Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 23

CHAPTER 36

Too Many Hands on the Steering Wheel.

Upon his arrival in Baghdad on May 11, the press labeled Amba.s.sador Bremer as America's "viceroy" in Iraq. He seemed to embrace the idea with relish. Bremer believed, as he wrote in his memoir, that his a.s.signment "combine[d] some of the vice-regal responsibilities of General Douglas MacArthur, de facto ruler of Imperial j.a.pan after World War II, and of General Lucius Clay, who led the American occupation of defeated n.a.z.i Germany." The difference, Bremer contended, was that his job was even more challenging than theirs had been.* I had no idea that he would see himself this way. It certainly was not a mindset conducive to working with proud and wary Iraqis or with the large American military contingent in the country. Perhaps unavoidable but adding to the unfortunate imagery was the fact that Bremer's offices were in one of Saddam's grand palaces. Its many marble rooms, filled with opulent murals and statues, offered a grotesque glimpse of the Iraqi dictators.h.i.+p. Paintings and inscriptions glorified the Iraqi regime. At least one of the sayings etched in Arabic on the ceiling was of dubious provenance: "Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country-Saddam Hussein." I had no idea that he would see himself this way. It certainly was not a mindset conducive to working with proud and wary Iraqis or with the large American military contingent in the country. Perhaps unavoidable but adding to the unfortunate imagery was the fact that Bremer's offices were in one of Saddam's grand palaces. Its many marble rooms, filled with opulent murals and statues, offered a grotesque glimpse of the Iraqi dictators.h.i.+p. Paintings and inscriptions glorified the Iraqi regime. At least one of the sayings etched in Arabic on the ceiling was of dubious provenance: "Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country-Saddam Hussein."2 Though I would have entered Iraq with a notably different mindset had I been in Bremer's shoes, I wasn't in his shoes. To his credit, he put his own life on hold to work long days in punis.h.i.+ng heat. Every day Coalition Provisional Authority officials went to work on behalf of their country. That took courage and a sense of duty. In later years, Bremer and his team, along with the Department of Defense, would be subjected to criticism for employing young, seemingly underqualified staffers in jobs critical to helping establish a postwar Iraqi society. What is often neglected in those critiques, however, was that the CPA was chronically short of staff. There was not a long line of seasoned volunteers to take on the challenges and frustrations that Bremer and the others withstood.

At the Pentagon, I established a special office, headed by former Wall Street banker Reuben Jeffery and retired Army colonel Jim O'Beirne, to support Bremer and reduce the paperwork and logistics challenges that would otherwise consume the CPA's time. A large number of Pentagon officials-military and civilian-volunteered to go over to Iraq to help. Unfortunately that esprit de corps was not widely found in other cabinet departments. The Department of State, outfitted with large numbers of experts in diplomacy and foreign affairs, provided two hundred names of would-be recruits. But when Jeffery and his team began contacting them, most demurred, many saying that their spouses or families didn't want them going to Iraq.3 Overall, the State Department was filling less than 40 percent of the slots it was slated to fill on the governance teams. Overall, the State Department was filling less than 40 percent of the slots it was slated to fill on the governance teams.4 One State official later admitted their att.i.tude: "Let's see what impediments we can put in their way. Let's see how long we can be in delivering this particular commodity or individual or amount of expertise. Let's see how long we can stiff 'em." One State official later admitted their att.i.tude: "Let's see what impediments we can put in their way. Let's see how long we can be in delivering this particular commodity or individual or amount of expertise. Let's see how long we can stiff 'em."5 I asked the director of administration at the Pentagon, Raymond DuBois, to coordinate financial and personnel support to the CPA. He became so frustrated with State's lack of cooperation that he personally canva.s.sed the retired Foreign Service officer community for volunteers. I asked the director of administration at the Pentagon, Raymond DuBois, to coordinate financial and personnel support to the CPA. He became so frustrated with State's lack of cooperation that he personally canva.s.sed the retired Foreign Service officer community for volunteers.6 In order to get up to speed, I encouraged Bremer to work closely with Garner. I hoped he could take advantage of Garner's knowledge of Iraq and its emerging leaders.h.i.+p. I had also asked my special a.s.sistant, Larry Di Rita, whom I had sent to Kuwait to help Garner stand up ORHA several months earlier, to stay on in Baghdad to help bring Bremer up to speed. A sharp and gregarious formal naval officer, Di Rita could help to impose structure and order into what was bound to be a challenging start for the CPA. But Bremer seemed not to want much a.s.sistance from those who had been engaged in Iraq before he arrived. He was eager to send Garner back to America and excluded him from key meetings during their transition.

Bremer's relations.h.i.+p with Sanchez was also apparently strained from the start, perhaps because Bremer thought he needed to establish control of Iraq and not yield authority to the military.* I was concerned that Bremer refused to meet with the four-star commander of Joint Forces Command, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, when he was in Iraq working on a lessons-learned project, which proved to be a valuable a.s.sessment of what actually took place in the days after Saddam's ouster. I was concerned that Bremer refused to meet with the four-star commander of Joint Forces Command, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, when he was in Iraq working on a lessons-learned project, which proved to be a valuable a.s.sessment of what actually took place in the days after Saddam's ouster.7 Most troubling was that Bremer proved reluctant to cede any significant authority to the Iraqis. In his memoir he noted that several weeks before he arrived in Baghdad he heard on the radio that "Jay Garner had announced his intention to appoint an Iraqi government by May 15." Upon hearing the news, Bremer wrote, "I almost drove off the George Was.h.i.+ngton Parkway."8 Garner's plan, in fact, would have consisted of a group of Iraqis advising the CPA, not a total handover of authority. Through political conferences in the Iraqi cities of Nasiriyah and Baghdad, Garner had skillfully cultivated leaders for the new Iraq, among internals as well as externals. He also had ensured there was an Iraqi presence in each of the country's twenty-three ministries. Garner's plan, in fact, would have consisted of a group of Iraqis advising the CPA, not a total handover of authority. Through political conferences in the Iraqi cities of Nasiriyah and Baghdad, Garner had skillfully cultivated leaders for the new Iraq, among internals as well as externals. He also had ensured there was an Iraqi presence in each of the country's twenty-three ministries.9 When Bremer departed for Baghdad, I believed he would work with Garner to build on his momentum by creating an Iraqi transitional government. It took months before I realized that this was not what Bremer had in mind. When Bremer departed for Baghdad, I believed he would work with Garner to build on his momentum by creating an Iraqi transitional government. It took months before I realized that this was not what Bremer had in mind.

