Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 53

* The traditional model of a secretary of defense and deputy secretary of defense was Mel Laird and his deputy, David Packard, who had cofounded Hewlett Packard and benefited from a long career in business. The traditional model of a secretary of defense and deputy secretary of defense was Mel Laird and his deputy, David Packard, who had cofounded Hewlett Packard and benefited from a long career in business.

Secretary Cohen offered to be helpful in any way to smooth the transition, which I appreciated greatly. His deputy, Rudy deLeon, and a number of Cohen's senior staff graciously agreed to stay on during the many months it took to get President Bush's nominees selected, cleared, confirmed, and on the job. Secretary Cohen offered to be helpful in any way to smooth the transition, which I appreciated greatly. His deputy, Rudy deLeon, and a number of Cohen's senior staff graciously agreed to stay on during the many months it took to get President Bush's nominees selected, cleared, confirmed, and on the job.

* From the time we recommended someone for a position, it took the White House personnel shop seventy days on average to approve them, and then another fifty-two days for Senate confirmation. From the time we recommended someone for a position, it took the White House personnel shop seventy days on average to approve them, and then another fifty-two days for Senate confirmation.6

* In the end, in October 2009, after labor unions representing federal workers spent many millions of dollars to help elect sympathetic lawmakers, Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress voted to kill the new pay-for-performance system we had put in place. In the end, in October 2009, after labor unions representing federal workers spent many millions of dollars to help elect sympathetic lawmakers, Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress voted to kill the new pay-for-performance system we had put in place.

* In addition to our global posture, I also thought our bases and facilities in the United States should not be off-limits to review. In 2001, on my recommendation, the Bush administration proposed the largest U.S. military base realignment and closure (BRAC) effort in history. We reduced the number of bases across America to streamline DoD, improve its overall effectiveness, and cut costs. By closing bases we no longer needed, we projected that we could save the American taxpayer an estimated $5.5 billion every year. We also ended up earning criticism from a number of members of Congress who represented areas where bases might be closed. In addition to our global posture, I also thought our bases and facilities in the United States should not be off-limits to review. In 2001, on my recommendation, the Bush administration proposed the largest U.S. military base realignment and closure (BRAC) effort in history. We reduced the number of bases across America to streamline DoD, improve its overall effectiveness, and cut costs. By closing bases we no longer needed, we projected that we could save the American taxpayer an estimated $5.5 billion every year. We also ended up earning criticism from a number of members of Congress who represented areas where bases might be closed.

* The only other signatory to the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union, had ceased to exist. The only other signatory to the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union, had ceased to exist.

* In our meeting, Deng was still trying to understand the American democratic system. He wondered how the U.S. Congress could enforce laws on China to reclaim American a.s.sets lost in Mao's Communist takeover twenty-five years earlier. "I could explain it," I told him, "but it would take a great deal of mao tai," referring to the Chinese liquor. In our meeting, Deng was still trying to understand the American democratic system. He wondered how the U.S. Congress could enforce laws on China to reclaim American a.s.sets lost in Mao's Communist takeover twenty-five years earlier. "I could explain it," I told him, "but it would take a great deal of mao tai," referring to the Chinese liquor.8

* In 1956, I learned that one of our close friends and a fellow Navy pilot, Jim Deane, had been shot down while flying a similar reconnaissance mission off the coast of China. Lieutenant Deane's remains were never recovered. There were rumors he might have survived the crash and was being held captive, but we were unable to get any conclusive information. Deane's wife asked her congressman, Gerald R. Ford, for his help in obtaining information. Later, on my 1974 trip to China with Kissinger, I was surprised when Kissinger handed me a memo about Jim Deane, whose fate he planned to raise with the Chinese. When I became secretary of defense in 2001, I tried to gather more information on missing American pilots, including Deane, when I met with Chinese officials. Despite our efforts, the Chinese never budged on the issue and Jim's widow, Beverly Deane Shaver, continues to search for answers. In 1956, I learned that one of our close friends and a fellow Navy pilot, Jim Deane, had been shot down while flying a similar reconnaissance mission off the coast of China. Lieutenant Deane's remains were never recovered. There were rumors he might have survived the crash and was being held captive, but we were unable to get any conclusive information. Deane's wife asked her congressman, Gerald R. Ford, for his help in obtaining information. Later, on my 1974 trip to China with Kissinger, I was surprised when Kissinger handed me a memo about Jim Deane, whose fate he planned to raise with the Chinese. When I became secretary of defense in 2001, I tried to gather more information on missing American pilots, including Deane, when I met with Chinese officials. Despite our efforts, the Chinese never budged on the issue and Jim's widow, Beverly Deane Shaver, continues to search for answers.

