Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 28

For decades, Syria has been considered a prized quarry for optimistic American diplomats. After my efforts to engage the Syrians in the early 1980s, George H. W. Bush's secretary of state, James Baker, traveled to Damascus no fewer than twelve times. Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright made more than forty trips between them during the Clinton administration. American secretaries of state spent hours in the Syrian president's waiting room cooling their heels as they awaited an audience. The Syrian state press played up these meetings with foreign officials, especially from the United States, as signs of Syria's clout in the world. Although for some time After 9/11, President Bush had carefully denied Syria such injections of prestige, the State Department's eagerness for engagement eventually resurfaced, with Powell and Armitage both making trips there, hoping for a diplomatic breakthrough that never came.

That hope was not solely the province of diplomats, however. CENTCOM military commander John Abizaid was a proponent of trying to peel off Syria from Iran, encouraging them to forge a historic peace with israel and thus help to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many in our military as well as in the State Department had long thought the stalemate over the Palestinian territories to be an underlying cause of violence in the region. I was skeptical, and even more skeptical of bringing in Syria from the cold. Nonetheless, I forwarded Abizaid's arguments to the President, thinking it was important that he know his CENTCOM commander's views on the matter.26 Peace with israel and an accommodation with the United States were not high on the priority list of the Syrian regime-not unless there was something major in it for them. Hafez al-a.s.sad and his son Bashar (who took the reins After his father's death in June 2000) hailed from a small Muslim sect, the Alawites. To maintain power in a nation with a Sunni majority, they burnished their pan-Arab credentials by working against Israel and making a not too hidden effort to oppose American forces in Iraq; they became the hub for gathering suicide bombers and jihadists to travel south across their border.

Throughout the 1990s, Syria built increasingly close ties with Iran and was heavily reliant on it for arms and funding. This alliance was more than just a marriage of convenience, as some have characterized it. The two nations had fas.h.i.+oned a de facto Hezbollah state in southern Lebanon. In exchange for funding and supplies, the terrorist organization Hezbollah worked to advance Syrian and Iranian policies in the region. With weekly flights from Tehran and Damascus shuttling in thousands of small arms and rockets, Hezbollah had ama.s.sed a military force to be reckoned with.

In February 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was a.s.sa.s.sinated by a ma.s.sive car bomb in front of the St. George Hotel in Beirut. Hariri was a symbol of Lebanese independence, and as such a threat to the Syria-Hezbollah occupation of his country. Unsurprisingly, evidence that Syria and Hezbollah had their hands in the a.s.sa.s.sination was abundant, though both denied the claims.27 President Bush announced that America supported an international investigation of the murder and would advocate enforcement of UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Syria's nearly fifteen thousand troops from Lebanon, as well as its many hundreds of intelligence officials. He recalled our amba.s.sador to Syria.

Hariri's death helped spark the so-called Cedar Revolution, a Lebanese popular movement against Syrian occupation and meddling, changing the dynamic in the region and at least temporarily stalling the U.S. efforts to win over Syria.* My old acquaintance, Walid Jumblatt, the wily leader of the Druze community in Lebanon, reversed his longstanding truce with Syria. I asked Jumblatt on one of his later visits to Was.h.i.+ngton how he had happened to switch sides. Recalling our strained relations during the Reagan administration, I said, "You were firing mortars and artillery at us back in 1984." My old acquaintance, Walid Jumblatt, the wily leader of the Druze community in Lebanon, reversed his longstanding truce with Syria. I asked Jumblatt on one of his later visits to Was.h.i.+ngton how he had happened to switch sides. Recalling our strained relations during the Reagan administration, I said, "You were firing mortars and artillery at us back in 1984."

"Yes," Jumblatt replied, "but I'm with you now." These encouraging signs proved fleeting.

I thought the administration's early policy of pressure and isolation, despite occasionally mixed signals from State Department representatives, had worked reasonably well in making the Syrian regime uneasy and willing to make important concessions, such as withdrawing its military from Lebanon. In Bush's second term, however, there was a change of course and the administration reengaged with Syria. The Department of State proposed relieving Syria's diplomatic isolation and reverting to the practice of sending high-level U.S. officials to Damascus for meetings.

This policy of engagement, combined with our worsening difficulties in Iraq that were at least partly the result of Syria's actions, sent a signal of weakness to a.s.sad that he was quick to exploit. He reverted to his earlier policies of greater hostility toward America and our interests. Yet even in 2007, the State Department invited Syria back to the negotiating table in pursuit of Middle East peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Seeing that the United States was again the supplicant, and with the ill feelings about their a.s.sa.s.sination of a democratic Lebanese leader seemingly having been forgotten, if not forgiven, the Syrians reverted to their tried-and-true ways: obfuscation and delay at the negotiating table and active support for terrorism and covert pursuit of illegal weapons programs. Proof enough of their true intentions came with the discovery-and later destruction by Israeli aircraft-of a curious facility in eastern Syria: an illegal nuclear reactor nearly identical to one in North Korea. Regrettably, U.S. diplomatic efforts may have emboldened, rather than deterred, one of the world's most dangerous regimes.

By July 2006, well over a decade of U.S. negotiations with North Korea and its erratic leaders.h.i.+p had yielded little of benefit to the United States. North Korea continued to test and launch ballistic missiles, bl.u.s.ter about attacking South Korea, and develop nuclear weapons, detonating what intelligence professionals believed was a low-yield bomb in October 2006. We had confronted North Korean officials in 2002 with the fact that we knew about their clandestine uranium-enrichment effort, in violation of the Clinton administration's "Agreed Framework." As I wrote at the time in a memo to the NSC princ.i.p.als, We should continue to deny Kim Jong Il the kind of attention he craves and has become accustomed to receiving in response to provocative behavior.... Getting us to the table is the trophy that Pyongyang seeks; for us to grant it in response to the latest nuclear provocations would only reinforce Pyongyang's weak hand and prove that bad behavior pays.28 As long as Kim Jong Il was in power, I thought we had little prospect of inducing his regime to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Every day Kim and his officials focused on ways to consolidate and protect their dictators.h.i.+p. Their disastrous policies sp.a.w.ned famine, torture, and oppression. The inhumane leaders.h.i.+p of North Korea seemed to believe that the surest hold on power was the pursuit of weapons programs.

