Panzer Commander Part 17

My combat group was split up: while Major Kurz with 11 Battalion defended in Saarlautem and became involved in tough houseto-house fighting with black Americans, who climbed the houses with knives in their mouths, I had to send Major Liehr with I Battalion to Merzig, to help the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, which was engaged in heavy defensive fighting there.

Again, the excellent American artillery helped to force small breaches.

Between 23 November and I I December, fierce fighting raged in the whole area of Saarlautern, Dillingen, and Merzig, where on 29 November the enemy managed to open a deep breach to the east at Saarlautem (Saarlouis). Owing to its heavy losses, our division now consisted solely of my combat group. We were pulled out in the middle of December and sent far to the east, past Saarbruecken, to the area between Pirmasens and Wissembourg, to be restored to strength, as reserve for Army Group G. For the 3rd U.S. Army the way to the Rhine lay open. It thrust north of Saarbruecken toward Kaiserslautern.

The next danger now looming came from the U.S. army group that was advancing northward from the south and southwest; from the Nancy-Baccarat area, past the slopes of the Vosges, it was trying to penetrate the Rhine valley between Kaiserslautern and Colmar, with the goal of taking Strasbourg and crossing the Rhine.

Yet we were granted a short respite. We had now been in action for more than six months without a break. Our losses had been high. All the same, our young replacements-thanks to our veterans-had been successfully integrated time and again. Here at the front the young men had quickly shed their illusions about marching with Hitler into a "Thousand-Year Reich." They had soon grasped the difference between propaganda and reality.

We lay with the combat group between the now useless installations of the Western Wall at Zweibruecken on the Saar and Pirmasens. On New Year's Eve we all got together. We didn't know how things would go, but we understood nevertheless that the war was no longer to be won. We only knew that we had to do'our duty.

Meanwhile, something had been happening: on 16 December 1944, Hitler had started the Ardennes offensive. We had heard about it marginally and had heard Goebbels's strident voice on the radio: "The Wehrmacht has launched its great offensive. We will Fighting the Americans, December 1944 225 destroy the enemy and cut all his lines of communication. Paris is our goal." Our comment on this news had been unanimous: How did Hitler think he could ever succeed in getting through the snowed-in Ardennes, over the icy, winding roads, with battered or inexperienced divisions and under the complete air superiority of the Allies?

What we didn't yet know on that New Year's Eve was that the unexpected offensive on our part had at first been successful, but then, on 28 December, had come to nothing.

The turn of the year had just been celebrated; we had drunk to a New Year full of question marks with a modest gla.s.s of punch, when a message reached us that the division was to prepare to move out that very night. I was summoned to Feuchtinger at his command post. He was very grave, wished me a happy New Year, and gave me the following briefing.

"On 28 December, I was called to Army Group G, where I met all the Army, corps, and divisional commanders. From there we went to Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who told us that Hitler wished to speak to us all that afternoon at his HQ in Bad Nauheim.

There we also met Field Marshal Keitel, Colonel-General Jodl, Himmler, and Bormann.

"The presence of the highest Army and Party leaders pointed to an important communication from Hitler. He began as usual with a long speech and emphasized that we were waging an ideological war, the loss of which would destroy the German people. "I haven't the slightest intention of losing the war. Think of Frederick the Great and his Seven Year War."

"Hitler then came to speak of the Ardennes offensive, in which not all the objectives had been achieved' (a highly optimistic view, it seemed to me), but which had had an 'incidental' consequence, namely, the weakening of the American front opposite us, where"Operation North Wind' was to begin. He estimated the strength of the Americans on our front as down to only four or five divisions, which he proposed to 'destroy' with eight offensive German divisions, in order to follow up with further blows. Hitler then ended his address by saying, and these were his words:"It must be our absolute goal to settle the matter here in the west offensively; that must be our fanatical goal."