* Of the forty-four Chinese Air Force interceptions of U.S. reconnaissance flights prior to April 1, 2001, six involved Chinese planes coming within thirty feet of U.S. aircraft and two involved Chinese planes coming within ten feet. Of the forty-four Chinese Air Force interceptions of U.S. reconnaissance flights prior to April 1, 2001, six involved Chinese planes coming within thirty feet of U.S. aircraft and two involved Chinese planes coming within ten feet.16

The article went on to say that the U.S. reconnaissance plane had violated Chinese airs.p.a.ce, and in doing so was a "threat to the national security of China." The article "modestly" closed with the demand that "the U.S. side...make a prompt explanation to the Chinese government and people about the U.S. plane's ramming of the Chinese jet and its infringement upon China's sovereignty and air s.p.a.ce, apologize to the Chinese side and shoulder all the responsibility arising from the incident." The article went on to say that the U.S. reconnaissance plane had violated Chinese airs.p.a.ce, and in doing so was a "threat to the national security of China." The article "modestly" closed with the demand that "the U.S. side...make a prompt explanation to the Chinese government and people about the U.S. plane's ramming of the Chinese jet and its infringement upon China's sovereignty and air s.p.a.ce, apologize to the Chinese side and shoulder all the responsibility arising from the incident."20

* Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the princ.i.p.al military adviser to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. Though the chairman is not in the chain of command or a member of the NSC, he generally serves as the communication link for military actions between the national command authorities-the president and the secretary of defense-and the combatant commanders. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the princ.i.p.al military adviser to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. Though the chairman is not in the chain of command or a member of the NSC, he generally serves as the communication link for military actions between the national command authorities-the president and the secretary of defense-and the combatant commanders.

* Powell had an engaging sense of humor and could poke fun at himself and some of the stereotypes of the State Department. On one occasion, Cheney, Rice, and I were at the State Department for one of our regular lunches, which we took turns hosting. The rest of us periodically kidded Powell about the State Department's lavish meals. This time when we arrived, Powell had the table set elegantly with cloth napkins and matching silverware, and at each of our place settings silver platters with matching silver covers awaited. After we all took our seats, hovering waiters in tuxedos pulled off the silver covers simultaneously in a dramatic fas.h.i.+on. Underneath we found brown paper bags with sandwiches in them. Powell grinned, and we roared with laughter. Powell had an engaging sense of humor and could poke fun at himself and some of the stereotypes of the State Department. On one occasion, Cheney, Rice, and I were at the State Department for one of our regular lunches, which we took turns hosting. The rest of us periodically kidded Powell about the State Department's lavish meals. This time when we arrived, Powell had the table set elegantly with cloth napkins and matching silverware, and at each of our place settings silver platters with matching silver covers awaited. After we all took our seats, hovering waiters in tuxedos pulled off the silver covers simultaneously in a dramatic fas.h.i.+on. Underneath we found brown paper bags with sandwiches in them. Powell grinned, and we roared with laughter.2

* A particularly egregious example appeared in the A particularly egregious example appeared in theWas.h.i.+ngton Post in 2003 ent.i.tled " in 2003 ent.i.tled "POWELL AND JOINT CHIEFS NUDGED BUSH TOWARD U.N." The article claimed that Powell and Joint Chiefs Chairman d.i.c.k Myers overruled a reluctant Bush, Rice, and me about seeking the international community's help in postwar Iraq. It was so utterly untrue that both Myers and Powell took the rare step of publicly disputing it. This was the sort of storyline that continued throughout the administration. Other similar headlines included: "POWELL TRIED TO TALK BUSH OUT OF WAR" and "POWELL'S DOUBTS OVER CIA INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQ PROMPTED HIM TO SET UP SECRET REVIEW." 12 12

* I find that committing a point of view to paper sharpens my thinking. It also permits other partic.i.p.ants in the discussion on a given issue to understand my perspective more precisely. This approach, of course, has its drawbacks. Stating one's position in a written doc.u.ment becomes part of history. It makes it hard to claim down the road that one was wiser than might have been the case, and it limits one's ability to wait to see how events unfold before being publicly committed to a specific course of action. I find that committing a point of view to paper sharpens my thinking. It also permits other partic.i.p.ants in the discussion on a given issue to understand my perspective more precisely. This approach, of course, has its drawbacks. Stating one's position in a written doc.u.ment becomes part of history. It makes it hard to claim down the road that one was wiser than might have been the case, and it limits one's ability to wait to see how events unfold before being publicly committed to a specific course of action.

