Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 54

* The reality was different from the media storyline. In the fog of war, Lynch's unit had become lost after taking a wrong turn, and in a firefight she had been wounded and captured. Lynch's captors took her to a local hospital, where a courageous Iraqi reported her whereabouts to U.S. forces. After her rescue, Lynch reportedly remembered little about the ordeal, but like most American troops who had volunteered to serve their country, she was brave and dedicated. The reality was different from the media storyline. In the fog of war, Lynch's unit had become lost after taking a wrong turn, and in a firefight she had been wounded and captured. Lynch's captors took her to a local hospital, where a courageous Iraqi reported her whereabouts to U.S. forces. After her rescue, Lynch reportedly remembered little about the ordeal, but like most American troops who had volunteered to serve their country, she was brave and dedicated.

* One mile east of the airport, Army Sergeant First Cla.s.s Paul Ray Smith and the soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division were clearing a position to hold enemy prisoners of war. Without warning, Republican Guard troops began firing from a nearby watchtower, and nearly one hundred Iraqi troops threatened to overrun his position and an aid station where dozens of wounded American soldiers were receiving medical attention. Smith manned a machine gun and led a counterattack from an exposed position. Though he would not survive the battle, Smith prevented Saddam's men from attacking the aid station, saving the lives of over a hundred American soldiers. For his courage, Paul Ray Smith became the first to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in the wars that began after September 11, 2001. One mile east of the airport, Army Sergeant First Cla.s.s Paul Ray Smith and the soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division were clearing a position to hold enemy prisoners of war. Without warning, Republican Guard troops began firing from a nearby watchtower, and nearly one hundred Iraqi troops threatened to overrun his position and an aid station where dozens of wounded American soldiers were receiving medical attention. Smith manned a machine gun and led a counterattack from an exposed position. Though he would not survive the battle, Smith prevented Saddam's men from attacking the aid station, saving the lives of over a hundred American soldiers. For his courage, Paul Ray Smith became the first to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in the wars that began after September 11, 2001.

* The list also included hospitals, mosques, and schools. The list also included hospitals, mosques, and schools.

* At one point, I commented to General John Abizaid and General Myers: "The history books suggest that the way they stopped looting in earlier era[s] in Iraq was to get the tribes to provide security for things like electric power lines and oil wells." I asked, "Have we considered talking to some of the tribes about providing that security and paying them for it, like we would police, and having them be responsible?" It would be precisely these tribes that would prove critical to achieving a level of security in the country three years later. At one point, I commented to General John Abizaid and General Myers: "The history books suggest that the way they stopped looting in earlier era[s] in Iraq was to get the tribes to provide security for things like electric power lines and oil wells." I asked, "Have we considered talking to some of the tribes about providing that security and paying them for it, like we would police, and having them be responsible?" It would be precisely these tribes that would prove critical to achieving a level of security in the country three years later.10

* The intelligence community a.s.sessed that the Iraqi "police and justice personnel appear to have extensive professional training," as one brief provided to the NSC princ.i.p.als a.s.serted. This proved to be off the mark. To a great many Iraqis, the police force was equated with the abuses of Saddam's regimes. The police lacked legitimacy and thus authority, posing a major problem for the coalition as an insurgency took root. The intelligence community a.s.sessed that the Iraqi "police and justice personnel appear to have extensive professional training," as one brief provided to the NSC princ.i.p.als a.s.serted. This proved to be off the mark. To a great many Iraqis, the police force was equated with the abuses of Saddam's regimes. The police lacked legitimacy and thus authority, posing a major problem for the coalition as an insurgency took root.12

* Today the Baghdad Museum is open and thousands of ancient Near Eastern artifacts have been moved back into their displays. Today the Baghdad Museum is open and thousands of ancient Near Eastern artifacts have been moved back into their displays.

