Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 21

CHAPTER 33

Exit the Butcher of Baghdad.

Only a few hours before the forty-eight-hour deadline for Saddam to leave Iraq for a life in exile expired, George Tenet called me from CIA headquarters in Langley. He said he had an urgent matter to discuss and would be coming to the Pentagon immediately.

The CIA had developed a network of informants across Iraq who reported tips on Saddam's activities. In my office, Tenet informed General Myers and me that two of the Agency's sources had information that Saddam Hussein and possibly his sons, Uday and Qusay, were en route to a family compound called Dora Farms, south of Baghdad. We knew there was a possibility that the informants could be compromised, or in error. Saddam constantly tested the loyalty of those around him. If the dictator had penetrated the CIA's network of informants, he could be using the sources to encourage us to strike a false target, possibly one where American bombs might kill innocents. The campaign might therefore begin amid charges of American war crimes against Iraqi civilians.

If Bush authorized a strike, it might have to take place before the public deadline set for Saddam to resign expired. Though we had no indication that Saddam might comply, Bush would be accused of going back on his word. Tenet and I agreed that the issue needed to be brought to the President, so we drove across the bridge over the Potomac to the White House.

By mid-afternoon Bush had hastily a.s.sembled the NSC in his small dining room just off the Oval Office. Tenet repeated what he had told me. "How solid are your sources on this?" Bush asked. Tenet expressed his high level of confidence.

We discussed the possible outcomes if a strike were ordered, the risk of action as well as the risk of inaction. Suppose it turned out that Saddam was meeting at the compound to comply with the President's ultimatum to resign and leave Iraq? What if it turned out to be a civilian target? What if our aircraft accidentally killed innocent Iraqis and Saddam got away?

As we contemplated these risks, Tenet left the room to speak by secure phone to Agency officials who were in touch with their source on the ground in Iraq. He came back with another promising report: Saddam had just arrived at the site in a taxi. The Iraqi dictator was known to use cars painted like taxis to move around the country inconspicuously. The Agency's contacts also reported that Saddam's whereabouts had been verified by a sophisticated electronic tracking system used by his bodyguards. Tenet believed the intel was as solid as it could be.

The President went around the room asking each of us if we favored a strike. Cheney, Powell, Myers, Tenet, and Rice all said yes, as did I. I felt Saddam had made his choice. He was not going to stand down. Removing him and his sons with an early air strike would eliminate the top of the Iraqi military command structure with a single blow. That might lead to a large-scale surrender of Iraqi military forces, saving many American and Iraqi lives. Any chance to avert a broader war had to be seriously considered. The President agreed. But keeping his word, he ordered that the attack commence after his forty-eight-hour deadline expired.

In the early morning hours of March 20-only ninety minutes after the deadline-two U.S. Air Force F-117 stealth fighters flew undetected into Iraqi airs.p.a.ce and released four one-ton bunker-busting bombs onto the Dora Farms complex. The war in Iraq had begun.

As we awaited confirmation that the attack had hit the target, early reports were promising. An eyewitness reported that Saddam Hussein had been brought out of the rubble on a respirator. Then the story started to change. Despite the multiple sources, at least one eyewitness, and the sophisticated tracking devices, Saddam was not, as it turned out, at Dora Farms. Neither were his sons. This first salvo in the war with Iraq foreshadowed the various intelligence failures that would later come to light.

Forty-five minutes after U.S. aircraft had dropped the first bombs targeting Saddam, President Bush appeared on television from the White House to inform the country that the war in Iraq had begun. Saddam responded with a broadcast to the Iraqi people, claiming that Americans would soon lose "patience" with the war effort.1 He ended his message with language characteristic of Islamists: "Long live jihad and long live Palestine." He ended his message with language characteristic of Islamists: "Long live jihad and long live Palestine."2 It was a notably unsubtle message-one that made clear the allies he sought. It was a notably unsubtle message-one that made clear the allies he sought.

General Franks had realized that it was not possible to achieve strategic surprise against Saddam's forces given the purposefully ill-disguised fact that our military had been building up in the region over several months. Nonetheless, Franks thought he might still gain an advantage through tactical surprise. In the 1991 Gulf War, and in our recent operations in Afghanistan, coalition forces conducted a long air campaign before the ground invasion. This was undoubtedly what Saddam and his generals expected to happen again, which would give the Iraqis time to lobby leaders in the Muslim world and Saddam's supporters at the United Nations to come to his aid before our tanks started rumbling across the desert. Instead, Franks decided to order the air and ground offensives to start simultaneously.

Franks was concerned that a delayed ground invasion might expose American forces staging in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Gulf to the risk of chemical or biological attack. Intelligence and military officials warned that once Saddam judged that our forces were on the march and approaching Baghdad to remove his regime, he would have nothing left to lose and would likely use WMD against the coalition forces. Based on the intelligence, Franks ordered American soldiers and Marines advancing into Iraq to be outfitted with the bulky and uncomfortable chemical and biological protective suits.

The initial coalition push toward Baghdad from the south had two thrusts. The first was spearheaded by the Army's 3rd Infantry Division, and the second by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and Task Force Tarawa. At the same time, a contingent of Marines took their objectives in the southern Rumaila oilfields to prevent Saddam from sabotaging the Iraqi people's most valuable natural resource, as he did during the first Gulf War. While British forces successfully took the southern city of Basra, American forces moved rapidly toward Baghdad, engaging the enemy along the way only as necessary.

There was less fighting in the south than had been expected. Many of Saddam's conscript forces, fearing the fate they would meet against coalition armor and airpower, deserted their positions, removed their uniforms, and fled to their homes.

During the first nights of the campaign, some American special operations commandos dropped into northern Iraq while others stalked the western deserts. As in Afghanistan, they used night vision and handheld laser devices to identify Saddam's forces, which American aircraft proceeded to attack with pinpoint accuracy.

