Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 29

Never much of a handwringer, I don't spend a lot of time in recriminations, looking back or second-guessing decisions made in real time with imperfect information by myself or others. In my press conferences I did not always conceal my lack of regard for hindsight "wisdom." While in office, I resisted answering the frequently asked, breezy, politically loaded questions, along the lines of "What do you regret most?" or "What do you wish you had done differently?" or "Was this or that a mistake?"

A secretary of defense has to be careful about what he says in public. His comments can affect troop morale or limit the president's options in the future. Nonetheless, officials need to periodically reexamine their own views and judgments. Human beings are fallible, and the information policy makers use to make their judgments is always incomplete, imperfect, and ever changing. The a.s.sumptions that underlie strategy can become stale or even proved wrong to begin with. It sometimes requires exquisite balancing skills to be properly skeptical and yet open to criticism in internal deliberations, while not suggesting to allies or enemies abroad that one is adrift or lacking confidence in a policy.

The senior Department advisers were accustomed to receiving skeptical "big think" snowflakes from me. I did this periodically-for the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the global defense posture realignment, major alliance management issues, transformation, and other significant activities. When one of these internal memos urging a rea.s.sessment of our strategy in the war on terror was leaked to the press, however, it made headlines. The front page of the October 22, 2003, USA Today USA Today read "DEFENSE MEMO: A GRIM OUTLOOK-RUMSFELD SPELLS OUT DOUBTS ON IRAQ, TERROR. " "Despite upbeat statements by the Bush administration, the memo to Rumsfeld's top staffreveals significant doubts about progress in the struggle against terrorists," the paper reported, adding: "The memo, which diverges sharply from Rumsfeld's mostly positive public comments, offers one of the most candid and sobering a.s.sessments to date of how top administration officials view the 2-year-old war on terrorism." read "DEFENSE MEMO: A GRIM OUTLOOK-RUMSFELD SPELLS OUT DOUBTS ON IRAQ, TERROR. " "Despite upbeat statements by the Bush administration, the memo to Rumsfeld's top staffreveals significant doubts about progress in the struggle against terrorists," the paper reported, adding: "The memo, which diverges sharply from Rumsfeld's mostly positive public comments, offers one of the most candid and sobering a.s.sessments to date of how top administration officials view the 2-year-old war on terrorism."14 Even though I had limited the addressees to Myers, Pace, Wolfowitz, and Feith, the memo had leaked when it was more broadly distributed to their staffs. Even though I had limited the addressees to Myers, Pace, Wolfowitz, and Feith, the memo had leaked when it was more broadly distributed to their staffs.

In my meetings with the combatant commanders I had solicited their thoughts on where the United States was doing well and where we needed to do better. This memo was my way of prodding top Pentagon officials to think about the war on terror comprehensively, not one slice at time. The memo centered on three key questions: First, how do we know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror? Second, is the U.S. government organized properly to prosecute the war? And third, how can the United States do better in countering the enemy ideologically-that is, not just in capturing or killing terrorists, but in preventing young people from becoming our murderous enemies in the first place?

I questioned whether the Defense Department, and the U.S. government in general, were changing fast enough to do what was necessary to win. I a.s.sessed the "mixed results" of our efforts against al-Qaida. Many terrorists remained at large. I pointed out that we had done a good job in reorienting the Defense Department to take the offensive in the war with islamist extremists, but I wondered: "Are the changes we have and are making too modest and incremental?" My memo continued: My impression is that we have not yet made truly bold moves.... [W]e lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madra.s.sas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?Does the US need to fas.h.i.+on a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions.Do we need a new organization?How do we stop those who are financing the radical madra.s.sa schools?Is our current situation such that "the harder we work, the behinder we get"?It is pretty clear that the coalition can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it will be a long, hard slog.Does CIA need a new finding [a presidential authorization for covert activity]?Should we create a private foundation to entice radical madradssas [sic] to a more moderate course?What else should we be considering?15 This doc.u.ment, which became known as the "Long, Hard Slog" memo, was cast by some as a rebuke of the Bush administration's strategy. It was not a sign of doubt, much less of disapproval. Rather, it was my view of what a senior official needed to do to ensure that we were not operating on autopilot-that we did not become complacent or closed-minded.

I was concerned that if the United States focused too narrowly on military means to defeat the terrorist threat posed by al-Qaida and other Islamist extremists, we could end up doing more harm than good over the long term. Even as early as October 2003, it was clear that bullets alone would not win the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. And in the much broader war against Islamist terrorism, without a serious and sustained ideological campaign to discredit radical Islamism, our enemies were going to be able to recruit and indoctrinate far more terrorists than we could capture or kill-and they'd be able to exploit our counterterrorism measures to feed anti-American resentment.

I also worried that an exclusive concentration of resources on fighting terrorism might invite other powers-perhaps North Korea or Iran-to challenge us by means other than terrorism. Terrorists and insurgents had become a serious threat, but there was no telling what kind of conflicts we might need to deter or defend against down the road a few years or decades hence. In short, we needed to give appropriate priority to other aspects of our national security strategy as well.

My October 2003 memo launched a useful recalibration of the administration's strategy in the war on terror, which resulted in a somewhat greater emphasis on the nonmilitary instruments of national power. We conducted a strategic review of the global war on terror and presented several important thoughts to President Bush, including a proposal for a new U.S. information agency and a civilian reserve corps at the State Department to provide civilian partners for our military in performing stabilization missions. The key elements of our strategic review were incorporated into formal presidential directives. They became the foundation of the 20052006 National Military Strategic Plan for the war on terror and helped shape the administration's 2006 National Security Strategy.16 One phrase in my October 2003 memo gained special attention: "long, hard slog." For some it evoked the Vietnam War and images of quagmire.17 I hadn't intended the unflattering comparison, but I did feel we needed to caution ourselves and the American people that the broader war against Islamist extremists might last many years like the Cold War. I hadn't intended the unflattering comparison, but I did feel we needed to caution ourselves and the American people that the broader war against Islamist extremists might last many years like the Cold War.

We had done much work we could be proud of. We were putting the pressure on al-Qaida and other Islamist terrorist groups around the world. While there had not been another attack on our country, we knew that our enemies were reorganizing as decentralized terrorist cells and as insurgent groups. They would take advantage of our troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, using the fighting there to train their next generation of terrorists. And they would use support from Syria and Iran to arm themselves. They would launch headline-grabbing attacks to try to convince the American public that our fight with them was futile, much as the Tet Offensive in Vietnam had. Theirs was a waiting game. They knew that they didn't have to win; they simply had to outlast us.