The situation brought to mind a quote I had read: "The power of the media is willful and dangerous because it dramatically affects Western policy while bearing no responsibility for the outcome. Indeed, the media's moral perfectionism is possible only because it is politically unaccountable." The situation brought to mind a quote I had read: "The power of the media is willful and dangerous because it dramatically affects Western policy while bearing no responsibility for the outcome. Indeed, the media's moral perfectionism is possible only because it is politically unaccountable."19

* In the 2000 campaign, candidate George W. Bush had indicated that he was similarly ill disposed to sending American troops to take on "nation-building" missions. "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building," Bush said. In the 2000 campaign, candidate George W. Bush had indicated that he was similarly ill disposed to sending American troops to take on "nation-building" missions. "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building," Bush said.8

* Rodman had come of age as a protege of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Like Kissinger, he was a strategist who thought long term, the kind of adviser I favored. Rodman was a quiet presence in Department meetings. When he spoke, it was with unusual precision and insight. Rodman had come of age as a protege of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Like Kissinger, he was a strategist who thought long term, the kind of adviser I favored. Rodman was a quiet presence in Department meetings. When he spoke, it was with unusual precision and insight.

The deputies committee was the most senior interagency forum below the cabinet level. Departments were represented by the deputy secretaries or under secretaries in the meetings. The deputies committee was the most senior interagency forum below the cabinet level. Departments were represented by the deputy secretaries or under secretaries in the meetings.

* In late 2003, when this deficiency became apparent, Doug Feith and I joined White House officials in urging the State Department to undertake the responsibility of creating an office of stabilization and reconstruction and a civilian reserve corps that could deploy as our military reserves did. Powell agreed eventually on the condition that it would be "small scale." He was understandably concerned about State being a.s.signed additional missions without increasing its budget, personnel, and resources. Such an office came into being only in 2004, but with less authority and a smaller mandate than it merits. In late 2003, when this deficiency became apparent, Doug Feith and I joined White House officials in urging the State Department to undertake the responsibility of creating an office of stabilization and reconstruction and a civilian reserve corps that could deploy as our military reserves did. Powell agreed eventually on the condition that it would be "small scale." He was understandably concerned about State being a.s.signed additional missions without increasing its budget, personnel, and resources. Such an office came into being only in 2004, but with less authority and a smaller mandate than it merits.

* The State Department and CIA had also not favored having the Northern Alliance advance on Kabul for fear the Afghans might not be able to settle disputes among Afghanistan's ethnic divisions. Their view seemed to be that the United States needed to orchestrate the takeover of the Afghan capital and set up a balance of power for them. The State Department and CIA had also not favored having the Northern Alliance advance on Kabul for fear the Afghans might not be able to settle disputes among Afghanistan's ethnic divisions. Their view seemed to be that the United States needed to orchestrate the takeover of the Afghan capital and set up a balance of power for them.

* More than a year before the war began, in January 2002, Pentagon officials were pus.h.i.+ng for a U.S. government-sponsored conference for all the external groups to show a united front against the Saddam regime. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage generated a series of bureaucratic impediments to stop or delay the meeting. Eventually, in December 2002, the administration organized a conference in London. By then, nearly a year had pa.s.sed, to the detriment of our country's planning efforts. Even then, State and CIA remained skeptical of the Iraqi externals, and voiced doubts about the Iraqis' ability to come together to build a new country. More than a year before the war began, in January 2002, Pentagon officials were pus.h.i.+ng for a U.S. government-sponsored conference for all the external groups to show a united front against the Saddam regime. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage generated a series of bureaucratic impediments to stop or delay the meeting. Eventually, in December 2002, the administration organized a conference in London. By then, nearly a year had pa.s.sed, to the detriment of our country's planning efforts. Even then, State and CIA remained skeptical of the Iraqi externals, and voiced doubts about the Iraqis' ability to come together to build a new country.