Coalition forces met their first sustained challenge when they advanced on the city of Nasiriyah, a key strategic target because it commanded crossings over the Euphrates River. Given the city's importance, American forces expected resistance from the Iraqi army. Instead, the enemy took the form of hundreds of Fedayeen irregular forces that had arrived in trucks, buses, and taxis. Eleven U.S. troops were killed in the fighting. A nineteen-year-old private named Jessica Lynch was captured by the enemy and extravagant reports about her resistance to capture flooded the media.* In hindsight, the real story out of Nasiriyah was the role of the Fedayeen Saddam and the magnitude of the threat they posed. Our intelligence community had not antic.i.p.ated the kind of enemy that coalition forces eventually faced in Iraq-or the kind of irregular operations by Saddam's paramilitary forces that foreshadowed the insurgency. Not until our forces were on the ground did we learn the extent to which the Fedayeen Saddam had stockpiled weapons and ammunition in nearly every city, town, and village in the country to help quell any uprising against Saddam. The Fedayeen were trained in counterinsurgency and capable of promptly and ruthlessly suppressing revolts against him. In hindsight, the real story out of Nasiriyah was the role of the Fedayeen Saddam and the magnitude of the threat they posed. Our intelligence community had not antic.i.p.ated the kind of enemy that coalition forces eventually faced in Iraq-or the kind of irregular operations by Saddam's paramilitary forces that foreshadowed the insurgency. Not until our forces were on the ground did we learn the extent to which the Fedayeen Saddam had stockpiled weapons and ammunition in nearly every city, town, and village in the country to help quell any uprising against Saddam. The Fedayeen were trained in counterinsurgency and capable of promptly and ruthlessly suppressing revolts against him.

The Fedayeen soon emerged as the core of an irregular enemy that attracted hundreds, and eventually thousands, of foreign fighters from across the Muslim world looking to fight the West. American forces routinely found a variety of foreign pa.s.sports on the bodies of enemies they captured or killed in battle. Most of the pa.s.sports doc.u.mented that their bearers had crossed into Iraq from Syria. These non-Iraqi jihadists tended to be poorly armed with Kalashnikov rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, but they had the ability to blend in well with the Iraqi civilian population, and they fought with the fervor of fanatics.

As it turned out, weeks before the war began, Saddam's ministry of defense had made efforts to integrate Arab jihadists into Iraqi training camps.3 Captured doc.u.ments describe legions of Muslim fighters from Syria, Libya, Bulgaria, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and the Palestinian territories. Captured doc.u.ments describe legions of Muslim fighters from Syria, Libya, Bulgaria, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and the Palestinian territories.4 One, dated March 27, 2003, describes an Iraqi intelligence official's conversation with the leader of Hamas in Gaza in which "[h]e requested us [the Iraqi government] to open the checkpoints at the border to let the volunteer fighters partic.i.p.ate in the war." One, dated March 27, 2003, describes an Iraqi intelligence official's conversation with the leader of Hamas in Gaza in which "[h]e requested us [the Iraqi government] to open the checkpoints at the border to let the volunteer fighters partic.i.p.ate in the war."5 The report continued, "Hamas is willing to carry out demonstrations and suicide attacks to support Iraq." Captured log records also doc.u.mented the steady stream of foreign fighters into Iraq during this period. The report continued, "Hamas is willing to carry out demonstrations and suicide attacks to support Iraq." Captured log records also doc.u.mented the steady stream of foreign fighters into Iraq during this period.6 Saddam ordered that Arab Fedayeen volunteers receive the same salaries and benefits as Iraq's Special Forces. Saddam ordered that Arab Fedayeen volunteers receive the same salaries and benefits as Iraq's Special Forces.7 It soon became clear that the gaps in our intelligence about the Fedayeen Saddam were signs of a broader problem. For years there had been an overreliance on reconnaissance from aircraft and satellites rather than on-the-ground human intelligence. The problem was not endemic only to the CIA. Intelligence agencies within the Defense Department, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, also failed to a.s.sess correctly the threat posed by the Fedayeen. While the attraction of foreign jihadists to the conflict in Iraq was possible given their hatred of America, the fact is that our intelligence agencies failed to warn of the possibility, and, as a result, our forces were not well prepared for it.

We would discover more gaps in U.S. intelligence. We would find that the reality on the ground ran counter to the prewar intelligence reporting that had informed CENTCOM's planning. It turned out that Iraqi infrastructure was not in serviceable condition; most of it was ramshackle and disintegrating. It turned out that the Iraqi army did not remain in whole units capable of being used for reconstruction after liberation; it dissolved itself. It turned out that the Iraqi police was not a trustworthy, professional force capable of securing the country after the invasion; they would have to be recruited and trained from scratch.

This intelligence failure on the existence and capabilities of the Fedayeen and foreign jihadists to wage an asymmetric war against our troops posed daunting consequences for the coalition effort. American forces that were prepared to fight more conventional forces had to adapt to an enemy that hid among civilians and fought by means of ambushes, car bombs, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Fedayeen and foreign jihadists fighting our troops in March and April 2003 would form the core of an insurgency that would engulf Iraq later in the year.

The coalition force's advance toward Baghdad coincided with a shamal, a ma.s.sive sandstorm that turned the skies over Iraq orange. In some places, the sand mixed with rain and became an unpleasant mud. Though the shamal slowed the U.S. drive northward, it did not stop it. Nor did it turn into the advantage for the Iraqi army that many thought it might.8 Iraqi forces around Baghdad believed the clouds of sand would give them cover. But our Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft in the sky above were able to penetrate the dust clouds with infrared cameras that could see the Iraqi forces below as they repositioned their armor. The Iraqis were stunned as American bombs, with demoralizing precision, broke through the clouds of dust and sand to destroy the Iraqi tanks. Iraqi forces around Baghdad believed the clouds of sand would give them cover. But our Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft in the sky above were able to penetrate the dust clouds with infrared cameras that could see the Iraqi forces below as they repositioned their armor. The Iraqis were stunned as American bombs, with demoralizing precision, broke through the clouds of dust and sand to destroy the Iraqi tanks.

