Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 24

On March 31, 2004, Iraqi insurgents ambushed four Blackwater contractors. They were pulled from their convoy and dragged through the city streets. Their murdered bodies were hanged over a Euphrates River bridge. Photographs and videos of the carnage promptly flashed around the world.

These crimes were monstrous-everyone understood that. But what many also did not seem to realize was that this act had a sinister and calculated purpose. The insurgents knew that they couldn't hold off an American a.s.sault with arms alone. Instead, they had a sophisticated propaganda effort designed to intimidate and make Americans question whether their effort was worth the cost. The shocking images of bloodied and charred American corpses dangling from a bridge was a public relations victory for them. Increasingly, people questioned why Iraq seemed to be chaotic, violent, and out of control after its liberation.

All of us on the National Security Council recognized that we could not allow an Iraqi city to become a sanctuary for murderers and terrorists. My impulse was not only to find the enemies who had committed the atrocity, but also to send a message across the country that anyone who engaged in acts of terror would face the might of the U.S. military.

With the situation appearing to worsen that spring, General Myers and I approved Abizaid's request to extend the tours of twenty thousand of our forces. Abizaid had earlier hoped that we might be able to gradually begin reducing troop levels. But that now seemed less likely.

On April 6, 2004, the Marines began an offensive to secure Fallujah, the largest combat mission in the eleven months since the end of major combat operations. Through no fault of the Marines, Operation Vigilant Resolve proved to be neither vigilant nor resolute. After three days of intense fighting, the Marines commanded a quarter of the city. But the gains came amid controversy, as the enemy's savage tactics, combined with their successful propaganda effort, had their desired effect.

Insurgents took over public buildings, notably mosques and hospitals, and used them as bases from which to attack the advancing Marines. When an American air strike destroyed a mosque, it led to a public outcry fueled by false news stories on Al-Jazeera that trumpeted civilian casualties and carnage.* It was asymmetric war in its purest form. The insurgents of course were violating the laws of war: using civilians as human s.h.i.+elds; firing on Marines from houses in Iraqi neighborhoods, daring the Marines to fire back; and storing their weapon caches in mosques, schools, and hospitals. The enemy sought to convince the world that America's use of force was indiscriminate, disproportionate, and reckless. It was asymmetric war in its purest form. The insurgents of course were violating the laws of war: using civilians as human s.h.i.+elds; firing on Marines from houses in Iraqi neighborhoods, daring the Marines to fire back; and storing their weapon caches in mosques, schools, and hospitals. The enemy sought to convince the world that America's use of force was indiscriminate, disproportionate, and reckless.

Sunni members of the Iraqi Governing Council, who were anxious to a.s.sume control of their government as the June deadline for Iraq sovereignty approached, expressed outrage at the U.S. attack on Fallujah and pressed Bremer for a cease-fire.

On April 9, Bremer, Abizaid, and Sanchez partic.i.p.ated in an NSC meeting via secure video from Baghdad. I joined the President, Powell, and Rice in the Situation Room. "We have a real threat with the top Sunni members of the Iraqi Governing Council," Bremer told the President. He said they were threatening resignation and the dissolution of the council. "I've agreed to a twenty-four-hour cessation of operations," Bremer said, adding, "This is not a cease-fire."

It sounded exactly like a cease-fire-even a capitulation-to me. The Iraqi Governing Council wanted time to negotiate, but I doubted any real concessions would be extracted from an army of fanatics who had vowed to attack the new Iraqi government. I wanted to continue the operation.

"What do we do when the Iraqi Council asks for an extension?" I asked.19 "I recommend we don't grant it," Abizaid answered quickly.

"I tend to agree," Bremer interjected, "but we can't rule it out, and we shouldn't answer hypothetically." His reluctance indicated to me an extension of the twenty-four-hour so-called cessation of hostilities was all but certain.

I knew Bush's instinct was to take the enemy out, but he also had to consider the diplomatic aspects. "How long do the Marines need to conclude their operations in Fallujah?" he asked.

"Three to four days," Abizaid replied.

"Well, tell 'em we'll quit in four days," Bush said.

As the Iraqi Governing Council engaged in discussions, our Marines, still taking fire from the enemy, held their positions but halted their advance. As the twenty-four-hour cessation of hostilities expired, just as I had antic.i.p.ated, Bremer was reluctant to continue the offensive. He said he feared uprisings in Iraq and a "collapse of the entire political process" if the Marines continued.20 It was not an unreasonable concern, but for me an even greater worry was the insurgent attacks that were continuing against our troops. I felt our military was being tested, and we needed to push back against the challenge. It was not an unreasonable concern, but for me an even greater worry was the insurgent attacks that were continuing against our troops. I felt our military was being tested, and we needed to push back against the challenge.

Bush seemed to share that view. At the NSC meeting the next day, on April 10, the President worried that there would be consequences if people thought, as he put it, that "we've been whipped."21 But the President did not issue an order for the Marines to continue. But the President did not issue an order for the Marines to continue.

The President decided that extending or canceling the cease-fire was an operational decision-one that belonged to the senior officials on the ground. Directly countermanding the recommendations of the two most senior commanders responsible, Abizaid and Sanchez, in addition to Bremer, was not in the cards. The Commander in Chief made the call to let them proceed as they saw fit.