* For example, over one three-month period in 2003, there were thirty-one meetings at the White House scheduled by the NSC staff. We did not receive any papers in advance for these meetings. Further, 48 percent of the meetings were canceled and we received summaries of the conclusions for only 17 percent of the meetings held. For example, over one three-month period in 2003, there were thirty-one meetings at the White House scheduled by the NSC staff. We did not receive any papers in advance for these meetings. Further, 48 percent of the meetings were canceled and we received summaries of the conclusions for only 17 percent of the meetings held.19

* Democrats were urging that any money from a projected budget surplus be directed to a so-called, nonexistent, Social Security "lockbox." Unlike the internet, the lockbox idea was an Al Gore invention. During the 2000 campaign, Gore and congressional Democrats used the gambit in an attempt to turn any proposal they didn't like-such as cutting taxes to leave more of the American people's hard-earned money with them-into an effort to raid Social Security. The whole debate struck me as absurd. There was no budget surplus for a lockbox (it was only a theoretical projection), and the last people in Congress who tended to be worried about restraining spending were the proponents of the lockbox idea. Moreover, most everyoneknew that Social Security needed fundamental reforms that few were willing to confront. Democrats were urging that any money from a projected budget surplus be directed to a so-called, nonexistent, Social Security "lockbox." Unlike the internet, the lockbox idea was an Al Gore invention. During the 2000 campaign, Gore and congressional Democrats used the gambit in an attempt to turn any proposal they didn't like-such as cutting taxes to leave more of the American people's hard-earned money with them-into an effort to raid Social Security. The whole debate struck me as absurd. There was no budget surplus for a lockbox (it was only a theoretical projection), and the last people in Congress who tended to be worried about restraining spending were the proponents of the lockbox idea. Moreover, most everyoneknew that Social Security needed fundamental reforms that few were willing to confront.

* They included: Ed Giambastiani; Jim Haynes, the Department's general counsel; Steve Cambone, the deputy undersecretary of policy; Larry Di Rita, my special a.s.sistant; and Torie Clarke, the a.s.sis tant secretary of defense for public affairs. They included: Ed Giambastiani; Jim Haynes, the Department's general counsel; Steve Cambone, the deputy undersecretary of policy; Larry Di Rita, my special a.s.sistant; and Torie Clarke, the a.s.sis tant secretary of defense for public affairs.

* The last time the Defcon had been raised to that level was in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, when I was amba.s.sador to NATO. The last time the Defcon had been raised to that level was in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, when I was amba.s.sador to NATO.

* Each of the other three hijacked aircraft had five al-Qaida terrorists...o...b..ard, and the difference between four and five terrorists may have meant the difference between failure and success. In 2002, the individual believed to be the twentieth hijacker-the missing hijacker from United Flight 93-came into U.S. custody in Afghanistan. The detention and interrogation at Guantanamo Bay of the suspected terrorist, Muhammed al-Qahtani, would later become a focal point of controversy. Each of the other three hijacked aircraft had five al-Qaida terrorists...o...b..ard, and the difference between four and five terrorists may have meant the difference between failure and success. In 2002, the individual believed to be the twentieth hijacker-the missing hijacker from United Flight 93-came into U.S. custody in Afghanistan. The detention and interrogation at Guantanamo Bay of the suspected terrorist, Muhammed al-Qahtani, would later become a focal point of controversy.

* Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China all share borders with Afghanistan. Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China all share borders with Afghanistan.

* He should not be confused with the terrorist who led the nineteen September 11 hijackers, an Egyptian also named Muhammed Atta. He should not be confused with the terrorist who led the nineteen September 11 hijackers, an Egyptian also named Muhammed Atta.

* At my first meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels in June 2001, I made a point of meeting privately with the minister of defense of Uzbekistan, Kodir Gulyamov, which surprised some of our NATO allies. At my first meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels in June 2001, I made a point of meeting privately with the minister of defense of Uzbekistan, Kodir Gulyamov, which surprised some of our NATO allies.