One week after the invasion began, General James Conway, commanding general of the I MEF, and General William Wallace of the Army's V Corps ordered a seventy-two-hour pause to resupply their troops. I understood the reason for the pause, given the logistical challenges involved with the movement of tens of thousands of troops, thousands of pieces of armor, trucks, and humvees, and supplies. The pause, however, led to news reports that U.S. forces were "bogged down," this time in an Iraqi quagmire.9 Despite concerns about the accuracy of some of the press coverage, we decided to give news reporters unprecedented access to real-time information as the war was underway. During the planning phase, the Pentagon's a.s.sistant secretary for public affairs, Torie Clarke, approached me with the creative concept of embedding reporters with American forces from the outset of the war. Clarke was aggressively engaged in making the Pentagon responsive to a continuously evolving media environment.

Myers and I weighed the pros and cons of Clarke's proposal and came to the conclusion that embedding reporters was worth the risk. We believed it would give them a firsthand understanding of the courage and the professionalism of the men and women in our armed forces. Some seven hundred reporters and photographers were embedded with American forces when the war in Iraq began.10 The process created new burdens for our forces, since they had to provide the journalists with food, shelter, transport, and, importantly, be responsible for their safety. No single element of the invasion force had the whole picture. But we concluded they could do a better job presenting the reality of the conflict than they would pool reporting from coalition headquarters. The process created new burdens for our forces, since they had to provide the journalists with food, shelter, transport, and, importantly, be responsible for their safety. No single element of the invasion force had the whole picture. But we concluded they could do a better job presenting the reality of the conflict than they would pool reporting from coalition headquarters.

The program posed risks for the journalists. From 2003 to 2009, seven embedded reporters were killed in Iraq, and several others were wounded.11 The embedded reporters' bravery was a proud chapter in American journalism. Despite the dangers, many journalists acknowledged the success of the embedding experiment. Some of the best reporting from the war and the postwar period came from these reporters. The The embedded reporters' bravery was a proud chapter in American journalism. Despite the dangers, many journalists acknowledged the success of the embedding experiment. Some of the best reporting from the war and the postwar period came from these reporters. The New York Times' New York Times' John Burns and Dexter Filkins had some of the most compelling coverage from the field with stories that hewed closely to the facts. To my surprise and disappointment, the program eventually became controversial within the press corps. One reporter told me that continuing to embed with U.S. troops meant being ostracized by other reporters who contended that a close linkage with the military could compromise their objectivity. John Burns and Dexter Filkins had some of the most compelling coverage from the field with stories that hewed closely to the facts. To my surprise and disappointment, the program eventually became controversial within the press corps. One reporter told me that continuing to embed with U.S. troops meant being ostracized by other reporters who contended that a close linkage with the military could compromise their objectivity.

There was a flip side to the media coverage in Iraq that I also found telling. A month after Saddam's regime was toppled, the chief news executive at CNN, Eason Jordan, wrote an op-ed in the New York Times New York Times t.i.tled "The News We Kept to Ourselves." He belatedly described some of the horrific crimes committed by Saddam Hussein's regime against Iraqis suspected of being too cooperative with reporters, including an instance in which the secret police beat a woman every day for two months and forced her father to watch. Jordan revealed that the Iraqis smashed her skull and tore her body apart limb by limb. CNN knew about these acts of barbarism for over a decade but had reported not a word of it out of fear the Iraqi government might eject them from their Baghdad news bureau. t.i.tled "The News We Kept to Ourselves." He belatedly described some of the horrific crimes committed by Saddam Hussein's regime against Iraqis suspected of being too cooperative with reporters, including an instance in which the secret police beat a woman every day for two months and forced her father to watch. Jordan revealed that the Iraqis smashed her skull and tore her body apart limb by limb. CNN knew about these acts of barbarism for over a decade but had reported not a word of it out of fear the Iraqi government might eject them from their Baghdad news bureau.

"I felt awful having these stories bottled up inside me," Jordan confessed. "Now that Saddam Hussein's regime is gone, I suspect we will hear many, many more gut-wrenching tales from Iraqis about the decades of torment. At last, these stories can be told freely," he added.12

During major combat operations in Iraq, the Pentagon adopted what the military calls a "battle rhythm." For many in the Department, long days grew even longer. Sat.u.r.days and Sundays became like any other day of the week. For me, a typical day began at 6:45 a.m. when Powell, Rice, and I talked over the phone. We needed to keep each other apprised of what had occurred overnight (daytime in Iraq and Afghanistan) and what we expected might happen over the coming twenty-four hours. Powell would give diplomatic updates and Rice would pa.s.s on any questions or concerns the President might have. That call would typically be followed by a thirty-minute secure videoconference at 7:25 a.m. with General Franks and his senior commanders, as well as the senior civilian and military leaders at the Pentagon, including the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs. Using slides and statistics, Franks would report on the progress of his operations. I would call the President if there was anything I needed to report immediately. And it was not unusual for Bush to call me with a question about a report or a news story he had seen or if he was concerned about some aspect of the campaign. The day would be interspersed with NSC and princ.i.p.al committee meetings at the White House and more operational updates, as well as meetings with members of Congress and our coalition partners.

As the advance on Baghdad resumed after the sandstorm and subsequent pause for resupply, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions entered the war. Two brigades of the 101st Screaming Eagles, under the command of Major General David Petraeus, were airlifted outside of the holy city of Najaf, the site of the revered Imam Ali Mosque. Block by block, the 101st cleared the city of enemy fighters, and then advanced toward Hillah, where the Hammurabi Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard blocked the way to Baghdad. Hillah was one of the relatively few places where conventional Iraqi forces directly engaged our forces. Petraeus' troops reduced the Hammurabi Division to wreckage. The last obstacle before Baghdad having been cleared, nothing stood between our forces and the southern outskirts of Iraq's capital city.