I thought it worthwhile to try to get China to work diplomatically to persuade North Korea to change its nuclear weapons policy, based on the view that our countries shared an interest in keeping the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, China seemed more interested in blocking U.S. efforts against North Korea than in keeping the Korean peninsula nuclear weaponsfree.* The outcome the Chinese seemed to fear most was a collapse of their neighbor. The outcome the Chinese seemed to fear most was a collapse of their neighbor.29 Then they would be forced to deal with refugees and a failed Korean state on their border. As long as Kim Jong Il had China as a patron of sorts, I was not optimistic that the negotiations with North Korea involving the Chinese, known as the six-party talks, would succeed. Then they would be forced to deal with refugees and a failed Korean state on their border. As long as Kim Jong Il had China as a patron of sorts, I was not optimistic that the negotiations with North Korea involving the Chinese, known as the six-party talks, would succeed.

Instead of offering inducements of financial aid and heating oil, I thought there might be a remote possibility that if we put enough diplomatic and financial pressure on the country, some of its senior generals might overthrow Kim Jong Il. By 2006, Rice and the State Department envoy to North Korea, Christopher Hill, made clear that North Korea was the State Department's issue alone, and that the views of the Defense Department would carry little weight. Rice and Hill seemed to believe they could obtain an agreement with North Korea to end its WMD programs. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless, a veteran expert on the region with years in the CIA, was no longer included in discussions.

On my desk at the Pentagon I kept a satellite picture of the Korean Peninsula taken at night to remind me of all the Americans who were fighting for the freedom of Iraqis, Afghans, and, most important, for the safety and freedom of our own citizens. The photo shows that south of a distinct line-the demilitarized zone-is a free nation illuminated by the countless bright lights of a successful economy, the world's thirteenth largest. To the norThis virtually total darkness, in which only one small pinp.r.i.c.k of light shows, marking the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. The two countries have the same people and the same resources, and yet one country is full of light, and the other is dark, hungry, and poor.

The lesson can sometimes be lost on any who take their freedom for granted. I found that younger South Koreans, in particular, needed to be reminded that the reason they weren't locked in the prison state of North Korea was because so many young Americans and allied forces had fought in the so-called forgotten war of the 1950s. Indeed, younger generations of South Koreans seemed to forget that the regime in the north still sought to unify all of the Korean Peninsula under its totalitarian rule.

In November 2003, I encountered this historical amnesia on a visit to Seoul. At an event on the top floor of a skysc.r.a.per downtown, a young Korean reporter approached me. The South Korean parliament was then debating whether or not to send troops to a.s.sist our coalition forces in Iraq, which had been liberated seven months earlier.

"Why should Koreans send their young men and women halfway around the globe to be killed or wounded in Iraq?" she asked me.

The question struck a deep chord. My close friend d.i.c.k O'Keefe had served in the Korean War fifty years earlier. He had been a wrestling teammate of mine at New Trier High School and had gone to Korea during the last year of the war. For the three weeks that cease-fire negotiations sought to bring the war to an end, both sides engaged in b.l.o.o.d.y battles as they tried to claim more land before an armistice was finally signed. In the twenty days the negotiations took place, U.S. and allied forces suffered 17,000 casualties, with 3,333 killed.30 On the last day of the war, O'Keefe was killed. On the last day of the war, O'Keefe was killed.

I had seen O'Keefe's name earlier that day on a wall with the names of all Americans killed in the conflict. I placed a wreath at the war memorial. The legacy of his sacrifice, and the other 36,500 Americans who lost their lives on the battlefields of the Korean peninsula, is that some fifty million Koreans are free today-including that young reporter who asked me her question.

I thought of d.i.c.k O'Keefe as I answered her question. "Why," I countered, "should Americans have sent their young men and women halfway around the world to Korea some fifty years ago?"

We stood overlooking Seoul's skyline of bright and tall skysc.r.a.pers, a testament to the skills and industriousness of the free Korean people. This had come to the people of South Korea through the courage and sacrifice of others.

Pointing out the window at the lively, free, and prosperous city, I said, "There's the answer."

CHAPTER 44

The Army We Had"You go to war with the Army you have-not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."-December 8, 2004 At Camp Buehring, a staging area in Kuwait for U.S. troops headed into Iraq, I held a meeting for some who would soon be deploying northward into a difficult fight against Iraqi insurgents. As I did dozens of times during my six years as secretary of defense, I gave the troops a chance to ask me any question they wished with the media there. After two questions from the audience, a soldier from the Tennessee National Guard raised his hand to ask the next one.

"Our soldiers have been fighting in Iraq for coming up on three years," he began. "A lot of us are getting ready to move north relatively soon. Our vehicles are not armored. We're digging pieces of rusted sc.r.a.p metal and compromised ballistic gla.s.s that's already been shot up, dropped, busted, picking the best out of this sc.r.a.p to put on our vehicles to take into combat. We do not have proper armament vehicles to carry with us north."1 He was raising a serious issue, one that was of concern to the troops and the Army-as evidenced when some of the members of the audience applauded.* I thought the question deserved a careful explanation, and I saw it as an opportunity to provide an overview of the steps the Army was taking to correct the problems they were experiencing. I responded at length: I thought the question deserved a careful explanation, and I saw it as an opportunity to provide an overview of the steps the Army was taking to correct the problems they were experiencing. I responded at length: I talked to the general [Steven Whitcomb] coming out here about the pace at which the vehicles are being armored. They have been brought from all over the world, wherever they're not needed, to a place here where they are needed. I'm told that they are being-the Army is-I think it's something like four hundred a month are being done. And it's essentially a matter of physics; it isn't a matter of money. It isn't a matter on the part of the Army of desire. It's a matter of production and capability of doing it.As you know, you go to war with the Army you have-not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time. Since the Iraq conflict began, the Army has been pressing ahead to produce the armor necessary at a rate that they believe-it's a greatly expanded rate from what existed previously-but a rate that they believe is the rate that is all that can be accomplished at this moment.I can a.s.sure you that General Schoomaker and the leaders.h.i.+p in the Army, and certainly General Whitcomb, are sensitive to the fact that not every vehicle has the degree of armor that would be desirable for it to have, but that they're working at it at a good clip.... [T]he goal we have is to have as many of those vehicles as is humanly possible with the appropriate level of armor available for the troops. And that is what the Army has been working on.2