There was logic in deferring to Bremer and Abizaid in that they had made some real progress elsewhere in Iraq. The military's efforts and arrests of senior members of the regime gave the Iraqi people an opportunity to close the book on their recent past and bring the criminals to account. By October 2003 the country's electricity generation was higher than prewar levels, though in the years that followed it would ebb and flow with the pace of attacks.* With help from Undersecretary of the Treasury John Taylor, they rapidly created and distributed new Iraqi currency and curbed inflation. Real Iraqi GDP growth during the CPA period was 46.5 percent. With help from Undersecretary of the Treasury John Taylor, they rapidly created and distributed new Iraqi currency and curbed inflation. Real Iraqi GDP growth during the CPA period was 46.5 percent.22 The stock market opened, as did schools and hospitals across the country. In March 2004, Bremer and CPA officials drafted an interim const.i.tution known as the Transitional Administrative Law that protected human rights, a.s.serted the freedom of religion, and established the basic structure of a representative Iraqi government. The stock market opened, as did schools and hospitals across the country. In March 2004, Bremer and CPA officials drafted an interim const.i.tution known as the Transitional Administrative Law that protected human rights, a.s.serted the freedom of religion, and established the basic structure of a representative Iraqi government.23 It left a lasting imprint on Iraqi society. These were important signs of progress that received relatively little recognition. It left a lasting imprint on Iraqi society. These were important signs of progress that received relatively little recognition.

The first battle of Fallujah, in April 2004, however, was not among the triumphs of that period. The cease-fire the momentum the Marines had gained. The Iraqi Governing Council again said they would resign if our forces pressed on. Eventually our coalition allies began to urge us to call off the attack. They were seeing the same images as many across the Arab world: wounded Iraqis, damaged mosques, and interviews with Fallujans describing supposed crimes by Marines targeting schools and hospitals. The widely disseminated propaganda increased the sense that the situation was one misstep away from a total, nationwide revolt against coalition forces. The Iraqi Governing Council tried to persuade the insurgents to lay down their arms and abandon the city. Bush was unhappy with the situation as was I. It was doubtful that a cease-fire would be productive.24 I knew that sooner or later, we would have to return to the enemy's stronghold. I knew that sooner or later, we would have to return to the enemy's stronghold.

Given a growing insurgency and the existence of sanctuaries like Fallujah where insurgents received support from the local population, it was clear that we needed to find a way to involve the Sunnis in the new Iraq. Only a small percentage of them were directly engaged in the insurgency or linked to groups like al-Qaida, but many others sympathized with the resistance and the sense that their country was being occupied by forces hostile to them. It was easy to appreciate why many Sunnis-who were once accorded all of the privileges in Iraqi society-might see the future without Saddam and his largesse as bleak. Around the time of the Fallujah standoff, General Abizaid and I were discussing a Sunni outreach strategy. He thought there could be a way to peel off the disaffected Sunnis from the Islamist extremists and hard-core Baathists. There were intelligence reports about former Iraqi generals and other senior Baathists who had fled Iraq but had connections with insurgents who were ready to negotiate.* A large payment of cash by us could buy a change of allegiance, they informed us. We needed to determine if their offers were in good faith. Abizaid persuaded me of the merits of a determined outreach effort. A large payment of cash by us could buy a change of allegiance, they informed us. We needed to determine if their offers were in good faith. Abizaid persuaded me of the merits of a determined outreach effort.25 In April 2004, I suggested to Bremer that he put together a strategy designed to "change the mindset of disenfranchis.e.m.e.nt and hopelessness" among the Sunnis.26 Senior military officers and I had been concerned for over a year that the Sunni tribes were being neglected, but we had found a less than receptive ear in the CPA. Senior military officers and I had been concerned for over a year that the Sunni tribes were being neglected, but we had found a less than receptive ear in the CPA.27 The Sunni outreach I outlined included easing up on de-Baathification efforts by moving Ahmad Chalabi out of the process. The Sunni outreach I outlined included easing up on de-Baathification efforts by moving Ahmad Chalabi out of the process.* I urged Bremer to focus on "labor-intensive projects in Sunni areas" and those near moderate Sunni mosques. I also asked him to build ties to Iraq's Sunni tribes through regular visits with their leaders. We could contract with members, as Saddam did, to provide essential services, such as protecting the electrical grid from sabotage. The tribes and their leaders-in s.h.i.+a and Kurdish communities as well as Sunni areas-were the backbone of Iraqi society. Not engaging them was unwise. Tribal leaders, I suggested, also could help us recruit for the security forces and put pressure on members of their tribes who helped the insurgency. I urged Bremer to focus on "labor-intensive projects in Sunni areas" and those near moderate Sunni mosques. I also asked him to build ties to Iraq's Sunni tribes through regular visits with their leaders. We could contract with members, as Saddam did, to provide essential services, such as protecting the electrical grid from sabotage. The tribes and their leaders-in s.h.i.+a and Kurdish communities as well as Sunni areas-were the backbone of Iraqi society. Not engaging them was unwise. Tribal leaders, I suggested, also could help us recruit for the security forces and put pressure on members of their tribes who helped the insurgency.

But Bremer was not inclined to work through the tribes. Despite his agreement to turn over sovereignty by June, it remained difficult to get him to accept the idea that Iraq belonged to the Iraqis, and that the Iraqis were ent.i.tled to their own culture and inst.i.tutions.