"'Operation North Wind' began on New Year's Eve," Feuchtinger went on, "our division is the Army group's reserve. Hitler's plan is to break through the Maginot Line south of Pirmasens with an armored group and advance south along the western fringe of the Vosges, in order to make contact with the 19th Army's bridgehead at Colmar. Five divisions of Volksgrenadiers are to push through the (snowed-in) Vosges from the west into the Rhine valley and join forces with a bridgehead west of the Rhine. Although we've received replacements and now have 74 Panthers and Panzer IVS again," Feuchtinger concluded, "two things are being overlooked: we have no air superiority and nothing equivalent to set against the ma.s.sive U.S. artillery. Our men are spent and the replacements have no experience. In accordance with orders, we shall a.s.semble in readiness today, I January 1944, just north of the Maginot Line. G.o.d be with youl" Major Spreu, who had now been given command of Regiment 192, and I looked at each other. Although nothing was said, it seemed to both of us that Hitler had decided to fight to the last man and to be prepared if necessary to have the German people conquer or go under.

What happened was inevitable: the Americans had made very good preparations for an attack on their right flank and established themselves in the Maginot Line. The division of our forces into two a.s.sault groups, especially with the inexperienced infantry group, was unable to produce the desired result.

Nevertheless, as we learned from prisoners and intercepted messages, Eisenhower, under the impact of the Ardennes offensive and "Operation North Wind," begun on New Year's Eve, had ordered the attack on the Western Wall in northern Alsace to be abandoned for the time being. According to reports, Eisenhower and de Gaulle had agreed, on 3 January, to withdraw to the Maginot Line in lower Alsace, retaining weak forces for the defense of Strasbourg.

"Operation North Wind" made no progress. In the snowed-in Vosges and to the west of them the two a.s.sault groups came to a standstill.

A new plan was conceived. Our division and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, swinging east from the area south of Wissembourg, were to break through the Maginot Line and trap the enemy in.the Haguenau depression.

The two divisions were moved east and received orders to prepare themselves for this attack. One last dramatic battle lay before US.

As I was leaving the divisional command post, an orderly officer of the staff took me to one side.

Fighting the Americans, December 1944 227 "Lieutenant-Colonel," he said, "I feel obliged to inform you, in your own interest and in that of your people, that court-martial proceedings are likely to be started against our divisional commander. Ten days ago General Feuchtinger was ordered to High Command West to provide information as to why on the night of 5 to 6 June 1944 he was not at his command post but in Paris.

"Feuchtinger was not at his command post but in Germany. I had to fetch him from there on 24 December and take him to HQ West.

"I feel obliged to inform you of this, as the commander of our combat group, so that you will know why our brave division has such a bad reputation with the higher commands." I was speechless. On Christmas Eve, while we had been putting up a desperate fight in the Western Wall at Saarlautern, our divi-, sional commander had been at home.

Certainly, we knew of Feuchtinger's fondness for la dolce vita.

We knew of his contacts from prewar days with high functionaries of the n.a.z.i regime and disapproved of them. We also had been unable to understand why, during the decisive hours of the invasion, he had been in Paris, and not, moreover, only at the "special HQ." We commanders had always maintained our loyalty to Feuchtinger whenever our friends in other panzer divisions had sneered at his style of leaders.h.i.+p and his way of life. Now even I felt this to be the last straw.

Although I too hold to the saying de mortuis nil nisi bene ("of the dead say nothing but good"), whei brave men, who fought so brilliantly, and of the thousands of dead, wounded, and, missing of those six months, I cannot help reproaching Feuchtinger with having done us all poor service.

At the end of January 1945, when the bitter fighting was over, General Feuchtinger said good-bye to us, his commanders.

Impa.s.sively we received his thanks for what we had done.

In March, Feuchtinger was condemned by a court-martial. The sentence, however, was mitigated on "orders from above" and under the pressure of events was not carried 6ut. I only heard of the court-martial proceedings against Feuchtinger long after my return from captivity.

After his release from American captivity, he had eked out a living at various jobs and died at the end of the 1950s, shortly before new proceedings were to be brought against him.

THE BATTLE FOR HATREN-RITRERSHOFFEN At the beginning of January 1945 the Vosges were deep in snow.

In the lowlands between Wissembourg-Haguenau and the Rhine the snow was a foot deep. It was bitterly cold; the roads were icy.

The civilian population was apprehensive, fearing that the war would once again ravage their villages. In many farmhouses there was no running water; the pipes were frozen.