At the State Department's insistence, I reluctantly had agreed to a month or so delay in implementing the Iraqi Interim Authority when the policy was established in March. I agreed that Bremer needed a chance to find his footing in Baghdad. But Bremer wanted to delay implementation of the IIA and the creation of an independent Iraqi government possibly by years, and seemed to think he had the President's support to do so. Bremer later wrote, "[T]he President's instructions to me... when I had lunch with him alone on May 6th, were that we're going to take our time to get it right.... The President had effectively, though perhaps not formally, changed his position on the question of a short or long occupation, having before the war been in favor of a short occupation. By the time I came in, that was gone."10 That would have been news to me, and I suspect it would also have come as news to the President. Bush, at least in my presence, never wavered in his desire to turn power over to the Iraqis as quickly as possible. Then again, he never firmly resisted the State Department's efforts to slow the timeline either. This ambiguity may have been just enough for Bremer to decide he had Bush's support for delay. In any event, Bremer certainly never discussed with me his perception that the President had decided on a significant reversal in his policy toward Iraq. That would have been news to me, and I suspect it would also have come as news to the President. Bush, at least in my presence, never wavered in his desire to turn power over to the Iraqis as quickly as possible. Then again, he never firmly resisted the State Department's efforts to slow the timeline either. This ambiguity may have been just enough for Bremer to decide he had Bush's support for delay. In any event, Bremer certainly never discussed with me his perception that the President had decided on a significant reversal in his policy toward Iraq.

For at least the first month of his tenure, in fact, Bremer continued to report back to me and Defense officials that he was implementing the President's plan to create an interim Iraqi government as soon as possible. In a June 2, 2003 memo, he wrote to me that in a meeting with Iraqi political leaders he "laid out our vision for establis.h.i.+ng an interim administration (IA) in the next five to six weeks."11 Seven days later I responded with a memo expressing my agreement with his plan and "the need to move quickly to create a leaders.h.i.+p council for the Interim Administration." I noted we were running out of time to put an Iraqi face on the CPA: Seven days later I responded with a memo expressing my agreement with his plan and "the need to move quickly to create a leaders.h.i.+p council for the Interim Administration." I noted we were running out of time to put an Iraqi face on the CPA: Indications are that Iraqi political/ethnic groups are restless. Standing still may lead to unraveling. Progress toward an IIA may be essential to r.e.t.a.r.d centrifugal forces.... Regime remnants are coalescing to some degree and stepping up sabotage. Their dream is a guerrilla insurgency. But guerrilla insurgencies depend on popular support. Progress toward an IIA will help neutralize if not dry up that popular support.12 Patience among Iraqis was wearing thin, and an insurgency was gaining momentum. Bremer gave no indication to me that he disagreed with my a.n.a.lysis that the best way to avert an escalating insurgency was to give Iraqis the opportunity to govern themselves.

By July, however, Bremer, echoing Colin Powell, apparently had concluded that a power-sharing arrangement between the coalition and Iraqis would not work. He a.s.serted that there could only be one government at a time-the CPA or an Iraqi one, but not both.13 Bremer then announced he would appoint an advisory "political council" of thirty-five Iraqis called the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and indicated that he would be making all the decisions. Bremer then announced he would appoint an advisory "political council" of thirty-five Iraqis called the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and indicated that he would be making all the decisions.14 Even as mere advisers, the Iraqis on the council seemed to irritate Bremer. He frequently complained about their leaders.h.i.+p abilities. "Those people couldn't organize a parade, let alone run the country," he wrote later.15 From my perspective, the leaders could not be judged on their administrative skills when they were not given real authority to administer anything. If the CPA had treated the governing council as something resembling an embryonic Iraqi government, the members might have been motivated to work more energetically and productively. Indeed, I thought one of the most important roles these leaders could play was to put an Iraqi face on the postwar administration, rather than an American one. I suggested to Bremer that the Iraqi Governing Council send someone approximating an amba.s.sador to the United States: "It seems to me it could help our cause if there were a talented, articulate Iraqi available for the media every day explaining the views of the Iraqis who favor freedom and self-government." From my perspective, the leaders could not be judged on their administrative skills when they were not given real authority to administer anything. If the CPA had treated the governing council as something resembling an embryonic Iraqi government, the members might have been motivated to work more energetically and productively. Indeed, I thought one of the most important roles these leaders could play was to put an Iraqi face on the postwar administration, rather than an American one. I suggested to Bremer that the Iraqi Governing Council send someone approximating an amba.s.sador to the United States: "It seems to me it could help our cause if there were a talented, articulate Iraqi available for the media every day explaining the views of the Iraqis who favor freedom and self-government."16 This was typical of my guidance to Bremer. Contrary to popular perception, I was not inclined to issue direct, detailed, not to be questioned orders to those who work for me. I have found that people at senior levels generally do better when given broad guidance and the leeway to exercise their judgment as changing circ.u.mstances arise. In Bremer's case, he had too much leeway. This was typical of my guidance to Bremer. Contrary to popular perception, I was not inclined to issue direct, detailed, not to be questioned orders to those who work for me. I have found that people at senior levels generally do better when given broad guidance and the leeway to exercise their judgment as changing circ.u.mstances arise. In Bremer's case, he had too much leeway.

I wondered if it would have been better for the CPA to promote self-government first and foremost at the local level, and to diffuse power out of Baghdad's insular Green Zone complex. Our military division commanders across Iraq were tailoring their operations to the unique circ.u.mstances in their parts of the country. General David Petraeus, for example, held local elections in the northern city of Mosul soon after liberation. That was an action-oriented, aggressive approach that worked in that part of Iraq but may or may not have worked in other areas. I believed that one template was unlikely to fit the whole country. Iraq was too ethnically and geographically diverse for a nationwide model. But the CPA was a Baghdad-centric organization that too often handed down decrees for the whole country without regard for the differences from province to province.

When a U.S. Marine commander recommended holding local elections in June 2003 in Najaf, a city they judged was ready for an elected town council, Bremer objected.17 He did not seem to favor organic political development at the local level. It wasn't until April 2004 that Bremer approved an order on the operations of provincial and local councils. He also seemed to see little value in engaging Iraq's tribes, which I considered key forces for stability in Iraqi history. He did not seem to favor organic political development at the local level. It wasn't until April 2004 that Bremer approved an order on the operations of provincial and local councils. He also seemed to see little value in engaging Iraq's tribes, which I considered key forces for stability in Iraqi history.