In the spring of 2004, we faced the danger of a two-front insurgency. Sunni insurgents were gaining ground and establis.h.i.+ng sanctuaries in Iraq's west, in places like Fallujah. Meanwhile, s.h.i.+a militias, under Muqtada al-Sadr, were threatening rebellion in the south. The son of a revered ayatollah who was murdered by Saddam's lieutenants, Sadr demonstrated little of his father's intellectual prowess. As a failing seminary student, he had earned the nickname "Mullah Atari" in recognition of his fondness for video games. Yet he developed a following and became a powerful and violent leader of opposition to the American occupation. His angry sermons drew flocks of young men from s.h.i.+a slums, enabling him to establish a militia that gained influence through a combination of social services and mob terror. Sadr intimidated other Iraqis by being able to put thousands of thugs and young males on the street. These mobs, called the Mahdi Army (though it was in no sense an army), were a potent force for disruption, demonstrations, and terror.

That April, long-simmering tensions with Sadr came to a head in Najaf, Iraq's holiest s.h.i.+a city. Taking advantage of the Fallujah flare-up, s.h.i.+a gangs heeded Sadr's call, televised on Al-Jazeera, to attack coalition forces throughout southern Iraq.28 Sadr had established his own Islamic courts and prisons in Najaf-the heart of the s.h.i.+te clerical establishment-where eyewitness accounts reported torture in the style of Saddam's regime. Sadr had established his own Islamic courts and prisons in Najaf-the heart of the s.h.i.+te clerical establishment-where eyewitness accounts reported torture in the style of Saddam's regime.29 There were several discussions in the National Security Council about whether, and if so when, our forces should take Sadr into custody. As early as August 2003 I had recommended that Abizaid and Bremer begin to think through "what we are going to do if red lines are crossed."30 When Sadr began calling the coalition "the enemy," I felt he had crossed the line. When Sadr began calling the coalition "the enemy," I felt he had crossed the line.31 If he wanted to define us as his enemy, my view was that we should treat him as one. He had evidently ordered the murder of one of Iraq's most respected moderate s.h.i.+a leaders, Abdul Majid al-Khoei. I felt it was important to establish the principle that no one-not even a cleric with the loyalty of tens of thousands of s.h.i.+a-should be above the law. In January 2004, I recommended that the CPA arrest Sadr to demonstrate "that the rule of law applies to s.h.i.+'a as well as Sunni." If he wanted to define us as his enemy, my view was that we should treat him as one. He had evidently ordered the murder of one of Iraq's most respected moderate s.h.i.+a leaders, Abdul Majid al-Khoei. I felt it was important to establish the principle that no one-not even a cleric with the loyalty of tens of thousands of s.h.i.+a-should be above the law. In January 2004, I recommended that the CPA arrest Sadr to demonstrate "that the rule of law applies to s.h.i.+'a as well as Sunni."32 But there was another legitimate consideration that preoccupied us. Arresting Sadr risked making him even more popular, and could further inflame tensions with the s.h.i.+a majority, possibly triggering an outright civil war. When Sadr was holed up in the holy city of Najaf, for example, several senior clerics who opposed him nonetheless argued strongly against storming the city to arrest him. They feared it would aggravate sectarian tensions and damage holy sites.33 Still, my view was to arrest the demagogue. Still, my view was to arrest the demagogue.

Since this was a decision that could have a significant impact on the relations.h.i.+p between the coalition and our Iraqi allies, the President concluded that Bremer had to decide the best course to take. As coalition forces surrounded Najaf, Bremer and Sanchez decided to let the Iraqis take action on their own to deal with Sadr and his so-called Mahdi Army.34 I understood the reluctance to storm the city. But the idea that the Iraqi clerics or politicians would take on Sadr seemed unrealistic. I understood the reluctance to storm the city. But the idea that the Iraqi clerics or politicians would take on Sadr seemed unrealistic.

To my amazement, Bremer has since claimed that he wanted to go after Sadr but "[W]e got word that Rumsfeld had given instructions not to execute the plan to arrest Muqtada until 'further notice.'"* That was not the case. It is possible that others on the NSC with whom Bremer regularly communicated might have opposed arresting Sadr, but I did not. In fact, I was so taken aback by Bremer's suggestion that I later asked Pentagon officials to examine the issue and find out if anyone else at the Defense Department might have led Bremer to think we had wanted him to refrain from acting. The conclusion was that no one had done any such thing. That was not the case. It is possible that others on the NSC with whom Bremer regularly communicated might have opposed arresting Sadr, but I did not. In fact, I was so taken aback by Bremer's suggestion that I later asked Pentagon officials to examine the issue and find out if anyone else at the Defense Department might have led Bremer to think we had wanted him to refrain from acting. The conclusion was that no one had done any such thing.36 Again, through no fault of their own, our military appeared ineffective, not only against the terrorists in Fallujah but also against the vocal cleric looking to cause trouble. Again, through no fault of their own, our military appeared ineffective, not only against the terrorists in Fallujah but also against the vocal cleric looking to cause trouble.

There was another cleric who was in many ways Sadr's polar opposite-sage and learned, modest, moderate, and, above all, restrained. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani kept his distance from Americans, declining to meet with U.S. officials-military or civilian. At critical points he calmed pa.s.sions among the millions of s.h.i.+a who revered him. He encouraged them to accept the separation between religion and the state in a const.i.tutional democracy, rejecting Iran's form of clerical rule. In the face of consistent provocations by al-Qaida and Sunni insurgent groups against s.h.i.+a people, shrines, and mosques, and the rebellions urged by Sadr, Sistani counseled calm and patience. Without him, I have no doubt that Iraq would be very different today-and not for the better. His leaders.h.i.+p, along with many others who truly wanted a better life for their people, offered hope as we moved toward finally giving them the sovereignty they desired.

