Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 22

At CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, General Franks and his staff prepared the Iraq war plan in its four required parts: Phase I, preparations for a possible invasion; Phase II, shaping the battle s.p.a.ce with the start of air operations; Phase III, decisive offensive and major combat operations; and Phase IV, posthostilities stabilization and reconstruction. In the summer and fall of 2002, Franks and his team had a lot on their plates. In addition to Iraq war planning, they were still engaged in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and maritime interdiction operations off the Horn of Africa.

Recognizing the burdens on CENTCOM, Myers expressed concern that it might not be paying sufficient attention to Phase IV.14 Franks admittedly had little enthusiasm for setting up a postcombat government or dealing with the related tangle of bureaucratic and interagency issues. As the general noted in his memoir, "I'm a war fighter, not a manager." Franks admittedly had little enthusiasm for setting up a postcombat government or dealing with the related tangle of bureaucratic and interagency issues. As the general noted in his memoir, "I'm a war fighter, not a manager."15 Myers advised me that he had decided to establish a new group to help CENTCOM plan for postcombat operations. He asked Franks to stand up Combined Joint Task Force 4, which would work in Franks' Tampa operation on Phase IV. Myers advised me that he had decided to establish a new group to help CENTCOM plan for postcombat operations. He asked Franks to stand up Combined Joint Task Force 4, which would work in Franks' Tampa operation on Phase IV.

Outside of the Pentagon, teams at the United States Agency for International Development, the NSC, and the State Department also were working on plans for the postwar period. Among these initiatives was the Future of Iraq project at State, which consisted of a series of doc.u.ments addressing aspects of postwar Iraq.16 Later, the State Department effort was dubbed in the press as "the earliest and most comprehensive planning undertaken by the U.S. government for a post-Saddam Iraq." Later, the State Department effort was dubbed in the press as "the earliest and most comprehensive planning undertaken by the U.S. government for a post-Saddam Iraq."17 Some of the partic.i.p.ants in the project later mischaracterized that work as a State Department plan that Pentagon officials ignored. "Many senior State Department officials are still bitter about what they see as the Pentagon's failure to take seriously their planning efforts, particularly in the 'Future of Iraq' project," the Some of the partic.i.p.ants in the project later mischaracterized that work as a State Department plan that Pentagon officials ignored. "Many senior State Department officials are still bitter about what they see as the Pentagon's failure to take seriously their planning efforts, particularly in the 'Future of Iraq' project," the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post wrote some years later. wrote some years later.18 In fact, senior DoD officials did review and consult those papers, finding some of them to be helpful. But the Future of Iraq project-outlining broad concepts-did not const.i.tute postwar planning in any sense of the word. There were no operational steps outlined in them nor any detailed suggestions about how to handle various problems. One State Department official, Ryan Crocker, a future amba.s.sador to Iraq, was heavily involved in the project and he later acknowledged, "It was never intended as a post-war plan."19 If it had been, it could at least have given us a blueprint to discuss and consider. If it had been, it could at least have given us a blueprint to discuss and consider.

The Future of Iraq papers were likely circulated at lower levels within the government, as is often the case with concepts and proposals. But I was not aware of an effort by any senior official at State to present these papers for interagency review or evaluation, as would certainly have been needed had they been intended as a plan. The notion that a few in the State Department may have alerted people to potential problems in postwar Iraq-even if quite helpfully-was not on its face a seminal achievement. I had listed problems that might arise in postwar Iraq in my "Parade of Horribles" memo. That does not mean my memo was a plan or a solution.

Further complicating matters prior to the war was an undercurrent of concern about the wisdom of even conducting large-scale planning. This could signal that America considered war inevitable and derail President Bush's diplomatic efforts, which continued almost until the day the war began.

In discussions of postwar Iraq, the toughest challenge was the tension between two different strategic approaches. The debate between them was legitimate, but it remained just that-a debate. It was never hashed out at the NSC and never finally resolved. Right up until the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis in 2004, the basic difference was between speed-how quickly we could turn over authority-and what was called legitimacy-exactly what political and const.i.tutional processes needed to be in place prior to turning the reins over. The Pentagon leaned to the former, the State Department to the latter.

Postwar planning for Iraq lacked effective interagency coordination, clear lines of responsibility, and the deadlines and accountability a.s.sociated with a rigorous process. I suspect that the failure to fas.h.i.+on a deliberate, systematic approach by which the President could establish U.S. policy on the political transition in post-Saddam Iraq was among the more consequential of the administration. Trying to achieve a bridge or compromise between the two different approaches was not a solution.

The postwar planning for Iraq exposed a gap in the way the United States government is organized. No template exists for the kind of postwar planning that proved necessary in Afghanistan, Iraq, and, for that matter, in Kosovo, Bosnia, and elsewhere. There was no single office that could take charge of the military and civilian elements of postwar reconstruction.* That left the Department of Defense, with its expertise in war-oriented planning-but not in postwar reconstruction-as the only practical option. That left the Department of Defense, with its expertise in war-oriented planning-but not in postwar reconstruction-as the only practical option.

In the fall of 2002, President Bush and I considered the advantages of unity of command and effort in postwar reconstruction. Dividing responsibilities between security and reconstruction, as had been the case in Bosnia and Afghanistan, was not an encouraging model.20 The President agreed. When the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD 24) on January 20, 2003, directing the Defense Department to coordinate postwar planning and a.s.sume the lead for postwar reconstruction, some critics grumbled about a Defense power grab. The President agreed. When the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD 24) on January 20, 2003, directing the Defense Department to coordinate postwar planning and a.s.sume the lead for postwar reconstruction, some critics grumbled about a Defense power grab.21 I don't know of anyone at the Pentagon, myself included, who was looking for more a.s.signments. The Department of Defense was engaged enough in the military aspects of the global effort against terrorists, including in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and Asia. I don't know of anyone at the Pentagon, myself included, who was looking for more a.s.signments. The Department of Defense was engaged enough in the military aspects of the global effort against terrorists, including in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and Asia.