* I recommended to President Bush that Garner be appointed amba.s.sador to Afghanistan soon after he returned to the United States, but without success. I believed he could inject a sense of urgency into the State Department mission in Kabul. I recommended to President Bush that Garner be appointed amba.s.sador to Afghanistan soon after he returned to the United States, but without success. I believed he could inject a sense of urgency into the State Department mission in Kabul.18

* The failure to take responsibility for leaks that threatened to damage the administration ultimately belonged to the White House. In April 2003, a few weeks after my phone conversation with Powell, I a.s.sembled a package of news articles quoting officials from the State Department, including Armitage, that revealed damaging a.s.sertions against the administration, and sent the memo to Card. The articles, I noted, "reflect a hemorrhaging in the administration. It is clearly not disciplined." Though it was seldom noted, Armitage also leaked CIA operative Valerie Plame's name to the press, causing further damage. The failure to take responsibility for leaks that threatened to damage the administration ultimately belonged to the White House. In April 2003, a few weeks after my phone conversation with Powell, I a.s.sembled a package of news articles quoting officials from the State Department, including Armitage, that revealed damaging a.s.sertions against the administration, and sent the memo to Card. The articles, I noted, "reflect a hemorrhaging in the administration. It is clearly not disciplined." Though it was seldom noted, Armitage also leaked CIA operative Valerie Plame's name to the press, causing further damage.22

* After a brief talk with Bremer, I told Card that "I think he is the man" to head the CPA. Tenet said he had heard good things about Bremer, and Powell said he thought well of Bremer but wanted to "run a couple of traps" before he could say he was comfortable. I later learned a slightly different version of the story of the Bremer selection. Apparently when I mentioned Bremer, Powell was delighted, because Bremer had close links to the State Department. After a brief talk with Bremer, I told Card that "I think he is the man" to head the CPA. Tenet said he had heard good things about Bremer, and Powell said he thought well of Bremer but wanted to "run a couple of traps" before he could say he was comfortable. I later learned a slightly different version of the story of the Bremer selection. Apparently when I mentioned Bremer, Powell was delighted, because Bremer had close links to the State Department.27

* Bremer quotes himself as saying, "I'd settle for MacArthur's problems." Bremer quotes himself as saying, "I'd settle for MacArthur's problems."1

* When I met with the two of them on my visits to Iraq, their body language signaled a lack of rapport. By the end of their tours in mid-2004, I received reports that they were barely speaking. When I met with the two of them on my visits to Iraq, their body language signaled a lack of rapport. By the end of their tours in mid-2004, I received reports that they were barely speaking.

* A subtle but important semantic misstep was that the administration allowed the United Nations to label the United States "an occupying power" in Security Council Resolution 1483. The unanimous May 2003 resolution signaled broad international approval for the coalition's efforts in a liberated Iraq, but it gave credence to the propaganda of our enemies that we were "occupying" Iraq. A subtle but important semantic misstep was that the administration allowed the United Nations to label the United States "an occupying power" in Security Council Resolution 1483. The unanimous May 2003 resolution signaled broad international approval for the coalition's efforts in a liberated Iraq, but it gave credence to the propaganda of our enemies that we were "occupying" Iraq.

* It's difficult to penetrate the fog of war even after the fact, but in the years that followed, some senior military officers who were on the ground now believe there were at least some Iraqi units that might have been called back to duty. Some believe that as many as three Iraqi divisions might have been available for use. "The idea," Lieutenant General McKiernan later said, "was to bring in the Iraqi soldiers and their officers, put them on a roster, and sort out the bad guys as we went." If McKiernan had been acting as the senior commander in Iraq on the ground, as I believed he was supposed to be, his view might have prevailed. It's difficult to penetrate the fog of war even after the fact, but in the years that followed, some senior military officers who were on the ground now believe there were at least some Iraqi units that might have been called back to duty. Some believe that as many as three Iraqi divisions might have been available for use. "The idea," Lieutenant General McKiernan later said, "was to bring in the Iraqi soldiers and their officers, put them on a roster, and sort out the bad guys as we went." If McKiernan had been acting as the senior commander in Iraq on the ground, as I believed he was supposed to be, his view might have prevailed.31

* The CPA called the proposed new army the New Iraqi Corps. Though it had been done unwittingly, the acronym NIC was a particularly foul word in Arabic. The CPA called the proposed new army the New Iraqi Corps. Though it had been done unwittingly, the acronym NIC was a particularly foul word in Arabic.