Lieutenant General Steven Whitcomb, commander of Army forces in the Persian Gulf, came forward to follow my answer by explaining that any delays were "not a matter of money or desire." He added, "It is a matter of the logistics, of being able to produce [the armor]."3 The exchange might have seemed straightforward to most of the people at the base. It seemed that way to me. But unfortunately only a few words of my extensive answer-"As you know, you go to war with the Army you have-not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time"-ended up being isolated in print and as a seemingly endless loop on cable television. The comment was characterized by some critics, and particularly their contacts in the press, as an example of insensitivity.4 I did not see my remarks that way, and I still don't. My statement carefully laid out the reality of the armed forces that existed when President Bush took office. Any president and any secretary of defense has available the military that their predecessors bequeath to them. The B-1 bomber I approved as secretary of defense in 1976 was being used in Afghanistan in 2001, just as the M-1 Abrams tank I had approved back then was the mainstay of the U.S. Army when I returned to the Pentagon a quarter of a century later. In turn, the number of up-armored vehicles available in 2004 were the consequences of decisions made years before President Bush or I took office in 2001. I did not see my remarks that way, and I still don't. My statement carefully laid out the reality of the armed forces that existed when President Bush took office. Any president and any secretary of defense has available the military that their predecessors bequeath to them. The B-1 bomber I approved as secretary of defense in 1976 was being used in Afghanistan in 2001, just as the M-1 Abrams tank I had approved back then was the mainstay of the U.S. Army when I returned to the Pentagon a quarter of a century later. In turn, the number of up-armored vehicles available in 2004 were the consequences of decisions made years before President Bush or I took office in 2001.

My response also told a simple truth about warfare: As a conflict evolves, both sides adapt to the reality of the battlefield. The emergence of improvised explosive devices as the Iraq conflict wore on necessitated a s.h.i.+ft to more armored vehicles that the Army had not acquired. It also necessitated a change by the commanders on the ground in their tactics, techniques, and procedures to make the troops less vulnerable. It took time to put up-armored vehicles in the field, and the Army, which has the responsibility to organize, train, and equip the troops, had not been arranged in an optimal way to accomplish that.

Commanders had been grappling with the problem of lethal improvised explosive devices since 2003, when they first began appearing. The favored IED was the roadside bomb. Made with garage door openers, egg timers, toy car radio controls, or was.h.i.+ng machine parts, the bombs were inexpensive to a.s.semble and crude in design. They were, however, remarkably effective in killing American and coalition troops.5 Among the most vulnerable to the roadside bombs were the thousands of humvees-lightly armored trucks-that were often used by our forces to move around in Iraq. Among the most vulnerable to the roadside bombs were the thousands of humvees-lightly armored trucks-that were often used by our forces to move around in Iraq.

Once ground commanders experienced the first attacks by IEDs in the summer of 2003, they began to adjust. But so did the enemy. Our troops began using jammers to block the signal of remote-controlled bombs-until the enemy s.h.i.+fted to using wires, pressure plates, and heat sensors to activate the bombs. Once our troops became adept at deciphering the telltale signs of IEDs buried under roads, the enemy put explosives in piles of trash, the carca.s.ses of animals, and, most savagely, in the corpses of murdered Iraqis. Our commanders changed their operating tactics as well, and began stopping three hundred yards before suspected roadside bombs. This led the enemy to plant second bombs at places where the convoys were likely to stop. Next, commanders began to position snipers on frequently bombed routes to kill those who planted IEDs, with the result that the enemy began planting IEDs elsewhere. The bombs themselves became increasingly sophisticated.6 Houses were rigged to explode when Iraqi or coalition troops entered to search them. In Fallujah and other cities, factories churned out ma.s.sive car bombs that could take out a city block. Houses were rigged to explode when Iraqi or coalition troops entered to search them. In Fallujah and other cities, factories churned out ma.s.sive car bombs that could take out a city block.

By 2004, IED attacks had risen to nearly one hundred per week, becoming the most deadly weapon our troops faced.7 General Abizaid and I regularly discussed the severity of the problem with General Casey. Abizaid urged that we mount a Manhattan Projectstyle effort to find a solution to IEDs, and in June 2004 we created the Joint IED Defeat Task Force with a budget of $1. 3 billion and a mandate to find ways to counter the threat. General Abizaid and I regularly discussed the severity of the problem with General Casey. Abizaid urged that we mount a Manhattan Projectstyle effort to find a solution to IEDs, and in June 2004 we created the Joint IED Defeat Task Force with a budget of $1. 3 billion and a mandate to find ways to counter the threat.8 I urged that anything and everything be tried. I was told that the task force we a.s.sembled had even tried using honeybees to detect IEDs with their keen sense of smell. Hair dryers were mounted on the fronts of vehicles to trigger the bombs' heat sensors. I urged that anything and everything be tried. I was told that the task force we a.s.sembled had even tried using honeybees to detect IEDs with their keen sense of smell. Hair dryers were mounted on the fronts of vehicles to trigger the bombs' heat sensors.9 Coalition troops were increasingly coming under attack from explosively formed penetrators. EFPs use a copper disc that becomes a semimolten slug capable of piercing even the strongest armor. The first EFPs in Iraq were in s.h.i.+a areas not far from the Iranian border. The chemical composition of their explosive charges had telltale signs of Iranian weapons manufacturers.10 We weren't moving fast enough. In December 2004, I again expressed my continued frustration in a note to Myers and Pace. "I am very uncomfortable with the pace at which this is going. We know that vehicles are vulnerable and we know they are less vulnerable with armor. We have known it for some time."11 And then, "My suggestion is this: until the Services can organize, [train] and equip the forces in a way that fits the tactics and strategies being used by the Combatant Commanders, the Combatant Commanders need to call a halt to what they are doing." And then, "My suggestion is this: until the Services can organize, [train] and equip the forces in a way that fits the tactics and strategies being used by the Combatant Commanders, the Combatant Commanders need to call a halt to what they are doing."12 If the U.S. Army could not provide enough armor for humvees, the commanders in theater would have to change the ways they fought. I ordered Abizaid and Casey to forbid all vehicles that had not been up-armored from leaving protected bases in Iraq. If the U.S. Army could not provide enough armor for humvees, the commanders in theater would have to change the ways they fought. I ordered Abizaid and Casey to forbid all vehicles that had not been up-armored from leaving protected bases in Iraq.13 I told them we would fly in welders with armor and take as many airplanes as needed to get them and the required armor into Iraq. Within a matter of weeks, no unarmored vehicles were allowed outside of protected compounds. I told them we would fly in welders with armor and take as many airplanes as needed to get them and the required armor into Iraq. Within a matter of weeks, no unarmored vehicles were allowed outside of protected compounds.