CHAPTER 46

The Dead Enders.

In June 2004, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez ended his tour as commander of American forces in Iraq and was replaced by George Casey, a four-star Army general. Casey began his military career in the late 1960s in the ROTC at Georgetown University. Though Casey had planned to stay for only two years in the military before heading to law school, he felt compelled to stay in the Army as the war in Vietnam raged. The decision was a weighty one for him. His father, a major general, had been killed in a helicopter crash in Vietnam shortly after Casey was commissioned. Throughout his time in Iraq, Casey wore one of his dad's medals around his neck as a reminder of the sacrifice.

After Sanchez's difficult tenure, the appointment of the calm, low-key, and a.n.a.lytical Casey was welcomed. "Boring is good, General Casey, and I applaud you on that," Senator Hillary Clinton told him at his confirmation hearing. "Clearly, you're a master at it. And it goes to the heart of your success."1 I had recommended Casey to the President at Abizaid's urging. Casey and his superior at CENTCOM were close personally and saw the Iraq war in similar terms. They emphasized transferring responsibility to the Iraqi government and training and equipping Iraqi forces so that American forces could begin to leave in an orderly fas.h.i.+on. With the end of the CPA, we had returned to our original emphasis on more modest goals-keeping the nation reasonably secure and enabling the Iraqis to defeat the insurgency over time.

In contrast to the strained relations.h.i.+p that characterized the Bremer and Sanchez pairing, Casey worked well with the first U.S. amba.s.sador to a free Iraq, John Negroponte. Measured and calm, Negroponte was a forceful advocate for the United States. His approach was vastly more collaborative with our military commanders in Iraq than Bremer's had been. Casey and Negroponte established their offices next to each other in Baghdad, as I had urged them to do before they left for Iraq. Together they created a joint campaign plan that for the first time in the conflict fully unified the military, economic, and diplomatic strands of the American effort toward common goals.

There was no shortage of work to be done in regaining the momentum toward Iraqi control that had slipped during the occupation. We had lost almost a year in training Iraq's army and police forces because of bureaucratic differences and misplaced priorities. After reorienting the emphasis toward internal security, Abizaid and I made a priority of increasing the number of Iraqi security forces. Consistent with this goal, Amba.s.sador Negroponte s.h.i.+fted substantial reconstruction funds away from infrastructure projects toward the training of Iraqi army and police forces.

I also pushed for more coalition forces to be involved in Iraq to lessen the burden on our troops. We could continue to bear the brunt of the difficult work, such as clearing and holding Iraqi neighborhoods, but other countries could pick up some of the slack by providing force protection at military bases and working at logistic hubs in Kuwait. If deploying troops to Iraq was politically too sensitive, I suggested that some countries replace American troops in places like the Sinai, Kosovo, and Bosnia, so we could focus more of our resources in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 I had pushed hard for a Muslim military contingent to go to Iraq to belie the propaganda aired on Al-Jazeera that America was waging a war against Islam. I had pushed hard for a Muslim military contingent to go to Iraq to belie the propaganda aired on Al-Jazeera that America was waging a war against Islam.3 Turkey's parliament had at one point agreed to deploy two divisions of troops. But suspicious of their neighboring countries, Iraqi leaders rejected the idea-to the detriment of Iraq's security and to U.S.-Turkey relations. Turkey's parliament had at one point agreed to deploy two divisions of troops. But suspicious of their neighboring countries, Iraqi leaders rejected the idea-to the detriment of Iraq's security and to U.S.-Turkey relations.

Some critics contended we were using Iraqis interchangeably with our own forces, as if we thought a recently trained Iraqi soldier was as capable as a U.S. Marine or Army soldier.4 That was not so; we never envisioned the Iraqi security forces becoming the equivalent of the U.S. military. I did think we could aim for a competent, capable Iraqi force that, over time, could earn the respect and support of the Iraqi people. I believed that training and equipping Iraqis to secure their own country was the best strategy to achieve a government reasonably capable of dealing with the challenges it faced. That was not so; we never envisioned the Iraqi security forces becoming the equivalent of the U.S. military. I did think we could aim for a competent, capable Iraqi force that, over time, could earn the respect and support of the Iraqi people. I believed that training and equipping Iraqis to secure their own country was the best strategy to achieve a government reasonably capable of dealing with the challenges it faced.*

Unlike most twentieth-century counterinsurgencies, such as that waged by the French in Algeria, the goal of the United States wasn't an Iraq that was disarmed and unable to resist occupation. To the contrary, we wanted an Iraq that we could leave behind fully independent and capable of defending itself with a well-trained and well-armed police force and army. We had a major interest in ensuring the Iraqis were successful. But ultimately we knew that we couldn't succeed for them. If more Iraqis didn't stop insurgents from taking refuge in their neighborhoods, building car bombs in their garages, and destroying power lines and reconstruction projects, and start providing more intelligence tips to Iraqi security forces, then the Iraqi people were doomed to live in a destroyed, violence-engulfed country.6 After some difficult months under a two-star general whose efforts resulted in only modest progress, we needed a three-star general who could aggressively accelerate the development of local forces. To reorient the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and make their training and equipping a top priority, I settled on an Army general who had excelled as a division commander during the major combat operations stage.

David Petraeus began his career at West Point, where he would later return as a professor armed with a Princeton Ph.D. He was by many accounts ambitious and driven. His experience with low-intensity conflict and peacekeeping in Haiti and Bosnia had served him well during his first tour in Iraq, where he commanded the 101st Airborne Division. He demonstrated inventiveness in Mosul through engagement with the population and a willingness to improvise.7 He held local elections for a town council and undertook reconstruction projects at his division's level, even as he had to cope with some CPA officials who were cool to initiatives coming from outside the Green Zone. He held local elections for a town council and undertook reconstruction projects at his division's level, even as he had to cope with some CPA officials who were cool to initiatives coming from outside the Green Zone.