* In 2004, after the fact, the Senate Intelligence Committee's report could highlight only one small section at the end of a thirty-eight-page National Intelligence Council doc.u.ment suggesting that the CIA cautioned of an insurgency: "[R]ogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces." This point was not included in the executive summary at the front of the doc.u.ment. Though press reports and opportunistic politicians seized on this line years later, CIA Director Tenet, to his considerable credit, came forward and put it into proper perspective in his memoirs: "It's tempting to cite this information and say, 'See, we predicted many of the difficulties that later ensued'-but doing so would be disingenuous.... Had we felt strongly that these were likely outcomes, we should have shouted our conclusions." In 2004, after the fact, the Senate Intelligence Committee's report could highlight only one small section at the end of a thirty-eight-page National Intelligence Council doc.u.ment suggesting that the CIA cautioned of an insurgency: "[R]ogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces." This point was not included in the executive summary at the front of the doc.u.ment. Though press reports and opportunistic politicians seized on this line years later, CIA Director Tenet, to his considerable credit, came forward and put it into proper perspective in his memoirs: "It's tempting to cite this information and say, 'See, we predicted many of the difficulties that later ensued'-but doing so would be disingenuous.... Had we felt strongly that these were likely outcomes, we should have shouted our conclusions."49

* According to the official Defense Department dictionary, guerrilla warfare was defined as "military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces." An insurgency was defined as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a const.i.tuted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." According to the official Defense Department dictionary, guerrilla warfare was defined as "military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces." An insurgency was defined as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a const.i.tuted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."53

* We learned that several Al-Jazeera correspondents were embedded with the terrorists. They knew when and where attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces would take place, and they videotaped the attacks showing our troops being killed. We learned that several Al-Jazeera correspondents were embedded with the terrorists. They knew when and where attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces would take place, and they videotaped the attacks showing our troops being killed.

* The often cited statistics about electricity generation did not give a full picture. After insurgent attacks on the power grid began taking a toll on production, Iraqis began to figure out the best solution for themselves. They bought generators for their homes and businesses that were far less susceptible to attacks than the large, vulnerable, and expensive power plants, lines, and transformers that made up the national grid. The often cited statistics about electricity generation did not give a full picture. After insurgent attacks on the power grid began taking a toll on production, Iraqis began to figure out the best solution for themselves. They bought generators for their homes and businesses that were far less susceptible to attacks than the large, vulnerable, and expensive power plants, lines, and transformers that made up the national grid.

* Two of the most promising leads were from two Sunni former army generals, Abdul Razaq Sultan al-Jibouri and Talalal-Gaood, who had reached out to the U.S. military in late 2003 and offered to help negotiate peace with Sunni tribes in Anbar province. Two of the most promising leads were from two Sunni former army generals, Abdul Razaq Sultan al-Jibouri and Talalal-Gaood, who had reached out to the U.S. military in late 2003 and offered to help negotiate peace with Sunni tribes in Anbar province.

* DoD's willingness to remove Ahmad Chalabi from a governance role in de-Baathification if he continued to be too stringent seemed not to register with those critics who argued that DoD officials were somehow fixated on making Chalabi the leader of Iraq. DoD's willingness to remove Ahmad Chalabi from a governance role in de-Baathification if he continued to be too stringent seemed not to register with those critics who argued that DoD officials were somehow fixated on making Chalabi the leader of Iraq.

* I wanted to make sure the details of a move to arrest Sadr had been properly considered before action was taken. With this in mind, at one point in 2003, I dictated a series of questions for Bremer and CPA security officials to consider before they moved against him. Bremer writes in his book that these "exasperating" questions were tantamount to my opposition to the plan. Asking questions about the operation and how it would be done was basic prudence. It was a mistake not to have asked similar "exasperating" questions about some of Bremer's other decisions. I wanted to make sure the details of a move to arrest Sadr had been properly considered before action was taken. With this in mind, at one point in 2003, I dictated a series of questions for Bremer and CPA security officials to consider before they moved against him. Bremer writes in his book that these "exasperating" questions were tantamount to my opposition to the plan. Asking questions about the operation and how it would be done was basic prudence. It was a mistake not to have asked similar "exasperating" questions about some of Bremer's other decisions.35

* Not all of the photos were released to avoid inflaming the situation on the ground in Iraq and other places where American servicemen and-women were at risk. Not all of the photos were released to avoid inflaming the situation on the ground in Iraq and other places where American servicemen and-women were at risk.