By late 2005, the several billion dollars we had invested in the IED problem had resulted in progress. Casualties were down, even though the number of attacks had spiraled upward. Still, I wanted a more focused senior Army leaders.h.i.+p, so I called another general out of retirement and back to duty: four-star General Montgomery C. Meigs. Meigs focused the Joint IED Defeat Organization on the people making the bombs and the enemy networks that sustained them. Armor continued to arrive in the theater, including the first prototypes of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) V-hulled vehicles that afforded more protection to the troops. Increased local cooperation and better intelligence about the insurgent networks led to more coalition operations against those who were making the weapons. The IED challenge-and the amount of time it took to equip the force and adjust to the enemy's tactics-highlighted again the need to accelerate the transformation of our military.

I steadily pushed each service to become more agile, more deployable, and better prepared to confront new, previously unantic.i.p.ated threats. steadily pushed each service to become more agile, more deployable, and better prepared to confront new, previously unantic.i.p.ated threats.14 We redirected the Air Force's energies and resources toward fielding more unmanned aerial vehicles, which by 2008 numbered over five thousand-a twenty-fivefold increase since 9/11. We redirected the Air Force's energies and resources toward fielding more unmanned aerial vehicles, which by 2008 numbered over five thousand-a twenty-fivefold increase since 9/11.15 Under the leaders.h.i.+p of Admiral Vern Clark, the Navy developed a new Fleet Response Plan to double its efficiency and the number of carrier strike groups available for global deployment at any given time. I encouraged the Marines to develop a special operations contingent. Under the leaders.h.i.+p of Admiral Vern Clark, the Navy developed a new Fleet Response Plan to double its efficiency and the number of carrier strike groups available for global deployment at any given time. I encouraged the Marines to develop a special operations contingent.

The Army faced the biggest challenges. It has a proud and storied history dating back to the Continental Army of 1775. Under such legendary generals as Grant and Sherman, it preserved the Union in a tough-fought civil war. Under Pers.h.i.+ng and Eisenhower it liberated Europe in two world wars. The Army manned the front lines of the Cold War flashpoints, its heavy tanks and artillery acting as a deterrent against a Soviet ground advance in Central Europe. For decades the Army had been organized for large land battles between sovereign states, symbolized by the service's prized seventy-ton M-1 Abrams tank. The immediate challenges we confronted by 2001 though were not from ma.s.sed enemy forces. By then our adversaries had learned that confronting the United States in a conventional war of ma.s.sed force was a bad idea. As a result, America was unlikely to soon face the major land, sea, and air battles for which our military had organized, trained, and equipped over many decades. Instead, we needed a military that could quickly deploy in enough numbers to bring decisive lethality to bear, could leverage our country's technological advantages, such as precision, communications, and stealth, and most important-could quickly adapt to changing circ.u.mstances in a given conflict and prevail.

Despite the unquestionable improvements made over the years-in many cases as the result of the lessons learned from the unconventional conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s-the Army was the most resistant to adapting to the new challenges and accelerating its transformation away from its Cold War posture of large, difficult to deploy, heavy divisions.

The small-scale unconventional conflicts of the Cold War, in Panama, El Salvador, Grenada, Lebanon, and elsewhere, were seen almost as distractions and diversions from what the Army was supposed to do and how it was supposed to do it. In fact, the painful experience in Lebanon had led Cap Weinberger, Reagan's secretary of defense, to codify the aversion to smaller-scale conflicts as a matter of doctrine-what became known as the Weinberger Doctrine (his senior military a.s.sistant, General Colin Powell, would later adopt a version of it as the Powell Doctrine). The idea was that U.S. troops should only be committed as a "last resort" in support of clearly defined goals, with a clear "exit strategy" and "overwhelming force" to get in and get out.16 In the twenty-first century, however, the task was not to "overwhelm" nations and people who were not our enemies. The enemy was not the local population but the terrorists and insurgents living, training, and fighting among them. This came to be the case in the post-9/11 conflicts we were fighting, including the counterinsurgency campaigns that evolved in Iraq and Afghanistan. These required measured application of military power to minimize civilian casualties and encourage local cooperation.

It also struck me that the new realities of warfare meant that our military should be prepared to be used earlier in order to avoid full-scale conflicts altogether. Merely by their presence abroad or the ability to deploy rapidly, our troops could rea.s.sure allies and, in some instances, deter aggression from hostile nations or nonstate actors. They could train foreign forces, as they have in Colombia, Georgia, Jordan, and Kenya, so that the militaries of our friends and allies would be better able to take up the fight against mutual threats-instead of leaving it to our men and women in uniform, who carry more than their share of the burden. They could provide critical intelligence to stop terrorist attacks. They could lend a hand in natural disasters around the world, earning valuable goodwill for the United States by their actions, as we did in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Pakistan earthquakes.

There were officers in the Army who understood the importance of deployability and speed, and who had taken aboard the lessons of previous unconventional conflicts. During the first Gulf War, there had been flashes of brilliance in the ground campaign that suggested that agility, mobility, and speed had their place in the Army. Throughout the 1990s the Army tried to resolve the tension between advocates for greater change and those who were reluctant to push too hard because of the momentum behind existing programs and weapons systems-momentum that would have to be s.h.i.+fted significantly if true transformation were to occur. During the late 1990s, Army chief of staff Eric s.h.i.+nseki had wisely challenged the Army with the adage that "if you don't like change, you'll like irrelevance a lot less."

Early on, it became apparent to those of us urging the Army to change that transforming it would be a contentious process. We would need to cancel some major Cold Warera weapon-development programs and encourage unconventional thinkers in the leaders.h.i.+p who could help to move the inst.i.tution.

After thorough reviews by the Army, the Pentagon's program a.n.a.lysis and evaluation (PA&E) office, and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, I announced in May 2002 that I was cancelling the $11 billion Crusader artillery system.17 Beyond its stunningly ill-conceived name, the program was an anachronism that typified the challenges we faced. A forty-ton, 155 millimeter howitzer, the Crusader could launch a sh.e.l.l from the Was.h.i.+ngton Mall and hit Camden Yards in Baltimore. But it was the ant.i.thesis of agility and deployability. The Crusader required two large cargo aircraft to deploy just one system with its ammunition and equipment, and it required considerable time and effort to a.s.semble it on arrival. It wasn't clear what role it could play in mountainous, land-locked Afghanistan, for example. I decided instead to use the $9 billion that had not yet been spent on it to invest in precision-guided weapon systems. Beyond its stunningly ill-conceived name, the program was an anachronism that typified the challenges we faced. A forty-ton, 155 millimeter howitzer, the Crusader could launch a sh.e.l.l from the Was.h.i.+ngton Mall and hit Camden Yards in Baltimore. But it was the ant.i.thesis of agility and deployability. The Crusader required two large cargo aircraft to deploy just one system with its ammunition and equipment, and it required considerable time and effort to a.s.semble it on arrival. It wasn't clear what role it could play in mountainous, land-locked Afghanistan, for example. I decided instead to use the $9 billion that had not yet been spent on it to invest in precision-guided weapon systems.