I'd had limited exposure to Petraeus at the time, so before settling on him I asked other senior officers for their a.s.sessments. The consensus was that he was cerebral, and savvy with the press. His personal public relations abilities were so good that the views of some of his colleagues were mixed. But despite some reservations by senior uniformed officials, I decided Petraeus would be a good fit for a mission in need of strong leaders.h.i.+p.* In June 2004, Petraeus deployed on his second tour to Iraq and took charge of training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, with a mandate to make sure they could a.s.sume more responsibility fighting the insurgency. In June 2004, Petraeus deployed on his second tour to Iraq and took charge of training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, with a mandate to make sure they could a.s.sume more responsibility fighting the insurgency.8 Generals Abizaid and Casey and I agreed that putting Iraqis forward to take the fight to the enemy and a.s.sume leaders.h.i.+p of their country was our best weapon against the insurgency and the surest way to avoid more U.S. casualties that would eventually sap the political will for America's effort in Iraq. We hoped that as Iraqis gained control of their destiny, the terrorists and regime remnants would no longer be seen as standing in opposition to Americans or coalition occupiers. Instead, the insurgents would be seen for what they were-opponents of the legitimate, elected Iraqi government.

When asked by reporters about the first signs of a sustained and organized resistance in April 2004 following the flare-up in Fallujah, I said, "Thugs and a.s.sa.s.sins and former Saddam henchmen will not be allowed to carve out portions of that city and to oppose peace and freedom. The dead enders, threatened by Iraq's progress to self-government, may believe they can drive the coalition out through terror and intimidation, and foment civil war among Sunnis and s.h.i.+as, or block the path to Iraqi self-rule, but they're badly mistaken."9 Some in the media mistook my use of the phrase "dead enders" to mean I was suggesting that victory was imminent, that the enemy would soon be defeated. Some in the media mistook my use of the phrase "dead enders" to mean I was suggesting that victory was imminent, that the enemy would soon be defeated.10 In fact, my meaning was exactly the opposite-namely that our forces were locked in a b.l.o.o.d.y struggle with an enemy that would fight to the bitter end, to their deaths. Rather than dismissing the insurgents, I was saying that because they would fight to the end, our work against them would be difficult. In fact, my meaning was exactly the opposite-namely that our forces were locked in a b.l.o.o.d.y struggle with an enemy that would fight to the bitter end, to their deaths. Rather than dismissing the insurgents, I was saying that because they would fight to the end, our work against them would be difficult.11 In its early months the insurgency was dominated by former Baathist regime holdouts. Later, evidence was discovered that suggested that Saddam had planned to mount an insurgency if his conventional forces were unable to turn back a U.S.-led invasion. Saddam's intelligence service disseminated messages to its members to organize a resistance by forming cells and training terrorists in the event of the regime's collapse.12 General Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, one of Saddam's close a.s.sociates and later a leader of the insurgency, led a secret program to launch a guerrilla war under the Unified Mujahedeen Command. General Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, one of Saddam's close a.s.sociates and later a leader of the insurgency, led a secret program to launch a guerrilla war under the Unified Mujahedeen Command.13 Baathists, whose ideology is secular, nevertheless tapped into the potent force of jihadism, attracting devout fanatics to their cause. Baathists, whose ideology is secular, nevertheless tapped into the potent force of jihadism, attracting devout fanatics to their cause.

The Baathist-jihadist axis, at least in its early phases, was less of an insurgency-an armed political movement that arose organically from the general population-and more a counterrevolution. It consisted mainly of Baathists seeking a return of their dictatorial power. When CENTCOM produced a list of the thirty-nine top leaders in the insurgency in the fall of 2004, almost all were connected to the old regime of Saddam. Indeed, early on one prominent insurgent group called itself "the Party of the Return."14 The insurgency began primarily as an effort to reclaim Sunni supremacy over Iraq's Kurds and s.h.i.+a. But by 2004 it had grown, bolstered by the support of a larger, more diverse group, not just of committed Baathists but of a number of non-Baathist Iraqi nationalists as well. Former Baathists exploited Islamist ideology to expand the conflict and attract recruits from all across the Muslim world. To anyone outside this privileged circle of Saddam regime loyalists, creating a new Islamic caliphate in Baghdad was far more appealing than reinstating Saddam and his ilk to power. The insurgency soon became dominated by foreign fighters and terrorists; predominant among them was a group calling itself al-Qaida in Iraq.

Al-Qaida's followers infiltrated Iraq and took advantage of the Sunnis' sense of disenfranchis.e.m.e.nt and alienation. Though only comprising approximately 20 percent of the population, Sunni Arabs had been the ruling cla.s.s in Iraq since the British Mandate of Mesopotamia after World War I. But nearly overnight following Saddam's fall, the Sunnis had become a mere minority in a country with a new s.h.i.+a-led government. Neighboring Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria were unhappy and worried about the new order in Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis feared they might become targets of reprisals for past grievances, and al-Qaida capitalized on this insecurity. While our intelligence community's prewar view was that secular Baathists and al-Qaida's religious extremists would not cooperate, it had become obvious by 2004 that al-Qaida in Iraq had formed bases in Sunni populations throughout much of the country, using a combination of security promises, persistent recruitment efforts, and brutal intimidation.

At first this may have seemed an attractive alliance to the Sunnis, but al-Qaida was not interested in helping the Baathists return to power. Al-Qaida forces seized control of neighborhoods and villages. They labeled as traitors those Iraqis who cooperated with the Iraqi government or with the Americans. We received reports of terrorists who murdered children or b.o.o.by-trapped dead bodies so that families would be killed when they tried to retrieve their loved ones. In Fallujah, those who refused to collaborate with the terrorists who controlled the city were beheaded and tossed into the Euphrates River.15 In November 2004, we recognized that our troops had to return to Fallujah. It was a sanctuary for al-Qaida in Iraq and much of the insurgency. Fifteen thousand U.S. Marines and soldiers along with two thousand Iraqi troops encircled the city. In the early morning hours of November 8, they swept northward through the city, block by block, engaging in the toughest urban fighting of the Iraq war. It also proved to be the bloodiest, with ninety-five American troops killed in combat. Though hard won, it was a key victory over the insurgents.16 Fallujah was cleared of the terrorists who had taken refuge there, and the city has never reverted to the enemy. Fallujah was cleared of the terrorists who had taken refuge there, and the city has never reverted to the enemy.

We had a priceless advantage in an ideological struggle against the enemy. We could offer the Iraqis a future the majority of Iraqis wanted-a future of self-government and national pride. We could also finally disprove the notion that the Americans were occupiers there to steal their oil. Elections would be a critical step toward that goal.