* Another problem was that those at CENTCOM and the Army who had been in positions of responsibility and partly responsible for the circ.u.mstances that preceded the abuses at Abu Ghraib had already left their positions. By the spring of 2004, most of those still in the relevant posts had been in there for relatively short periods of time. On the operational side, General Abizaid had been on the job for only several months when the abuse occurred. Under him, General Sanchez was the officer directly overseeing operations in Iraq and, therefore, the officer most likely to be fired. But in my view the Army administrative chain had thrust Sanchez into a position he never should have been in, and proceeded to deny Sanchez the staff and support he required and requested and that I had authorized. The Army's leaders.h.i.+p had also been in flux. I had already fired Secretary of the Army Tom White in April 2003 for other reasons. Les Brownlee was an acting secretary when Abu Ghraib occurred. The Army chief of staff, General s.h.i.+nseki, who had been in charge when the original deficiencies in training, selection of senior personnel, and establis.h.i.+ng Sanchez's headquarters occurred, had retired After his full four-year term in June 2003. The new Army chief of staff, Pete Schoomaker, had been in his position for only several months when the abuse occurred. Another problem was that those at CENTCOM and the Army who had been in positions of responsibility and partly responsible for the circ.u.mstances that preceded the abuses at Abu Ghraib had already left their positions. By the spring of 2004, most of those still in the relevant posts had been in there for relatively short periods of time. On the operational side, General Abizaid had been on the job for only several months when the abuse occurred. Under him, General Sanchez was the officer directly overseeing operations in Iraq and, therefore, the officer most likely to be fired. But in my view the Army administrative chain had thrust Sanchez into a position he never should have been in, and proceeded to deny Sanchez the staff and support he required and requested and that I had authorized. The Army's leaders.h.i.+p had also been in flux. I had already fired Secretary of the Army Tom White in April 2003 for other reasons. Les Brownlee was an acting secretary when Abu Ghraib occurred. The Army chief of staff, General s.h.i.+nseki, who had been in charge when the original deficiencies in training, selection of senior personnel, and establis.h.i.+ng Sanchez's headquarters occurred, had retired After his full four-year term in June 2003. The new Army chief of staff, Pete Schoomaker, had been in his position for only several months when the abuse occurred.

* Myers and I were accompanied by Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army; General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Lieutenant General Lance L. Smith, Deputy Commander, CENTCOM. Myers and I were accompanied by Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army; General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Lieutenant General Lance L. Smith, Deputy Commander, CENTCOM.

* The magnitude of the scandal naturally tempted charlatans to come forth to capitalize on the outrage. In March 2006, the The magnitude of the scandal naturally tempted charlatans to come forth to capitalize on the outrage. In March 2006, the New York Times New York Times profiled Ali Shalal Qaissi, the founder of the a.s.sociation of Victims of American Occupation Prisons. Qaissi claimed to be the hooded prisoner made famous by Abu Ghraib guards who placed a prisoner on a box with wires attached to his hands. Qaissi handed out business cards with the silhouette of the image on it. The newspaper, among other media outlets, accepted the story without skepticism. It later was exposed as a lie. profiled Ali Shalal Qaissi, the founder of the a.s.sociation of Victims of American Occupation Prisons. Qaissi claimed to be the hooded prisoner made famous by Abu Ghraib guards who placed a prisoner on a box with wires attached to his hands. Qaissi handed out business cards with the silhouette of the image on it. The newspaper, among other media outlets, accepted the story without skepticism. It later was exposed as a lie.14

* The Church Report concluded: "[N]one of the pictured abuses...bear any resemblance to approved policies at any level, in any theater.... [N]o approved interrogation techniques at GTMO are even remotely related to the events depicted in the infamous photographs of Abu Ghraib abuses.... If an MP ever did receive an order to abuse a detainee in the manner depicted in any of the photographs, it should have been obvious to that MP that this was an illegal order that could not be followed.... We found, without exception, that the [Defense Department] officials and senior military commanders responsible for the formulation of interrogation policy evidenced the intent to treat detainees humanely." The Church Report concluded: "[N]one of the pictured abuses...bear any resemblance to approved policies at any level, in any theater.... [N]o approved interrogation techniques at GTMO are even remotely related to the events depicted in the infamous photographs of Abu Ghraib abuses.... If an MP ever did receive an order to abuse a detainee in the manner depicted in any of the photographs, it should have been obvious to that MP that this was an illegal order that could not be followed.... We found, without exception, that the [Defense Department] officials and senior military commanders responsible for the formulation of interrogation policy evidenced the intent to treat detainees humanely."15