Wissembourg is a small town in northern Alsace on the border with the Palatinate. On the slopes of this area, around Landauahrweiler and Bergzabern, the good Palatine wine was grown. TO the east the Rhine was not far away, on the other side of which lay Baden-Baden in the Black Forest.

Between the eastern slopes of the Vosges and the Rhine a wide lowland stretched south as far as Strasbourg.

Our concentration area lay north of Wissembourg, where we arrived during the night of 5 to 6 January after a difficult march over icy roads.

It was planned that the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division which had been unable to break the Maginot Line west of the Vosges, was likewise to a.s.semble behind us during the following night.

Our task was to push southward through the Maginot Line with two combat groups hard by the eastern foothills of the Vosges, close all outlets from the Vosges, and cut the enemy's communications with Strasbourg.

I asked for maps with the exact location of bunkers and other fortifications. There were none. Not even the upper echelons had maps. To rea.s.sure us, we were told that the Maginot Line was barely manned and const.i.tuted no obstacle.

"Blind," we set off south on 6 January. Even before we had reached the first bunkers, we came up against fierce resistance and once again the concentrated fire of the American artillery.

By the afternoon the two combat groups had indeed driven the enemy back, but we had still not come across the bunkers of the Line.

We continued the attack during the night of 6 and 7 January.

Thick mist lay over the Rhine valley, visibility was down to a hundred yards. Suddenly we could make out the first bunker, which received us with heavy fire. Our leading men and the accompanying SPW landed in thick mine fields; the artillery stepped up its barrage of fire. There was no doubt about it: the enemy intended to hold his Fighting the Americans, December 1944 229 position on the Maginot Line under all circ.u.mstances and keep his lines open to Strasbourg and the Rhine. Ou'r division, which was now reduced to the fighting strength of a grenadier regiment, would not suffice to force a pa.s.sage..

From the prisoners we took in the approaches to the Maginot Line we knew who our opponents were: the experienced 79th U.S. Infantry Division, part of the 14th U.S. Armored Division and elements of the 42nd U.S. Infantry Division, as well as strong artillery. These were to be our concern for the next 14 days.

Army group seemed to have realized that the Americans were far stronger than expected.

On 8 January, Captain Herr, accompanied by grenadiers and army engineers, once again moved south. This a.s.sault party, with 12 Panthers, managed to force one bunker into surrender, shoot up , three Shermans, and take many prisoners. He lost one Panther through mines. Then such heavy artillery fire descended on the bunker that Herr lost 20 grenadiers and engineers, who had been sitting on his tanks. He had to withdraw.

Army group issued fresh orders: "Two days ago, south of th( Haguenau forest, we managed to form a bridgehead over the Rhine north of Strasbourg. From this bridgehead a westward thrust is to be made to cut the communications of the enemy north of the Haguenau forest. The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division will move west on 9 January along the northern edge of the forest, break through the Maginot Line, and advance down the eastern slopes of the Vosges. The 21st Panzer Division will a.s.semble on its right and after the first breakthroughs will likewise move west at once." On 8 January, 20 a.s.sault-guns arrived from Germany; Captain Herr still had I I tanks available. On the same day the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division a.s.sembled in two combat groups, our division just north of it with my regiment in contact with the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division.

It was bitterly cold and snowing. Only rarely did the moon s.h.i.+ne through. Then one could see the dark monsters looming up out of the snow. We knew that we had to cut through barbed-wire entanglements and clear mines. For this only a few engineers were available and young replacements, soldiers of 16 and 17.

During the night of 8 and 9 January the first a.s.sault party of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division worked its way up to the first bunker. Without a sound the youngsters crept forward and began to cut a pa.s.sage through the barbed wire. Whenever the moon came out all movement froze. Toward four in the morning a ath had been cleared; it was only another hundred yards to the bunker. On all fours the a.s.sault party worked its way forward. Then they were there. The Americans seemed to be asleep. The barrel of a gun poked menacingly from its embrasure. The men crept around the bunker. The armored door was closed. An NCO beat against it with the b.u.t.t of his gun and it slowly opened.