I learned much later from Admiral Giambastiani that Bremer was uncomfortable with the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP was an enormously valuable way to allow American military commanders across Iraq to help fund small-scale development projects in their area of responsibility (AOR).18 The local military commanders knew which projects were needed to earn local support to make headway against the insurgency. Our military commanders were convinced the funds were often more valuable than bullets, but Bremer refused to allocate CERP money to the military from the Saddam government's seized a.s.sets. The local military commanders knew which projects were needed to earn local support to make headway against the insurgency. Our military commanders were convinced the funds were often more valuable than bullets, but Bremer refused to allocate CERP money to the military from the Saddam government's seized a.s.sets.

In July 2003, Bremer announced a new program for the CPA called "Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People." The doc.u.ment listed as the primary goal the "early restoration of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people" and added that the CPA "will not leave until we have succeeded in carrying out the President's [Bush's] and Prime Minister's [Tony Blair's] vision."19 Bremer's interpretation of that vision included improving water resource management, improving health care services, reforming the tax system, building a welfare safety net, improving education and housing, and creating a vibrant civil society. Bremer's interpretation of that vision included improving water resource management, improving health care services, reforming the tax system, building a welfare safety net, improving education and housing, and creating a vibrant civil society.20 I was struck by the reality that our own country was still working on some of those areas two centuries after our independence. I was struck by the reality that our own country was still working on some of those areas two centuries after our independence.

Bremer's ambitions went far beyond the limited role for the United States that the Department of Defense and the interagency process had planned for and well beyond the role that had been resourced. CENTCOM had planned to liberate Iraq and set up the rough framework for the country to govern itself. The military had not planned to occupy every corner of Iraq with an American soldier or to try to impose a Western-style democracy on the country. The result was that the CPA and Iraq ended up with the downsides of an occupation strategy and few of the benefits-and without the resources that might have allowed some mitigation. The means were not well linked to the ends. It would be several months before those of us in Was.h.i.+ngton fully recognized that such a s.h.i.+ft in policy had occurred.

It was natural, perhaps inevitable, that there would be missteps in the aftermath of liberation in so unfamiliar a country. But in those critical early days, the ambiguities in fundamental strategy were harmful. Bremer's arrival marked an unfortunate psychological change in Iraq-from a sense of liberation, with grat.i.tude owed to the American military and our allies, to a growing sense of frustration and resentment that Iraq had come under the rule of an American occupation authority.*

The failure to establish an Iraqi interim government quickly was not the cause of every problem we faced in post-Saddam Iraq. The legacy of tyranny, the harmful actions of ill-intentioned neighbors, the catastrophic state of its infrastructure, the mistrust of foreigners, the ethnic and sectarian tensions, and the political vacuum all contributed to the instability. Nonethe-less, I am persuaded that many of these difficulties became worse as a result of the delay in ceding authority to the Iraqis. The CPA's top-down approach inadvertently stoked nationalist resentments and fanned the embers of what would become the Iraqi insurgency. Many Iraqis a.s.sociated the CPA with imperiousness and heavy-handedness. In his book War and Decision War and Decision, Doug Feith argues that the main problem with the CPA was not the commonly cited decisions on de-Baathification or the disbanding of the Iraqi army that gave rise to an insurgency. He suggests that the CPA's policies and methods fueled the insurgency in other, more subtle ways.21 The broader impression of an overbearing U.S. authority issuing edicts to the Iraqi people b.u.t.tressed the anticoalition arguments of militants like Muqtada al-Sadr and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This played well into propaganda that the United States was trying to dominate and exploit Iraq rather than liberate it and return it promptly to Iraqi control. The broader impression of an overbearing U.S. authority issuing edicts to the Iraqi people b.u.t.tressed the anticoalition arguments of militants like Muqtada al-Sadr and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This played well into propaganda that the United States was trying to dominate and exploit Iraq rather than liberate it and return it promptly to Iraqi control.

Bremer issued two important orders soon after he arrived in Baghdad. In subsequent years both orders became characterized as the two original sins of the occupation and the cause of the difficulties in the years that followed. At the time, however, they were greeted with approval by a great many Iraqis and were put into place with the best of intentions.

CPA Order Number 1 concerned the policy of de-Baathification-the removal from the government of officials in the top layers of Baath Party.22 Many were minority Sunni Arabs who had run Iraq for three decades. The Baath Party was less of a political party than a symbol of the state, much like the Communist Party in the Soviet Union or the n.a.z.is in Germany. As such, it had become a widely hated vestige of Saddam's regime. Bremer, rightly in my view, thought it was important to make clear to Iraqis that the Baathists who had served a regime that had terrorized the citizenry, deployed the secret police, murdered regime opponents, and authorized torture chambers and rape rooms were not going to return to power. Many were minority Sunni Arabs who had run Iraq for three decades. The Baath Party was less of a political party than a symbol of the state, much like the Communist Party in the Soviet Union or the n.a.z.is in Germany. As such, it had become a widely hated vestige of Saddam's regime. Bremer, rightly in my view, thought it was important to make clear to Iraqis that the Baathists who had served a regime that had terrorized the citizenry, deployed the secret police, murdered regime opponents, and authorized torture chambers and rape rooms were not going to return to power.