As with the M-1 Abrams tank issue in the Ford administration, my decision on the Crusader provoked near rebellion in the Army establishment, as well as hostility in the iron triangle: Congress, the defense contractors, and the DoD bureaucracy. The artillery community was angry. The defense contractors were apoplectic. Some in Congress were enraged. Some retired Army officers (including a few linked to contractors) were furious at what they characterized as inst.i.tutional disrespect. Their thoughts were ill.u.s.trated on the cover of the June 2002 Armed Forces Journal Armed Forces Journal featuring my photo and the headline "does he really hate the army?" featuring my photo and the headline "does he really hate the army?"18 Some in the Army took actions that in my view bordered on insubordination. The Army's Congressional Affairs office, for example, sent talking points to allies on Capitol Hill arguing that my "decision to kill Crusader puts soldiers at risk" and would cost lives.19 Ending the Crusader was "[r]eminiscent of unpreparedness in [the] late 1930s," the talking points alleged. "OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] is looking for a quick kill to demonstrate their political prowess," they continued. The talking points concluded that "[a] decision to kill Crusader puts the relevance of land power, hence the Army, in question." Ending the Crusader was "[r]eminiscent of unpreparedness in [the] late 1930s," the talking points alleged. "OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] is looking for a quick kill to demonstrate their political prowess," they continued. The talking points concluded that "[a] decision to kill Crusader puts the relevance of land power, hence the Army, in question."20 A colonel on the Army staff called up my military a.s.sistant. "Now your boss is going to get what's coming to him," the colonel said. "We've got Congress on our side. We're going to stick it up where the sun don't s.h.i.+ne and break it off." A colonel on the Army staff called up my military a.s.sistant. "Now your boss is going to get what's coming to him," the colonel said. "We've got Congress on our side. We're going to stick it up where the sun don't s.h.i.+ne and break it off."

The Army's top leaders, Tom White and Eric s.h.i.+nseki, were visibly unhappy with my decision and also unhelpful. Before his appointment, Secretary White had been an Army one-star general who, after retiring, was a senior vice president at Enron.* In the months that followed my decision to cancel the artillery system, White had not been cooperative in moving the Army away from the Cold War weapons system toward the agile and more mobile force President Bush had campaigned for and which I sought. White's narrow focus on and advocacy for the inst.i.tutional interests of a single service was no longer acceptable in a world that demanded jointness and integration of the Army with Marines, sailors, and airmen. The Army needed better, more forward-leaning leaders.h.i.+p. On April 25, 2003, I called White into my office for a chilly meeting. I told him I was prepared to accept his letter of resignation, though he had not drafted one. In retrospect I had made a mistake in putting a retired Army general in as the secretary-at least one who was so unwilling to upset the entrenched bureaucracy and help lead the Army into the new century. In the months that followed my decision to cancel the artillery system, White had not been cooperative in moving the Army away from the Cold War weapons system toward the agile and more mobile force President Bush had campaigned for and which I sought. White's narrow focus on and advocacy for the inst.i.tutional interests of a single service was no longer acceptable in a world that demanded jointness and integration of the Army with Marines, sailors, and airmen. The Army needed better, more forward-leaning leaders.h.i.+p. On April 25, 2003, I called White into my office for a chilly meeting. I told him I was prepared to accept his letter of resignation, though he had not drafted one. In retrospect I had made a mistake in putting a retired Army general in as the secretary-at least one who was so unwilling to upset the entrenched bureaucracy and help lead the Army into the new century.

Eventually Congress and the Army supported my decision on the Crusader, but it came at a high cost to me in frayed relations.h.i.+ps with a few influential members of Congress and a number in the retired Army community. What I knew was that our nation needed the Army to be relevant for the twenty-first century, and that canceling the Crusader was the right decision for the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, and, most important, for our country. Now, almost a decade later, no one is clamoring to reinstate the Crusader.

One year after the Crusader dustup, I added to the tensions with my recommendation of a retired four-star Special Forces general, Pete Schoomaker, to be the new Army chief of staff when General s.h.i.+nseki completed his tour. Some took the decision to bring him out of retirement as a vote of no confidence in the senior Army leaders.h.i.+p. In fact, I'd first proposed the job to s.h.i.+nseki's vice chief, General Jack Keane, seeing inst.i.tutional benefit to continuing to promote from within the active-duty force. Keane declined for family reasons. While there were certainly other active-duty Army general officers at the three-and four-star level who had proven themselves, I recognized that the next chief would face significant internal resistance to the changes we needed to effect. I decided I wanted someone at the top of the Army who had the ability and desire to jar the inst.i.tution and transform it into the expeditionary force our country needed. For many hardened Army traditionalists who came of age in a time of a fixed, defensive force designed to repel an a.s.sault from Soviet armored divisions in Central Europe, my recommendation to the President of a retired Special Forces officer was the last straw.

Many conventional Army officers considered the Special Forces to be undisciplined cowboys. It was not uncommon in military circles to hear them described as "hotdogs" who took too many risks, got into trouble, and needed to be rescued. General s.h.i.+nseki, a combat infantry officer who had been wounded in Vietnam, made it clear to me he was not enthusiastic about the Special Forces and their capabilities. "No Special Forces soldier ever pulled me off the battlefield," he once said to me.

The mistrust ran both ways, and the Special Forces folks were less than enthusiastic about s.h.i.+nseki. For years Army Special Forces had been distinguished by their traditional green berets, which became their nickname. In a break from the past, s.h.i.+nseki had insisted on requiring all Army personnel to wear berets. His decision was seen by many in the Special Forces and Army Rangers as devaluing their proud symbol.

