade Franks from his view, nor Myers from his, nor, to my knowledge, any of the chiefs from theirs.

In December 2002, the Was.h.i.+ngton Post made headlines with a story that two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to the war in Iraq and to the war plan they had partic.i.p.ated in developing, and had approved. "[A]spects of the plan, which appear riskier than usual U.S. military practice, worry the chief of the Army, Gen. Eric s.h.i.+nseki, and the commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James L. Jones, defense officials said" the paper declared.25 I was astounded by the report, which, if true, deserved the headline it generated. It would be most unusual, to say the least, for sitting members of the Joint Chiefs to publicly oppose the Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense, the responsible combatant commander, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the eve of a potential war. Both Jones and s.h.i.+nseki had been invited to, and for the most part attended, the many deliberations on the Iraq war plan in "the Tank"-the Joint Chiefs' conference room-with Franks. They had each taken part in a number of meetings with the President, with Myers, and with me.26 Neither Jones nor s.h.i.+nseki raised concerns, either about the wisdom of President Bush's intention to go to war if diplomacy failed or of Franks' war plan on how to fight it. Neither Jones nor s.h.i.+nseki raised concerns, either about the wisdom of President Bush's intention to go to war if diplomacy failed or of Franks' war plan on how to fight it.27 The day the story appeared I called each of them on the phone, reaching Jones first. "General Jones," I said, after referencing the Post Post article, "you have had every opportunity to talk and you haven't." article, "you have had every opportunity to talk and you haven't."

"You're right," Jones responded.28 A seasoned insider known for his skill in navigating the Was.h.i.+ngton political scene, Jones knew well the effect of appearing in the press criticizing a war plan, particularly when he hadn't raised a single criticism of it on the inside. He said it wouldn't happen again. He told me explicitly that he wanted me to know he was "on board with the plan." To my knowledge, Jones never corrected the record with the A seasoned insider known for his skill in navigating the Was.h.i.+ngton political scene, Jones knew well the effect of appearing in the press criticizing a war plan, particularly when he hadn't raised a single criticism of it on the inside. He said it wouldn't happen again. He told me explicitly that he wanted me to know he was "on board with the plan." To my knowledge, Jones never corrected the record with the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post.

Though Jones seemed to take responsibility for the remarks attributed to him, s.h.i.+nseki was a different matter. When I raised the article with him, he indicated that the story was not true, and that he had not expressed doubts to anyone.

"Who do you believe?" s.h.i.+nseki asked. "The Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post or me?" or me?"29 When he put it that way, I was not inclined to believe a press report over what a four-star general said to me personally. Even though s.h.i.+nseki was adamant that the Post Post had the story wrong, no correction from s.h.i.+nseki found its way into the paper either. had the story wrong, no correction from s.h.i.+nseki found its way into the paper either.

The incident reveals much about how Was.h.i.+ngton works. Neither general was directly quoted in the story saying he was skeptical, yet on the front page of the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post they were so portrayed. Each denied the central element of the story. Still, the story ran, was never corrected or retracted, and as a result, s.h.i.+nseki and Jones gained reputations as war skeptics and heroes to war critics. I respect both s.h.i.+nseki and Jones for their service to our country, but I cannot explain their failure to correct the public record. they were so portrayed. Each denied the central element of the story. Still, the story ran, was never corrected or retracted, and as a result, s.h.i.+nseki and Jones gained reputations as war skeptics and heroes to war critics. I respect both s.h.i.+nseki and Jones for their service to our country, but I cannot explain their failure to correct the public record.*

Six weeks after the article appeared, President Bush invited the senior military officials to the White House to give them still another opportunity to review and offer their comments on the war plan. I accompanied the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the cabinet room on January 30, 2003. Once we were gathered, the President went around the long table. Looking each of them squarely in the eye, Bush asked the four-star officers in uniform, one at a time, to offer their views and to raise any questions or issues they might have. This was one more chance for the most senior officers of the United States military to express any reservations they might have directly to the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Franks-the responsible combatant commander-and me. No one in the room-not General s.h.i.+nseki, not General Jones, nor anyone else-raised an objection. These were all decorated, experienced senior officers, not wilting wallflowers. I a.s.sumed and expected that they would speak up if they had reservations-indeed, it was their duty to do so. They did not.

It was not long before s.h.i.+nseki, I believe unintentionally, would again be catapulted into the public spotlight. That February, after having been called to testify to Congress about the impending war, the soft-spoken general became one of the most famous members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recent history-a poster child, even a martyr, for opponents of the war.

The popular version of the General's now famous February 2003 testimony is that s.h.i.+nseki testified to members of Congress that far more troops would be needed in Iraq than were provided for in the war plan. Because he had supposedly spoken truth to power, the New York Times New York Times claimed he was later "vilified, then marginalized" by members of the Bush administration, including me. claimed he was later "vilified, then marginalized" by members of the Bush administration, including me.30 Both a.s.sertions were false. Both a.s.sertions were false.