Holding an election during such a fragile period in a war-torn country carried significant risks. There was the obvious danger that terrorists could launch devastating attacks on Iraqi citizens on election day, setting back any political progress. We also had to keep in mind that if we rushed to national elections, we could end up with an antidemocratic result. Groups that were already well organized would have a major advantage if elections were held too soon. Those groups tended to be bankrolled by the Iranian regime and were deeply sectarian. If they emerged the ultimate winners, the long-term survival prospects of a free society in Iraq capable of resisting foreign influences would be slim. In the worst-case scenario, we could end up with leaders in power who rivaled Saddam in their l.u.s.t for violence and support for terrorism.

Al-Qaida understood that the fight to establish a free, self-governing Iraq in the heart of the Arab world would be a critical threat to their cause. For some time prior to the elections, enemies of a free Iraq led by al-Qaida put up posters with messages such as "YOU VOTE. YOU DIE." Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant who had proclaimed himself leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, declared "a fierce war on this evil principle of democracy." He called the elections a sham meant to deceive the Iraqi people and subjugate them to American puppets. "Anyone who tries to help set up this system is part of it," he warned.17 Zarqawi claimed that anyone partic.i.p.ating in elections was an apostate. The insurgents knew what a powerful threat the elections posed to their cause. Zarqawi claimed that anyone partic.i.p.ating in elections was an apostate. The insurgents knew what a powerful threat the elections posed to their cause.

We set an ambitious schedule for three elections in 2005. The first election, which if successful promised to be a watershed event in the Arab world, was scheduled for January. Iraqis would vote to fill 275 seats in their national legislature. The legislature would then draft an Iraqi const.i.tution. In the second vote, the Iraqi people would approve or reject the const.i.tution in a referendum. And finally, the Iraqi people would elect a free Iraqi government under their new const.i.tution.

As the first elections approached in January 2005, commentators across the world predicted disaster.18 Foreign affairs specialists called for postponement of the elections in light of the terrorists' threats. Foreign affairs specialists called for postponement of the elections in light of the terrorists' threats.19 There was a possibility that many voters, fearing for their lives and the lives of their families, would not show up at polling places. Brent Scowcroft, who had been national security adviser for President Ford and later for President George H. W. Bush, as well as chairman of President George W. Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, warned that the elections had "the great potential for deepening the conflict" in Iraq. There was a possibility that many voters, fearing for their lives and the lives of their families, would not show up at polling places. Brent Scowcroft, who had been national security adviser for President Ford and later for President George H. W. Bush, as well as chairman of President George W. Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, warned that the elections had "the great potential for deepening the conflict" in Iraq.20 Others worried that the lack of partic.i.p.ation by minority Sunnis, who threatened to boycott the election, would undermine its legitimacy. Others worried that the lack of partic.i.p.ation by minority Sunnis, who threatened to boycott the election, would undermine its legitimacy.

Like President Bush, I was determined that the elections go forward. I was under no illusions that free elections would quickly solve all of Iraq's problems, but delaying the vote because of the intimidation of the terrorists would give them a major psychological victory and set back our efforts to help the Iraqis create a representative, sovereign government for themselves.

Iraq's first election day was on Sunday, January 30, 2005, ten days after President Bush's second inauguration. How many, I wondered, would show up at polling stations despite knowing they were risking their lives by voting? With Baghdad seven hours ahead of our time, preliminary reports were already coming in when I turned on the cable news early that Sunday morning.

There was no need for detailed expert a.n.a.lysis to understand the historical consequence of what was taking place across Iraq. The televised images said it all. There were long lines at polling places. Iraqi men dressed in their best clothes were standing proudly as they waited to cast their votes. Some brought their children to watch a piece of history unfold. Voters had to dip their index finger in indelible purple ink to a.s.sure that no one voted more than once-and these purple fingers became a proud symbol of partic.i.p.ation in a free and fair election. No doubt citizens were emboldened by the highly visible presence of the Iraqi security forces that American forces had trained and equipped. They stayed at their posts and held their ground. Iraqi and coalition forces had imposed extensive security measures to try to prevent terrorist attacks, and their efforts were largely successful.

Over the course of the day, fear gave way to elation. Men and women danced in the streets and waved their purple fingers in the air.21 "It's like a wedding. I swear to G.o.d, it's a wedding for all of Iraq," the director of one polling station in a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad rejoiced. "No one has ever witnessed this before. For a half-century, no one has seen anything like it. And we did it ourselves." "It's like a wedding. I swear to G.o.d, it's a wedding for all of Iraq," the director of one polling station in a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad rejoiced. "No one has ever witnessed this before. For a half-century, no one has seen anything like it. And we did it ourselves."22 Nearly 60 percent of registered Iraqis had cast their ballots in defiance of al-Qaida threats and attempts at intimidation. Many Sunnis had not turned out, but they soon came to regret it, as they realized they would have little say in the formation of their new government. They resolved to partic.i.p.ate in greater numbers next time.

Nine months later, Iraqis overwhelmingly approved the national const.i.tution their elected representatives had drafted. The successful referendum belied the proposal that Iraq should be split into separate Sunni, s.h.i.+a, and Kurd autonomous zones, an unhelpful idea some in Congress, Senator Joe Biden prominent among them, had been advocating.23 In the late autumn of 2005, we approached the third free election in Iraq, one that would establish a permanent Iraqi government. President Bush held an NSC meeting on November 2 to discuss the security strategy for the election and the perennial issue of U.S. troop levels. Did we need more? In the White House Situation Room, President Bush held forth, with General Casey and others joining on the secure video screen from Baghdad. We discussed ramping up troop levels with additional brigades to secure polling stations for the elections and to deal with any instability in the weeks after. We planned to increase troops to 160,000 and were considering sending two more brigades, as many as 10,000 additional troops.

"My recommendation is don't deploy these two brigades," General Casey said. "None of my commanders believe we need the force."24 Casey and Abizaid would not fail to let their superiors in the chain of command know when and if they believed they needed to increase troop levels. They knew well that having too few troops could result in violence that might have been deterred. But like them, I was aware that if we added more troops at the wrong time and in the wrong places, we could weaken Iraqi leaders.h.i.+p and stunt the development of a sovereign nation still in its formative stages. It was not a simple issue.

"We need to avoid dependency syndrome," I added, supporting Abizaid and Casey's view. "We need to take our hand off the bicycle seat."