Since 2001, I had made a priority of increasing the size, capabilities, equipment, and authorities of the special operations forces. By 2006, we had boosted their funding over 107 percent, doubled the number of recruits, and improved their equipment substantially.21 I authorized the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a lead command for war on terror planning and missions. We provided the CENTCOM combatant commander the authority to transfer special ops units anywhere he deemed necessary in his area of responsibility. We s.h.i.+fted some of the tasks that Special Forces had historically been responsible for, such as training foreign militaries, to allow regular forces to do them as well. This freed up special operators for more upper-tier tasks-reconnaissance and direct-action missions. I also urged the Marines to create a special operations contingent, and in 2005 we established the Marine Corps' special Operations Command (MARSOC). I authorized the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a lead command for war on terror planning and missions. We provided the CENTCOM combatant commander the authority to transfer special ops units anywhere he deemed necessary in his area of responsibility. We s.h.i.+fted some of the tasks that Special Forces had historically been responsible for, such as training foreign militaries, to allow regular forces to do them as well. This freed up special operators for more upper-tier tasks-reconnaissance and direct-action missions. I also urged the Marines to create a special operations contingent, and in 2005 we established the Marine Corps' special Operations Command (MARSOC).22 Even though these were historic changes for the armed forces, they were resented by those wedded to the conventional, traditional Army. Even though these were historic changes for the armed forces, they were resented by those wedded to the conventional, traditional Army.

Pete Schoomaker was bright, tough, and impatient. In addition to expanding special operations, he decided to implement an idea that had been kicking around for some time but, at least until he arrived on the scene, had met resistance. Schoomaker and I wanted to convert the Army from a force of ten active divisions (of fifteen thousand to twenty thousand troops each) into a force of forty highly capable brigade combat teams (of three thousand to five thousand troops each), with additional combat brigades in the National Guard.23 Divisions had been part of a centuries-long Army tradition-commemorated with proud banners and songs, each with its own culture, history, and ethos. Divisions also tended to be organized around a central purpose-light infantry or artillery, for example. Often our country's need was for only a portion of the sizable capability of an entire division. It was for readily deployable, smaller, more agile units rather than the full division strength. But the way Army divisions were organized, a small cadre of troops deployed from a division left the rest of the division inoperable. Despite the respect that properly existed for the proud histories of the divisions, modern warfare often calls for relatively more deployable fighting units of a smaller scale. Divisions had been part of a centuries-long Army tradition-commemorated with proud banners and songs, each with its own culture, history, and ethos. Divisions also tended to be organized around a central purpose-light infantry or artillery, for example. Often our country's need was for only a portion of the sizable capability of an entire division. It was for readily deployable, smaller, more agile units rather than the full division strength. But the way Army divisions were organized, a small cadre of troops deployed from a division left the rest of the division inoperable. Despite the respect that properly existed for the proud histories of the divisions, modern warfare often calls for relatively more deployable fighting units of a smaller scale.

The successful transition to the modular Army that exists today and that Schoomaker and a new generation of Army officers championed has made a truly historic difference in its capability. The changes created self-contained and interchangeable brigades with their own organic elements such as artillery and infantry. The brigades can be deployed rapidly and work effectively alongside the other services. Sustained deployment of ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq has been made possible by this innovation. The successful conversion of the central Army maneuver unit from division to brigade has been described by defense a.n.a.lyst Robert Kaplan as "one of the most significant s.h.i.+fts in Army organization since the Napoleonic era."24 Canceling the Crusader, dismissing the Army secretary, expanding special operations forces, bringing a four-star officer out of retirement to lead the Army, and a Special Forces officer to boot, encouraging war planning that takes into account speed, precision, agility, and deployability, and s.h.i.+fting from divisions to brigade combat teams-all were decisions that triggered fierce disagreement, and even resentment. I knew that change is hard. But I was always heartened when I met with the troops, because they seemed to appreciate that I was willing to do what it took to get the job done.

PART XIV

THE LONG, HARD SLOG"It is pretty clear that the coalition can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it will be a long, hard slog."-Memorandum to senior Pentagon officials, October 16, 2003

Samarra, IraqFEBRUARY 22, 2006 In war, fortunes can change rapidly. We saw this in the chaotic days after the rapid overthrow of Saddam Hussein. We saw it again nearly three years later, when the limits of American power became painfully obvious, demanding of a war-weary nation new a.s.sessments, approaches, and most of all, resolve.

In the early morning hours of February 22, 2006, Sunni extremists linked to al-Qaida entered the al-Askari Golden Mosque, a major s.h.i.+a holy site with a dome two hundred feet high that dominated the landscape in the city of Samarra. The extremists overpowered the mosque's guards, laid explosives throughout the building, and then detonated the explosives remotely. The blasts reduced the mosque's famous, venerated golden dome to rubble.

The United States had the most formidable military in the world. We had put men on the moon. Yet as many Iraqis no doubt wondered, why couldn't we stop a handful of thugs armed with small weapons and a few pounds of high explosives?

No one was killed or wounded in the attack, but the bombing of the Samarra mosque was the most strategically significant terrorist attack in Iraq since liberation, seemingly designed by al-Qaida to trigger an all-out Sunni-s.h.i.+a civil war. Based on the restraint shown by the s.h.i.+a up to that point and field reporting from commanders that the country was relatively stable and calm following the bombing, we had expectations that the al-Qaida plan would not succeed. As I reported at a press conference, "From what I've seen thus far, much of the reporting in the U.S. and abroad has exaggerated the situation, according to General Casey."1 Nonetheless, hours after the bombing, I asked General Pace, who in October 2005 had succeeded d.i.c.k Myers as the first Marine chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Eric Edelman, the new undersecretary for policy, what kind of immediate response we could mount to mitigate the damage of the Samarra mosque bombing.2 Though some press accounts may have been exaggerated, looking back, it is now clear that the effect of the bombing proved a game changer in Iraq. The event marked the ascendance of s.h.i.+a militia and a new stage of sectarian conflict focused in Baghdad. The militias, loyal to various s.h.i.+a political leaders and parties, had existed since the first days of post-Saddam Iraq. They had infiltrated the Iraqi police and army units that we had made a priority to train and equip. In the wake of Samarra, the s.h.i.+a militias began a campaign of ruthless ethnic cleansing. Though some press accounts may have been exaggerated, looking back, it is now clear that the effect of the bombing proved a game changer in Iraq. The event marked the ascendance of s.h.i.+a militia and a new stage of sectarian conflict focused in Baghdad. The militias, loyal to various s.h.i.+a political leaders and parties, had existed since the first days of post-Saddam Iraq. They had infiltrated the Iraqi police and army units that we had made a priority to train and equip. In the wake of Samarra, the s.h.i.+a militias began a campaign of ruthless ethnic cleansing.

Since the end of the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2004, our recalibrated strategy had centered on moving responsibility to the Iraqi security forces as quickly as possible. I believed it was the right approach and would work given time and sufficient patience by the American people. And prior to the Samarra bombing, it had seemed promising. The Iraqis had held successful elections amid a period of declining violence. Through 2005, more and more Sunnis had partic.i.p.ated in voting, leading to the smooth and successful government elections in December. Declining attacks against Iraqi civilians and coalition forces would trend lower for months before sudden spikes of violence would seem to erase the recent gains. There had been the hope that we might begin to reduce troop levels in a gradual withdrawal. No longer.