But we knew that many thousands of Iraqis had been forced into the Baath Party and were members in name only. Under Saddam, almost anyone who wanted to advance professionally had to join, including schoolteachers, doctors, and engineers. There was no desire or intention to punish everyone in the system. As I had noted immediately after my trip to Baghdad at the end of April 2003, in certain sectors Baathists were keeping the fragile Iraqi infrastructure from collapsing.23 The goal of de-Baathification was to target those at the top of the party, the ones who were so closely linked with the former regime that they could not be trusted to serve in the post-Saddam government. The de-Baathification policy in fact was akin to the Allies' de-n.a.z.ification policy in Germany after World War II, which barred some 2.5 percent of the German population from postwar government service. In Iraq, by contrast, DoD officials intended the policy to cover only one tenth of 1 percent of the population. The goal of de-Baathification was to target those at the top of the party, the ones who were so closely linked with the former regime that they could not be trusted to serve in the post-Saddam government. The de-Baathification policy in fact was akin to the Allies' de-n.a.z.ification policy in Germany after World War II, which barred some 2.5 percent of the German population from postwar government service. In Iraq, by contrast, DoD officials intended the policy to cover only one tenth of 1 percent of the population.24 Though the policy later found few defenders at the top level of the administration, de-Baathification initially had broad support among the relevant cabinet departments and agencies. The approach was promoted in the State Department's Future of Iraq Project that, as noted, later became touted in the media as the neglected plan for postwar Iraq.25 Two weeks before the war began, an NSC staff member briefed the President on the policy. He explained that there were 1. 5 million members of the Baath Party in Iraq but proposed removing only the 1 to 2 percent who were what he called "active and full members." All told, there were some twenty-five thousand people who could lose their government jobs. There were no objections from any of the princ.i.p.als present at the NSC meeting. However, the President did express some skepticism. "It's hard to imagine punis.h.i.+ng twenty-five thousand people," Bush said. He then asked the critical question: "Who will do the vetting?" Two weeks before the war began, an NSC staff member briefed the President on the policy. He explained that there were 1. 5 million members of the Baath Party in Iraq but proposed removing only the 1 to 2 percent who were what he called "active and full members." All told, there were some twenty-five thousand people who could lose their government jobs. There were no objections from any of the princ.i.p.als present at the NSC meeting. However, the President did express some skepticism. "It's hard to imagine punis.h.i.+ng twenty-five thousand people," Bush said. He then asked the critical question: "Who will do the vetting?"26 The President understood that there was a good deal of pent-up rage against the ruling Sunnis by Iraq's s.h.i.+a and Kurdish populations. In the wrong hands, it would be easy for de-Baathification to be an ax rather than a scalpel. The President understood that there was a good deal of pent-up rage against the ruling Sunnis by Iraq's s.h.i.+a and Kurdish populations. In the wrong hands, it would be easy for de-Baathification to be an ax rather than a scalpel.

After Bremer announced the policy in May, he appointed Ahmad Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi s.h.i.+a majority, to administer it. With Chalabi in charge, just as the President had feared, de-Baathification gained a reputation for score settling. Stories circulated about schoolteachers who were fired, former Baathist officials who were beaten in the streets, and even murders-acts that the CPA had not authorized, condoned, or had even minimal control over.

De-Baathification inflamed the minority Sunnis, who saw it as an act of vengeance against them as a group. Sunnis justifiably argued that while many of them had been forced to partic.i.p.ate in the Baathist government, they were not all complicit in Saddam's crimes. The policy, and how it was administered, led some Sunnis to become embittered against the American presence in Iraq.

CPA Order Number 2-the decision to disband the Iraqi army-has since become one of the most criticized decisions of the war. Of the dozens of important decisions made during that week in May 2003, it was not one that stuck out with unique prominence at the time. But in hindsight, its importance is unmistakable.

Disbanding the army was not my instinct. Everything I wanted to do in Iraq was tied to the thought that we should have the Iraqis doing as much for themselves as possible. If we disbanded the army, it would mean that as many as four hundred thousand young Iraqi men would be put out of jobs and onto the streets. Some were armed, had military training, and could become susceptible to calls for resistance against the United States, coalition forces, and the new Iraqi government.

Before the war I had agreed it would be wise to keep the Iraqi army as a reconstruction corps-something loosely resembling FDR's Civilian Conservation Corps. In January 2003, Feith and his staff, working with the Joint Staff, drafted a briefing called "Rebuilding the Iraqi Military" that recommended retaining the regular army.27 One month later, at a February 26 meeting, Pentagon representatives briefed the NSC princ.i.p.als on the DoD plans for what they called "the reintegration of the regular army." Under the plan, those structures of the military that were tainted with the crimes of the Baath regime-the Republican Guard and secret police among them-would be dissolved, but the regular army would be retained to a.s.sist in keeping security. The proposal would use the army "as a national reconstruction force during the transition phase." One month later, at a February 26 meeting, Pentagon representatives briefed the NSC princ.i.p.als on the DoD plans for what they called "the reintegration of the regular army." Under the plan, those structures of the military that were tainted with the crimes of the Baath regime-the Republican Guard and secret police among them-would be dissolved, but the regular army would be retained to a.s.sist in keeping security. The proposal would use the army "as a national reconstruction force during the transition phase."28 The a.s.sumption was that they had structure and manpower as well as skills and equipment that could be valuable a.s.sets. By March, the brief was updated with the recommendation that following combat operations in Iraq, the army "should 'maintain its current status in a.s.sembly areas and permanent garrisons.'" The a.s.sumption was that they had structure and manpower as well as skills and equipment that could be valuable a.s.sets. By March, the brief was updated with the recommendation that following combat operations in Iraq, the army "should 'maintain its current status in a.s.sembly areas and permanent garrisons.'"29 In short, the Iraqi army would be retrained and used as an instrument of defense of the new Iraqi state. In short, the Iraqi army would be retrained and used as an instrument of defense of the new Iraqi state.

But I was aware that there were some downsides to keeping it in the form we found it. Controlled by Sunni officers loyal to Saddam, the army had been an instrument of terror against many s.h.i.+a and Kurds. It was bloated with senior officers-eleven thousand generals, almost all of them Sunnis.30 (By comparison, the U.S. Army, about the same size as Saddam's, had about three hundred generals.) Corruption was deeply ingrained. The Kurds and s.h.i.+a, together composing 80 percent of Iraq's population, would also vehemently oppose any attempt to retain Saddam's army. We had to ask whether it made sense to risk alienating the vast majority of Iraqis by trying to keep and reconst.i.tute the army. I concluded that the benefits outweighed the risks, and that we would keep it intact to help with security and reconstruction. (By comparison, the U.S. Army, about the same size as Saddam's, had about three hundred generals.) Corruption was deeply ingrained. The Kurds and s.h.i.+a, together composing 80 percent of Iraq's population, would also vehemently oppose any attempt to retain Saddam's army. We had to ask whether it made sense to risk alienating the vast majority of Iraqis by trying to keep and reconst.i.tute the army. I concluded that the benefits outweighed the risks, and that we would keep it intact to help with security and reconstruction.

The calculus changed, however, as coalition troops drove north to Baghdad. Faced with the prospects of death or capture if they engaged our coalition forces, many members of the Iraqi army removed their uniforms and deserted. Undoubtedly, large numbers of the army's conscript soldiers-most of them s.h.i.+a-had never wanted to serve the Saddam regime in the first place and didn't plan to stay any longer than necessary. CENTCOM was operating on the U.S. intelligence community's judgment that the Iraqi army would remain intact after the invasion, and that the largely s.h.i.+a conscripts at lower levels of the military would be available to actively work with coalition forces to secure and reconstruct the country.* That judgment turned out to be incorrect. That judgment turned out to be incorrect.