* Until 2001, UAVs had been used mainly on an experimental basis. When they first had been ready for operations, Defense and CIA officials debated over who would control them and who would pay for their use. In both bureaucracies, some officials were eager to avoid responsibility and preferred not to be burdened with the cost. After 9/11, with coalition operations underway in Afghanistan, George Tenet and I began to sort out Defense-CIA joint Predator operations. We came to an agreement over who owned and paid for the a.s.sets, where they would operate, and who would "pull the trigger" on the very few UAVs that were armed at the time. Until 2001, UAVs had been used mainly on an experimental basis. When they first had been ready for operations, Defense and CIA officials debated over who would control them and who would pay for their use. In both bureaucracies, some officials were eager to avoid responsibility and preferred not to be burdened with the cost. After 9/11, with coalition operations underway in Afghanistan, George Tenet and I began to sort out Defense-CIA joint Predator operations. We came to an agreement over who owned and paid for the a.s.sets, where they would operate, and who would "pull the trigger" on the very few UAVs that were armed at the time.

* Powell remarked, "All of the countries in the region-the United States, Russia and, as you heard, Pakistan, through Musharraf last evening-say, it's better that they not enter Kabul. There's too many uncertainties as to what might happen." Secretary Powell went on to say, "Entering a city is a difficult thing. You put people in close quarters, they are of different tribal loyalties. We have seen what has happened previously when you had an uncontrolled situation and two forces arriving in Kabul at the same time not meaning each well." Powell remarked, "All of the countries in the region-the United States, Russia and, as you heard, Pakistan, through Musharraf last evening-say, it's better that they not enter Kabul. There's too many uncertainties as to what might happen." Secretary Powell went on to say, "Entering a city is a difficult thing. You put people in close quarters, they are of different tribal loyalties. We have seen what has happened previously when you had an uncontrolled situation and two forces arriving in Kabul at the same time not meaning each well."10

* Early on, Karzai emerged as a possible candidate for a national leaders.h.i.+p post. As such, we wanted him protected. At one point during the fighting against a much larger Taliban force, Karzai was evacuated briefly to Pakistan. In talking with Pentagon reporters, I mentioned Karzai's evacuation. Though my remarks were accurate, I did not want to give a false impression that Karzai had sought to retreat, which he most certainly had not. Karzai, understandably, didn't want it known that he had been taken out of Afghanistan, even for a short period. I later apologized to Karzai. He responded graciously. Early on, Karzai emerged as a possible candidate for a national leaders.h.i.+p post. As such, we wanted him protected. At one point during the fighting against a much larger Taliban force, Karzai was evacuated briefly to Pakistan. In talking with Pentagon reporters, I mentioned Karzai's evacuation. Though my remarks were accurate, I did not want to give a false impression that Karzai had sought to retreat, which he most certainly had not. Karzai, understandably, didn't want it known that he had been taken out of Afghanistan, even for a short period. I later apologized to Karzai. He responded graciously.

* At one point I watched a Predator video feed of a tall, lanky man wearing a turban and white robes and surrounded by what looked like an entourage of bodyguards. Our military command center was abuzz with antic.i.p.ation. There was not a doubt in anyone's mind that the image on the screen in front of us was Osama bin Laden. As they made final preparations to take out the target, something spooked the man we were observing, perhaps an intelligence tip or someone catching sight of our Predator UAV above. He took off, running like a gazelle over rocky, rugged terrain. He couldn't have been more than twenty years old. Bin Laden was in his midforties in 2001. Intelligence later corroborated that the man we all were absolutely convinced was bin Laden was not. At one point I watched a Predator video feed of a tall, lanky man wearing a turban and white robes and surrounded by what looked like an entourage of bodyguards. Our military command center was abuzz with antic.i.p.ation. There was not a doubt in anyone's mind that the image on the screen in front of us was Osama bin Laden. As they made final preparations to take out the target, something spooked the man we were observing, perhaps an intelligence tip or someone catching sight of our Predator UAV above. He took off, running like a gazelle over rocky, rugged terrain. He couldn't have been more than twenty years old. Bin Laden was in his midforties in 2001. Intelligence later corroborated that the man we all were absolutely convinced was bin Laden was not.