With the President's decision, in January 2003 the Department of Defense created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian a.s.sistance (ORHA). The office's mission was to help CENTCOM manage the transition to the post-war phase in Iraq.22 To run the organization, I recruited Jay Garner, a barrel-chested retired lieutenant general who had spent nearly four decades in the U.S. Army. I had met him when we served together on the s.p.a.ce Commission in 2000. General Garner knew Secretary Powell and had fought in Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, when Powell was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In what was called Operation Provide Comfort, Garner had led twenty thousand troops to a.s.sist Iraqi Kurds battered by Saddam's regime. He helped to secure an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq. When U.S. troops withdrew from Kurdistan and the American flag was lowered in July 1991, Garner was the last American to cross into Turkey. Thousands of Kurds delayed his departure by lifting him on their shoulders in celebration of his work. To run the organization, I recruited Jay Garner, a barrel-chested retired lieutenant general who had spent nearly four decades in the U.S. Army. I had met him when we served together on the s.p.a.ce Commission in 2000. General Garner knew Secretary Powell and had fought in Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, when Powell was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In what was called Operation Provide Comfort, Garner had led twenty thousand troops to a.s.sist Iraqi Kurds battered by Saddam's regime. He helped to secure an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq. When U.S. troops withdrew from Kurdistan and the American flag was lowered in July 1991, Garner was the last American to cross into Turkey. Thousands of Kurds delayed his departure by lifting him on their shoulders in celebration of his work.23 I saw Garner's military background as a valuable a.s.set. I knew the civilian reconstruction effort in Iraq would have to be done in close cooperation with CENTCOM's military personnel-the unity of effort envisioned in the President's directive. Once on the ground in the Gulf region, Garner's office would become an element of CENTCOM, reporting to Franks, and thereby a.s.suring unity of command. I believed a retired general, one who knew many CENTCOM officers and understood military culture, would have the best chance of avoiding friction with the military personnel. I also thought that Garner's prior a.s.sociation with Colin Powell would foster good relations between the reconstruction office and the State Department.

Garner believed, as I did, in empowering local populations to do things for themselves. "We're notorious for telling people what to do," he said. Garner thought American heavy-handedness had been a mistake in Vietnam, one he didn't want to repeat in Iraq.24 Once the military had toppled Saddam's regime, I thought it was strategically important to put the United States in a supporting role to the Iraqis as soon as possible. This was the Pentagon's and-at least as I understood it-the President's vision. Once the military had toppled Saddam's regime, I thought it was strategically important to put the United States in a supporting role to the Iraqis as soon as possible. This was the Pentagon's and-at least as I understood it-the President's vision.

Months before the war began in Iraq, we encountered strong resistance from State and the CIA to the idea of working with Iraqi expatriates. I couldn't quite understand why the idea was controversial. One of the first things we did in Afghanistan, after all, was develop relations.h.i.+ps with the Northern Alliance and Afghan exiles. Hamid Karzai, in fact, had lived for years abroad. I thought it made sense to do something similar in Iraq: reach out to the anti-Saddam elements (largely confined to the autonomous areas of Kurdistan) and to the Iraqi exiles who had been advocating the liberation of their country for many years.* These Iraqi "externals," many living in the United States or London, included some highly educated and skilled professionals. Some clearly had ambition. While by no means monolithic in their politics or their views, they shared an interest in Iraq's freedom and success. I thought the diversity of views among them was not only natural, but healthy. Why, I wondered, wouldn't we want them involved in a post-Saddam Iraq early, rather than late or never? These Iraqi "externals," many living in the United States or London, included some highly educated and skilled professionals. Some clearly had ambition. While by no means monolithic in their politics or their views, they shared an interest in Iraq's freedom and success. I thought the diversity of views among them was not only natural, but healthy. Why, I wondered, wouldn't we want them involved in a post-Saddam Iraq early, rather than late or never?

Key officials at State and in the CIA, including at senior levels, viewed the externals in general as untrustworthy, however. Particular animus was directed against Ahmed Chalabi, a secular s.h.i.+te from a wealthy Baghdad family who lived abroad. Chalabi had worked with the CIA in the 1990s to promote resistance to the Iraqi regime. The relations.h.i.+p soured after the CIA and Chalabi quarreled over responsibility for a failed operation in northern Iraq that led to the murder and exile of many hundreds of anti-Saddam Iraqis. Despite his differences with State and the CIA, Chalabi retained bipartisan support among elements of the U.S. Congress, having been a strong proponent for the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act.

Some concocted a myth that the Pentagon was engaged, as CIA Director Tenet put it in his book, in "thinly veiled efforts to put Chalabi in charge of post-invasion Iraq."25 Chalabi knew a number of administration officials, including but not exclusively some at the Pentagon. I had met him once or twice at meetings set up for the Iraqi exiles. He struck me as one of a number of bright Iraqis looking to do what they could for their country. However, no one in the Department of Defense urged that Chalabi be "anointed" as the ruler of post-Saddam Iraq, although some officials admired his skills. Robert Blackwill, who served as Rice's director for Iraq and was previously U.S. amba.s.sador to India, once remarked that Chalabi was the "Michael Jordan of Iraq." I a.s.sumed Chalabi would partic.i.p.ate in an interim government, but I had no idea who would emerge as its head. That was for the Iraqis to decide. Chalabi knew a number of administration officials, including but not exclusively some at the Pentagon. I had met him once or twice at meetings set up for the Iraqi exiles. He struck me as one of a number of bright Iraqis looking to do what they could for their country. However, no one in the Department of Defense urged that Chalabi be "anointed" as the ruler of post-Saddam Iraq, although some officials admired his skills. Robert Blackwill, who served as Rice's director for Iraq and was previously U.S. amba.s.sador to India, once remarked that Chalabi was the "Michael Jordan of Iraq." I a.s.sumed Chalabi would partic.i.p.ate in an interim government, but I had no idea who would emerge as its head. That was for the Iraqis to decide.