CHAPTER 45

Hands Off the Bicycle Seat.

He wasn't on the road to Damascus, but Amba.s.sador Bremer did appear to have had a sudden conversion on his way out of Baghdad. On May 21, 2004, one month before his departure as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and thirteen months after the end of major combat operations against Saddam, he handed a letter to my military aide, Colonel Steve Bucci, and asked him to deliver the letter to me personally when he arrived back at the Pentagon. Bucci had organized a group of senior staff officers to go to Baghdad in the first months of the CPA to strengthen the organization's management. We were determined to contribute our most capable to the CPA effort.

Bremer's letter recommended a review of troop levels in Iraq. In particular, he asked that we consider deploying an additional division, consisting of 25,000 to 30,000 troops, which would bring the total number of U.S. troops to over 160,000.1 Two years later, Bremer cited his letter as proof that he always thought U.S. troop levels in Iraq were too low to enable CPA's mission to succeed. As head of the CPA, Bremer had had ample opportunity to express his opinions, and he had commented favorably on existing troop-level decisions on several occasions. In July 2003, for example, he expressed support for the proposal by CENTCOM's General Abizaid to "reconfigure our troop profile... [to] get away from heavy forces towards lighter more mobile force, forces which have Special Operation skills."2 That same month Bremer appeared on the television program That same month Bremer appeared on the television program Meet the Press Meet the Press, and host Tim Russert tried to pin him down on the troop-level issue.

"Have you asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for more American troops?" Russert inquired.

"No, I have not," Bremer replied. "I expressed-"

"Do we need more?" Russert pressed.

"I do not believe we do," Bremer replied. "I think the military commanders are confident we have enough troops on the ground, and I accept that a.n.a.lysis."3 I was not pleased that Bremer was recommending more troops for the first time as he was on his way out of Baghdad and not in person to provide his reasoning.* Nevertheless, I treated his recommendation as a serious matter meriting the prompt attention of our most senior military officials. Nevertheless, I treated his recommendation as a serious matter meriting the prompt attention of our most senior military officials. Immediately after receiving it, I sent it to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, with a memo. Immediately after receiving it, I sent it to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, with a memo.

"Questions have been raised about whether US, Coalition and Iraqi force levels in Iraq are adequate," I wrote to Myers, noting that the issue had been raised by some members of Congress, by some retired generals, and now by Bremer.6 I directed Myers to have General Abizaid and the Joint Chiefs of Staff review Bremer's letter and report back to me. I also asked Myers to a.s.sess possible force requirements over the next six months. I directed Myers to have General Abizaid and the Joint Chiefs of Staff review Bremer's letter and report back to me. I also asked Myers to a.s.sess possible force requirements over the next six months.

Myers' formal response on July 13, 2004 noted that General Abizaid "constantly evaluates the number of forces required to be successful in Iraq" and that he "believes forces in theater are adequate to perform the current tasks."7 Myers wrote that CENTCOM's plan antic.i.p.ated a reduction of a brigade of troops by August 2004. The Chairman also noted that "a more optimistic forecast" from CENTCOM envisioned a transition to Iraqi control of security beginning in January 2005, and after which only seven U.S. brigades (the equivalent of some thirty thousand U.S. troops) would be required. Myers wrote that CENTCOM's plan antic.i.p.ated a reduction of a brigade of troops by August 2004. The Chairman also noted that "a more optimistic forecast" from CENTCOM envisioned a transition to Iraqi control of security beginning in January 2005, and after which only seven U.S. brigades (the equivalent of some thirty thousand U.S. troops) would be required.8 Myers, Abizaid, and the Joint Chiefs antic.i.p.ated that more troops might be needed "should the current environment change." Myers' memo listed "potential triggers" for such a force increase request: large-scale violent demonstrations, large-scale rioting and looting, a significant increase in attacks on coalition forces, and a general uprising in two major population areas at once.9 In fact, several months later, CENTCOM did request, and I approved, an increase of more than 20,000 troops to help provide security for the January 2005 elections. In fact, several months later, CENTCOM did request, and I approved, an increase of more than 20,000 troops to help provide security for the January 2005 elections.

This wasn't the first time I had asked the generals whether troop levels were adequate; I raised the question of whether we had appropriate resources when I visited Iraq and in regular conversations with Myers and Abizaid. Nor was Bremer the first person to suggest that more troops might be needed; there wasn't a day that went by without some member of Congress or retired military officer on television calling for more troops. We were all well aware of the issue. I raised the possibility with our commanders in theater and with senior Defense Department officials that the critics may have a valid point.

At the time of the invasion in March 2003, I believed we made the right call with approximately 150,000 U.S. and 20,000 coalition troops on the ground and the option to deploy up to 450,000 U.S. troops if General Franks judged them necessary. If anything, troop levels were high for the fight our forces initially encountered. Saddam's regime fell more quickly than had been antic.i.p.ated, and the resistance from Iraqi army units was relatively modest. Our Arab friends had consistently urged us to leave Iraq as soon as possible if war came. Riots and demonstrations might break out if the war dragged on, especially if we were seen as occupiers. That argument seemed reasonable to me. I know it also registered with Abizaid, Franks, and, I believe, with President Bush.

After major combat operations against Saddam's forces came to an end in April 2003, I discussed the issue of troop levels with senior commanders and the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs on a near weekly basis. The arguments against substantially increasing troop levels continued to seem persuasive. More troops do not necessarily mean a greater chance for success. In fact, too many troops could hurt our ability to win Iraqi confidence, and it could translate into more casualties, because more troops would mean more targets for our enemies. To my thinking, even more important than the number of forces on the ground were the types of missions they were undertaking. We could send hundreds of thousands of troops to Iraq, and if they didn't have the right operational approach and tactics, they weren't likely to achieve our goals.

The potential benefit of deploying more troops was a continuous preoccupation for me and the commanders over the next three years. Could Iraq's early troubles have been reduced by increasing our force levels? In retrospect, it's possible there may have been times when more troops could have been helpful. General Franks told me in 2008 that, in hindsight, his recommendation to stop the flow of additional troops into Iraq by holding the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Cavalry Division might have been a mistake. However, I know of no senior officials, military or civilian, who expressed disagreement with the decision at the time. Certainly I did not.