The American crew had been taken completely by surprise and were quickly overcome. The noise alerted other bunkers and the intermediate positions. Heavy Aghting broke out at once. The American artillery laid down a barrage of fire on the bunker.

Then a combat group of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, supported by a.s.sault-guns, moved up to attack through the gap.

Heavy artillery fire prevented a rapid advance. The group turned left and forced its way from the north into the little village of Hatten.

At the same time an armored group from my division also moved up, with the intention of pus.h.i.+ng past Hatten. Several tanks drove over mines. The attack made no progress. One of my battalions also entered Hatten from the north and relieved the elements of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division that were there.

The southern part of the village was fiercely defended by American infantry, who mounted a counterattack, but this was repu.

By the evening of 9 January only a small breach had been achieved. Army group and corps pressed for a continuation of the attack. The breakthrough in the Maginot Line was to be extended, in order to push through to the west.

During the night of 9 and 10 January, my combat group, with Regiment 125, moved up to the bunker, to the right of me our sister Regiment 192.

The division had been supplied with a further artillery regiment, so we were somewhat better supported.

The armored group of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division had tried in vain to force its way also into the neighboring village of Rittershoffen; our division now prepared to take Rittershoffen on 10 January.

Reserve Major w.i.l.l.y Spreu commanded Regiment.192 in place of the sick Colonel Rauch. His attack on the Maginot Line north of Hatten had also come to a standstill on 9 January in front of the bunkers, his companies heavily reduced. As last reserve he still had his engineer platoon, consisting of one sergeant, one NCO, and 20 Fighting the Americans, December 1944 231 mostly inexperienced men. That evening Major Spreu positioned his ant.i.tank guns and heavy weapons opposite a bunker that was standing out clearly.

As Major Spreu reported later, "At first light I moved up with the platoon of engineers, while my heavy weapons fired nonstop at the gun-ports in the bunker. We charged through the snow and within a few minutes were at the bunker. The engineers threw hand grenades into the ports, while others cut through the barbed wire and cleared mines. When we ran around to the rear entrance, the door opened and a white flag appeared with five officers and a garrison of 117 men. Four of the officers had suffered severe eye injuries from the firing at the ports. They were treated at once by the regimental doctor; the others were sent to the rear. The bunker turned out to be a heavily armed stronghold in an extensive system of fortifications, so I at once made it my command post." Next day, in the affack on the hills north of Rittershoffen, Major Spreu was severely wounded and taken to the hospital. On 24 February, for his "personal bravery," he was awarded the Knight's Cross.

On 10 January, I moved up with my regiment for the attack on Rittershoffen. That night I succeeded in forcing my way into the village, but there too, just as at Hatten, the enemy held out in the houses and at once mounted a counterattack with tanks and infantry. This. .h.i.t my II Battalion in particular, which had established itself in the center near the church.

In these two villages of Hatten and Rittersboffen there now developed one of the hardest and most costly battles that had ever raged on the western front.

The Americans strained every sinew to regain the Maginot Line, to avoid being cut off in the Strasbourg area. In Rittershoffen we were only.20 yards apart. Sometimes we would be in the first floor of a house while the Americans were in the cellar-and vice versa.

This bitter house-to-house fighting raged for nearly two weeks.

Both sides used their artillery nonstop, also flamethrowers.

The Americans set fire to almost all the houses with incendiary sh.e.l.ls. We took prisoners from the 827th U.S. Arinored Battalion, which consisted almost entirely of blacks. They told us their instructions were to shoot up or set on fire any house in which Germans-they "n.a.z.is"-were to be found. I had to leave my own cellar in a said hurry when an incendiary sh.e.l.l burst in front of my look-out and we were in danger of suffocation. I moved into another cellar quite 232 PANZER COMMANDER close to the command post of Major Kurz, who with his 11 Battalion was having to bear the brunt of the attacks.

Prisoners from the 14th U.S. Armored Division cursed, "G.o.dd.a.m.n it, this is the bloodiest battle we've ever fought, worse than the legendary battle of Anzio in Italy." Even now the civilian population remained in the two villages.