The State Department's and CIA's desire to ensure that Chalabi not have a leaders.h.i.+p role in postwar Iraq may have led both organizations to oppose the exiles generally. For example, CIA officials opposed our efforts to const.i.tute a force of Iraqi exiles to fight and act as interpreters and translators alongside our troops in the invasion. Tenet was cool to the idea. When "Agency officers suggested to DoD that they sc.r.a.p the idea of a fighting force of Iraqi exiles... [w]e were scoffed at once again," he wrote.26 While not large in size, I believed the Free Iraqi Forces, as they were called, could be a useful corrective to the perception that the United States was invading Iraq to occupy the country rather than liberate it. While not large in size, I believed the Free Iraqi Forces, as they were called, could be a useful corrective to the perception that the United States was invading Iraq to occupy the country rather than liberate it.27 At least in part because of a lack of cooperation from the State Department and the CIA, we were unable to recruit and train enough Free Iraqi Forces to show that Iraqis were involved in the military campaign to rid their country of Saddam. At least in part because of a lack of cooperation from the State Department and the CIA, we were unable to recruit and train enough Free Iraqi Forces to show that Iraqis were involved in the military campaign to rid their country of Saddam.28 State Department and CIA officials instead argued that the United States should a.s.sist Iraqis from inside the country to emerge as the new leaders. I had no problem with that approach-in theory. But in reality it would take a long time to a.s.semble a team of acceptable and capable candidates within Iraq after Saddam's ouster. His Iraq was hardly a training ground for aspiring leaders. Visible political opponents tended not to have long lives. Regrettably, because of State Department wariness of the Iraqi externals, the United States did little to include them in planning for the postwar period until after Saddam's regime had fallen.*

Instead of putting an Iraqi face on postwar Iraq as soon as possible, the State Department proposed an American-led civil authority for an indefinite period.29 On March 1, 2003, Powell sent a memo from the State Department historian labeled "informative." The paper argued that any occupation would take "time." That apparently was Colin Powell's position on the matter. On March 1, 2003, Powell sent a memo from the State Department historian labeled "informative." The paper argued that any occupation would take "time." That apparently was Colin Powell's position on the matter.30 At a princ.i.p.als meeting in the White House on March 7, 2003, two weeks before war would begin, we discussed whether to put Iraqis in charge of the post-Saddam government sooner rather than later. In Powell's absence-he was in New York at the United Nations-Richard Armitage represented the State Department.

In late 2002, I had proposed that after Saddam's regime was toppled, we should promptly announce a provisional council, the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA). This Interim Authority, designed as an Iraqi variation on the one in Afghanistan, was intended to bring Iraqis from all parts of the country, plus externals, and all political factions into a temporary national governing coalition. Its immediate but limited responsibilities would include supervising the drafting of a const.i.tution, playing a significant role in the conduct of Iraq's foreign policy, and administering selected departments of the government. Members.h.i.+p would include representatives from Iraq's Kurdish, Sunni, and s.h.i.+te populations. For several months, the deputies and the interagency coordinating committees discussed, debated, and refined the concept. The State Department had been uncomfortable with the proposal.

"Don't rush this," Armitage urged in our NSC meeting. "We'll sacrifice legitimacy."

Vice President Cheney countered that no one, least of all him, was pus.h.i.+ng for a few Iraqis with Was.h.i.+ngton connections to fly in and take the reins of a nation of twenty-five million people. But he noted, "We can't leave the government to chance." Cheney indicated that without Iraqis transitioning into positions of responsibility quickly, there would need to be a prolonged American occupation.

I continued to feel that doing little to cultivate a cadre of Iraqi leaders, as Armitage seemed to be suggesting, would be a mistake. "I believe legitimacy comes because the Iraqi Interim Authority is temporary," I said. "How well it works will determine its legitimacy." n.o.body at the table was going to be able to determine in advance whether or not an interim Iraqi government would be seen as legitimate by the Iraqi people.

"We should take two or three months to consult all Iraqis before we appoint an Interim Authority," responded Armitage. This too was a consistent message from State: delay.

"So you wouldn't have an Interim Authority at all?" Cheney asked. The reason for the Iraqi Interim Authority was that it would serve for a short time-probably no more than several months. But if it were substantially delayed, there would be no point in establis.h.i.+ng an Interim Authority at all. The meeting ended without resolution.

On March 10, 2003, we met again to discuss the same issue-this time at the National Security Council level with President Bush chairing the meeting.

The President agreed with the framework of the Iraqi Interim Authority proposal. Though we had provided a detailed plan for implementation, the exact execution and timing were left to be worked out in consultation with the Iraqis, who would start by leading smaller ministries and in later stages take control of the more important ones.31 Only after those on the Interim Authority had developed and demonstrated their leaders.h.i.+p capability would they take over key government ministries such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Oil. But it was not clear if this would be in days, weeks, or months. Only after those on the Interim Authority had developed and demonstrated their leaders.h.i.+p capability would they take over key government ministries such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Oil. But it was not clear if this would be in days, weeks, or months.

The following day I went to see the President. I was concerned about unresolved issues in this planning and the lack of policy resolution. Even though Bush had decided in favor of the Interim Authority, it still was not certain whether State would support quickly transitioning power to the Iraqis as I favored and-I thought-the President had decided.

Because the Defense Department would have to implement whatever plans for postwar Iraq the President finally approved, I wanted to be sure we would have the necessary resources in place. I told the President I thought I should go to Iraq for two weeks after major combat operations to oversee the beginning of the Phase IV plan. I said I would work with General Garner to help ensure that we do whatever was necessary to allow the Iraqis to take leaders.h.i.+p of their country.

President Bush didn't cotton to the idea. "What if we had a problem with North Korea?" he asked.

It was a fair question. As we were preparing for war in Iraq, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il was increasing pressure on the Korean Peninsula by flagrantly violating previous diplomatic agreements to end its WMD programs. The President was concerned that Kim Jong Il might view an Iraq war as an occasion to increase his troublemaking in the region.

"Well, Mr. President, if that happened," I replied, "I would come home immediately."

The President thought about that for a moment. Then he shook his head. "No, Don," he replied. "You need to be here."32 I should have pressed the point harder. It was clearly important to establish order in Iraq after Saddam was gone-after coalition forces would end three decades of Baathist rule. We would have to fill the resulting political vacuum with a mechanism by which sectarian and ethnic groups could join to govern in a peaceful way. The tensions from State officials pulling in one direction, toward a more lengthy U.S.-run occupation and the Defense Department in another direction, would have to be managed carefully. A top-level administration official in Baghdad might have made a difference in those early days. There would have been someone able to decide firmly in favor of one option over the other and extract additional guidance from Was.h.i.+ngton as required. I did not have a full understanding at the time, however, just how badly that was going to be needed.

chapter 35Mission Accomplished?.