In the early spring of 2003, when the decision was made, the possibility of an organized insurgency had not been included in CENTCOM's a.s.sumptions. On my April 30 trip to Basra and Baghdad, I was briefed by military commanders and intelligence officials. Except for sporadic skirmishes, the country seemed increasingly pacified. The worst of the looting that had swept parts of Iraq in the first weeks of April appeared to be over. It is conceivable that several thousand more troops in Baghdad, where most of the media was located, might have at least kept the capital from appearing so chaotic, a perception that proved damaging throughout our country and the world.

As the situation in Iraq worsened with insurgent attacks increasing through late 2003 and early 2004, we actively weighed the merits of deploying additional troops. On February 23, 2004, three months before Bremer sent his departure memo, I had an encounter on the issue with CENTCOM commander John Abizaid. En route to Baghdad, we met in the Kuwaiti government's guesthouse for foreign officials. The flight from Was.h.i.+ngton had been long. I was tired and had a lot of questions.

Abizaid had flown up from CENTCOM headquarters in Qatar to join me for the flight into Iraq the following day. I asked to meet with him along with Bill Luti, the Department's senior policy adviser on Iraq. A former Navy captain, Luti had a sharp mind coupled with an irreverence and pugnacity I found appealing. Despite his usual knack for lightening the mood in meetings, even Luti couldn't ease my sense that things weren't going well in Iraq.

Abizaid and Luti joined me in the office attached to my room. I asked them to close the door.

"d.a.m.n it, General," I said. "We're getting pounded back in Was.h.i.+ngton over troop levels." We appeared to be making little headway against the insurgency. Media pundits, members of Congress, and retired generals were insisting that additional forces were the answer. I needed to know whether Abizaid shared those concerns. If he didn't, I needed to know why he had confidence in maintaining the troop levels he was recommending.

I asked him directly if we needed more. It was not a rhetorical question. I wanted to hear his professional military advice. I made it clear to all senior military officials that they owed me their best advice not only when I asked for it but whenever they had something to recommend.10 Abizaid replied somewhat wearily that if he thought we needed more troops, he'd tell me so. It was certainly not the first time he had considered the question, and I suspected the constant queries from all quarters were becoming irritating to him. He then listed the reasons he didn't think more troops were needed. He stressed that we were in an asymmetric war that would be won or lost on intelligence. The need was not to get more Americans in uniform on the ground. The need was to get more intelligence professionals on the ground recruiting local informants. We were fighting an enemy in an Arab land where guests were welcome, but Americans who overstayed their welcome would not be. If Iraq wanted to regain the pride and honor so important in its society, Iraqis would need to take on the fight. We couldn't do it for them. We needed more of an "Iraqi face" on the coalition effort in Iraq, not more American troops. Abizaid replied somewhat wearily that if he thought we needed more troops, he'd tell me so. It was certainly not the first time he had considered the question, and I suspected the constant queries from all quarters were becoming irritating to him. He then listed the reasons he didn't think more troops were needed. He stressed that we were in an asymmetric war that would be won or lost on intelligence. The need was not to get more Americans in uniform on the ground. The need was to get more intelligence professionals on the ground recruiting local informants. We were fighting an enemy in an Arab land where guests were welcome, but Americans who overstayed their welcome would not be. If Iraq wanted to regain the pride and honor so important in its society, Iraqis would need to take on the fight. We couldn't do it for them. We needed more of an "Iraqi face" on the coalition effort in Iraq, not more American troops.

Over the years that followed, I prodded many in the Department to give me their personal views on the issue of troop levels in Iraq (and in Afghanistan, for that matter). When I raised questions as to whether other operational approaches might be considered, such as an even greater focus on training and advising Iraqi security forces or securing the population, they told me their area commanders were tailoring their tactics and techniques to fit the different conditions across Iraq. It wasn't that things were perfect; they did say repeatedly that they needed more civilian experts, better intelligence, and, most of all, more Iraqi troops. There also undoubtedly were areas within Iraq where additional forces were needed due to a request from a local commander. But the overall force level for the country was a different matter, and the view I consistently heard was that the top-line number was sufficient.

I knew that general agreement could be a sign that we were not challenging our own a.s.sumptions as rigorously as we might. A comment I made often in meetings, paraphrasing Pat Moynihan, was that in unanimity one often found a lack of rigorous thinking. That's why I periodically sent memos asking for views that differed from whatever seemed to be the broad consensus. I wrote Generals Myers and Pace, saying, "I would like to know what the general officers, and possibly some key colonels, in Iraq think about the various options we face."11 I followed up the next day: "I don't need to know names, but it would be helpful for me to have a sense of what the commanders at various levels think on these issues. Please include minority opinions and their reasoning." I followed up the next day: "I don't need to know names, but it would be helpful for me to have a sense of what the commanders at various levels think on these issues. Please include minority opinions and their reasoning."12 The memo continued: The memo continued: For example, I would be interested in knowing whether or not they believe the US and the coalition 1. Are doing about the right things overall, and with about the right number of troops in their respective areas of operation (specify their AORs).

2. Need more troops and, if so, where and for what purposes.

3. Would be better off with fewer US troops (where) and doing less of what types of activities.

4. Would be better off with the same (larger or smaller) number of troops, but refocusing coalition efforts to put X% (i.e., 10%? 50? 90%?) of our forces on the tasks of organizing, training, equipping, and mentoring Iraqi Security forces.

5. Should cut back dramatically on US-only patrols and focus most of their efforts on joint patrols and/or mentoring Iraqi Security forces.

6. Put more coalition forces [on] Iraq's borders (with Syria? Iran? and/or [in] Baghdad? Mosul? other?), but remain available to conduct raids throughout the country as required.

7. Should establish a larger presence in the relatively secure North and South, and less coalition presence in the Sunni Triangle.

8. Other.13 I wanted candor, which is why I was willing to accept anonymous responses in case less senior officers might be hesitant to express views that differed from their immediate superiors. The lives of our troops and the success of the war were at stake, so mine was as serious an inquiry as one could make. I wanted to reach down the chain of command to find what more junior officers were thinking. I did not receive any responses that they wanted more forces or that they disagreed with the strategy.

I also had in mind my recollections of the U.S. involvements in Vietnam and Lebanon. In both cases I had observed that local populations, if permitted, would lean more and more on Americans to solve their problems. In the end, the South Vietnamese and the people of Lebanon were left vulnerable and relatively defenseless when American public support for these missions eroded and the United States pulled out.

I was concerned that U.S. and coalition forces might inadvertently dis