President Bush replied, "Drawdown is the right thing. The announcement before the election is the problem." The President had put his finger onthe crux of the issue: If we signaled a drawdown before the December 2005 Iraqi elections, it might discourage people from coming out to vote for a new parliament. Ultimately, Bush decided to hold back one of the two brigades we were considering sending and to deploy the other only as far as Kuwait, to stand by in reserve in case violence in Iraq spiked during the election period.

On December 15, 2005, more than twelve million Iraqis voted for their national legislature, as provided for by the const.i.tution the Iraqi people had ratified. The 70 percent turnout included many Sunnis. A quarter of those elected were female, as mandated by the new Iraqi const.i.tution.

I had sent a memo to President Bush in November 2005 listing some signs of progress in Iraq. The Iraqi Security Forces were beginning to show signs of promise. The Iraqis had a new const.i.tution they had written and approved, and were forming their own governmental inst.i.tutions. There were tentative, early, and still modest efforts to bring Sunnis, s.h.i.+a, and Kurds together. In the memo, I also called the President's attention to some of the remaining difficulties: "bursts of violence, including a.s.sa.s.sinations and attempts to intimidate Iraqi leaders; Iran and Syria continue to be unhelpful, and US casualties." I concluded that there was cause to be somewhat optimistic. "The central question is whether the U.S. will be safer by succeeding in Iraq or by precipitously withdrawing. The answer is clear. Quitting is not an exit strategy. Victory is the only acceptable exit strategy."25 The Iraqis were moving forward toward a free, self-governed future. The majority of them showed they were willing to defy the insurgents. But the foreign fighters were not ready to give up. More terrorists continued to flow in from outside, most from Syria and Iran. They continued to stage b.l.o.o.d.y attacks and inflame sectarian tensions.

Though it was not clear at the time, the Samarra Golden Mosque bombing on February 22, 2006, touched off a new phase of the war. In the wake of the bombing, just ten weeks after the election of a national legislature, s.h.i.+a militias and death squads, some loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, joined in the violence.26 The ranks of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi militia swelled with new recruits. Baghdad witnessed pitched battles, as sectarian militias savaged each other, with civilians often caught in the middle. s.h.i.+a militias roamed the capital city with handguns and power drills exacting revenge for anyone suspected of cooperating with Sunnis. The death squads' victims were often innocents who happened to have Sunni-sounding names. Many Sunnis, in turn, supported the attacks waged by al-Qaida. Iraqis fled mixed neighborhoods or risked becoming victimized by the militias. The ranks of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi militia swelled with new recruits. Baghdad witnessed pitched battles, as sectarian militias savaged each other, with civilians often caught in the middle. s.h.i.+a militias roamed the capital city with handguns and power drills exacting revenge for anyone suspected of cooperating with Sunnis. The death squads' victims were often innocents who happened to have Sunni-sounding names. Many Sunnis, in turn, supported the attacks waged by al-Qaida. Iraqis fled mixed neighborhoods or risked becoming victimized by the militias.

The Golden Mosque bombing also jeopardized ongoing discussions over the seating of a new Iraqi government. It derailed Generals Abizaid and Casey's plans to turn over more responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces month by month and to reduce U.S. troop levels gradually. The situation was now too precarious to contemplate that s.h.i.+ft. Casey recommended doubling the number of troops in Baghdad. If large swaths of neighborhoods in the capital city were engulfed in violence, there could be little progress elsewhere. It would be difficult for national politicians to reconcile and forge a countrywide consensus as long as sectarian militias rampaged within earshot of the seat of their national government. And the Western media, based in Baghdad, would focus on the violence in their immediate area and report that the situation in the country was in decline.

CHAPTER 47

Eyes on Afghanistan.

On December 7, 2004, I had arrived in Kabul as a member of the U.S. delegation led by Vice President Cheney for President Karzai's inauguration. The frigid Afghan air was no match for the warmth shared by millions that day as they celebrated their first democratically elected leader in the country's long history. In a repudiation of the restrictive, repressive Taliban rule, Afghan women were given prominent roles in the ceremony. They were even allowed to sing again. Some choked back tears as they did so. A stirring sight that day was children flying kites-a practice that had been banned by the Taliban. It was a wonderful moment, filled with promise and potential, justifying what our forces had fought for.

Three months earlier, in the country's first-ever free national election, Afghans had turned out at polling stations to vote for their nation's president. There were reports that women in Bamiyan province awoke at 3:00 a.m. the day of voting. Because the Taliban had threatened to kill any women who cast ballots, they began their day with a ritual wash and cleansing as if they were preparing to die. In Konar province, the Taliban launched an attack on election day. Although it was one hundred yards from the polling place, the Afghan voters stayed in line. Not one person left.

I thought that the initial success could be attributed to the modesty of our goals. The strategy was based on the idea of letting Afghans solve Afghan problems, a.s.sisting them and amplifying their successes where we could-such as helping to build a national army and train a police force-and executing light footprint counterinsurgency operations to protect strategic towns from Taliban influence. There were fewer than fifteen thousand American troops in the country until 2004 and fewer than twenty-five thousand through 2006.1 Afghanistan experienced relatively few incidents of violence until the summer of 2005. Intelligence collected from around the country indicated that after the October 2004 elections, the successful vote had so demoralized the enemy that many Taliban were prepared to give up the fight. Aside from a few major engagements, such as Operation Anaconda in the spring of 2002, coalition troops skirmished with Taliban forces only occasionally. There was a visible Afghan government in place early and quickly, led by Hamid Karzai. He persuaded many former warlords to put down their arms and join his government in pursuit of an agenda of peace.2 Afghan technocrats, many of them Western educated, advised the nation's leaders. We accelerated the buildup of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the police force, knowing that ultimately they would need to be the ones securing their nation. Afghan technocrats, many of them Western educated, advised the nation's leaders. We accelerated the buildup of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the police force, knowing that ultimately they would need to be the ones securing their nation.3 We encouraged the Karzai government to consolidate and build its country's inst.i.tutions while recognizing that ultimately much of the state's power would be wielded by tribal leaders and power brokers at the provincial and local levels, as it had been for centuries. We encouraged the Karzai government to consolidate and build its country's inst.i.tutions while recognizing that ultimately much of the state's power would be wielded by tribal leaders and power brokers at the provincial and local levels, as it had been for centuries.4 My position was that we were not in Afghanistan to transform a deeply conservative Islamic culture into a model of liberal modernity. We were not there to eradicate corruption or to end poppy cultivation. We were not there to take owners.h.i.+p of Afghanistan's problems, tempting though it was for many Americans of goodwill. Instead, Afghans would need to take charge of their own fate. Afghans would build their society the way they wanted. With our coalition allies we would a.s.sist them within reason where we were able.