Women, children, and old people, packed in like sardines, sat in the cellars of the houses. Electricity had been cut off, the supply of food was short, and there was no water for the pipes were frozen. We tried to help as much as we could. By day any movement was fatal; our supplies could be brought up only by night in armored vehicles. In this we were helped by a hollow, which concealed us from the enemy, whose flares threw the area into brilliant light.

As early as the second day my regimental doctor came to me and angrily said, "I have up to 50 wounded lying in a cellar who are in urgent need of medical treatment. I have no morphine left and hardly any dressings. In another cellar there are more than 40 dead, who can't be buried here. I'm also doing what I can for the civilians." On many nights I was at least able to send a few wounded civilians and men of my unit to the rear, past Hatten, and have ammunition brought up. My orderly officer, Dr. Mueller-Temme, had to get the ammunition boxes forward to the grenadiers, since all the other men of my staff were in action, to compensate to some extent for the losses in the two battalions.

But neither the Americans, who now had elements of an armored division and two infantry divisions fighting in Rittershoffen, nor we would give way. Our battle in the two villages, as we heard later, was constantly being mentioned in army communiqu&s.

After a few days I discovered that there were also elements of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division in Rittershoffen, who had got stuck there, while the bulk of them were fighting in Hatten. In both places we had elements of the 79th U.S. Infantry Division encircled for a time, but they fought their way out again with heavy losses. After eight days we had news that a parachute battalion was coming to Rittershoffen as reinforcements.

The place became a phantom village after only a- few days.

Almost all the buildings, including the church, which was defended by Major Kurz's men, were in ruins. Many of the houses were on fire and lit up the scene at night. The dead lay about the streets, among them many civilians. We couldn't recover their bodies, since the Fighting the Americans, December 1944 233 enemy here was often no more than 15 or 20 yards away. The cows bellowed in their stalls unattended; the cadavers of animals stank and infected the air.

After eight days we still didn't know whether we were continuing to fight there for reasons of prestige, or whether there was a tactical significance to our holding the positions.

It seemed to me that we and our brave adversaries were no longer thinking of anything but survival. Contact with division had been lost after only a few days. Through our death-defying SPW crews of I Battalion, who every night ensured the removal of wounded and the provision of supplies, we heard that things looked much the same in Hatten as with us. There too a battalion of the 79th Infantry Division had been encircled at the beginning and had only freed itself after days of fighting.

There too the northern and western parts were in our hands. The rest of the village was being defended tenaciously by the Americans.

We heard that on 10 January a strong a.s.sault party of the 25th Grenadier Division had managed to crack a stronghold near Hatten and take 300 prisoners. With that the Maiinot Line had been bro n m ken through over a length of 10 kim In Hatten and Ritter 16 shoffen, and to the north of them, we were opelessly bogged down. Artillery duels on a colossal scale took place every day, heavier than we had ever experienced in Normandy.

What oppressed us most was the fate of the innocent civilians.

Over 100 dead, most of them children and old people, were later counted.

On 14 January the Americans tried to recapture Rittershoffen and, in Hatten, free two battalions of the 79th U.S. Infantry Division that were trapped there. Thanks to the courageous performance of my combat group and elements of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, the attack was successfully beaten off with heavy losses for the enemy. We heard from prisoners that from 14 January command in the "Battle of Hatten-Rittershoffen" had been taken over by the 14th U,S. Armored Division. Attached to it in Rittershoffen were one battalion of the 79th Infantry Division, which for a time had been surrounded by us, and elements of the 42nd U.S. Rainbow Division. As the chronicle of the 14th U.S. Armored Division was later to record: "It was a brutal, b.l.o.o.d.y and slow business, worse than anything we had experienced." On the following day, the Americans tried again, and again came to grief. On the two sides more than 10,000 sh.e.l.ls were fired every day.

On 17 January it snowed again heavily; visibility was down to a hundred yards. At dawn the Americans attacked Rittershoffen and Hatten with 45 tanks and infantry. They were supported by very heavy artillery fire. In the half-light, a strong a.s.sault party forced its way unexpectedly into Rittershoffen and took prisoner members of the regimental and battalion staffs of Panzer Grenadier Division, as well as some resting elements.