In the weeks after Iraq's liberation, the Department of Defense was still pus.h.i.+ng for an Iraqi Interim Authority with some independence. With Saddam's forces defeated, the Iraqi people were wondering what would come next. Given the region's pathologies and the propaganda aired on Al-Jazeera, I was concerned that people across the Muslim world would believe that the United States sought to establish a colonial-type occupation for the purpose of taking Iraq's oil. We needed to put forward a group of Iraqis as the core of a new interim government in order to avoid that perception. We were losing valuable time.

On April 1, I sent a memorandum to the President and the members of the National Security Council saying that the time for trying to craft "the perfect plan" was over. "We have got to get moving on this," I wrote. "This is now a matter of operational importance-it is not too much to say that time can cost lives."1 It wasn't often that I wrote the President in such unequivocal terms, but I felt interagency deliberation needed to come to an end. Absent "a fundamental objection," I wrote, I was going to have General Franks announce the first steps to create the Iraqi Interim Authority as soon as possible. It wasn't often that I wrote the President in such unequivocal terms, but I felt interagency deliberation needed to come to an end. Absent "a fundamental objection," I wrote, I was going to have General Franks announce the first steps to create the Iraqi Interim Authority as soon as possible.2 State Department officials again objected. They argued that establis.h.i.+ng the IIA so soon after the war would complicate things. They also contended that the situation in Iraq was different from Afghanistan, which is a poor country with little infrastructure in place, and therefore a new government could be established more readily. They believed that we needed to take some time to ensure we did it the right way.

An unequivocal order from the President resolving the differences was not forthcoming, so those of us in the Defense Department resigned ourselves to what we thought might be a delay of a month or two. Rice was pus.h.i.+ng for a senior diplomat to head up the reconstruction effort, so I understood that it might make sense to wait until he was chosen and had a chance to a.s.sess the situation. As I would learn, a delay of a month or two was not what Powell and his colleagues had in mind.

At the end of April I traveled to the Gulf region. As I wrote to the President in a report summarizing my meetings, the leaders I met with unanimously believed that a quick transition to Iraqis would "help ease the apprehension of their people of a long-term U.S. occupation." It was, I added, a good reason for us to move forward on the Interim Authority.3 I noted the remarkable consensus among our Arab partners of the threats posed by that perennial irritant in the Middle East, Syria. That regime's behavior had not changed since I met with Syrian leaders in the 1980s. They were still aiding terrorists and still causing trouble. I noted the remarkable consensus among our Arab partners of the threats posed by that perennial irritant in the Middle East, Syria. That regime's behavior had not changed since I met with Syrian leaders in the 1980s. They were still aiding terrorists and still causing trouble.

The liberation of Iraq engendered a feeling uncharacteristic for the Syrian regime-fear. Their leaders appeared to be rattled by America's ouster of Saddam Hussein. They might have been wondering if they would be next. When I arrived in Kuwait, the foreign minister said that a Syrian official had asked him to pa.s.s word to me that they were not harboring terrorists or facilitating the entry of jihadists into Iraq-the very things we knew they were doing. "We need to keep up the pressure," I wrote the President.4 On April 28, I took off from Kuwait International Airport and in fifteen minutes was over newly liberated Iraq. Only eighty miles of arid desert and some of the densest oil fields in the world separate Kuwait City from the southern Iraqi city of Basra. But in another sense the two countries seemed a universe apart. Moving from Kuwait to Iraq reminded me of leaving democratic West Germany and entering totalitarian Eastern Europe back in the 1970s. The modern Kuwaiti cityscape gave way to dusty, one-story buildings barely discernible from the thousands of square miles of sand that surrounded the Euphrates and Tigris river valleys.

Saddam's legacy to the Iraqi people was an economic system that combined the worst elements of Stalinist central planning with organized crimestyle enrichment for the fortunate few. Iraq had billions of barrels of oil and one of the Arab world's most educated populations. Yet the dictator had cut off the Iraqi people from the rest of the world, brutalized them, eviscerated their sense of trust in one another, and denied them the fruits of economic progress.

It had been just over nineteen years since I was last on Iraqi soil. The regime I had visited back then had been swept away: Saddam and his top lieutenants were on the run.

On my first stop, in Basra, I thanked the British forces who had once again proven the value of America's special relations.h.i.+p with the United Kingdom. The government of Prime Minister Tony Blair had been one of the first to lend support to America after the 9/11 attacks. When the President delivered his historic speech to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, Blair had flown to Was.h.i.+ngton from London to express his country's solidarity. Blair and his secretary of state for defense, Geoffrey Hoon, had sent more than forty thousand troops to help topple Saddam's regime and to secure southern Iraq. I found Blair to be the most eloquent public voice explaining the rationale and sense of urgency for the coalition effort. Though he endured relentless domestic criticism, he stuck by his decision.

The British had engaged in difficult close combat with the Fedayeen Saddam in the cities of the south. Some Fedayeen had climbed onto the advancing British tanks and had to be removed with bayonets in hand-to-hand fighting. The job of the American forces would have been infinitely harder without them. The British had the correct perspective about the postwar situation we faced. As the commander of the British 1st Armored Division told me, "There is no humanitarian crisis, except the one the regime caused by turning off the electricity and water."5 The surprise and speed achieved by our invasion forces prevented the environmental and humanitarian catastrophes we had feared. The surprise and speed achieved by our invasion forces prevented the environmental and humanitarian catastrophes we had feared.

Coalition commanders had declared southern Iraq "permissive," meaning that the enemy forces had been rooted out. Farther north, and in and around Baghdad, there was still resistance. For much of our C-130 flight into the capital, as we traced the path inscribed by the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, we flew low over the riverbanks to reduce the risk from surface-to-air missiles.

In the polished marble rooms of one of Saddam's many palaces, I met with General Jay Garner and his staff for a briefing on the activities of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian a.s.sistance. Garner was optimistic about the progress being made and hopeful for Iraq's future. As we drove through liberated Baghdad in the late afternoon traffic, cars raced forward to pull alongside and honk and wave. In one car the driver gave us the thumbs-up, but a pa.s.senger in the backseat gave a thumbs-down. I mused that in Iraq only Saddam won 100 percent approval.