Some political opponents of the administration claimed that the war in Iraq "distracted" the Bush administration from what was referred to as the "good" and "right" war in Afghanistan.5 Yet it was precisely during the toughest period in the Iraq war that Afghanistan, with coalition help, took some of its most promising steps toward a free and better future. In my visits to the country every few months, I felt a palpable energy and excitement. Women were beginning to claim their place in society: starting businesses, serving in the parliament, and once again receiving education and medical aid. Afghan presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2004 and September 2005 took place essentially without incident and were heralded as free and fair. A vibrant media-many dozens of radio and television stations and newspapers-was free to comment on and criticize the coalition presence and Afghanistan's new leaders. By 2006, nearly four million Afghan refugees had returned to their homeland. Yet it was precisely during the toughest period in the Iraq war that Afghanistan, with coalition help, took some of its most promising steps toward a free and better future. In my visits to the country every few months, I felt a palpable energy and excitement. Women were beginning to claim their place in society: starting businesses, serving in the parliament, and once again receiving education and medical aid. Afghan presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2004 and September 2005 took place essentially without incident and were heralded as free and fair. A vibrant media-many dozens of radio and television stations and newspapers-was free to comment on and criticize the coalition presence and Afghanistan's new leaders. By 2006, nearly four million Afghan refugees had returned to their homeland.6 An Afghan "face" on the effort was enormously beneficial. Though most of the partic.i.p.ant nations had failed to deliver fully on reconstruction pledges made at the 2001 Bonn conference, members of the international community were finding it harder to ignore the pleas of a legitimate Afghan government they had earlier offered to support. Levels of violence remained relatively low, in part because would-be insurgents seemed reluctant to challenge the popularly supported Afghan government. I did not think Afghanistan had suddenly shed centuries of ethnic strife and endemic corruption, but it did seem Afghans might be finding their way to managing their problems without our permanent a.s.sistance.

If some later contended that we never had a plan for full-fledged nation building or that we under-resourced such a plan, they were certainly correct. We did not go there to try to bring prosperity to every corner of Afghanistan. I believed-and continue to believe-that such a goal would have amounted to a fool's errand. It struck me that sending U.S. servicemen and-women in pursuit of an effort to remake Afghanistan into a prosperous American-style nation-state or to try to bring our standard of security to each of that nation's far-flung villages would be unwise, well beyond our capability, and unworthy of our troops' sacrifice.

Our more modest goal was to rid Afghanistan of al-Qaida and replace their Taliban hosts with a government that would not harbor terrorists. We were willing to let Afghan traditions and processes determine the political outcomes. Our objectives reflected a healthy sense of the limitations of what we could achieve in a country suspicious of foreign influence.

I also did not see more U.S. troops as the solution to Afghanistan's many challenges. "I am persuaded that the critical problem in Afghanistan is not really a security problem," I wrote President Bush in August 2002. "Rather, the problem that needs to be addressed is the slow progress that is being made on the civil side."7 Hamid Karzai's government needed help building his country's inst.i.tutions so he could show the Afghan people that a life of freedom offered more prosperity and security than life under the Taliban. With the exception of Afghanistan's national army, building these inst.i.tutions required first and foremost a.s.sistance from the non-military departments and agencies of the U.S. government and the coalition countries. Hamid Karzai's government needed help building his country's inst.i.tutions so he could show the Afghan people that a life of freedom offered more prosperity and security than life under the Taliban. With the exception of Afghanistan's national army, building these inst.i.tutions required first and foremost a.s.sistance from the non-military departments and agencies of the U.S. government and the coalition countries.8 Sending more troops to the villages and valleys of Afghanistan would not resolve the country's long-term problems. In fact, they could exacerbate them by fostering resentment among a proud population and providing more targets for our enemies to attack. Sending more troops to the villages and valleys of Afghanistan would not resolve the country's long-term problems. In fact, they could exacerbate them by fostering resentment among a proud population and providing more targets for our enemies to attack.

The interim government of Hamid Karzai had to deal with a fundamental question of what role the nation's former warlords, the t.i.tans who had dominated Afghan politics and effectively ruled different parts of the country since the 1970s, would have in his government and in Afghanistan's future. The warlords commanded sizable militias and patronage networks that could be used in the service of an Afghan state; their considerable resources could just as well be used to tear the country apart if they decided it was in their interests to return to the civil strife of the 1980s and 1990s. A government dominated by warlords risked alienating the Afghan people, the majority ofwhom did not want a reprise of the lawlessness, factionalism, and brutality that had marked the previous two decades. On the other hand, Karzai could neither confront them militarily nor ignore them altogether. The result would be more internal conflict and very likely the fall of Karzai's government.

To a.s.sist the fledgling Afghan leaders.h.i.+p, it helped that we had outstanding American leaders.h.i.+p on the ground from 2003 to 2005, led by Amba.s.sador Zal Khalilzad and General David Barno. Khalilzad had a charm, confidence, and casualness about him that was appealing and effective. He was a tenacious negotiator and loyal to the presidents he served. Lieutenant General Barno was the widely respected commander of the American military forces in Afghanistan. When he arrived there, Barno moved his office into the U.S. emba.s.sy in Kabul and lived in a trailer on the compound, eschewing more official trappings. Every morning Khalilzad and Barno held a country-team meeting with their senior advisers to ensure the closest possible coordination of civil and military activities across Afghanistan. This tight linkage between the State and Defense Departments was a model of how civil-military relations should work.

Khalilzad and Barno worked with Karzai to enlist the warlords' support for the central government and reached out to Afghan tribal leaders to bring security to the country's far-flung provinces. The tribes had contributed greatly to stability throughout Afghanistan's history. Most of the country was too remote and ethnically diverse to be effectively controlled by a centralized government. Though it was much different than our American notions of government, Afghanistan's tribes had been the ribcage of governance at the local level for millennia. This was one Afghan practice the United States wasn't going to change.