Media a.n.a.lysis suggested that the battle for Baghdad might be like the brutal siege of Stalingrad during World War II.13 There were reports that Saddam Hussein had seen the movie There were reports that Saddam Hussein had seen the movie Black Hawk Down Black Hawk Down, about the ill-fated U.S. involvement in Somalia.14 The lesson he and other enemies had taken away was that American forces could be defeated in urban conflict because our tolerance for casualties was judged to be low. Some in the White House also feared that Saddam could turn Baghdad into an urban nightmare for American and coalition troops by using the city neighborhoods as death traps. This was by far the most urgent concern of Rice and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card, who, before the war began, had asked for numerous briefings on the subject. Franks grew impatient with the number of times he was asked to brief on Fortress Baghdad at the White House. The lesson he and other enemies had taken away was that American forces could be defeated in urban conflict because our tolerance for casualties was judged to be low. Some in the White House also feared that Saddam could turn Baghdad into an urban nightmare for American and coalition troops by using the city neighborhoods as death traps. This was by far the most urgent concern of Rice and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card, who, before the war began, had asked for numerous briefings on the subject. Franks grew impatient with the number of times he was asked to brief on Fortress Baghdad at the White House.

After pus.h.i.+ng through the Karbala Gap on the outskirts of Baghdad and securing the river crossings into the capital, U.S. forces were poised to take the city. Some of the fiercest fighting took place around Baghdad International Airport.* Intelligence was reporting that Fedayeen, regular army and Republican Guard units had ma.s.sed in central Baghdad. U.S. troops launched what became known as thunder runs into the heart of the city to test the strength of the resistance. Intelligence was reporting that Fedayeen, regular army and Republican Guard units had ma.s.sed in central Baghdad. U.S. troops launched what became known as thunder runs into the heart of the city to test the strength of the resistance.

As columns of U.S. tanks and armored vehicles sped through Baghdad, the world was introduced to an unconventional celebrity. He was a figure who not only provided comic relief in a time of war, but also offered a disturbing insight into the delusional world that was the Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraqi minister of information, Muhammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, popularly known as Baghdad Bob, had a special talent for either ignoring unwelcome facts or lying about them shamelessly.

After U.S. forces seized the Baghdad airport, he claimed: "We butchered the forces present at the airport. We have retaken the airport! There are no Americans there!" But as Baghdad Bob was making his wild p.r.o.nouncements on television, just around the corner American forces seized Saddam's parade ground downtown. Confronted with this evidence, he was impressively undaunted. "There you can see," Baghdad Bob said. "There is nothing going on."15 Despite Baghdad Bob's protestations to the contrary, the U.S. military's thunder runs into Baghdad damaged the Iraqi forces' morale and killed large numbers of Iraqi and foreign fighters. U.S. forces encountered not the Special Republican Guard divisions they expected but instead legions of jihadists on the streets of Baghdad. Saddam knew his Republican Guard tank divisions were no match for the American military, but the fanatics armed with small weapons and craving martyrdom proved to be formidable foes.

On April 9, 2003, the Marines reached Firdos Square in the heart of Baghdad. "The midget Bush and that Rumsfeld deserve only to be beaten with shoes by freedom-loving people everywhere," Baghdad Bob declared, as American troops fixed a rope around the neck of the larger than life statue of Saddam that dominated the square, much as his likeness populated the rest of the capital city and the entire country.16 Our forces were understandably exhilarated by the prospects of the liberation of Baghdad they had made possible. As the statue of Saddam was pulled down by Iraqis and Marines, one Marine draped an American flag over the statue's head. I remember General Myers expressing concern and calling someone at CENTCOM to fix the problem. Whether Myers' message got through or not, the American flag was removed. As the statue came down, a crowd of Iraqis began to beat Saddam's likeness with their shoes-an Arab expression of disrespect. Critics of the war would belittle those who claimed the Iraqis would greet the Americans as liberators-and to be sure not all Iraqis did-but in Firdos Square that day, the sentiment was clearly one of liberation.

Saddam's regime collapsed twenty-one days after the war began. The invasion was accomplished with skill, precision, and speed-and a minimum of casualties-by Franks, his team at CENTCOM, and the men and women volunteers in uniform. It was a heady moment. Less than two years after 9/11, the U.S. military had changed the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, two of the world's leading sponsors of terrorism.

PART XI

The Occupation of Iraq

Baghdad, IraqAPRIL 9, 2003 As cheering Iraqis in the heart of the capital brought down the over life-sized statue of Saddam Hussein, a scene decidedly less euphoric was occurring in a Sunni neighborhood just across the Euphrates. More than one hundred armed Iraqi soldiers, many wearing civilian clothing, entered the National Museum of Iraq. They took up sniper positions to contest the final advance of American soldiers and Marines into Baghdad and tried to turn the museum into a fortress.

A custodian of Iraq's long and rich history, the Iraqi National Museum housed a peerless collection that illuminated the beginnings of civilization. The importance of this heritage was lost on no one, least of all the American military. CENTCOM planners had put the National Museum of Iraq high on the coalition's "no-strike" list.*

Immediately after the regime collapsed in early April 2003, Iraqis across the country released pent-up grievances against the tyranny that had smothered them and impoverished their country for over thirty years by looting from government buildings. Looters ransacked and stripped Saddam's palaces bare of furniture and decorations. Faucets and toilets in many public buildings disappeared, and wires were pulled from walls to salvage the copper. Stealing back property that was considered stolen from the Iraqi people struck them, evidently, as justified.

The looting made it appear that postwar Iraq was descending into chaos. A camera caught an Iraqi taking a vase out of a building in Baghdad-and that scene was replayed over and over across the world. This was accompanied by images of coalition troops standing by in tanks. The implication? America was fiddling while Baghdad burned.