At a power plant in southern Baghdad, Iraqi and American military engineers briefed us on the sorry state of the country's infrastructure. The power grid, manufacturing base, water and sewer systems, and oil drilling and refining capacity all were on the verge of collapse. Pipes and wires in many facilities were literally being held together by duct tape and string. The Department of Defense had expected that there would be a need to fix what might be destroyed in the war, but our intelligence had not prepared CENTCOM and interagency planners for an entire infrastructure that was crumbling at its foundation from years of underinvestment and neglect. It was clear from those earliest days that it would take many hundreds of millions of dollars to reestablish basic services.

The Iraqis who were in charge of the Baghdad power plant, and those in the facilities and ministries, were Baathists; they had been privileged under Saddam Hussein. Retaining these professionals could be problematic, because many others were reluctant to work with anyone who had received favors from the regime. Ideally, senior Baathists would not be allowed to stay in place. But we did not have the luxury of being doctrinaire. The coalition and the Interim Authority that followed would need many skilled people to keep a dysfunctional country running, even if they were Baathists. With regard to the technocrats, at least, I wrote to the President, it would be best to find a way to work with them.6 My visit offered a sobering look at the challenges ahead. As I warned our troops at a meeting in a huge hangar at Baghdad Airport: We still have to find and deal with the remaining elements of the former regime. We have to root out and eliminate terrorist networks operating in this country. We have to help Iraqis restore their basic services. And we have to help provide conditions of stability and security so that the Iraqi people can form an interim authority-an interim government-and then ultimately a free Iraqi government based on political freedom, individual liberty, and the rule of law.7 At General Franks' request, President Bush would formally declare the end of major combat operations the following day, on May 1, 2003. This would mark the beginning of Phase IV-posthostilities stabilization and reconstruction. Franks had hoped that announcing the end of combat operations would encourage those of our allies who preferred not to be part of the invasion to now feel comfortable enough to support reconstruction.8 He had notified me in a cable that, after the President's declaration, Army Lieutenant General David McKiernan would be the senior commander in Iraq for ninety days. He had notified me in a cable that, after the President's declaration, Army Lieutenant General David McKiernan would be the senior commander in Iraq for ninety days.9 McKiernan and the senior officers at his headquarters, dubbed "the dream team" in some Army circles, would be tasked with the command of the many thousands of American troops. McKiernan and the senior officers at his headquarters, dubbed "the dream team" in some Army circles, would be tasked with the command of the many thousands of American troops.

On my flight heading back to Kuwait City I was startled to see McKiernan onboard the C-130 aircraft. I asked him where he was going.

"To my headquarters back in Kuwait," he said.

"Well, aren't you in charge of what's going on in Iraq?" I asked.

McKiernan told me he went in and out of Iraq once, sometimes twice a week to check on things. It struck me that in the crucial weeks following the fall of Saddam, McKiernan did not seem to think of himself as the commander in charge of the ground operations, and didn't seem to be preparing to take over command of all coalition forces in the country, as Franks had indicated in his cable. That meant that the senior American military leaders.h.i.+p in the country consisted of Army and Marine division commanders. To be sure, these were some of America's most talented war fighters: Army Major Generals Ray Odierno and David Petraeus and Marine Major General James Mattis. They each reported to General McKiernan, but McKiernan seemed to have removed himself from the critical daily responsibilities in the country.

The following day-May 1, 2003-President Bush flew in a U.S. Navy S-3B Viking onto the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln. He stood under a sign that said "MISSION ACCOMPLISHED" and announced that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended."10 Bush was correct, but those in charge of his public affairs team did not appreciate the sizable difference between the end of major combat operations and "mission accomplished." The phrase would haunt his presidency until the day it ended. Bush was correct, but those in charge of his public affairs team did not appreciate the sizable difference between the end of major combat operations and "mission accomplished." The phrase would haunt his presidency until the day it ended.

I had seen an early draft of the President's speech while flying to the Gulf. It seemed too optimistic to me.11 As I discussed my thoughts with Bush over the phone, I suggested edits to tone down any triumphalist rhetoric. He was receptive to my concerns. From the transcript I read of the delivered remarks, it was clear the speech had been muted. It was not the words in the President's speech that left the public perplexed when tough fighting in Iraq continued, but the unforgettable banner behind him. As I discussed my thoughts with Bush over the phone, I suggested edits to tone down any triumphalist rhetoric. He was receptive to my concerns. From the transcript I read of the delivered remarks, it was clear the speech had been muted. It was not the words in the President's speech that left the public perplexed when tough fighting in Iraq continued, but the unforgettable banner behind him.

The next day, when asked about the President's speech, I tried to strike a note of caution: [I]t would be a terrible mistake to think that Iraq is a fully secure, fully pacified environment. It is not. It is dangerous. There are people who are rolling hand grenades into compounds. There are people that are shooting people. And it's not finished. So we ought not to leave the world with the impression that it is.12 I had another issue with the President's remarks. "The transition from dictators.h.i.+p to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort," Bush had said. "Our coalition will stay until our work is done." That was not the way I understood our plan. A nation that had suffered under decades of dictatorial rule was unlikely to quickly reorganize itself into a stable, modern, democratic state. Deep sectarian and ethnic divisions, concealed by a culture of repression and forced submission to Saddam, lurked just below the surface of Iraqi society.