Though a latecomer to relinquis.h.i.+ng power to the Iraqis, Bremer worked to organize the transition once the decision was made. He planned a timetable with the Iraqi Governing Council that set out dates for writing an interim const.i.tution and setting up a transitional national a.s.sembly. With the CPA's a.s.sistance, they drafted their interim const.i.tution in March 2004. Though based in part on principles from our Const.i.tution, it was by no means an American doc.u.ment, but appropriately an Iraqi doc.u.ment. It protected the rights of minority Sunnis, Kurds, and Christians and gave the long beleaguered majority s.h.i.+a a full role in their government. Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority deserve credit for helping Iraqis craft the most representative const.i.tution in the history of the Arab world.

In May 2004, following the recommendations that the Defense Department's policy shop and the Joint Staffhad developed, Iraqis on the governing council met to select an interim prime minister. Ayad Allawi, a medical doctor by training, became the first Iraqi leader to a.s.sume power since Saddam Hussein. He was a symbol of opposition to Saddam. In years past Allawi, along with some of Saddam's generals, had attempted to overthrow the Iraqi regime. He fled to London, where Saddam's. .h.i.t-men broke into his residence and attacked him with an ax as he slept, wounding him in the head and chest. Miraculously, he survived and remained resolute in his opposition to the regime. Though a secular s.h.i.+a, Allawi had launched the Iraqi National Accord in 1990-a group comprising many Sunni, Baathist military officers who had become disaffected with the Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraqi Governing Council selected him unanimously as prime minister.

The approach of the June 30 handover date proved an irresistible draw for terrorists and insurgents. They staged several b.l.o.o.d.y suicide bombings, which seemed designed to intimidate the Iraqis and cast doubt on whether they would be able to lead. The enemy understood well that attacks against a sovereign government would not be nearly as popular or as widely supported as attacks against coalition "occupiers."

After several of these bombings, doubts resurfaced within and outside of the U.S. government about whether the Iraqis truly were ready to govern themselves. Reporters frequently asked Bremer and others if the date for the transfer was still on track. Bremer defended the plan steadily.37 I did as well. I had no doubt that the turnover was the right thing to do. I did as well. I had no doubt that the turnover was the right thing to do.

As June 30 approached, intelligence reports warned that enemy fighters were planning an ugly reception for the new government, in the form of ma.s.sive attacks across the country. Bremer wisely decided to outmaneuver them by moving the date of the handover forward by two days.

At the time, I was in Istanbul with President Bush at a historic NATO summit meeting. The alliance was going to admit seven new members, all formerly part of the Warsaw Pact. Three were former republics of the Soviet Union. The alliance had fifteen members when I served as U.S. amba.s.sador there in the early 1970s. It would now have twenty-six. The meeting in Istanbul, in fact, would be the largest gathering of NATO heads of state ever a.s.sembled. I felt a great sense of satisfaction seeing the leaders of those once communist nations free to chart their own courses and voluntarily, indeed eagerly, join the NATO alliance. It was a vindication of the tough, nerveracking, long-sustained, costly, and high-minded half-century struggle by the allied countries, with bipartisan U.S. leaders.h.i.+p, to contain and eventually defeat Soviet communism.

As I surveyed the large, circular table and the representatives of our alliance partners, I thought about Iraq. I wondered if decades from now Americans might look back on the liberation of those long repressed Iraqis with the same kind of satisfaction that we felt about our liberation of Europe from n.a.z.ism and Soviet communism.

I was sitting with the U.S. delegation when an aide pa.s.sed a cable from Iraq to Condi Rice. In a ceremony with little fanfare-certainly less than when he had arrived in Iraq a year earlier-Bremer presented Prime Minister Allawi with a letter from President Bush affirming the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority.38 Rice penned a note on the cable and pa.s.sed it to me. Rice penned a note on the cable and pa.s.sed it to me.

"Mr. President, Iraq is sovereign," the note read, marking the historic day of June 28, 2004. "Letter was pa.s.sed from Bremer at 10:26AM, Iraq time." I handed the note to the President. He had been concentrating on the NATO discussion but looked down long enough to read it. He then took out his pen and wrote "Let Freedom Reign!" before turning to the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, seated to his right, and whispering the good news. The two leaders smiled at one another and shook hands.

The U.S. and coalition occupation was over. Not a moment too soon, I said to myself. For me the question was whether it was too late. We were still trying to regain the trust of the Iraqi people-a task that had been made more difficult not only by a long and heavy-handed occupation but by the crimes of a few military guards at a prison called Abu Ghraib.

PART XII

Wartime Detention

Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.APRIL 28, 2004 Two months before Iraqis a.s.sumed control of their country, the world was shocked by images of U.S. soldiers taunting naked Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. The digital photos, taken by the soldiers in acts of p.o.r.nographic self-indulgence, doc.u.mented the s.a.d.i.s.tic abuse and torment they were inflicting on prisoners in their charge. The acts were inexcusable. The photographs threatened to weaken public support and call into question the legitimacy of our ongoing efforts on the eve of the transition to Iraqi sovereignty.