A flood of disaster stories gushed forth. News organizations wildly a.s.serted that nearly all of the museum's collection had been looted.1 "[I]t took only 48 hours for the museum to be destroyed," the "[I]t took only 48 hours for the museum to be destroyed," the New York Times New York Times reported, "with at least 170,000 artifacts carried away by looters." reported, "with at least 170,000 artifacts carried away by looters."2 But the news stories tended not to blame the Iraqi fighters for breaking into the museum, turning it into a combat zone, and putting its collections at risk. "American troops were but a few hundred yards away as the country's heritage was stripped bare," National Public Radio claimed. But the news stories tended not to blame the Iraqi fighters for breaking into the museum, turning it into a combat zone, and putting its collections at risk. "American troops were but a few hundred yards away as the country's heritage was stripped bare," National Public Radio claimed.3 Some even accused American servicemen of partic.i.p.ating in the reported heists. Some even accused American servicemen of partic.i.p.ating in the reported heists.4 "You'd have to go back centuries, to the Mongol invasion of Baghdad of 1258, to find looting on this scale," said one British archaeologist. "You'd have to go back centuries, to the Mongol invasion of Baghdad of 1258, to find looting on this scale," said one British archaeologist.5 Across the world, officials, especially those opposed to the war, made a great complaint. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan piled on, issuing a statement "deplor[ing] the catastrophic losses."6 French President Jacques Chirac, a man of bottomless cynicism whose anti-Americanism had become reflexive, called the alleged museum looting "a veritable crime against humanity." French President Jacques Chirac, a man of bottomless cynicism whose anti-Americanism had become reflexive, called the alleged museum looting "a veritable crime against humanity."7 As if the ill-grounded comments of foreign officials were not enough, I then had the experience of turning on the television and seeing my colleague, Secretary of State Powell, in Was.h.i.+ngton issuing what was in essence a public apology on behalf of the U.S. government about the museum looting, with a promise to recover what was lost. As if the ill-grounded comments of foreign officials were not enough, I then had the experience of turning on the television and seeing my colleague, Secretary of State Powell, in Was.h.i.+ngton issuing what was in essence a public apology on behalf of the U.S. government about the museum looting, with a promise to recover what was lost.8 Iraq and Afghanistan were the first wars of the twenty-first century-the first where operations were reported in real time on blogs, talk radio, and twenty-four-hour news channels. The public was hearing all kinds of allegations and one-sided, sensational reports. It took a while for the facts to catch up. Contrary to early reports, coalition forces had moved rapidly toward the museum to secure it. When American troops arrived, there were no visible looters. The advance on the building was halted, however, when our troops came under a barrage of sniper fire and rocket-propelled grenades from inside. The American commander on the ground faced a vexing choice. If his troops engaged further with the enemy forces in the museum, he risked destroying portions of the building, including whatever artifacts were within.9 Because the rest of Baghdad was rapidly falling under coalition control, the commander decided to hold back, expecting that enemy forces in the building soon would disperse. Because the rest of Baghdad was rapidly falling under coalition control, the commander decided to hold back, expecting that enemy forces in the building soon would disperse.

I thought the looting being reported was tragic, but I did not fault our troops. Iraq is the size of the state of California. Unfortunately, it would have been impossible to gather a force large enough to stop it all. In addition, General Franks had a long list of priorities for his troops that were as important, if not more so. They had to defeat remaining enemy units. They had to search the suspected WMD sites identified by the CIA. They had to secure large caches of weapons that had been placed all over the country. They had to locate, seize, and secure government doc.u.ments that Iraqi officials were no doubt busily shredding. They had to find Saddam Hussein and other senior Iraqi officials, to bring an earlier end to the war. They had to act as local police, since the Iraqi army and police force had unexpectedly disappeared.*

It had been only days since coalition forces had ended Saddam Hussein's regime in a military campaign prosecuted faster and more successfully than most had predicted. Meanwhile, critics of the administration had made error after error-calling the campaign in Afghanistan a quagmire just days before the overthrow of the Taliban government, calling the advance on Baghdad a quagmire just days before American forces overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime-yet they never seemed to lose credibility. Now critics were once again selling the public and the world a bill of goods about the alleged looting of the national museum and the alleged indifference of American forces to this supposed rape of Iraq's cultural heritage, which also proved not to be the case. The irresponsible reporting was harmful to our troops just as they were trying to build relations.h.i.+ps with Iraqi citizens.

At the same time these unsettling allegations were being made, my family was undergoing a personal crisis. In the first week of April, Joyce became extremely ill. It was increasingly clear something was terribly wrong. It turned out that she was suffering from a ruptured appendix. The problem had gone undiagnosed for some days. Our daughter Valerie flew in to be with Joyce at the hospital. At the time, I was spending more than fifteen hours a day at the Pentagon. I would visit Joyce in the hospital in the early morning and then again in the late evening hours. At one point she looked so pale and weak that she reminded me of how her wonderful mother, Marion, looked just before she died at age ninety.

Though Joyce would eventually and thankfully make a full recovery, all of this weighed heavily on my mind when I was preparing for a Pentagon press briefing on April 11, 2003 as the looting furor continued. I intended to remind the press and the American people about the success our forces had just achieved. I wanted to put events in context and defend our troops. I thought I could tamp down the controversy. Unintentionally, I wound up fueling it. A reporter asked me if I thought the words "anarchy" and "lawlessness" were ill chosen to describe the situation in Iraq. "Absolutely," I responded. I expressed my frustration that reporters insisted on highlighting the negative aspects of Saddam's ouster, which was a positive, albeit complex event.

"Given how predictable the lack of law and order was, as you said, from past conflicts," another queried, "was there part of General Franks' plan to deal with it?"

In fact, military planners had expected a difficult transition period. CENTCOM had prepared plans to inst.i.tute martial law if the commanders thought it necessary.11 CENTCOM's public order plan hinged on a key intelligence a.s.sumption that proved to be inaccurate: The existing Iraqi police could be helpful in keeping order. CENTCOM's public order plan hinged on a key intelligence a.s.sumption that proved to be inaccurate: The existing Iraqi police could be helpful in keeping order.* The military had experienced what Generals Myers and Franks and I ironically called "catastrophic success." Because Saddam's forces had crumbled so rapidly, our troops were able to liberate Baghdad even faster than antic.i.p.ated. "Freedom's untidy," I said. "Free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things, and that's what's going to happen here." The military had experienced what Generals Myers and Franks and I ironically called "catastrophic success." Because Saddam's forces had crumbled so rapidly, our troops were able to liberate Baghdad even faster than antic.i.p.ated. "Freedom's untidy," I said. "Free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things, and that's what's going to happen here."13 Then I vented some annoyance by uttering a few ill-chosen words: "Think what's happened in our cities when we've had riots, and problems, and looting. Stuff happens!" I was thinking back to the riots in American cities after the a.s.sa.s.sination of Martin Luther King, Jr., when whole blocks of Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. were set aflame. Then I vented some annoyance by uttering a few ill-chosen words: "Think what's happened in our cities when we've had riots, and problems, and looting. Stuff happens!" I was thinking back to the riots in American cities after the a.s.sa.s.sination of Martin Luther King, Jr., when whole blocks of Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. were set aflame.