I hoped Iraq would turn toward some form of representative government, but I thought we needed to be clear-eyed about democracy's prospects in the country. Even the United States, though it had been the heir of hundreds of years of British democratic political development, did not evolve smoothly or quickly into the liberal democracy that we benefit from today. Millions of African Americans were considered property for more than seventy-five years after our country's founding. Women couldn't vote until nearly one hundred and fifty years after independence from England. I was concerned that the President's remarks suggested that the United States might remain until Iraq had achieved democratic self-sufficiency which might take decades. I doubted whether the American people would have the patience for a protracted, multiyear occupation as Iraqis fumbled their way along the road toward something approximating a free, nondictatorial government. And I a.s.sumed the Iraqi people would be even less willing to put up with a long American occupation, which could become a rallying point for rebellion.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan once said, "[T]he central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society."13 A millennia-old culture dating to the very beginnings of civilization would have to work its way toward adopting practices we considered democratic gradually. The art of compromise, which is central to a successful democracy, is not something that people learn overnight. If we hurried to create Iraqi democracy through quick elections, before key inst.i.tutions-a free press, private property rights, political parties, an independent judiciary-began to develop organically, we "could end up with a permanent mistake-one vote, one time-and another Iran-like theocracy," as I wrote in a May 2003 memo. A millennia-old culture dating to the very beginnings of civilization would have to work its way toward adopting practices we considered democratic gradually. The art of compromise, which is central to a successful democracy, is not something that people learn overnight. If we hurried to create Iraqi democracy through quick elections, before key inst.i.tutions-a free press, private property rights, political parties, an independent judiciary-began to develop organically, we "could end up with a permanent mistake-one vote, one time-and another Iran-like theocracy," as I wrote in a May 2003 memo.14 I conveyed these thoughts to the President and to Rice, suggesting the administration soften the democracy rhetoric. I proposed that we talk more about freedom and less about democracy, lest the Iraqis and other countries in the region think we intended to impose our own political system on them, rather than their developing one better suited to their history and culture.15 I wondered as well how we would define democracy if that became our goal. If Iraq never created an American-style system of government, would that mean that our mission had been a failure or that the troops would have to stay indefinitely? Emphasis on Iraqi democracy invited critics of the war to find the innumerable instances in which Iraq would inevitably fall short. Further, Iraq's neighbors, our regional partners, who would be important to our efforts to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq, were less than enthusiastic about our emerging posture. In fact, the reason so many countries supported us, and the reason two successive U.S. presidents and the Congress of the United States supported regime change in Iraq, was because of the consistent emphasis on the security threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Bringing democracy to Iraq had not been among the primary rationales.

It was hard to know exactly where the President's far-reaching language about democracy originated. It was not a large part of his original calculus in toppling Saddam's regime, at least from what I gleaned in private conversations and NSC meetings. I didn't hear rhetoric about democracy from Colin Powell or State Department officials. I know it did not come from those of us in the Department of Defense. Condoleezza Rice seemed to be the one top adviser who spoke that way, but it was not clear to me whether she was encouraging the President to use rhetoric about democracy or whether it was originating with the President.

Bush often expressed his belief that freedom was the gift of the Almighty. He seemed to feel almost duty-bound to help expand the frontiers of freedom in the Middle East. I certainly sympathized with his desire to see free systems of government spread around the globe. I had met and greatly admired Natan Sharansky, a former Soviet dissident, whose ideas on democracy had deeply influenced Bush. As much as I agreed with both Sharansky and Bush that we would all be better off if the world had more democracies, I thought we needed to be careful about how we pursued it. I believed in expanding the frontiers of freedom where possible, but that goal had to be tempered by our limited ability to achieve it.

As the unsuccessful search for WMD stockpiles dragged on, the administration's communications strategy seemed to s.h.i.+ft further toward democracy as a reason for America's presence in Iraq. This intensified during the 2004 presidential campaign. Instead of explaining the WMD failure within the context of imperfect intelligence, and emphasizing Saddam's intent and ability to restart his WMD programs if given the chance, as the Iraq Survey Group, led by former UN weapons inspector Charles Duelfer, had definitively concluded, the s.h.i.+ft to democracy seemed to some as a way to change the subject.16

My concerns about the military's management of Iraq in the first days of the critical postwar period were abated somewhat when I learned that there finally would be a full-time military commander. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez a.s.sumed command of ground forces in June 2003. The child of a Mexican American family, Sanchez had grown up along the Texas side of the Rio Grande in a one-bedroom house without plumbing. The future three-star Army general earned his commission in the early 1970s through ROTC. Sanchez had an admirable record of performance in the 1990s in the Balkans, where he had demonstrated the blend of military professionalism and political sensitivity that is needed when commanding coalition forces in another country. He had glowing recommendations from the Army leaders.h.i.+p, particularly Chief of Staff Eric s.h.i.+nseki, who had taken an interest in Sanchez's advancement. Sanchez had been serving in Germany as a two-star division commander and had deployed into Iraq with his division after most major combat operations were over. His was an important a.s.signment, involving command of some fifteen thousand troops. However, as commander of all coalition forces in Iraq, Sanchez would have to lead a force more than ten times that size, work with numerous coalition nations, and command a headquarters that he had never been trained or prepared to a.s.sume.

The reality-which should have been clear to the senior Army leaders.h.i.+p, CENTCOM, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff-was that Sanchez was not only the most junior three-star general in Iraq, but the most junior three-star in the entire U.S. Army. I can only speculate that part of the logic behind an otherwise inexplicable selection was that CENTCOM and the Army staff believed that with the emergence of an Iraqi Interim Authority and a reconst.i.tution of Iraqi security forces, we could begin a drawdown of coalition forces. This would have left Sanchez commanding significantly fewer than the 170,000 coalition troops there in mid-2003. It may also have been a.s.sumed that Sanchez would be operating in a postwar environment, in which an international peacekeeping force could maintain security if needed.

Whatever the rationale behind the decision, it later became clear that Sanchez had been put in a terrible position. The establishment of a government, the long-term care of detainees, the training and equipping of security forces, and, ultimately, the engagement of an increasingly deadly terrorist threat called for a senior military official with far more experience. That the Army leaders.h.i.+p, with the agreement or acquiescence of CENTCOM and the Joint Staff, slotted him for the top command post was a serious misa.s.sessment. Further, the a.s.signment required a large, fully staffed supporting headquarters that the U.S. Army, CENTCOM, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Was.h.i.+ngton failed to provide Sanchez with for months. I later learned that Sanchez was operating with well less than half-37 percent-of the staff he required for his headquarters. "It seems to me we have a real problem," I wrote to General Myers when in 2004 I first discovered the scope of the failure to properly staff Sanchez's headquarters. These deficiencies were brought to light by investigations into the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. "A combatant commander asks for something. The Joint Staff agrees to it. You recommend it to me. Then the Services never fulfill it."17 I do not recall being made aware of the Army's decision to move General Sanchez into the top position. He had been a.s.signed to Iraq during ongoing force rotations that took place in the aftermath of major combat operations. During this time, divisions and other units that had deployed as part of the force buildup as early as late 2002 were being rotated out, and new units were being rotated in. As a component of those changes, the Army and CENTCOM developed the structure for the command elements. To my recollection, the chief of staff of the Army and CENTCOM leaders.h.i.+p did not bring the relevant plans to my attention. But even as the situation in Iraq deteriorated, and Sanchez and his minimal staff were becoming overwhelmed, no senior official in the Army, CENTCOM, or the Joint Staff recommended a change. The problem of the McKiernan to Sanchez transition caused me to change the nature of my involvement in a.s.signing officers to senior positions. Previously, the chairman and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the deputy, and I had been princ.i.p.ally involved in promotions at the four-star level. Now we decided to increase our involvement in decisions regarding key service appointments.