The agreed-upon warlord strategy called for building up the capacity of Afghan national inst.i.tutions, such as the army and police. Karzai managed to rebalance his government through the selection of new personnel for key positions, broadening popular support. That strategy was successful in bringing about the disarmament and demobilization of the warlord militias and in promoting conciliation with some lower-level Taliban fighters. Karzai brought in Tajik leader Fahim Khan to head the new Ministry of Defense and Uzbek warlord Ras.h.i.+d Dostum as the military's chief of staff. I argued that we should train as many Afghans as we could so they could begin to take over the security responsibilities for their country.* By late 2003, there were more recruits from every ethnic group and every corner of Afghanistan signing up for spots in the Afghan National Army than there were slots to fill. By late 2003, there were more recruits from every ethnic group and every corner of Afghanistan signing up for spots in the Afghan National Army than there were slots to fill.

As in Iraq, there was a glaring deficiency in our training of local security forces: the police.10 Germany had agreed to train Afghanistan's police in early 2002 at the Bonn conference. It sent forty police advisers to Kabul, which was enough to train only several hundred for the capital city. Germany had agreed to train Afghanistan's police in early 2002 at the Bonn conference. It sent forty police advisers to Kabul, which was enough to train only several hundred for the capital city.11 In light of the modest efforts by our coalition partner, the State Department took over the effort a year later. State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) had the statutory responsibility for police training by the United States. Unfortunately, they lacked the resources and expertise to fulfill it and so sought help from contractors. Their eight-week basic training course did not include weapons training, and only thirty-nine hundred of the thirty-four thousand "trained" police officers had even been through the eight weeks of training. In light of the modest efforts by our coalition partner, the State Department took over the effort a year later. State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) had the statutory responsibility for police training by the United States. Unfortunately, they lacked the resources and expertise to fulfill it and so sought help from contractors. Their eight-week basic training course did not include weapons training, and only thirty-nine hundred of the thirty-four thousand "trained" police officers had even been through the eight weeks of training.12 I tried to have the police training responsibilities transferred from State to Defense, where the crucial mission could be given the attention, resources, and focus it needed, and where our trainers had backgrounds in training for counterinsurgency.13 I had worked out an agreement with Colin Powell in 2004, only to have his turf-conscious deputy scuttle it with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I had worked out an agreement with Colin Powell in 2004, only to have his turf-conscious deputy scuttle it with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.14 Without a viable Afghan police force, U.S. forces would be taking on the policing duties at an inordinately high cost in taxpayer dollars and American lives. Without a viable Afghan police force, U.S. forces would be taking on the policing duties at an inordinately high cost in taxpayer dollars and American lives.15 I wrote to NSC Adviser Steve Hadley: I wrote to NSC Adviser Steve Hadley: It is costing the US taxpayers a fortune as long as the US, instead of the Afghans, continues to provide for Afghan security.... I don't think it is responsible to the American taxpayers to leave it like it is. We need a way forward. I've worked on it and worked on it. I am about to conclude that it is not possible for the US Government bureaucracy to do the only sensible thing. If anyone has an idea as to what can be done about it, I'd like to hear it. I'm ready to toss in the towel. The only solution I can see is to fas.h.i.+on an old-time decision memo and have the President decide it. If that is necessary, please draft the memo; or, if you prefer not to do it, tell me and I'll do it.16 Months later, I was finally able to get permission for the Defense Department to a.s.sume responsibility for the police training. Over the next two years, we invested more than $1. 5 billion in the mission.17 An inst.i.tutional fix to the underlying problem took even longer-over the continued objections of some in the State Department bureaucracy and members of congressional oversight committees who did not want to relinquish budgetary control over their failing State Department foreign police training programs. An inst.i.tutional fix to the underlying problem took even longer-over the continued objections of some in the State Department bureaucracy and members of congressional oversight committees who did not want to relinquish budgetary control over their failing State Department foreign police training programs.18 It was not until January 2006 that we managed to realign our country's authorities for training foreign forces when Congress pa.s.sed Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act. It was not until January 2006 that we managed to realign our country's authorities for training foreign forces when Congress pa.s.sed Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act.*

On the military side of our coalition effort, General Barno and Amba.s.sador Khalilzad recommended s.h.i.+fting the strategic emphasis from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency, since most of the remaining al-Qaida and Taliban had fled into the tribal areas of Pakistan.20 Our forces would still pursue terrorists when and where they found them, but coalition forces would move to strategically located outposts in key population centers outside of Kabul and the main base at Bagram airfield to help to defend the population from enemy infiltration and intimidation. This approach to counterinsurgency didn't require tens of thousands of U.S. troops. It used Afghan army and police to bolster the small American presence and the twenty-two Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) we had established, supposedly comprised of experts from different agencies and bureaus of the U.S. government. The PRT was a well-conceived idea. It was a decentralized way of enabling Americans to work with local Afghan (and Iraqi) leaders on reconstruction projects-but the teams proved difficult to staff with the needed non-military experts able to help Afghans in agriculture, education, civil society, and building local government inst.i.tutions. Ninety-eight percent of the U.S. contingent in our PRTs ended up being military personnel. Our forces would still pursue terrorists when and where they found them, but coalition forces would move to strategically located outposts in key population centers outside of Kabul and the main base at Bagram airfield to help to defend the population from enemy infiltration and intimidation. This approach to counterinsurgency didn't require tens of thousands of U.S. troops. It used Afghan army and police to bolster the small American presence and the twenty-two Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) we had established, supposedly comprised of experts from different agencies and bureaus of the U.S. government. The PRT was a well-conceived idea. It was a decentralized way of enabling Americans to work with local Afghan (and Iraqi) leaders on reconstruction projects-but the teams proved difficult to staff with the needed non-military experts able to help Afghans in agriculture, education, civil society, and building local government inst.i.tutions. Ninety-eight percent of the U.S. contingent in our PRTs ended up being military personnel.*

In June 2005, the tours of Khalilzad and Barno were over. Khalilzad was sent to Baghdad to become the new U.S. amba.s.sador there. Five months before Khalilizad's departure, I had asked the President that I be involved in the decision on his replacement. Typically deciding on diplomatic representation was a matter between the White House and the State Department, but to my thinking, Afghanistan was a different matter given the Defense Department's deep involvement there. "We suffered not getting Zal in earlier than we did," I wrote, referring to the unfortunate selection of Khalilzad's predecessor, a career Foreign Service officer who had had little success in advancing the political process for much of 2002 and 2003. "We need to have someone who can carry [Khalilzad's] level of representation forward without a hitch."22 For forty-five days after Khalilzad left Kabul for Baghdad, the United States was without an amba.s.sador in Afghanistan. Rice and the State Department eventually announced the selection of Ronald Neumann, a career Foreign Service officer, to replace Khalilzad, without any discussion with the Defense Department. I expressed my displeasure to Steve Hadley.23 In the months after Khalilzad's departure, ominous signs began to appear on the horizon. In the months after Khalilzad's departure, ominous signs began to appear on the horizon.