Prior to the public release of the images, I was shown a portion of them. Many depicted military guards performing humiliating acts on Iraqi prisoners-forcing them into what appeared to be a human pyramid, with naked detainees piled on top of one another. In some photos, the guards were shown pointing, laughing, or giving a thumbs-up.

A number of other photographs were not released to the public at the time. They showed soldiers engaged in similarly disturbing s.e.xual, s.a.d.i.s.tic acts-but with each other: Americans on Americans. Had all of the pictures been released at once, the public might have drawn more quickly the conclusions that I drew: These acts could not conceivably have been authorized by anyone in the chain of command, nor could they have been any part of an intelligence-gathering or interrogation effort. Rather, they were the senseless crimes of a small group of prison guards who ran amok in the absence of adequate supervision.*

To my knowledge, no one in the Pentagon had forewarning of the issues that gave rise to the abuses at Abu Ghraib, but that was beside the point. Unacceptable acts had been visited upon human beings in U.S. charge. The ramifications were so great that, as the head of this department of three million people, I felt compelled to step forward to take responsibility for the inst.i.tutional failure.1 As I began to come to terms with what had happened at Abu Ghraib, the events left me feeling punched in the gut. As I began to come to terms with what had happened at Abu Ghraib, the events left me feeling punched in the gut.

It was the U.S. military command in Iraq that first announced publicly that it was conducting an investigation into instances of abuse of Iraqi detainees in January 2004. At the time there was little media interest in the story, but once it was accompanied by photographs three months later, that changed dramatically. In another unique feature of war in the twenty-first century, the photographs made their way across the world within minutes, inviting a reaction that was as angry as it was swift. Leaders of nations across the world issued condemnations. The Vatican's foreign minister, invoking the word "torture," called Abu Ghraib "a more serious blow to the United States than September 11."2 I shared the sense of outrage, but the reaction to Abu Ghraib in some instances seemed to be exacerbated by motivations other than simply getting to the bottom of what had transpired and bringing to justice those who had engaged in the illegal acts. The shameful abuse at Abu Ghraib would be exploited by many: America's enemies, of course, who skillfully used the outcry for their propaganda purposes; Arab governments that had an interest in making their populations think of the Iraqi liberation as dangerous and chaotic; opponents of the war, who used the abuse to justify their position that the efforts in Iraq were immoral; and, most obviously, political opponents of President Bush seven months before the 2004 election. In some quarters, the reaction quickly veered into overstatement.

"We're not going to recover from this damage," Congressman John Murtha announced. "This one incident destroyed our credibility in Iraq and in all the Arab world."3 "Shamefully, we now learn that Saddam's torture chambers reopened under new management-U.S. management," Senator Ted Kennedy declared on the floor of the United States Senate. "Shamefully, we now learn that Saddam's torture chambers reopened under new management-U.S. management," Senator Ted Kennedy declared on the floor of the United States Senate.4 For a senior senator to equate the perverted escapades of a handful of guards on the midnight s.h.i.+ft with the routine practices of rape, torture, and murder in Saddam's prisons was appalling, even by the low standards of a political season. I was surprised when my colleague Colin Powell mentioned Abu Ghraib in the same context as the My Lai ma.s.sacre-an appalling episode from the Vietnam War that involved the cold-blooded murder of hundreds of civilians. "I don't know what to make of it," Powell said. "I'm shocked. I mean, I was in a unit that was responsible for My Lai." For a senior senator to equate the perverted escapades of a handful of guards on the midnight s.h.i.+ft with the routine practices of rape, torture, and murder in Saddam's prisons was appalling, even by the low standards of a political season. I was surprised when my colleague Colin Powell mentioned Abu Ghraib in the same context as the My Lai ma.s.sacre-an appalling episode from the Vietnam War that involved the cold-blooded murder of hundreds of civilians. "I don't know what to make of it," Powell said. "I'm shocked. I mean, I was in a unit that was responsible for My Lai."5 Also lost in the melee was any recognition that the military command in Iraq first brought these abuses to light. A soldier discovered the photos and handed them to senior military officials. A prompt investigation began, leading to the suspension of seventeen personnel.

Critics nonetheless expanded their attacks by taking the inexcusable acts at the Abu Ghraib prison as the basis of a systematic critique of the Bush administration's war policies. An article in The New Yorker New Yorker, citing anonymous sources, a.s.serted that the abuses were part of official and systematic coercive interrogation methods.6 Those false charges were widely disseminated and repeated by people who could and should have known better. "What happened at the prison, it is now clear, was not the result of random acts by a few bad apples," stated Al Gore. "It was the natural consequence of the Bush administration policy." Those false charges were widely disseminated and repeated by people who could and should have known better. "What happened at the prison, it is now clear, was not the result of random acts by a few bad apples," stated Al Gore. "It was the natural consequence of the Bush administration policy."7 The Economist placed a picture of a detainee on its cover under the headline " placed a picture of a detainee on its cover under the headline "RESIGN, RUMSFELD." Similar calls came from the New York Times New York Times, the Boston Globe Boston Globe, and Democratic members of Congress. Though I didn't often find myself in agreement with them, I was quickly coming to the same conclusion, although for quite different reasons. I believed my resignation as secretary might demonstrate accountability on the part of the U.S. government. I thought that my resignation might also allow the administration and the Iraqi people to move beyond the scandal.