* One soldier confided that they had encountered a phenomenon largely unknown to them until that point: saddle sores. The problem had become so severe, in fact, that they found it difficult to ride. Some tried Vaseline to make it more comfortable, but the conditions were so windy and dusty that the sand turned the Vaseline into a scratchy paste. Then some clever mind came up with a different solution: pantyhose. It was another example of the often unexpected challenges our forces had had to meet and overcome. One soldier confided that they had encountered a phenomenon largely unknown to them until that point: saddle sores. The problem had become so severe, in fact, that they found it difficult to ride. Some tried Vaseline to make it more comfortable, but the conditions were so windy and dusty that the sand turned the Vaseline into a scratchy paste. Then some clever mind came up with a different solution: pantyhose. It was another example of the often unexpected challenges our forces had had to meet and overcome.

* Leaflets dropped from U.S. aircraft encouraged Iraqi army units to rebel. CIA-sponsored radio broadcasts spread the same message. Leaflets dropped from U.S. aircraft encouraged Iraqi army units to rebel. CIA-sponsored radio broadcasts spread the same message.

* The French ended their partic.i.p.ation in the no-fly zones in 1998. The French ended their partic.i.p.ation in the no-fly zones in 1998.1

* In the days after the liberation of Iraq in 2003, I was given a video that U.S. Army soldiers had found. It was a twelve-minute film Saddam's internal security services had put together. The video doc.u.mented various methods of torture that his regime used, including beatings, limb and tongue amputations, and beheadings. Men were thrown off three-story buildings. Some were forced to hold out their arms to have them broken by lead pipes. Saddam's men proudly videotaped their atrocities to terrorize others. In the days after the liberation of Iraq in 2003, I was given a video that U.S. Army soldiers had found. It was a twelve-minute film Saddam's internal security services had put together. The video doc.u.mented various methods of torture that his regime used, including beatings, limb and tongue amputations, and beheadings. Men were thrown off three-story buildings. Some were forced to hold out their arms to have them broken by lead pipes. Saddam's men proudly videotaped their atrocities to terrorize others.

Republicans voted 202 to 9 and Democrats voted 157 to 29 in favor of the bill. Republicans voted 202 to 9 and Democrats voted 157 to 29 in favor of the bill.

* On the dangers posed by Iraq, General Jim Jones, then commandant of the Marine Corps, was among the most vocal. He was concerned that our operations over Iraq were, as he put it, "a high risk strategy without clear objectives or a discernible end state." "I am working [on] the problem and certainly agree with your concern," I wrote back on September 10, 2001. On the dangers posed by Iraq, General Jim Jones, then commandant of the Marine Corps, was among the most vocal. He was concerned that our operations over Iraq were, as he put it, "a high risk strategy without clear objectives or a discernible end state." "I am working [on] the problem and certainly agree with your concern," I wrote back on September 10, 2001.11

* When the strike took place, President Bush was on a state visit to Mexico. He and I had both approved the strikes, but neither of us was informed of their timing. So when reporters asked the President about them at the joint press conference he was having with Mexican President Vicente Fox, Bush was caught by surprise. Keeping the Commander in Chief in the dark about the timing of a strike was not the preferred course of action. But, one month into the new term, I was the only Senate-confirmed Bush-nominated official in the Department of Defense. We were still missing the entire layer of senior civilians who would coordinate communication with the White House and other members of the National Security Council. When the strike took place, President Bush was on a state visit to Mexico. He and I had both approved the strikes, but neither of us was informed of their timing. So when reporters asked the President about them at the joint press conference he was having with Mexican President Vicente Fox, Bush was caught by surprise. Keeping the Commander in Chief in the dark about the timing of a strike was not the preferred course of action. But, one month into the new term, I was the only Senate-confirmed Bush-nominated official in the Department of Defense. We were still missing the entire layer of senior civilians who would coordinate communication with the White House and other members of the National Security Council.

* After his capture in Iraq by the American military in 2003, Saddam told an FBI interviewer he was interested in pursuing a "security agreement with the United States to protect [Iraq] from threats in the region" before the invasion occurred. For someone supposedly interested in cultivating a new relations.h.i.+p with the United States, Saddam had an odd way of showing it: firing on American pilots, praising and rewarding terrorists, and applauding the 9/11 attacks. After his capture in Iraq by the American military in 2003, Saddam told an FBI interviewer he was interested in pursuing a "security agreement with the United States to protect [Iraq] from threats in the region" before the invasion occurred. For someone supposedly interested in cultivating a new relations.h.i.+p with the United States, Saddam had an odd way of showing it: firing on American pilots, praising and rewarding terrorists, and applauding the 9/11 attacks.13

* Since he admitted himself into treatment in September 2001, Nick has lived a drug-free life with the support of his wife, Anne. Since he admitted himself into treatment in September 2001, Nick has lived a drug-free life with the support of his wife, Anne.