The Iraqi army, in Bremer's words, "disbanded itself."32 The evolving situation called to mind the John Maynard Keynes quote, "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?" Few, if any, of the arguments in favor of using the army continued to be applicable, while most of the reasons against using it remained. Bremer recommended a change of course. The evolving situation called to mind the John Maynard Keynes quote, "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?" Few, if any, of the arguments in favor of using the army continued to be applicable, while most of the reasons against using it remained. Bremer recommended a change of course.33 He made the decision in close coordination with his senior adviser on defense issues, Walter Slocombe, who had served as undersecretary of defense for policy in the Clinton administration and who at my request had agreed to a.s.sist the CPA. He made the decision in close coordination with his senior adviser on defense issues, Walter Slocombe, who had served as undersecretary of defense for policy in the Clinton administration and who at my request had agreed to a.s.sist the CPA.

Bremer and Slocombe championed a proposal to create an entirely new Iraqi army. The training and equipping of the army would fall under the control of the CPA and not, as commonly a.s.sumed, under the United States military. Bremer briefed me and several other Defense officials about the outlines of the plan on May 19, 2003 and then other members of the National Security Council three days later. His decision, particularly its specifics, did not receive the full interagency discussion it merited.34 We were told that each of the soldiers was to receive a stipend while the army was reorganized, so that they would not be aimless, unemployed, and on the streets. We were told that each of the soldiers was to receive a stipend while the army was reorganized, so that they would not be aimless, unemployed, and on the streets.35 Unfortunately, there was a month delay before Bremer's office announced the payments and another month before the CPA could issue them. Unfortunately, there was a month delay before Bremer's office announced the payments and another month before the CPA could issue them.36 Many members of the Iraqi army became embittered. The initial pace of training the new army was also excruciatingly slow. Many members of the Iraqi army became embittered. The initial pace of training the new army was also excruciatingly slow.37 Later I revived the question of whether it might be desirable or possible to rea.s.semble units of the old Iraqi army and bring them into service in some form.38 I asked General Abizaid for an a.s.sessment. But Bremer strenuously objected to this idea, apparently on the grounds that Iraqis would not want any remnants of the old army reconst.i.tuted. I asked General Abizaid for an a.s.sessment. But Bremer strenuously objected to this idea, apparently on the grounds that Iraqis would not want any remnants of the old army reconst.i.tuted.39 Whether or not disbanding the Iraqi army was ultimately a good idea, the failure to reform and reconst.i.tute it quickly was costly. Whether or not disbanding the Iraqi army was ultimately a good idea, the failure to reform and reconst.i.tute it quickly was costly.

Bremer's plan for a new Iraqi army focused on defending Iraq from an external threat rather than on using it for internal security.* This decision stemmed from his certain view that the Iraqi people would never trust or tolerate any version of Saddam's army patrolling their streets. Yet the far greater threat to Iraqis was not from outside invaders but from the insurgency being waged from within. The army was being trained to fight the wrong war. This decision stemmed from his certain view that the Iraqi people would never trust or tolerate any version of Saddam's army patrolling their streets. Yet the far greater threat to Iraqis was not from outside invaders but from the insurgency being waged from within. The army was being trained to fight the wrong war.

For nearly a year Abizaid made efforts to get the training of the Iraqi army transferred from the CPA to the military, which had vastly more experience. Bremer finally relented in the spring of 2004. In the meantime, Abizaid and Sanchez had built up the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, a force of military units that remained in their communities, but the size of Iraq's national security forces was still too small to deal with the insurgency.

It is fair to ask why differences between the CPA and CENTCOM, and more broadly between State and Defense, were not better resolved. I have asked it myself as I look back. The fact was that Bremer's views on Iraqi governance and occupation reflected those of the State Department. Those key differences were never clearly or firmly resolved in the NSC. Only the President could do so.

As time went on, Bremer's pride of owners.h.i.+p in his policy concerning the Iraqi army wavered. In 2005, Bremer said the decision had been his, calling it "the most important decision I made, and it had the effect of avoiding a civil war in Iraq."40 However, by September 2007, as criticism of his decision intensified, Bremer wrote an op-ed in the However, by September 2007, as criticism of his decision intensified, Bremer wrote an op-ed in the New York Times New York Times ent.i.tled, "How I Didn't Dismantle Iraq's Army." ent.i.tled, "How I Didn't Dismantle Iraq's Army."41 Apparently Bremer felt he was blamed unfairly for the decision, and in truth, it wasn't all Bremer's fault. Many shared responsibility for the policy. I was told of Bremer's decision and possibly could have stopped it.42 Members of the NSC had been informed of his decision before Bremer announced it, and not one partic.i.p.ant registered an objection. Members of the NSC had been informed of his decision before Bremer announced it, and not one partic.i.p.ant registered an objection.43 My impression was that President Bush wanted Bremer to have considerable freedom of action. However, it is now clear that the NSC should have deliberated the decision more fully. We should have had more clarity about the critical details of implementation, ensuring that the stipend payments and the size, purpose, and timeline for it were well understood and agreed to beforehand. My impression was that President Bush wanted Bremer to have considerable freedom of action. However, it is now clear that the NSC should have deliberated the decision more fully. We should have had more clarity about the critical details of implementation, ensuring that the stipend payments and the size, purpose, and timeline for it were well understood and agreed to beforehand.

There is no mistaking that the decision to dissolve the Iraqi army had consequences, but as time has gone on we may be finding it has had some advantages as well.44 Perhaps because much effort was poured into building a new force from scratch, it is emerging as one of Iraq's more effective inst.i.tutions. By way of contrast, its police force suffers from lack of training and discipline, sectarianism, and corruption. As in Afghanistan, the State Department was, by U.S. law, placed in charge of police training in Iraq. However, State sent very few qualified people to either country. Perhaps because much effort was poured into building a new force from scratch, it is emerging as one of Iraq's more effective inst.i.tutions. By way of contrast, its police force suffers from lack of training and discipline, sectarianism, and corruption. As in Afghanistan, the State Department was, by U.S. law, placed in charge of police training in Iraq. However, State sent very few qualified people to either country.45 In the case of Iraq, for reasons still unclear, the training program was delayed for six months. As a result, the country was without any sort of internal security force for a critical period following the war. In the case of Iraq, for reasons still unclear, the training program was delayed for six months. As a result, the country was without any sort of internal security force for a critical period following the war.