A report by Senator Carl Levin in 2008 disregarded all of these findings and claimed that "senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees." A report by Senator Carl Levin in 2008 disregarded all of these findings and claimed that "senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees."

* In 1943 American troops executed fifty to seventy unarmed Italian and German prisoners of war in the Sicilian town of Biscari. At the liberated concentration camp at Dachau, U.S. troops shot and killed n.a.z.i SS guards who had already surrendered. A lengthy investigation and military cover-up of the murders followed. In 1943 American troops executed fifty to seventy unarmed Italian and German prisoners of war in the Sicilian town of Biscari. At the liberated concentration camp at Dachau, U.S. troops shot and killed n.a.z.i SS guards who had already surrendered. A lengthy investigation and military cover-up of the murders followed.1

More than sixty thousand inmates are s.e.xually abused every year in American prisons and jails. A September 2009 Justice Department report shows that out of ninety-three federal prisons, ninety-two reported instances of prison employees s.e.xually abusing prisoners. More than sixty thousand inmates are s.e.xually abused every year in American prisons and jails. A September 2009 Justice Department report shows that out of ninety-three federal prisons, ninety-two reported instances of prison employees s.e.xually abusing prisoners.2

* In early 2002 there were reports that some al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners in Dostum's custody might have died in s.h.i.+pping containers near the northern Afghan town of Dasht-e-Leili. Dostum insisted that the deaths had been accidental, the result of suffocation, combat injuries, and sickness. The scope of what exactly occurred-whether negligence or malfeasance, as some later alleged-was never determined. What was clear was that U.S. Special Forces had not seen, taken part in, or condoned the action. Dostum, a leader respected by a large number of Afghans, particularly ethnic Uzbeks, was a valuable ally to the Northern Alliance and to our Special Forces in defeating the Taliban and al-Qaida; he also later was a member of the country's freely elected government. Like many complex figures and phenomena in Afghanistan, he was a fact of life. In early 2002 there were reports that some al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners in Dostum's custody might have died in s.h.i.+pping containers near the northern Afghan town of Dasht-e-Leili. Dostum insisted that the deaths had been accidental, the result of suffocation, combat injuries, and sickness. The scope of what exactly occurred-whether negligence or malfeasance, as some later alleged-was never determined. What was clear was that U.S. Special Forces had not seen, taken part in, or condoned the action. Dostum, a leader respected by a large number of Afghans, particularly ethnic Uzbeks, was a valuable ally to the Northern Alliance and to our Special Forces in defeating the Taliban and al-Qaida; he also later was a member of the country's freely elected government. Like many complex figures and phenomena in Afghanistan, he was a fact of life.

* In a 2002 interview, Clinton Justice Department official and future attorney general in the Obama administration Eric Holder said, "It seems to me that given the way in which they have conducted themselves, however, that they are not, in fact, people ent.i.tled to the protection of the Geneva Convention [sic]. They are not prisoners of war. If, for instance, Muhammed Atta had survived the attack on the World Trade Center, would we now be calling him a prisoner of war? I think not. Should Zacarias Moussaoui be called a prisoner of war? Again, I think not." In a 2002 interview, Clinton Justice Department official and future attorney general in the Obama administration Eric Holder said, "It seems to me that given the way in which they have conducted themselves, however, that they are not, in fact, people ent.i.tled to the protection of the Geneva Convention [sic]. They are not prisoners of war. If, for instance, Muhammed Atta had survived the attack on the World Trade Center, would we now be calling him a prisoner of war? I think not. Should Zacarias Moussaoui be called a prisoner of war? Again, I think not."20

Only nation-states-not groups or individual actors-may ratify treaties. Only nation-states-not groups or individual actors-may ratify treaties.