In Desert Storm, 10 percent of U.S. weapons were precision guided. By 2001, a decade later, some 70 percent of U.S. air-delivered weapons were guided by lasers or GPS with devastating accuracy. In Desert Storm, 10 percent of U.S. weapons were precision guided. By 2001, a decade later, some 70 percent of U.S. air-delivered weapons were guided by lasers or GPS with devastating accuracy.

* In 1990 and 1991, the military had s.h.i.+pped some four hundred thousand short tons of ammunition into the Iraq theater. More than 80 percent was returned to the United States untouched. In 1990 and 1991, the military had s.h.i.+pped some four hundred thousand short tons of ammunition into the Iraq theater. More than 80 percent was returned to the United States untouched.2

* David Kay, the chief UN weapons inspector in 1991, believed it would have been only twelve to eighteen months until the regime reached "regular industrial-scale production of fissile material," or enriched uranium, that could be used in an atomic bomb. David Kay, the chief UN weapons inspector in 1991, believed it would have been only twelve to eighteen months until the regime reached "regular industrial-scale production of fissile material," or enriched uranium, that could be used in an atomic bomb.4

* I considered it my responsibility to ask questions and seek needed information from briefers. In my experience, the good briefers and a.n.a.lysts did not show discomfort when I engaged them. In fact, they tended to enjoy the give-and-take and seemed appreciative of the interest of a senior official. Some commented that the interchanges helped them do their work better and provided useful input for their colleagues. After a few in the CIA alleged that some policy officials had "politicized intelligence," in 2004 I asked not to receive my daily oral briefings from the CIA. If questions were going to be reported as efforts to distort rather than to better understand or clarify the information we were receiving, it not only wasn't worth taking time to receive the briefings, it had risks. As a result, I began simply reading the CIA briefing materials and asking the undersecretary of defense for intelligence to pose any questions I might have. I considered it my responsibility to ask questions and seek needed information from briefers. In my experience, the good briefers and a.n.a.lysts did not show discomfort when I engaged them. In fact, they tended to enjoy the give-and-take and seemed appreciative of the interest of a senior official. Some commented that the interchanges helped them do their work better and provided useful input for their colleagues. After a few in the CIA alleged that some policy officials had "politicized intelligence," in 2004 I asked not to receive my daily oral briefings from the CIA. If questions were going to be reported as efforts to distort rather than to better understand or clarify the information we were receiving, it not only wasn't worth taking time to receive the briefings, it had risks. As a result, I began simply reading the CIA briefing materials and asking the undersecretary of defense for intelligence to pose any questions I might have.

* I have no knowledge of what Powell may have said to individuals when not in my presence-such as news reporters. But in the National Security Council meetings I attended, this was the only time I heard Secretary Powell discuss the issue. A few years later, when that issue started to surface in the press, I asked both Rice and the President if they had any memory of Powell ever suggesting a need for more troops. Bush said Powell might have said something to him, but was uncertain. Rice said she was at all the meetings between Powell and the President and had no memory of Powell raising the issue. I have no knowledge of what Powell may have said to individuals when not in my presence-such as news reporters. But in the National Security Council meetings I attended, this was the only time I heard Secretary Powell discuss the issue. A few years later, when that issue started to surface in the press, I asked both Rice and the President if they had any memory of Powell ever suggesting a need for more troops. Bush said Powell might have said something to him, but was uncertain. Rice said she was at all the meetings between Powell and the President and had no memory of Powell raising the issue.21

* In the wake of the Vietnam War, the Army organization structure was changed so that the Army Reserves would have to be called up in the event of war. "They're not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves," General Creighton Abrams remarked. The TPFDD was a legacy of the military's post-Vietnam mindset. In the wake of the Vietnam War, the Army organization structure was changed so that the Army Reserves would have to be called up in the event of war. "They're not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves," General Creighton Abrams remarked. The TPFDD was a legacy of the military's post-Vietnam mindset.24