Defense officials repeatedly urged State and its representatives at the CPA to improve police training and devote more resources to the task.46 But just as he had with regard to the training of the army, Bremer argued against having the U.S. military take over Iraqi police training. "I do not agree with placing the Iraqi police program under the military command," Bremer wrote me in February 2004, after I informed him that DoD would be a.s.suming responsibility for police training. He said the transfer would "convey to the Iraqis the opposite of the principle of civilian standards, rules and accountability for the police." But just as he had with regard to the training of the army, Bremer argued against having the U.S. military take over Iraqi police training. "I do not agree with placing the Iraqi police program under the military command," Bremer wrote me in February 2004, after I informed him that DoD would be a.s.suming responsibility for police training. He said the transfer would "convey to the Iraqis the opposite of the principle of civilian standards, rules and accountability for the police."47 This would have been a compelling argument if Iraq were Nebraska. But it wasn't. It was a war zone that was suffering from a vicious insurgency. We needed a capable police force to bring law and order and gather intelligence to stop the insurgency from metastasizing further, and we needed it fast. Too much time had been wasted already. The whole process had cost us a year-and done incalculable harm to our country's mission in Iraq in the interim. This would have been a compelling argument if Iraq were Nebraska. But it wasn't. It was a war zone that was suffering from a vicious insurgency. We needed a capable police force to bring law and order and gather intelligence to stop the insurgency from metastasizing further, and we needed it fast. Too much time had been wasted already. The whole process had cost us a year-and done incalculable harm to our country's mission in Iraq in the interim.

The early months of the Iraq occupation-throughout the summer of 2003-saw the stirrings of an Iraqi insurgency. In August, the ill.u.s.trious United Nations envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was killed when a flatbed truck filled with explosives barreled into the UN headquarters in Baghdad. Twenty-two other UN officials were also killed. The attack sent a chilling message to nations and organizations that were then considering joining the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. From that point on, our efforts to persuade countries to contribute became considerably more difficult.

Military commanders told me that before the attack they had warned UN officials several times that cement revetments and gates were needed to protect the UN compound. In declining to heed those warnings, they explained to our commanders, "That would make us too much like you." After the bombing, the United Nations closed its mission and withdrew from Iraq.

When the signs of a resistance movement emerged that summer-grenade attacks, small-arms fire, the occasional suicide bomber, or car bomb-we tried to identify who and what was fueling the movement. At first, the insurgency consisted of former regime figures and common criminals. On the eve of the invasion, Saddam had released one hundred thousand prisoners who contributed to the lawlessness.48 Eventually the insurgency extended to groups like al-Qaida, which tapped into popular Sunni hostility against the s.h.i.+a as well as the resentment that many Sunnis felt at the loss of their political privileges. Though the Sunni resistance initially seemed to lack organization and strength, its forces were soon being augmented by foreign fighters, jihadists who began pouring across Iraq's borders from Syria and Saudi Arabia. Eventually the insurgency extended to groups like al-Qaida, which tapped into popular Sunni hostility against the s.h.i.+a as well as the resentment that many Sunnis felt at the loss of their political privileges. Though the Sunni resistance initially seemed to lack organization and strength, its forces were soon being augmented by foreign fighters, jihadists who began pouring across Iraq's borders from Syria and Saudi Arabia.

The resistance was centered in Iraq's western Sunni provinces. Because the 3rd Infantry Division had been denied access to Iraq's north through Turkey, most of the Sunni territory was not covered by U.S. troops in the early days of the war. Major combat operations were over by the time U.S. troops reached those strongholds. This meant that cities like Fallujah, Tikrit, and Ramadi never experienced major battles with U.S. troops and became safe havens for insurgents.

In the list of intelligence shortcomings, the failure to highlight the dangers of an insurgency was among the more serious. Intelligence reports occasionally discussed the possibility of postwar disorder and instability, but I don't recall seeing a briefing that antic.i.p.ated the likelihood of a sustained guerrilla campaign against the coalition.* Our intelligence community lacked an appreciation for the Baathist regime's ability to finance, command, and control an insurgency after Saddam's overthrow. They repeatedly a.s.serted that ideological conflicts between the secular Baathists and the jihadist religious extremists of al-Qaida precluded strategic cooperation between them-yet such cooperation became the heart and soul of the insurgency. Our intelligence community lacked an appreciation for the Baathist regime's ability to finance, command, and control an insurgency after Saddam's overthrow. They repeatedly a.s.serted that ideological conflicts between the secular Baathists and the jihadist religious extremists of al-Qaida precluded strategic cooperation between them-yet such cooperation became the heart and soul of the insurgency.

Out of the dozens of intelligence and military briefings on what might be expected from a war in Iraq, the first time I had heard of the possibility of "protracted guerrilla war" came from someone removed from the intelligence community. In April 2003, as our troops raced northward through Iraq, a retired Marine colonel named Gary Anderson wrote an op-ed on the possibility of a guerrilla war. Anderson had served in Somalia and Lebanon and was steeped in the lessons of asymmetric warfare. "Many observers of the war with Iraq are focused on the looming battle for Baghdad in antic.i.p.ation that it will be the culminating event of the conflict...," he wrote in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post several days before the fall of Baghdad. "But in the view of the Iraqi leaders.h.i.+p, it may be only the end of a first stage in a greater Iraqi plan." He warned about the rise of "a protracted guerrilla war against the 'occupation,' which the American-British coalition bills as liberation." several days before the fall of Baghdad. "But in the view of the Iraqi leaders.h.i.+p, it may be only the end of a first stage in a greater Iraqi plan." He warned about the rise of "a protracted guerrilla war against the 'occupation,' which the American-British coalition bills as liberation."50 He even raised the specter that the new phase of the war could be managed by Saddam himself. After reading Anderson's article, I decided it should be of interest to Bremer and Abizaid. Because I found it different from what we were being told, I also sent it to Myers, Wolfowitz, and Feith and asked them to give it some thought. He even raised the specter that the new phase of the war could be managed by Saddam himself. After reading Anderson's article, I decided it should be of interest to Bremer and Abizaid. Because I found it different from what we were being told, I also sent it to Myers, Wolfowitz, and Feith and asked them to give it some thought.51 Senior DoD officials discussed what we should label this resistance movement in July 2003. I did not want to label the enemy inaccurately or give it legitimacy that it didn't deserve. As the new CENTCOM commander, Abizaid did an initial a.s.sessment of the problem. In one of his first press briefings as CENTCOM commander, he called it "a cla.s.sical guerrilla-type campaign against us."52 Guerrillas can have positive connotations in many parts of the world. Many saw guerrillas as the brave vanguard of an outmatched force committed to bringing down a government through asymmetric means. I was also cautious about using the word "insurgency" at first. Insurgency struck me as an organized effort with a central command and control committed to the overthrow of a government. DoD's official definition of the term supported this interpretation. Guerrillas can have positive connotations in many parts of the world. Many saw guerrillas as the brave vanguard of an outmatched force committed to bringing down a government through asymmetric means. I was also cautious about using the word "insurgency" at first. Insurgency struck me as an organized effort with a central command and control committed to the overthrow of a government. DoD's official definition of the term supported this interpretation.* In summer 2003, Iraq didn't have its own government and, moreover, the attacks seemed to lack central coordination. I told senior DoD officials that we had "to do a better job of using words that are well thought through and calculated to express exactly what we mean." In summer 2003, Iraq didn't have its own government and, moreover, the attacks seemed to lack central coordination. I told senior DoD officials that we had "to do a better job of using words that are well thought through and calculated to express exactly what we mean."54 I didn't want to end up with another label like "war on terror" that we might regret down the road. I didn't want to end up with another label like "war on terror" that we might regret down the road.