On May 5, at 10:00 in the morning, one week After the photos became public, I walked into the Oval Office with a handwritten note. "Mr. President," it said, "I want you to know that you have my resignation as Secretary of Defense any time you feel it would be helpful to you."8 I told him that if the controversy over the abuse kept growing, I might not be effective in managing the Department. I also said that I believed someone needed to be held accountable. I told him that if the controversy over the abuse kept growing, I might not be effective in managing the Department. I also said that I believed someone needed to be held accountable.

Bush had been deeply affected by the photographs. He shared my view on the importance of accountability.

"Don, someone's head has to roll on this one," he said. I told the President he had my resignation, and I thought he should accept it. However, I left our meeting without a decision.

That evening, Bush called me at the Pentagon. He said he had thought the matter over. "Your leaving is a terrible idea," he said. "I don't accept your resignation."

He asked if there was anyone else he should hold accountable by firing them, and he raised General Myers as a possibility. "Mr. President," I replied, "you would be firing the wrong person."

There was a rationale for firing a senior official. I understood and shared the President's need to hold someone at the top accountable for what had happened. But it would have been unjust to fire General Myers, who as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not in the chain of command and had no direct line of responsibility in the abuse at Abu Ghraib.

I too wanted to demonstrate accountability by removing those at senior levels who were ultimately responsible for the lack of training, supervision, discipline, and professionalism that led to the inexcusable actions at the prison. As I discovered in the weeks After the abuse came to light, responsibility was diffuse.

Complicating matters was the fact that there were two lines of responsibility: the operational chain of command through CENTCOM, and the administrative chain of command through the Army. The operational chain of command started with the Commander in Chief and ran through me to the CENTCOM combatant commander to the U.S. commander in Iraq down to military officials at Abu Ghraib prison. The administrative chain of command started with me and ran through the secretary and chief of staff of the Army. I hoped that each chain of command quickly would identify where the primary responsibility lay and that we could hold accountable the appropriate senior officers.* That is not what happened. To help put the matter behind the Defense Department, I determined that President Bush deserved an option, and that left n.o.body but me. That is not what happened. To help put the matter behind the Defense Department, I determined that President Bush deserved an option, and that left n.o.body but me.

On May 7, 2004, I crossed the Potomac and headed up Independence Avenue to Capitol Hill to testify on the abuses. In Was.h.i.+ngton there was speculation as to whether I might resign on the spot. There were also suggestions that more members of Congress might personally demand my resignation at the hearing. As I made my way to the Capitol, protesters lined the entrances to the Senate and House office buildings, some carrying signs accusing me, the President, and the military of war crimes.

In my testimony and subsequent press conferences on Abu Ghraib, I wanted to express my deep feelings of disgust and outrage at these indefensible acts. But there was a legal limit on what I could say publicly. The servicemen and-women depicted in the photos were awaiting trial by courts-martial. In the military justice system, the judge, jury, and prosecutor are all members of the Defense Department, and any comment made by an official in the chain of command-military or civilian-risks exerting what is called "unlawful command influence" on the outcome of the trial. If I had expressed my strongly held opinion on the guilt of those involved, it could have made it impossible to hold them accountable by law. My public statements on Abu Ghraib were carefully calibrated with legal advice. Most Americans were understandably outraged at those who had committed these acts, and they wanted to know that President Bush and I were outraged as well. Unfortunately, because both of us were at the top of the chain of command, we had to take care that our words were properly measured.

In seven hours of testimony to the Senate and House Armed Services committees alongside General Myers and Army officials, I explained what we knew about the Abu Ghraib abuse and that we were determined to do our best to make sure it never happened again.* I opened my testimony by raising the question of who bore responsibility for what had taken place. "These events occurred on my watch." I said. "As Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for them. I take full responsibility." I opened my testimony by raising the question of who bore responsibility for what had taken place. "These events occurred on my watch." I said. "As Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for them. I take full responsibility."9 On behalf of the Department, I apologized to the President, the Congress, the country, and the Iraqi detainees who were in military custody. Promising a full investigation, I regretted that those of us at the Pentagon had not known about the abuse-and had not seen the pictures-earlier. I stressed the importance of a full, open airing of what had taken place at Abu Ghraib and of a transparent system to punish the illegal acts. "[H]owever terrible the setback," I said, "this is also an occasion to demonstrate to the world the difference between those who believe in democracy and human rights and those who believe in rule by the terrorist code."10 I ended with an appeal to the members of Congress, to Americans, and to the world. "Judge us by our actions," I said. "[W]atch how a democracy deals with wrongdoing and scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and weaknesses." I ended with an appeal to the members of Congress, to Americans, and to the world. "Judge us by our actions," I said. "[W]atch how a democracy deals with wrongdoing and scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and weaknesses."11 During my testimony, Senator Evan Bayh, a Democrat from Indiana, asked me if my resignation would help undo some of the damage to our reputation.

"That's possible," I responded. I did not volunteer that I had already submitted it to the President.

Though Bush told me I should not resign, the matter still was not settled in my mind. The previous week had been excruciating because the scandal was so damaging to our armed forces and the country. I generally thrived under pressure, but I wasn't thriving now. Abu Ghraib was threatening to consume the Defense Department, eclipsing the fine work thousands of servicemen and-women did every day. The Democratic National Committee was already using Abu Ghraib to raise funds for its campaigns.

That Sunday-Mother's Day-our children called and told me they were with me no matter what I decided. Vice President Cheney said that with Iraq in such a difficult condition, the President wanted me at the Defense Department. "You have to stay," he urged in a phone call.