In my view, much of the blame that later fell on Sanchez was misplaced. To be sure, there were failures on his watch, but much of the responsibility belonged to his superiors in the Army and the senior leaders.h.i.+p of the Department.

In late April 2003, we also faced an unexpected personnel move at CENTCOM headquarters: General Franks announced his plans to retire. For the past two of his three years at the post, Franks had spent his days and nights planning two demanding military campaigns, and he was anxious to step down. I asked him to stay to oversee the transition of power to an Iraqi authority, but he insisted on departing. I was disappointed to have a leaders.h.i.+p transition at such a critical time.

Franks' position as combatant commander at CENTCOM was a.s.sumed by his deputy, General John Abizaid. The son of an Arab American Navy veteran of World War II, Abizaid graduated from West Point, earned a scholars.h.i.+p that allowed him to study Arabic in Jordan, and later completed a master's degree in Middle Eastern studies at Harvard. Cerebral in demeanor and strategic in thinking, Abizaid embodied military, regional, and linguistic expertise.

As commander of CENTCOM, Franks had established and a.s.sumed responsibility for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), with Jay Garner reporting to him. I had advised Garner before he took the post at ORHA that, as circ.u.mstances evolved, the top civilian post in Iraq would likely be a.s.sumed by a senior official from the State Department.

In early May, the President announced the selection of former Amba.s.sador L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer to replace Garner. Though Garner was disappointed that his tour was ending sooner than expected, he had done his job well and had formed a good working relations.h.i.+p with emerging Iraqi leaders, who he had a.s.sured would soon be leading the Iraqi Interim Authority.* Garner was pus.h.i.+ng for a swift transition to the Iraqis-a policy I agreed with but about which Rice and perhaps the President himself seemed to have developed second thoughts. The interdepartmental policy differences that had not been decisively resolved came to the surface. The way the Bremer selection was handled added another layer of difficulty. Garner was pus.h.i.+ng for a swift transition to the Iraqis-a policy I agreed with but about which Rice and perhaps the President himself seemed to have developed second thoughts. The interdepartmental policy differences that had not been decisively resolved came to the surface. The way the Bremer selection was handled added another layer of difficulty.

"The choice of Mr. Bremer is a victory for the State Department over the Pentagon," the New York Times New York Times promptly announced. promptly announced.19 "Some administration officials were so concerned that the move not look like a setback for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that they were considering having him announce it upon his return from Baghdad on Friday night, to make it look like a Pentagon initiative." "Some administration officials were so concerned that the move not look like a setback for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that they were considering having him announce it upon his return from Baghdad on Friday night, to make it look like a Pentagon initiative."20 I didn't know who "some administration officials" were, but from the Pentagon it looked like Deputy Secretary of State Armitage was again feeding the press his version of events. His leaks were so brazen that I finally mentioned them to Powell. "Colin, we have a problem," I said in one such conversation on March 31, 2003. "Rich Armitage has been badmouthing the Pentagon all over town. It's been going on for some time and it's only gotten worse."21 I asked Powell to try to manage his deputy. The President was facing rearguard disloyalty from a small band of "senior State Department officials" who were attacking the administration and the effort in Iraq in the press as anonymous sources.*

"I don't know what the h.e.l.l is in Armitage's craw," I told Powell, "but I'm tired of it."23 Powell told me he would look into it. He expressed concerns about Wolfowitz, whom Powell claimed was leaking against him. I didn't believe that was true. I made a point of repeatedly telling those I worked with at the Pentagon not to speak to the press against State, the CIA, the White House, or any members of the administration-no matter how strong the temptation. "If you've got a problem," I told senior Pentagon staff, "come and see me." Powell told me he would look into it. He expressed concerns about Wolfowitz, whom Powell claimed was leaking against him. I didn't believe that was true. I made a point of repeatedly telling those I worked with at the Pentagon not to speak to the press against State, the CIA, the White House, or any members of the administration-no matter how strong the temptation. "If you've got a problem," I told senior Pentagon staff, "come and see me."24 Several months later the subject of leaking came up in a meeting with the President and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card in the Oval Office. Most of it was routine business-senior military nominations, an update on operations in Iraq, and preparations for our meeting later that morning with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. As the meeting closed, Bush raised the issues between the State and Defense Departments that were being leaked to the media.

"The controversy between DoD and State is hurting. It needs to stop," the President said.25 I couldn't have agreed more. It was what I had been counseling for over a year. The problem was that he was talking to the wrong person. I couldn't have agreed more. It was what I had been counseling for over a year. The problem was that he was talking to the wrong person.

"Mr. President, I have repeatedly told my folks never to leak or trash their colleagues. All the evidence suggests that it is State that is tras.h.i.+ng us. If anyone has any information that my folks at DoD are leaking anything or tras.h.i.+ng anyone, tell me."

Card interjected, "That's what they say at State."

"Look Andy, if it's going both ways, I need to see evidence," I responded.

The meeting left a sour taste in my mouth. The truth was that there weren't stories in the newspapers about Defense officials anonymously criticizing their counterparts in the State Department.

The next day the President called me. "I've got great confidence in you and what your team at DoD is doing. I didn't mean to send the wrong signal. You're doing a fabulous job."

"I appreciate the call, Mr. President. I may have taken yesterday's meeting amiss, but if you feel there's a war between the State and Defense Departments, it takes two to fight, and DoD isn't fighting. What is happening is hurting you. If it gets to a point where the solution is for me to leave, I will do so in a second."