Abizaid didn't back down. In response to my queries, he gave the reasons why he believed it was a guerrilla war: The resistance had some public support; the attacks were sustained and asymmetric; and it was beginning to demonstrate some organization. The growing momentum of the attacks, particularly in western, Sunni-populated areas, proved Abizaid's point. He had done what I expected of all those who served in the U.S. military: When questioned by the Secretary of Defense, he marshaled the facts and arguments to support his position. He convinced me that we were indeed facing an insurgency. In November 2003, I asked for information and briefings on historical insurgencies and what the lessons learned of Britain's successful counterinsurgency in Malaya (now Malaysia) during the 1950s were.55 There was no mistaking that there was a gaping blind spot where our government and intelligence community might have antic.i.p.ated the possibility of an insurgency in Iraq. There was no mistaking that there was a gaping blind spot where our government and intelligence community might have antic.i.p.ated the possibility of an insurgency in Iraq.

As the months went on, it was clear that when I made suggestions to Bremer, he did not take them well. His formal direction from the President to report through me was being ignored. He was receiving guidance directly from many in the administration-the President, Rice, Powell-and choosing which guidance he preferred. After four months of what looked to me to be a series of unfortunate decisions, I felt a need to intervene.

I was...o...b..ard a military plane returning to the United States after a four-day trip to Iraq and Afghanistan on September 8, 2003, when I scanned the Pentagon's "Early Bird," a compilation of the top national securityrelated stories in major newspapers. One item that caught my attention was an op-ed by Bremer in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post ent.i.tled, "Iraq's Path to Sovereignty." This was the first I'd heard of the article's existence. In fact, I had just spent two days in Baghdad with Bremer, and he had mentioned nothing about it, nor had he even hinted at the startling news it contained. ent.i.tled, "Iraq's Path to Sovereignty." This was the first I'd heard of the article's existence. In fact, I had just spent two days in Baghdad with Bremer, and he had mentioned nothing about it, nor had he even hinted at the startling news it contained.

"[H]ow can we get Iraqis back in charge of Iraq?" Bremer asked in his article. "Elections are the obvious solution to restoring sovereignty to the Iraqi people. But at the present elections are simply not possible."56 He outlined seven steps that Iraq would have to take on its path to self-government, including economic progress, ratification of a const.i.tution, and then elections. Only after the completion of these steps, Bremer wrote, would the CPA relinquish control of the country. I thought to myself that a turnover could take years under Bremer's policy-and if there were a stalemate at any step, it could take longer. This was quite a departure from our approach in Afghanistan. Afghans had had a sovereign interim government operating before their new const.i.tution was drafted, let alone ratified, as a number of increasingly frustrated Iraqis noted. He outlined seven steps that Iraq would have to take on its path to self-government, including economic progress, ratification of a const.i.tution, and then elections. Only after the completion of these steps, Bremer wrote, would the CPA relinquish control of the country. I thought to myself that a turnover could take years under Bremer's policy-and if there were a stalemate at any step, it could take longer. This was quite a departure from our approach in Afghanistan. Afghans had had a sovereign interim government operating before their new const.i.tution was drafted, let alone ratified, as a number of increasingly frustrated Iraqis noted.

I recognized, of course, that the plan Bremer was now outlining was similar to the approach long favored by the State Department, in which Iraq would regain sovereign power only after a multiyear period of U.S. administration. Indeed, Secretary Powell, at Bremer's request, flew to Baghdad to insist that this plan was the only way to ensure a successful and stable Iraq.57 Bremer recounts Powell declaring to a meeting of the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad that giving sovereignty to the Iraqi leaders at that time was "entirely unacceptable." Bremer recounts Powell declaring to a meeting of the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad that giving sovereignty to the Iraqi leaders at that time was "entirely unacceptable."58 Bremer's decision to publish his op-ed without informing me-and his apparent decision to follow the State Department's view-ended even the pretense that he reported through the Department of Defense, or that I was in any way in Bremer's line of authority. Bremer's decision to publish his op-ed without informing me-and his apparent decision to follow the State Department's view-ended even the pretense that he reported through the Department of Defense, or that I was in any way in Bremer's line of authority.

Yet I was astonished to learn much later that Bremer had approached the President about moving out from under his theoretical reporting relations.h.i.+p through me, citing my "micromanagement." "Don terrifies his civilian subordinates," Bremer reportedly told the President. "I can rarely get any decisions out of anyone but him. This works all right, but isn't ideal."59 The micromanagement charge was ironic coming from Bremer, of all people. Over the previous months I had worked to try to develop a good working relations.h.i.+p with him. I commended him for his work and made a point of noting whenever he seemed to be on the right track. The micromanagement charge was ironic coming from Bremer, of all people. Over the previous months I had worked to try to develop a good working relations.h.i.+p with him. I commended him for his work and made a point of noting whenever he seemed to be on the right track.60 I still had considerable sympathy for the challenges he faced. He was in a tough job and getting criticism and advice from all sides. The Iraqis were pressing for more authority. The insurgency was blossoming. But Bremer and his CPA suffered not from too much oversight on my part but from too little. That needed to change. Bremer's op-ed reflected the still unresolved internal conflicts in the administration's Iraq policy. I decided it was worth a last-ditch effort to get it back on track. I still had considerable sympathy for the challenges he faced. He was in a tough job and getting criticism and advice from all sides. The Iraqis were pressing for more authority. The insurgency was blossoming. But Bremer and his CPA suffered not from too much oversight on my part but from too little. That needed to change. Bremer's op-ed reflected the still unresolved internal conflicts in the administration's Iraq policy. I decided it was worth a last-ditch effort to get it back on track.