I had uttered more than a thousand words at that press conference before I said "stuff happens," but they were the only two words that seemed to matter. My point was that in all wars, bad things happen. During World War II, cities across Germany suffered from looting and chaos soon after Allied troops entered. The northern city of Bremen was, as one shocked onlooker described it, "probably among the most debauched places on the face of G.o.d's earth" as liberated Germans looted stores, museums, and government buildings.14 Liberated Iraqis were doing the same thing, filling the temporary vacuum that existed between the old order and the new. What I said was characterized as callous and indifferent. Once I saw how my comments were being interpreted in the media, I realized I had made a mistake. Liberated Iraqis were doing the same thing, filling the temporary vacuum that existed between the old order and the new. What I said was characterized as callous and indifferent. Once I saw how my comments were being interpreted in the media, I realized I had made a mistake.

As it happened, most of what the media had reported about the museum looting-that monstrous "crime against humanity"-turned out to be false. After reports about the looting of the Iraq National Museum first surfaced, CENTCOM's director of operations, Major General Gene Renuart, dispatched Marine Colonel Matthew Bogdanos to Baghdad to investigate. Though press reports commonly reported 170,000 items stolen, Bogdanos discovered that only a tiny fraction of that was actually looted.15 Somewhere between 3,000 and 15,000 items were later proved missing from the museum collections. Somewhere between 3,000 and 15,000 items were later proved missing from the museum collections.16 Those numbers included the state-sanctioned looting, theft, and forgery that Saddam Hussein's regime had used as a source of revenue for some years. Those numbers included the state-sanctioned looting, theft, and forgery that Saddam Hussein's regime had used as a source of revenue for some years.17 The press claims that had become an international sensation, Bogdanos concluded, were "intentionally false, a fiction perpetuated first by some museum staff, and then repeated by the press." The press claims that had become an international sensation, Bogdanos concluded, were "intentionally false, a fiction perpetuated first by some museum staff, and then repeated by the press."18 I also received firsthand information about the museum from an unusual source. Our informant was a spy who had been in Baghdad prior to the invasion. Days before coalition bombs began falling on regime targets in the capital, he had visited the already closed national museum. He peered through the museum's windows and found none of the museum's antiquities on display. Well before the war started, it appeared, the museum curators had put tens of thousands of pieces in safe vaults or taken them out of Baghdad.* This same plan had been used in the Iran-Iraq War and during the first Gulf War. The museum staff also left doors unlocked, which suggested that the director, a Baathist and Saddam ally, intended for the fighters and looters to move about freely in the compound. This same plan had been used in the Iran-Iraq War and during the first Gulf War. The museum staff also left doors unlocked, which suggested that the director, a Baathist and Saddam ally, intended for the fighters and looters to move about freely in the compound.

A few media outlets belatedly issued some corrections, but not with anything approaching the prominence of their original false reports of extensive looting. "Officials at the National Museum of Iraq have blamed shoddy reporting amid the 'fog of war' for creating the impression that the majority of the inst.i.tution's 170,000 items were looted in the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad," noted the "Officials at the National Museum of Iraq have blamed shoddy reporting amid the 'fog of war' for creating the impression that the majority of the inst.i.tution's 170,000 items were looted in the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad," noted the Daily Telegraph Daily Telegraph one month later. one month later.20 One museum official tried to explain the confusion: "I said there were 170,000 pieces in the entire museum collection... not 170,000 pieces stolen.... No, no, no. That would be every single object we have!" One museum official tried to explain the confusion: "I said there were 170,000 pieces in the entire museum collection... not 170,000 pieces stolen.... No, no, no. That would be every single object we have!"21 Those in the press who created and spread the grossly false and harmful stories about the museum looting took no responsibility for the negative pall that quickly engulfed the coalition's efforts. It was as if the news media had shrugged its collective shoulders and said "stuff happens."

CHAPTER 34

Catastrophic Success.

Before the war, officials in the Department of Defense spent many months a.n.a.lyzing contingencies and risks-both the risks of war and the risks of leaving Saddam Hussein in power. We knew the United States could defeat Iraq's forces in a reasonable period of time, but the more difficult challenge came after the end of major combat operations. Our military was well organized, trained, and equipped to win wars. Winning the peace after an enemy regime has been removed is quite another matter. There were many difficulties still ahead when the statue of Saddam Hussein was pulled down in Firdos Square on April 9, 2003, but it was not the absence of postwar contingency planning that caused them.

Some who might have been in a position to know better suggested that the Iraq war would be a "cakewalk" and that the risks were few.1 That was not the view of those who would be ordering the men and women of our military into combat-not President Bush, not me, and not any of those I worked closely with at the Pentagon. In fact, the members of our Defense Department team were thinking long and hard about potential problems in post-Saddam Iraq. That was not the view of those who would be ordering the men and women of our military into combat-not President Bush, not me, and not any of those I worked closely with at the Pentagon. In fact, the members of our Defense Department team were thinking long and hard about potential problems in post-Saddam Iraq.

No war has ever gone according to plan, but that did not absolve any of the President's advisers of their duty to prepare carefully and consider the possible perils that our forces might face. Because of the public controversy and divided opinions over the impending war, I believed it was important to give the President a full set of things to consider, especially those arguing against military conflict.

In the autumn of 2002, during a National Security Council meeting on Iraq, I departed from the agenda to read a handwritten list of possible problems, later referred to as the "Parade of Horribles," that I believed could result from an invasion. Sitting at the table in the Situation Room, with Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rice, Tenet, and the others in attendance, I went through the items one by one. The list was meant to generate serious, early thinking about the potential risks and what might be done to a.s.sess and reduce them. I also hoped to encourage others on the NSC to raise their concerns. That discussion was brief.