I was later reminded of an episode more than a half century earlier. In April 1952, when I was studying naval science in college, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Hobson Hobson struck the aircraft carrier USS struck the aircraft carrier USS Wasp Wasp in the dark of night. The in the dark of night. The Hobson Hobson sank to the Atlantic seafloor with 176 men aboard. sank to the Atlantic seafloor with 176 men aboard.12 The commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander W. J. Tierney, went down with the vessel. A Navy board of inquiry ultimately concluded that Tierney was to be held responsible for the incident. It could not have been easy to demand accountability from a commanding officer who lost his life. Nevertheless, there is a tradition on the sea and in our Navy that with authority comes responsibility and accountability. The Navy's venerable tradition regrettably seemed not to have taken hold to the same extent in the other military services. The case of the The commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander W. J. Tierney, went down with the vessel. A Navy board of inquiry ultimately concluded that Tierney was to be held responsible for the incident. It could not have been easy to demand accountability from a commanding officer who lost his life. Nevertheless, there is a tradition on the sea and in our Navy that with authority comes responsibility and accountability. The Navy's venerable tradition regrettably seemed not to have taken hold to the same extent in the other military services. The case of the Hobson Hobson said a lot about leaders.h.i.+p-and its consequences. said a lot about leaders.h.i.+p-and its consequences.

On May 10, 2004, President Bush came to the Pentagon for a briefing on Iraq. At the end of the briefing, I asked the President if I could see him alone. As we sat at the round table in my office overlooking the Pentagon's River Entrance, I handed him a second letter of resignation.13 "By this letter I am resigning as Secretary of Defense," it read. "I have concluded that the damage from the acts of abuse that happened on my watch, by individuals for whose conduct I am ultimately responsible, can best be responded to by my resignation." As he read my letter, Bush was quiet. "By this letter I am resigning as Secretary of Defense," it read. "I have concluded that the damage from the acts of abuse that happened on my watch, by individuals for whose conduct I am ultimately responsible, can best be responded to by my resignation." As he read my letter, Bush was quiet.

"Mr. President, the Department of Defense will be better off if I resign," I insisted.

"That's not true," he responded, tossing the letter across the table back to me.

I told the President my mind was made up. Nonetheless, he insisted that he wanted some time to think about it and to consult with others. The next day, Vice President Cheney came to the Pentagon. "Don, thirty-five years ago this week, I went to work for you," he said, "and on this one you're wrong."

In the end, Bush refused to accept my resignation. He had concluded that my departure would not make Abu Ghraib go away, and that he preferred to have me stay to manage the problem and the Department. For some in the United States and around the world, Abu Ghraib was a metaphor. The pictures from the prison had come to symbolize the war many had come to oppose. The President may have felt that my resignation might embolden the critics of the war effort, who would frame it as an indication of the administration's guilt and argue that it proved the Iraq war was hopeless.

As much as I believed I was right to resign, I eventually accepted the President's decision and agreed to stay and continue to manage the scandal, while working to keep the Pentagon, two wars, and our major transformation efforts moving forward. I now believe that this was a misjudgment on my part. Abu Ghraib and its follow-on effects, including the continued drumbeat of "torture" maintained by partisan critics of the war and the President, became a damaging distraction.* More than anything else I have failed to do, and even amid my pride in the many important things we did accomplish, I regret that I did not leave at that point. More than anything else I have failed to do, and even amid my pride in the many important things we did accomplish, I regret that I did not leave at that point.

Hundreds of individuals inside the Defense Department and on independent panels outside spent thousands of hours looking into the reasons that the abuse at Abu Ghraib occurred. One thing that became clear was that the crimes had nothing whatsoever to do with interrogation or intelligence gathering. The U.S. soldiers shown in the photographs were not interrogators, nor were they involved in collecting intelligence from those detainees. Further, the individuals they were abusing were not intelligence targets undergoing interrogations. The guards were not following any guidelines or policies approved at any level. They were a small group of disturbed individuals abusing the Iraqis they were in charge of guarding.

Part of the cause of Abu Ghraib was a lack of training. Part of it was a lack of discipline and supervision. And part of it was the failure from the outset of the Department of the Army and Joint Staff to provide the appropriate and agreed-upon staff and support to General Sanchez's headquarters in Iraq, which made it difficult, if not impossible, for his busy command to oversee adequately the growing population of Iraqi detainees in prisons like Abu Ghraib.

I directed officials at the Pentagon to cooperate fully with the numerous investigations underway-some of which I ordered. Vice Admiral Albert Church, a cousin of the crusading Senator Frank Church who led the Senate's intelligence investigations in the 1970s, conducted one of them. "One point is clear," he concluded. "[W]e found no direct (or even indirect) link between interrogation policy and detainee abuse."* A nonpartisan investigation led by two former Secretaries of Defense, James Schlesinger and Harold Brown, which included the late Congresswoman Tillie Fowler and retired General Charles Horner, found that "There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities." A nonpartisan investigation led by two former Secretaries of Defense, James Schlesinger and Harold Brown, which included the late Congresswoman Tillie Fowler and retired General Charles Horner, found that "There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities."16 After twelve nonpartisan, independent reviews and investigations of Defense Department detainee policies, After twelve nonpartisan, independent reviews and investigations of Defense Department detainee policies,17 not one found evidence that abuse had been encouraged or condoned by senior officials in the Defense Department-military or civilian. not one found evidence that abuse had been encouraged or condoned by senior officials in the Defense Department-military or civilian.