CHAPTER 37

Liberation from the Occupation.

Beginning in September 2003, after Bremer's article was published, I a.s.sembled a review group on Iraq policy, headed by Doug Feith and Lieutenant General Walter "Skip" Sharp, the director of plans on the Joint Staff. I hoped to bring resolution to the unresolved debate about our strategy for when to hand over authority to Iraqis. With input from Generals Myers, Pace, and Abizaid, we reformulated the five princ.i.p.al U.S. strategic goals for an Iraqi government: renouncing terrorism, abandoning WMD and long-range missile programs, seeking peace with its neighbors, remaining a unified country, and developing the Iraqi economy.1 Our plan called for the prompt a.s.sembly of a group of Iraqis to select an interim prime minister, help draft a const.i.tution, and pave the way for elections. We also called for a date certain for the transfer of full sovereign authority: no later than the middle of 2004. I wanted to give Iraqis concrete a.s.surance that the occupation of their country was going to end-and soon.2 I asked Bremer and Abizaid to fly to Was.h.i.+ngton to discuss it with us at the Pentagon. My hope was to sit down with Bremer and have him offer ideas and input, with the ultimate goal of getting him to buy in to our plan. I had a sense that our effort might prove successful.

Prominent Iraqis had protested Bremer's views as set forth in his op-ed. They were not pleased with his a.s.sertion that Iraqis would be taking on substantive roles later rather than sooner. Their significant outcry seemed to have put Bremer in a more cooperative mood. In fact, I thought he might be ready to accept a dignified way for him to drop his plan altogether.

I cleared much of my calendar for the two days Bremer and Abizaid would be in Was.h.i.+ngton. Over the course of our hours-long meetings, we showed them our strategic review and solicited their thoughts.3 As I had hoped, Bremer was receptive. By the close of our discussions, he had reversed his position that the Coalition Provisional Authority could not be dismantled until after elections were held. As I had hoped, Bremer was receptive. By the close of our discussions, he had reversed his position that the Coalition Provisional Authority could not be dismantled until after elections were held.

On October 29, 2003, with Bremer's acquiescence, I presented the agreed-upon proposal to the President and the members of the National Security Council. As he heard our timetable, Powell again expressed reservations, calling the turnover plan "exceptionally ambitious."4 The President liked it, however, which was not surprising since it was in line with what I thought he had preferred to do all along. Bush soon set June 30, 2004, as the deadline for turning over sovereign power to the Iraqis. The occupation now had a foreseeable end. The President liked it, however, which was not surprising since it was in line with what I thought he had preferred to do all along. Bush soon set June 30, 2004, as the deadline for turning over sovereign power to the Iraqis. The occupation now had a foreseeable end.

As this was going on in October 2003, there was a curious development. A number of news outlets began to report that there had been a shake-up in the administration's Iraq policy-but it was not the one that actually had just occurred. "President Bush is giving his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, the authority to manage postwar Iraq and the rebuilding of Afghanistan," USA Today USA Today reported. reported.5 In what the In what the New York Times New York Times called "a major reorganization" of the postwar effort, it quoted a senior administration official as saying that "[t]his puts accountability right into the White House." called "a major reorganization" of the postwar effort, it quoted a senior administration official as saying that "[t]his puts accountability right into the White House."6 The news stories surrounding Rice's announcement reported that she had established something called the "Iraqi Stabilization Group," with undetermined responsibilities. CNN reported that it "will be responsible for handling the day-to-day administration of Iraq."7 One newspaper ran a cartoon of Rice pulling down a statue of me in front of the Pentagon, as Saddam's statue had been pulled down in Firdos Square. One newspaper ran a cartoon of Rice pulling down a statue of me in front of the Pentagon, as Saddam's statue had been pulled down in Firdos Square.

I thought it would have been terrific if Rice and her staff had the interest and skill to manage all U.S. efforts in Iraq and improve the situation. But they did not. In fact, the lack of resolution on issues relating to the administration's Iraq strategy at the NSC level had been a major contributing factor to the problems in the first place. Years later I learned that Bremer had been having a daily phone call with Rice at 6:00 a.m., Was.h.i.+ngton time. She had had ample opportunity to offer Bremer and the CPA management advice. After the press began speculating about the new powers of Rice's group-and the supposed coup against the Pentagon-Rice tried to clarify the situation. Publicly she said she had consulted on the establishment of the group with various officials, including me. That was not the case. I was informed of the new group's existence as a fait accompli, but not consulted about whether it was desirable, necessary, or appropriate.

I sent the cartoon to Rice with a note saying she should keep it for her sc.r.a.pbook.8 The news stories about Rice's new management plan also repeated the widely believed canard that the State Department had been cut out of postwar planning.9 The stories bore the unmistakable fingerprints of Powell's top aides. The stories bore the unmistakable fingerprints of Powell's top aides.

I had been eager for the State Department to accept more responsibility in Iraq and would have been the last person to shut them out. When we asked the State Department to send experts to Iraq, they failed to meet their quotas.10 When we asked for support for reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, they struggled to fill them. When the State Department was in charge of training the Iraqi police, it did not get the job done. Powell was in National Security Council meetings and princ.i.p.als meetings on Iraq and shared in every major decision. It was a mystery as to what these State Department officials felt they were not involved in. I was skeptical that either the National Security Council or the State Department truly wanted to be accountable for the administration's Iraq policy, and I was all too aware that Rice and the NSC were not able to manage it. When we asked for support for reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, they struggled to fill them. When the State Department was in charge of training the Iraqi police, it did not get the job done. Powell was in National Security Council meetings and princ.i.p.als meetings on Iraq and shared in every major decision. It was a mystery as to what these State Department officials felt they were not involved in. I was skeptical that either the National Security Council or the State Department truly wanted to be accountable for the administration's Iraq policy, and I was all too aware that Rice and the NSC were not able to manage it.

On October 6, 2003, I sent a memo to the President with copies to Cheney and Andy Card. "In Monday's paper," I wrote, "Condi, in effect, announced that the President is concerned about the post-war Iraq stabilization efforts and that, as a result, he has asked Condi Rice and the National Security Council to a.s.sume re