Because I considered the topic so important, when I returned to the Pentagon I used my notes to draft a memo, which I sent to a few of the Department's senior civilian and military advisers for comment. The DoD policy shop and dozens of military planners at CENTCOM and on the Joint Staff had been working long hours on contingencies in the event of war. Taking their suggestions into account, I expanded my original list and submitted it as a memo to the President and the members of the NSC. "It is offered simply as a checklist," I noted, "so that they are part of the deliberations."2 With regard to the risks of an invasion, my memo listed a number of problems that were worth thinking about in case they materialized, though they ultimately did not: While the US is engaged in Iraq, another rogue state could take advantage of US preoccupation-North Korea, Iran, PRC in the Taiwan Straits, other?

There could be higher than expected US and coalition deaths from Iraq's use of weapons of ma.s.s destruction against coalition forces in Iraq, Kuwait and/or Israel.

Fortress Baghdad could prove to be long and unpleasant for all.3 My memo to the NSC also directed attention to some serious risks that did in fact materialize, in whole or in part: US could fail to find WMD on the ground in Iraq and be unpersuasive to the world.

US could fail to manage postSaddam Hussein Iraq successfully, with the result that it could fracture into two or three pieces, to the detriment of the Middle East and the benefit of Iran.

Rather than having the post-Saddam effort require 2 to 4 years, it could take 8 to 10 years, thereby absorbing US leaders.h.i.+p, military and financial resources.

Iraq could experience ethnic strife among Sunni, s.h.i.+a and Kurds.

World reaction against "pre-emption" or "antic.i.p.atory self-defense" could inhibit US ability to engage [with other countries in order to deal with problems of common concern] in the future.4 To take just one for example, I understood that if WMD were not found, the administration's credibility would be undermined. That was why I felt we needed to make sure everyone understood that WMD was only one of the many reasons underlying the decision to remove Saddam. If we had had a full discussion of this possibility then, it might have made an important difference in the administration's communications strategy. It also might have tempered the WMD-focused briefing Powell would make to the UN Security Council several months later in February 2003.

My memo did not argue for or against military action in Iraq. That was not the intent. Indeed, at the end, I noted that "it is possible of course to prepare a similar ill.u.s.trative list of all the potential problems that need to be considered if there is no regime change in Iraq."5 I wrote the memo because I was uneasy that, as a government, we had not yet fully examined a broad enough spectrum of possibilities. Unfortunately, though the Department of Defense prepared for these contingencies in our areas of responsibility, there was never a systematic review of my list to the NSC. I wrote the memo because I was uneasy that, as a government, we had not yet fully examined a broad enough spectrum of possibilities. Unfortunately, though the Department of Defense prepared for these contingencies in our areas of responsibility, there was never a systematic review of my list to the NSC.

To a.n.a.lyze what an American presence in postwar Iraq might look like, we needed to know with precision what the desired objective was-what were America's goals. In March 2001, six months before 9/11, I had written a short paper t.i.tled "Guidelines When Considering Committing U.S. Forces" that summarized what I believed the commander in chief should consider before ordering combat operations.6 The memo was intended to help the administration establish a framework for when and how military force should be applied, and under what circ.u.mstances. I had seen over the years that there often was pressure on presidents to use military force without clearly achievable military objectives. The memo was intended to help the administration establish a framework for when and how military force should be applied, and under what circ.u.mstances. I had seen over the years that there often was pressure on presidents to use military force without clearly achievable military objectives.

When it came to the administration's goals in Iraq, my views were straightforward. They were to help the Iraqis put in place a government that did not threaten Iraq's neighbors, did not support terrorism, was respectful to the diverse elements of Iraqi society, and did not proliferate weapons of ma.s.s destruction. Period. The aim was not to bestow on it an American-style democracy, a capitalist economy, or a world-cla.s.s military force. If Iraqis wanted to adapt their government to reflect the liberal democratic traditions espoused by Thomas Jefferson and Adam Smith, we could start them on their way and then wish them well.

As soon as we had set in motion a process, I thought it important that we reduce the American military role in reconstruction and increase a.s.sistance from the United Nations and other willing coalition countries. Any U.S. troops remaining in Iraq would focus on capturing and killing terrorists and left over supporters of the old regime that were still fighting.

I questioned the way earlier administrations had used the military in post-conflict activities. When we took office in 2001, more than twelve thousand forces remained in the Balkans performing tasks that might have been turned over to local security forces earlier.7 Throughout my tenure, I focused on reducing the American military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo and a.s.signing security responsibilities to local security forces or international peacekeepers from countries more directly affected by potential instability in the area. Throughout my tenure, I focused on reducing the American military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo and a.s.signing security responsibilities to local security forces or international peacekeepers from countries more directly affected by potential instability in the area.*

I recognized the Yankee can-do att.i.tude by which American forces took on tasks that locals would be better off doing themselves. I did not think resolving other countries' internal political disputes, paving roads, erecting power lines, policing streets, building stock markets, and organizing democratic governmental bodies were missions for our men and women in uniform. Equally worrisome, locals could grow accustomed to the unnatural presence of foreign forces acting as their de facto government and making decisions for them. The risk was that these nations could become wards of the United States.

My experience in Lebanon during the Reagan administration also demonstrated the problem of dependency on U.S. forces in countries facing internal strife and violence. By late 1983, the Marine presence in Beirut was just about the only thing keeping the country from either descending into a civil war or falling under Syrian domination. When President Reagan, spurred by the Congress, withdrew the Marines, Lebanon quickly succ.u.mbed to Syria.