"That's a c.r.a.ppy solution," Bush responded.

"It's certainly not my first choice, but we need you in the White House, and if my leaving would help, I'm ready."

Then Bush added, "I'm working hard on Powell and Armitage. I've seen the recent articles and I know what's going on."26

In fact, the selection of Bremer was not a triumph of State over Defense. I believe I may have been one of the first to include his name on a list of possible candidates for the post.* Bremer came to my attention for a possible senior diplomatic job in a discussion I had with George Shultz soon after I returned to the Pentagon in 2001. He recommended Bremer along with several others for presidential envoy slots, if and when the need arose, in much the same way Shultz had recommended me to President Reagan as an envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty and later to the Middle East. I liked the idea of having the presidential envoy in Iraq be one with ties to the State Department, since State's involvement was badly needed. The Defense Department could not perform all or even most of the nonmilitary tasks that needed to be done. For postwar stabilization and reconstruction to be successful, it would take leaders.h.i.+p and resources from State and other cabinet departments, as well as from coalition nations. I also liked that Bremer was considered an action-oriented executive, able to get things done. Bremer came to my attention for a possible senior diplomatic job in a discussion I had with George Shultz soon after I returned to the Pentagon in 2001. He recommended Bremer along with several others for presidential envoy slots, if and when the need arose, in much the same way Shultz had recommended me to President Reagan as an envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty and later to the Middle East. I liked the idea of having the presidential envoy in Iraq be one with ties to the State Department, since State's involvement was badly needed. The Defense Department could not perform all or even most of the nonmilitary tasks that needed to be done. For postwar stabilization and reconstruction to be successful, it would take leaders.h.i.+p and resources from State and other cabinet departments, as well as from coalition nations. I also liked that Bremer was considered an action-oriented executive, able to get things done.

Because Bush had placed the Defense Department in charge of Bremer and postcombat stability operations, Bremer met with me prior to his departure to discuss a rough road map and guidelines. Our discussion was based on a DoD memo t.i.tled "Principles for Iraq-Policy Guidelines," which had twenty-six guidelines I had vetted with others in the Pentagon, the State Department, and the NSC. Our May 13 memo did not lay out the details or exact timing of the way forward. I understood that Bremer would need flexibility to respond to the circ.u.mstances he found. But I had no reason to think that Bremer had any doubts about the advisability of the policy that President Bush had approved before the war: the development of the Iraqi Interim Authority, with the goal that it would exercise substantial authority as soon as possible.

Bremer's mandate was to make the memo's twenty-six principles operational. We had no illusions that the coalition would be able to withdraw if Iraq collapsed into chaos. "Without security for the Iraqi people," I wrote, "none of their goals will be achievable." But, I stressed the importance of handing over responsibilities to the Iraqis.

In staffing ministries and positioning Iraqis in ways that will increase their influence, the Coalition will work to have acceptable Iraqis involved as early as possible, so Iraqi voices can explain the goals and direction to the Iraqi people. Only if Iraqis are seen as being engaged in, responsible for, and explaining and leading their fellow citizens will broad public support develop that is essential for security.28 At the Department of Defense we recognized that some of the aspiring Iraqi leaders would fail to meet our standards for good governance and efficiency. There were precious few Mr. Smiths (as in the Jimmy Stewart movie) in the world. But it was of paramount importance that U.S. officials should take advantage of every opportunity to increase the influence of well-intentioned Iraqi leaders and begin to give them control of their country.

Bremer and I discussed the need to work closely together. I had decided I would give him considerable lat.i.tude for decision making, since he was the man on the ground. Bremer, however, had a robust definition of the term "lat.i.tude." When I was a special envoy for President Reagan, I only reported through Secretary of State Shultz. It seemed appropriate that I report directly through the cabinet officer who had the day-to-day responsibility to manage the issues on which I was focused. Even with the t.i.tle of "presidential" envoy, I never sought and rarely had direct interactions with the President. It did not occur to me to try to bypa.s.s the secretary of state and go directly to President Reagan, nor would I deal directly with any other cabinet officials without first engaging my direct supervisor, who, in my case, was Shultz.

Bremer had a totally different approach. He a.s.sumed that he had direct access to President Bush from the start. The President and Rice both not only accepted but facilitated Bremer's unfiltered contact with them. On the same day that Bush announced Bremer's appointment, May 6, 2003, they had a private lunch. I made a note to myself at the time: "POTUS had lunch with him alone-shouldn't have done so. POTUS linked him to the White House instead of to DoD or DoS [State]."29 The President could of course have lunch with whomever he wanted. But in Bremer's case, such actions contributed to a confused chain of command. This imprecision damaged Was.h.i.+ngton's communications with the CPA throughout the period of Bremer's tenure.

It became clear that Bremer intended to not be exclusively connected to any cabinet official. Bremer later wrote that after one of his private meetings with President Bush, "[Bush's] message was clear. I was neither Rumsfeld's nor Powell's man. I was the president's man."30 He quickly established active relations.h.i.+ps with Rice, Powell, and, as a career Foreign Service officer, his former colleagues in the State Department. Certainly it was desirable that the CPA have good ties to the political and diplomatic apparatus of the Bush administration, given the nature of its responsibilities in Iraq. I did not discourage that. What developed, though, was something I had not antic.i.p.ated. Bremer was able to pick and choose the members of the NSC he would deal with on any particular issue, the result often being that the other members were left in the dark. The muddled lines of authority meant that there was no single individual in control of or responsible for Bremer's work. There were far too many hands on the steering wheel, which, in my view, was a formula for running the truck into a ditch. He quickly established active relations.h.i.+ps with Rice, Powell, and, as a career Foreign Service officer, his former colleagues in the State Department. Certainly it was desirable that the CPA have good ties to the political and diplomatic apparatus of the Bush administration, given the nature of its responsibilities in Iraq. I did not discourage that. What developed, though, was something I had not antic.i.p.ated. Bremer was able to pick and choose the members of the NSC he would deal with on any particular issue, the result often being that the other members were left in the dark. The muddled lines of authority meant that there was no single individual in control of or responsible for Bremer's work. There were far too many hands on the steering wheel, which, in my view, was a formula for running the truck into a ditch.