By early 2006, a reorganized Taliban insurgency had emerged in Afghanistan's east and south. Increasing numbers of Taliban fighters traveled into Afghanistan from Pakistan and retreated back across the border whenever coalition forces tried to engage them. It was likely the Taliban would be mounting an offensive in the summer months of 2006 against coalition and Afghan forces.

Disturbed, I asked Dr. Marin Strmecki, an erudite and longtime student of Afghanistan whose previous a.n.a.lysis in the Pentagon's policy shop had impressed me, to return to the country on a fact-finding mission in early spring and report back to me.24 That August, Strmecki briefed me. He didn't sugarcoat anything. The bottom line, he told me, was we faced a "deteriorating security situation" caused by a Taliban escalation and weak or bad governance in southern Afghanistan that created "a vacuum of power into which the enemy moved." That August, Strmecki briefed me. He didn't sugarcoat anything. The bottom line, he told me, was we faced a "deteriorating security situation" caused by a Taliban escalation and weak or bad governance in southern Afghanistan that created "a vacuum of power into which the enemy moved."25 The Taliban had in fact created a shadow government in towns across southern Afghanistan. If we did nothing, it was possible that the southern city of Kandahar could return to Taliban control. The Taliban had in fact created a shadow government in towns across southern Afghanistan. If we did nothing, it was possible that the southern city of Kandahar could return to Taliban control.

I made an effort to get Strmecki's report circulated around the administration and encouraged my colleagues to get his briefing. As I noted in a memo to Vice President Cheney and Steve Hadley, "Given the new level of the insurgency there, [Strmecki] has a new strategy for Afghanistan, which I think merits our careful thought and attention."26 After four years of relative dormancy, the Taliban was poised to mount a serious offensive. Strmecki's recommendation was that if we were to meet the Taliban's escalation, we needed to mount a counterescalation. It would "not require more U.S. or international military forces but does require new diplomatic initiatives visa-vis Pakistan, renewed energy and urgency in shaping the U.S. partners.h.i.+p with the Afghan government, and more resources for security and development programs," Strmecki advised. After four years of relative dormancy, the Taliban was poised to mount a serious offensive. Strmecki's recommendation was that if we were to meet the Taliban's escalation, we needed to mount a counterescalation. It would "not require more U.S. or international military forces but does require new diplomatic initiatives visa-vis Pakistan, renewed energy and urgency in shaping the U.S. partners.h.i.+p with the Afghan government, and more resources for security and development programs," Strmecki advised.27 The central problem was the sanctuary Pakistan provided for the insurgents. I had repeatedly pressed Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf on the issue. Pakistan's largely autonomous western regions were home to many Islamist radicals, some influential in its government's intelligence organization-the ISI-and the military. The thought of Pakistan's nuclear a.r.s.enal falling under the control of Islamist extremists or their terrorist allies was nightmarish.

We were also still working to dispel the suspicions that many Pakistanis and their leaders had about the United States, after our Congress had imposed damaging sanctions on their country in the 1990s. Our job was to rebuild the relations.h.i.+ps between our two countries to win Pakistani cooperation against al-Qaida and Islamist terrorists and help reduce their nuclear tensions with India.

We had seen some hopeful signs. We successfully pressured Pakistan to shut down its nuclear proliferation operation run by A. Q. Khan, widely regarded as the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb. Musharraf's government had been helpful in providing intelligence on senior al-Qaida operatives. With Pakistani intelligence, we often mounted sensitive special operations missions into their territory and conducted UAV drone strikes against terrorist targets. Musharraf had ordered Pakistani forces into western Pakistan to attack Taliban and al-Qaida strongholds and, as a result, lost hundreds of his soldiers.

To be sure, Pakistan was less forthcoming with intelligence on the Taliban networks in the country. Some in the Pakistani intelligence services believed they needed to fund and train the Taliban as a hedge against Indian influence in Afghanistan. Musharraf had made some unhelpful truces and arrangements with governors in western Pakistan, which had the effect of allowing the Taliban to regroup. It was clear by 2006 that the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan were directly contributing to an insurgency and the destabilization of neighboring Afghanistan.

To blunt the insurgency, I had concluded we needed to expand and accelerate the Afghan National Army well beyond the seventy thousand troops originally planned. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the commander who had replaced David Barno, had recommended we cut back the size of the ANA to fifty thousand in the fall of 2005, but we soon reversed the decision. I was disappointed to learn that Eikenberry had moved his military headquarters out of the U.S. emba.s.sy in Kabul, reversing the close civil-military linkage that Barno and Khalilzad had forged.

Strmecki recommended we develop a "multi-year COIN [counterinsurgency] plan" utilizing Afghan troops to defend key towns and villages against Taliban infiltration.28 "While the past three years have seen progressive improvements in the counterinsurgency techniques of the Coalition, there are opportunities to undertake additional innovations," Strmecki wrote. "While the past three years have seen progressive improvements in the counterinsurgency techniques of the Coalition, there are opportunities to undertake additional innovations," Strmecki wrote.29 Without deploying tens of thousands of U.S. military forces, we could use a parallel structure of civil, nonmilitary support teams to help Afghans stabilize their towns and villages, offering viable livelihoods rather than succ.u.mbing to the Taliban. This of course would require yet another effort, building on our earlier attempts, to get other departments and agencies of our federal government to send support teams of civilian experts. Without deploying tens of thousands of U.S. military forces, we could use a parallel structure of civil, nonmilitary support teams to help Afghans stabilize their towns and villages, offering viable livelihoods rather than succ.u.mbing to the Taliban. This of course would require yet another effort, building on our earlier attempts, to get other departments and agencies of our federal government to send support teams of civilian experts.

I had sought to increase the NATO alliance's involvement in Afghanistan to lessen the burden on our troops as well. Eventually all of the alliance's forces were placed under one command-the International Security a.s.sistance Force (ISAF) led by an American general-to achieve an integrated effort.30 It was a major step for NATO that promised a new relevance for the Alliance in the twenty-first c