* "Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information." "Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information."21

POWs must also be held "under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area." Put a different way, housing POWs in individual cells-even with the luxuries of cable TV and individual bathrooms, as is done in many minimum security prisons across the United States-could be a violation of the Geneva Conventions. They must be housed as soldiers, in open barracks under the same conditions as U.S. forces and are ent.i.tled to wear their uniforms and badges of rank. POWs must also be held "under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area." Put a different way, housing POWs in individual cells-even with the luxuries of cable TV and individual bathrooms, as is done in many minimum security prisons across the United States-could be a violation of the Geneva Conventions. They must be housed as soldiers, in open barracks under the same conditions as U.S. forces and are ent.i.tled to wear their uniforms and badges of rank.22

* If we transferred detainees to governments that were tolerant of terrorists, they might well return to fight against us. Some nations were unable to give us the necessary human rights a.s.surances and might turn the detainees over to security forces, from which they might receive treatment unacceptable by our standards. Other nations would not agree to allow U.S. officials to visit with transferred detainees to ensure their humane treatment or interview them to obtain additional intelligence. Still, I didn't want to allow these issues to become excuses for not working the problem aggressively. If we transferred detainees to governments that were tolerant of terrorists, they might well return to fight against us. Some nations were unable to give us the necessary human rights a.s.surances and might turn the detainees over to security forces, from which they might receive treatment unacceptable by our standards. Other nations would not agree to allow U.S. officials to visit with transferred detainees to ensure their humane treatment or interview them to obtain additional intelligence. Still, I didn't want to allow these issues to become excuses for not working the problem aggressively.

Over the next three years we were able to reduce the number by a third, mostly by moving detainees to other nations. By the end of the Bush administration more than five hundred detainees had been moved out of detention at Guantanamo Bay. Over the next three years we were able to reduce the number by a third, mostly by moving detainees to other nations. By the end of the Bush administration more than five hundred detainees had been moved out of detention at Guantanamo Bay.

* I approved interrogation techniques beyond the traditional Army Field Manual for one other detainee, Muhammed Ould Slahi, in August 2003, in accordance with an April 2003 working group proposal that had been approved by senior military and civilian DoD officials. Slahi had recruited some of the 9/11 al-Qaida pilots and been a key facilitator in the 2000 Millennium Plot. He tenaciously resisted questioning. After he was isolated from other detainees and interrogated, Slahi became one of the most valuable intelligence a.s.sets giving information on al-Qaida. Within weeks intelligence reports indicated that he began cooperating as a result of the interrogation plan and was providing large amounts of useful intelligence. I approved interrogation techniques beyond the traditional Army Field Manual for one other detainee, Muhammed Ould Slahi, in August 2003, in accordance with an April 2003 working group proposal that had been approved by senior military and civilian DoD officials. Slahi had recruited some of the 9/11 al-Qaida pilots and been a key facilitator in the 2000 Millennium Plot. He tenaciously resisted questioning. After he was isolated from other detainees and interrogated, Slahi became one of the most valuable intelligence a.s.sets giving information on al-Qaida. Within weeks intelligence reports indicated that he began cooperating as a result of the interrogation plan and was providing large amounts of useful intelligence.

* Admiral Church has said, "I thought going in that I was going to find something different. I thought I was going to find the dots connecting.... You had pictures of Abu Ghraib. You had leaks beginning to show up about harsh interrogation techniques approved by fairly high levels in the office of the Secretary of Defense. And so...it occurred to me there's probably some pretty close linkage there. But the facts didn't bear that out. In fact, most of the abuse that we found had no relation to interrogation at all.... So I thought there would be a linkage, I didn't see it in terms of the abuse." Admiral Church has said, "I thought going in that I was going to find something different. I thought I was going to find the dots connecting.... You had pictures of Abu Ghraib. You had leaks beginning to show up about harsh interrogation techniques approved by fairly high levels in the office of the Secretary of Defense. And so...it occurred to me there's probably some pretty close linkage there. But the facts didn't bear that out. In fact, most of the abuse that we found had no relation to interrogation at all.... So I thought there would be a linkage, I didn't see it in terms of the abuse."24