Shortly after, a messenger rushed into my cellar, "Lieutenantcolonel, the Amis have captured almost all our staff officers and a lot of men. I just managed to get away. Can you help?" Thank goodness some elements of the parachute battalion and our own reconnaissance battalion were available and I was able to send them into a counterattack at once. They managed to free most of our men and take more than 80 prisoners.

On 18 January, beginning at 1400 hours, the enemy again laid down a heavy artillery barrage on both villages and at 1700 hours, as it grew dark, moved in to attack Rittershoffen from the north and south. He thereby came up against the paratroops and my II Battalion. After heavy losses he was thrown back, our artillery having given us effective support.

During !he night an orderly from division arrived to see me.

"Lieutenant-Colonel, I am instructed by the divisional commander to brief you on the intentions of Army Group G. "On 19 January an attack will be launched south of the Haguenau forest with a tank corps and the paratroop division from the extended bridgehead over the Rhine. Our division was to have been detailed for this. It was appreciated that for the moment a disengagement is impossible. The two burnt-out divisions engaged in Hatten-Rittershoffen are to simulate further attacking intentions, through increased activity by a.s.sault parties and the heavy use of artillery, in order to tie down the enemy forces employed there. The goal is to push past Haguenau to the west and then surround the enemy forces standing north of the River Moder.

"It will interest you to know," the young officer continued with amus.e.m.e.nt, "that Himmler has been entrusted with the high command of Rhine-sector south. Hitler himself, moreover, has ordered the new attack south of the Haguenau forest. Nothing more can now go wrong, Lieutenant-Colonel." We had become so bold and full of gallows humor in the mean Fighting the Americans, December 1944 235 time that such remarks, which were punishable by demotion or even the death penalty, were now permissible.

"Very well," I dismissed the young lieutenant, "let us then rely on Himinler and his 'war experience."' In spite of heavy artillery fire, the fighting for our two villages, up to 90 percent destroyed, subsided in the next two days. Only in Hatten did the paratroops, supported by a few tanks, once again attack the brave 79th U.S. Infantry Division. The Americans defended themselves with guns, pistols, bazookas, and knives house by house, so that the attack had to be broken off.

In the evening of 19 January advance parties of the 47th Volksgrenadier Division arrived; they had been brought up by train from Germany and were to relieve us. During the night the heavily reduced elements of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division were relieved, to be restored to strength further to the rear.

The remainder of this brave division werepulled out during the night of 20 and 21 January.

On the morning of that cold winter day, the 21st, a suspicious calm lay over and around Rittershoffen. I asked Major Kurz to find out, by means of an a.s.sault party, what the enemy was up to.

I myself glanced as usual from my cellar window across to the ruined houses on the other side of the street, where we had often seen individual Americans flitting back and forth.

Everything was quiet; even the enemy guns were silent, Then Major Kurz came running the hundred yards to my command post, "Lieutenant-Colonel, the Amis have gone; they've evacuated the place during the night, under cover of their artillery." Kurz looked at me from his red-rimmed eyes. I pressed his hand.

"So that's it, Kurz. Thanks for all you and your men have done." Unshaven, with our "U-boat" ds, we stood facing each other. We couldn't grasp that the murderous battle was over.

"There are no winners and no losers here. So what was it all for?" Slowly the exhausted men came out of teir cellars; a few civilians appeared. They had tears in their eyes.

"Is it all over now? Can we bury our dead?"

"We are so sorry for you and your lovely village. This d.a.m.n war! For you it's now at an end." Thoughtfully Kurz and I walked with slow steps to the church, only a part of which was still undamaged.

Through a gaping hole in the wall we went in. I stood facing the altar, which lay in ruins, and looked up at the organ. It seemed to be unharmed. A few more of our men came in.

"Come," I called to a lance-corporal, "we'll climb.up to the organ.,, On arriving above, I asked the man to tread the bellows. I sat down at the organ and-it was hardly believable-it worked.

On the spur of the moment I began to play Bach's chorale Nun danket alle Gott. It resounded through the ruins to the outside. More and more of my men climbed into the battered church, followed by old women and children, who knelt on the ground and quietly prayed. My men were not ashamed of their tears.

What had happened? What had made the Americans abandon the two villages and relinquish the chance of retaking the Maginot Line still, in spite of everything?