One of the guidelines in my memo on putting American forces at risk was that a proposed action needed to be "achievable-at acceptable risk." "We need to understand our limitations," I wrote. "The record is clear[that] there are some things the U.S. simply cannot accomplish."9 Thus, at the Department of Defense, postwar planning for Iraq had begun with the generally accepted recognition that recent efforts to rebuild nations had been flawed. We had tried to avoid those mistakes in Afghanistan by emphasizing the importance of building up indigenous security forces, both army and police, and promptly establis.h.i.+ng a new, independent government under the leaders.h.i.+p the Afghans selected. But unfortunately the U.S. military seemed to be doing most of the postcombat stabilization and reconstruction work on its own. Despite tireless efforts by the Defense Department's comptroller, Dov Zakheim, to solicit funds and a.s.sistance from friends and allies for reconstruction, their contributions were minimal. Thus, at the Department of Defense, postwar planning for Iraq had begun with the generally accepted recognition that recent efforts to rebuild nations had been flawed. We had tried to avoid those mistakes in Afghanistan by emphasizing the importance of building up indigenous security forces, both army and police, and promptly establis.h.i.+ng a new, independent government under the leaders.h.i.+p the Afghans selected. But unfortunately the U.S. military seemed to be doing most of the postcombat stabilization and reconstruction work on its own. Despite tireless efforts by the Defense Department's comptroller, Dov Zakheim, to solicit funds and a.s.sistance from friends and allies for reconstruction, their contributions were minimal.10 At the Bonn conference in 2001, the United Nations had treated Afghanistan's reconstruction like Solomon's baby, but without Solomon's wisdom. Reconstruction activities had been divided among different coalition nations-training the police and border guards (Germany), rebuilding a judiciary (Italy), counternarcotics (Britain), disarming militias (j.a.pan)-without any realistic a.s.sessment of their ability to deliver. Afghanistan's reconstruction proved largely to be a series of unfulfilled pledges by well-intentioned but poorly equipped coalition partners. So too the contributions of the civilian departments and agencies of our government were modest. At the Bonn conference in 2001, the United Nations had treated Afghanistan's reconstruction like Solomon's baby, but without Solomon's wisdom. Reconstruction activities had been divided among different coalition nations-training the police and border guards (Germany), rebuilding a judiciary (Italy), counternarcotics (Britain), disarming militias (j.a.pan)-without any realistic a.s.sessment of their ability to deliver. Afghanistan's reconstruction proved largely to be a series of unfulfilled pledges by well-intentioned but poorly equipped coalition partners. So too the contributions of the civilian departments and agencies of our government were modest.

I understood that there were times when the United States would not be able to escape some nation-building responsibilities, particularly in countries where we had been engaged militarily. It would take many years to rebuild societies shattered by war and tyranny. Though we would do what we could to a.s.sist, we ultimately couldn't do it for them. My view was that the Iraqis and Afghans would have to govern themselves in ways that worked for them. I believed that political inst.i.tutions should grow naturally out of local soil; not every successful principle or mechanism from one country could be transplanted in another.

As early as the summer of 2002, well before the Iraq war, the Pentagon policy team, led by Doug Feith, was developing an approach that would allow Iraqi opposition elements-including the Kurds of semiautonomous northern Iraq and the sizable exile community-to partic.i.p.ate in an interim governing body. A key member of our policy team, a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, sketched out some of the imperatives we needed to consider.*

The postWorld War II German and j.a.panese models of reconstruction, Rodman contended, were the wrong a.n.a.logies. Rather, he suggested we look to postwar France, where Roosevelt and Churchill planned an Allied military occupation because they did not think Charles de Gaulle commanded the respect of the French people. When De Gaulle returned to France after D-Day and millions came to greet him, however, Allied military planners, led by Eisenhower, reconsidered. Rodman observed that if the Allies had gone ahead with the plan for occupation, the Communists, who were then the backbone of the French anti-n.a.z.i resistance, "would have taken over the countryside while the allies sat in Paris imagining that they were running the country."11 Rodman's point was that we didn't want Americans holed up in Baghdad deluding themselves that they were actually controlling the country. There were "bad guys all over Iraq-radical s.h.i.+a, Communists, Wahhabis, al-Qaeda-who will strive to fill the political vacuum," Rodman presciently warned. To prevent a vacuum, the U.S. government should begin preparing moderate Iraqis to take over their country. I agreed with Rodman's a.n.a.lysis.

Feith and Rodman alerted me that in the interagency discussions at the deputies committee level and below, the State Department had different ideas. Officials at State favored what they called a Transitional Civil Authority, led by the United States, that would govern post-Saddam Iraq for a multi-year period. State's idea, as Rodman wrote, "is that (1) the Iraqi opposition is too divided to fill the vacuum on its own, and (2) the U.S. will want to control what happens with Iraqi WMD, oil, etc." Officials at State favored what they called a Transitional Civil Authority, led by the United States, that would govern post-Saddam Iraq for a multi-year period. State's idea, as Rodman wrote, "is that (1) the Iraqi opposition is too divided to fill the vacuum on its own, and (2) the U.S. will want to control what happens with Iraqi WMD, oil, etc."12 On July 1, 2002, I forwarded Rodman's a.s.sessment to Cheney, Powell, Tenet, and Rice, in the hope that they might be similarly persuaded that an American occupation would be a mistake: Organizing the Iraqi opposition to a.s.sist with regime change is needed for two reasons: to ensure legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of other regional players, and to make sure the wrong people don't fill the vacuum created by the end of the Saddam regime. Regional leaders have argued that it is important for Iraqis to be seen partic.i.p.ating in the liberation of their country.... An attempt to run Iraqi affairs by ourselves without without a pre-cooked umbrella group of Iraqi Opposition leaders could backfire seriously.... In Iraq, there are many undesirable opposition elements-a Communist faction, Sunni fundamentalists and radical Sh'ia-all with presumably some support around the country and in some inst.i.tutions. Organizing the democratic opposition groups that we favor into a real political-military force is essential to preempt these groups, avoid a political vacuum, and avoid a chaotic post-Saddam freefor-all. a pre-cooked umbrella group of Iraqi Opposition leaders could backfire seriously.... In Iraq, there are many undesirable opposition elements-a Communist faction, Sunni fundamentalists and radical Sh'ia-all with presumably some support around the country and in some inst.i.tutions. Organizing the democratic opposition groups that we favor into a real political-military force is essential to preempt these groups, avoid a political vacuum, and avoid a chaotic post-Saddam freefor-all.13 A chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all was the last thing we wanted if President Bush decided to go into Iraq. I was reasonably certain that the memo was read, but it did not lead to any resolution on a postwar strategy by the NSC.