It is undoubtedly too late to correct the literally hundreds of misstatements that were repeated in what Jamie McIntyre, the Pentagon reporter for CNN, described as a media-generated myth elevated to "the level of Scripture."31 General s.h.i.+nseki appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25, 2003, before the war started. During his testimony, he was asked a question by Senator Levin of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the committee.

LEVIN: General s.h.i.+nseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war? General s.h.i.+nseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?s.h.i.+NSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think... In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think...LEVIN: How about a range? How about a range?s.h.i.+NSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point-something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about posthostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground-force presence... I would say that what's been mobilized to this point-something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about posthostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground-force presence...32 It remains a mystery why Levin would decide it was in our country's interest to publicize in an open hearing Franks' planned number of troops four weeks before the war began, but it was not Levin's unusual question that received attention. s.h.i.+nseki's response began a media firestorm that sought to pit what some journalists and war critics characterized as his lone, courageous voice against an administration bent on war.

Reflecting on his actual comments, what s.h.i.+nseki said was unremarkable. He noted that the forces mobilized in the region to that point were probably enough. He also said he deferred to the combatant commander, General Franks, for the exact requirements. When asked by journalists about s.h.i.+nseki's comment, I should have known better than to respond to a quote that I had not heard myself, but I took the bait. So did Paul Wolfowitz, who characterized s.h.i.+nseki's answer as "wildly off the mark." We were focused on avoiding any signals to the enemy about how many troops Franks had in mind. Bush's political opponents inflated s.h.i.+nseki's comments into a grand confrontation with the administration he served, though, in fact, there was no clash at all.

It was later claimed that, in retaliation for s.h.i.+nseki's comment, I authorized a leak of the name of his supposed replacement, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Jack Keane, a year before s.h.i.+nseki was slated to retire. I did not talk to the press about s.h.i.+nseki's successor, nor did I ask anyone else to do so. Neither the President nor I had decided on s.h.i.+nseki's replacement. Furthermore, when the dust settled it was not Keane at all but General Pete Schoomaker, and only after s.h.i.+nseki had completed every day of his full four-year term as chief of staff and retired with full honors.

s.h.i.+nseki was not dismissed early or otherwise rushed out the door. Yet literally hundreds of news reports in the press and on television falsely declared that General s.h.i.+nseki was fired for insubordination and "shunted aside."33 Critics of the administration explained s.h.i.+nseki's silence during the war-he declined to respond to press requests or correct the record-as the result of the alleged shunning he supposedly had suffered at the hands of senior Department officials. This hardened into a myth that he was punished for telling the truth about the war. Its promoters cite as evidence that I did not attend s.h.i.+nseki's retirement ceremony. The truth is that s.h.i.+nseki did not invite me, despite the fact that several senior officers urged him to do so. Critics of the administration explained s.h.i.+nseki's silence during the war-he declined to respond to press requests or correct the record-as the result of the alleged shunning he supposedly had suffered at the hands of senior Department officials. This hardened into a myth that he was punished for telling the truth about the war. Its promoters cite as evidence that I did not attend s.h.i.+nseki's retirement ceremony. The truth is that s.h.i.+nseki did not invite me, despite the fact that several senior officers urged him to do so.

As s.h.i.+nseki was departing in June 2003, he addressed the controversy that journalists had inflated into a major crisis in civilian-military relations in a private end-of-tour memorandum. "During the February testimony, I didn't believe there was a 'right' answer on the number of forces required to stabilize Iraq," he wrote. s.h.i.+nseki said that his testimony was "misinterpreted."34 He saw that his testimony had been distorted for political purposes. Perhaps someday he will publicly correct the gross and repeated mischaracterizations in the media. He saw that his testimony had been distorted for political purposes. Perhaps someday he will publicly correct the gross and repeated mischaracterizations in the media.

The s.h.i.+nseki myth did harm to civilian-military relations. It became widely believed among the military's active and retired communities, which came to resent the bad treatment I supposedly inflicted on a general officer. The myth also bolstered the allegation that I was intolerant of views that challenged my own and that I punished those who put them forward.

In fact, the opposite was the case. I welcomed and made a point of encouraging different views, dissent, and challenges. It was a constant refrain of mine at meetings that all proposals and plans are based on a.s.sumptions, that those a.s.sumptions should be spelled out clearly, examined skeptically, and reexamined routinely-and that applied also, indeed especially, to my own. Everyone makes errors in judgment, and the higher the official, the worse the consequences can be. So it was a principle with me that subordinates should speak up.

In 2002, for example, I sent a snowflake to a representative of the CIA who sat in on some of my Pentagon meetings: When I told you I want you to speak up, I meant it. You know a whale of a lot about this subject, and every once in a while I see you in th