* In April 2003 the service secretaries were: Thomas White, secretary of the Army; Hansford Johnson, acting secretary of the Navy; and James Roche, secretary of the Air Force. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were: General Eric s.h.i.+nseki (Army); General Michael Hagee (Marine Corps); Admiral Vern Clark (Navy); and General John Jumper (Air Force), plus the chairman, d.i.c.k Myers, and the vice chairman, Pete Pace. In April 2003 the service secretaries were: Thomas White, secretary of the Army; Hansford Johnson, acting secretary of the Navy; and James Roche, secretary of the Air Force. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were: General Eric s.h.i.+nseki (Army); General Michael Hagee (Marine Corps); Admiral Vern Clark (Navy); and General John Jumper (Air Force), plus the chairman, d.i.c.k Myers, and the vice chairman, Pete Pace.

* For a full discussion of the CIA's interrogation program, see Marc Thiessen's treatment of this issue in his book, For a full discussion of the CIA's interrogation program, see Marc Thiessen's treatment of this issue in his book, Courting Disaster Courting Disaster.

According to an April 2009 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report prepared by Democratic Senator Jay Rockefeller, and consistent with my recollection, Colin Powell and I were informed of the enhanced interrogation techniques on September 16, 2003-a year After members of Congress had received extensive briefings. According to an April 2009 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report prepared by Democratic Senator Jay Rockefeller, and consistent with my recollection, Colin Powell and I were informed of the enhanced interrogation techniques on September 16, 2003-a year After members of Congress had received extensive briefings.32

* In a June 2004 Judiciary Committee hearing, Democratic New York Senator Chuck Schumer put it much more starkly: "There are times when we all get in high dudgeon. We ought to be reasonable about this. I think there are probably very few people in this room or in America who would say that torture should never, ever be used, particularly if thousands of lives are at stake. Take the hypothetical: If we knew that there was a nuclear bomb hidden in an American city, and we believed that some kind of torture, fairly severe maybe, would give us a chance of finding that bomb before it went off, my guess is most Americans and most senators, maybe all, would say, Do what you have to do. So it is easy to sit back in the armchair and say that torture can never be used. But when you are in the foxhole, it is a very different deal. And I respect-I think we all respect-the fact that the president is in the foxhole every day." In a June 2004 Judiciary Committee hearing, Democratic New York Senator Chuck Schumer put it much more starkly: "There are times when we all get in high dudgeon. We ought to be reasonable about this. I think there are probably very few people in this room or in America who would say that torture should never, ever be used, particularly if thousands of lives are at stake. Take the hypothetical: If we knew that there was a nuclear bomb hidden in an American city, and we believed that some kind of torture, fairly severe maybe, would give us a chance of finding that bomb before it went off, my guess is most Americans and most senators, maybe all, would say, Do what you have to do. So it is easy to sit back in the armchair and say that torture can never be used. But when you are in the foxhole, it is a very different deal. And I respect-I think we all respect-the fact that the president is in the foxhole every day."

* I was not told precisely about the intelligence gained through the CIA program, but I believe General Michael Hayden, a four-star Air Force general who had been director of the National Security Agency, and in 2006 led the CIA. Hayden was not a partisan or a bomb thrower. He did not have to defend boldly and publicly a program that he had inherited. After a careful review, Hayden concluded, "I was convinced enough that I believed that we needed to keep this tool available." Hayden, along with former federal judge and U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey, wrote that: "[F]ully half of the government's knowledge about the structure and activities of al Qaeda came from those interrogations." I was not told precisely about the intelligence gained through the CIA program, but I believe General Michael Hayden, a four-star Air Force general who had been director of the National Security Agency, and in 2006 led the CIA. Hayden was not a partisan or a bomb thrower. He did not have to defend boldly and publicly a program that he had inherited. After a careful review, Hayden concluded, "I was convinced enough that I believed that we needed to keep this tool available." Hayden, along with former federal judge and U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey, wrote that: "[F]ully half of the government's knowledge about the structure and activities of al Qaeda came from those interrogations." 35 35