At a commander's conference in February 2003, a midlevel officer stood up and, in his question, informed me for the first time that the Army was giving only five days' notice for National Guard and Reserve call-ups. It was a strikingly and unacceptably short lead time, given that members of the Guard and Reserves had full-time jobs and lives outside of that in the uniform. I felt they needed and deserved at least thirty days' notice of a possible call-up, if at all possible. And, in this case, it was possible, and in short order we managed to get the Army to fix its system. At a commander's conference in February 2003, a midlevel officer stood up and, in his question, informed me for the first time that the Army was giving only five days' notice for National Guard and Reserve call-ups. It was a strikingly and unacceptably short lead time, given that members of the Guard and Reserves had full-time jobs and lives outside of that in the uniform. I felt they needed and deserved at least thirty days' notice of a possible call-up, if at all possible. And, in this case, it was possible, and in short order we managed to get the Army to fix its system.

* Other instances of military action without UN Security Council approval are: Vietnam War (195975); the liberation of Grenada (1983); the liberation of Haiti (199495); NATO's bombing of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); the U.S.-UK bombing of Iraq (1998); and NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia (1999). Other instances of military action without UN Security Council approval are: Vietnam War (195975); the liberation of Grenada (1983); the liberation of Haiti (199495); NATO's bombing of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); the U.S.-UK bombing of Iraq (1998); and NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia (1999).

* According to the Volcker report, "[D]ifferences among member states impeded decision-making, tolerated large-scale smuggling, and aided and abetted grievous weaknesses in administrative practices within the Secretariat.... As a result, serious questions have emerged about the United Nations' ability to live up to its ideals." According to the Volcker report, "[D]ifferences among member states impeded decision-making, tolerated large-scale smuggling, and aided and abetted grievous weaknesses in administrative practices within the Secretariat.... As a result, serious questions have emerged about the United Nations' ability to live up to its ideals."28

* I was reminded of that fact during a meeting in Vilnius with Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus. "Secretary Rumsfeld," he said, "I remember you when you first ran for Congress in Illinois in 1962." Adamkus had lived in the Chicago area for a number of years. He told me that he ran on the Republican ticket for sanitary district trustee in Cook County at the same time I was running for Congress. "You won your race and I lost mine," he added. "But you're now a president," I replied. "I'd say you've made out all right for yourself." I was reminded of that fact during a meeting in Vilnius with Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus. "Secretary Rumsfeld," he said, "I remember you when you first ran for Congress in Illinois in 1962." Adamkus had lived in the Chicago area for a number of years. He told me that he ran on the Republican ticket for sanitary district trustee in Cook County at the same time I was running for Congress. "You won your race and I lost mine," he added. "But you're now a president," I replied. "I'd say you've made out all right for yourself."

"If Americans had listened to some European leaders during the past 50 years," the President of Latvia told me, "we [Latvia] would still be in the Soviet Union." "If Americans had listened to some European leaders during the past 50 years," the President of Latvia told me, "we [Latvia] would still be in the Soviet Union."3

* As the CIA noted at the time, "[I]t would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an active, long-term presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or obtaining their acquiescence." As the CIA noted at the time, "[I]t would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an active, long-term presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or obtaining their acquiescence."10

* A majority of the Turkish lawmakers voted in favor of the law allowing our forces to pa.s.s through Turkey on the way to Iraq, but the 264 to 251 vote failed to meet a parliamentary rule that required a majority of those present to vote in favor. Because there were 19 abstentions, three more votes in favor of the resolution were needed for it to pa.s.s. A majority of the Turkish lawmakers voted in favor of the law allowing our forces to pa.s.s through Turkey on the way to Iraq, but the 264 to 251 vote failed to meet a parliamentary rule that required a majority of those present to vote in favor. Because there were 19 abstentions, three more votes in favor of the resolution were needed for it to pa.s.s.

* Both generals went on to serve in the Obama administration: s.h.i.+nseki as secretary of veterans affairs and Jones as national security adviser. Both generals went on to serve in the Obama administration: s.h.i.+nseki as secretary of veterans affairs and Jones as national security adviser.

* On September 30, 2002, for example, I dictated a note: "I want to talk to the Vice President about getting Tenet active in getting Arabs in states to help offer Saddam a way out." On September 30, 2002, for example, I dictated a note: "I want to talk to the Vice President about getting Tenet active in getting Arabs in states to help offer Saddam a way out."36