On May 29, 2004, at the height of the controversy, I attended the dedication of the World War II Memorial on the Was.h.i.+ngton Mall. A number of people came up to me to offer encouragement. The most unusual was a gray haired former president and husband of the junior senator from New York who was castigating the administration over the scandal at the same time.

Bill Clinton walked across the large reception tent and shook my hand. He said something to the effect of "Mr. Secretary, no one with an ounce of sense thinks you had any way in the world to know about the abuse taking place that night in Iraq." He added, "You'll get through this."18 I appreciated the gracious gesture. I appreciated the gracious gesture.

The abuse at Abu Ghraib and illegal acts committed elsewhere in U.S. military detention facilities are part of the story of detention operations in wartime, to be sure. But they are only part of the story. Between 2001 and 2006, more than eighty thousand captured personnel pa.s.sed through Defense Department custody. Of those, there were only a small number of doc.u.mented cases of abuse. Each time there was an allegation of wrongdoing, it was promptly investigated and prosecuted when appropriate. The rare instances of abuse should not blind the world to the professionalism and skill of the tens of thousands of Americans in uniform who were entrusted with detainee operations.

CHAPTER 38

The Least Worst Place"At the top there are no easy choices."-Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation Present at the Creation

In the heat of war, human frailty can undermine discipline and corrupt behavior even among well-trained soldiers. World War II, for example, saw instances of war crimes committed against captured soldiers on both sides of the conflict.* Detention operations in war have also suffered from misjudgments. President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the internment of more than one hundred thousand j.a.panese Americans in desolate camps across the western United States although they were not enemies. Detention operations in war have also suffered from misjudgments. President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the internment of more than one hundred thousand j.a.panese Americans in desolate camps across the western United States although they were not enemies.

Even in nonmilitary, peacetime situations, detention is a difficult task, as the staggering statistics of murder, rape, and abuse in federal, state, and local prisons across the United States attest. Whenever and wherever abuse of prisoners occurs-from Bagram to San Quentin-it is an evil deed and a shameful disservice to our country, our society, and the huge majority ofcivilian and military guards who perform their difficult duties with professionalism. Whenever and wherever abuse of prisoners occurs-from Bagram to San Quentin-it is an evil deed and a shameful disservice to our country, our society, and the huge majority ofcivilian and military guards who perform their difficult duties with professionalism.

When it came to captured terrorists, I knew that housing and interrogating them would require close attention and inevitably arouse controversy. Each step of the way toward crafting a coherent policy, we confronted complicated legal and policy dilemmas. Some critics cast these issues as simple questions of right and wrong. On matter After matter, however, we found ourselves facing decisions for which the options available were all imperfect.

We were dealing with individuals capable of horrific acts of murder and destruction. Yet they were human beings in the custody of a nation that properly holds itself to high standards. Belief in human dignity is the underpinning of Western civilization and one of the chief differences between Americans and our enemy. I knew our government had to create a legal architecture that afforded detainees due process while protecting our national security. I also believed that we needed to reinforce the incentives embodied in the Geneva Conventions. The Conventions are treaties with the broad purpose of protecting innocent life by deterring violations of the laws of the war, such as targeting civilians, not just for ensuring the proper treatment of prisoners of war.

In the months and years following 9/11, most detainees in American custody were categorized as unlawful enemy combatants. They were enemies who had ignored the long-established rules of warfare and, as a result, effectively waived the privileges accorded to regular soldiers. Some of these captured detainees were terrorists and insurgents who had attacked-and, in many cases, killed-American and coalition forces. Inevitably, others would be in our custody by mistake, as is also the case in our domestic criminal justice system.

We also knew that some detainees possessed potentially time-sensitive information that could prevent future attacks and save American lives. But while it was important to obtain that information, it was also imperative to put rules and safeguards in place to govern interrogations. In keeping with my oath of office, it was my duty to help protect the country and the American people from all enemies, and to preserve and defend the Const.i.tution. We had a responsibility to protect innocent civilians. I was among those obligated to see to the effective and proper interrogation and detention of those captured in the war against terrorists.

Since 9/11, our primary responsibility was to prevent another attack on our people. On a near daily basis we were receiving fragmentary pieces of intelligence on a range of threats. Terrorists could use suitcase radiation weapons, or vials of anthrax or smallpox, that could spread widely and quickly, devastating the populations of major American cities. The questioning of those in Department of Defense custody provided information that saved innocent American lives. I make no apology for that.

From the outset of the global war on terror, one of the Defense Department's tasks was to fas.h.i.+on a process for deciding whom to hold and whom to release. I pressed military commanders and intelligence officials with a number of questions: How many detainees should we plan to hold? For how long? At what locations? For what purposes?

This was a war that could be long and have no definitive end. We were fighting irregular forces-al-Qaida and other terrorists-not military personnel of a nation that upheld the laws of war. Our enemies were extremists motivated by an ideology in which it is perfectly acceptable, indeed in their minds a sacred obligation, to kill ordinary civilians-men, women, and children.

The longer America held detainees, the more problems we would have. The guidance I gave to the Department was to be highly selective, so that we would hold as few detainees as possible. I wanted procedures in place for promptly evaluating those captured on the battlefield, to release as many as possible without compromising American lives, and to transfer as many others as possible to the custody of their home countries. As I frequently told the President and others, the last thing we wanted was for the United States, let alone the Department of Defense, to become "the world's jailer."3