Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy Part 17

(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition existed after Tsus.h.i.+ma.

3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different states:--

(a) With us.

(b) With the enemy.

(c) In dispute.

If in dispute, it may be that:--

(1) We have preponderance.

(2) Our enemy has preponderance.

(3) Neither side preponderates.

COMMAND IN DISPUTE

The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.

The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.

It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.

The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations_.

In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.

_Rule 1._ So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker.

_Rule 2._ In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able to obstruct the pa.s.sage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.

EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.

SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE PRIMARY OBJECT?

When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.

Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have obtained a complete decision.

From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be subst.i.tuted "_control of pa.s.sage and communication_."

The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?"

METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL

1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.

2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by:--

(a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful (containing).

(b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).

(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).

BLOCKADE

Blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. The object may be:--

(d) Blockade.

i. _Close blockade_ to prevent the enemy putting to sea. The object being usually to secure local or temporary control.

ii. _Observation blockade_, to force the enemy to put to sea _by occupying the common lines of communications_ (_see_ below). In this case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control.

Both natures are operations upon the lines of pa.s.sage and communication, but in case (1) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line; in case (2) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it.

GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES

In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is compatible with security from torpedo attack.

In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible with bringing enemy to action if he comes out.

Examples:--_Case_ (1): First stage of Togo's blockade of Port Arthur.

_Case_ (2): Nelson off Toulon.

_Confusion of the two_: Sampson's attempt to close Santiago simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to sea.

THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.

Ash.o.r.e, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.

At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel, if, indeed, they are not identical.

Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical.

This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.

_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly all our current maxims of Naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on Naval thought.

It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and operations against them in each case.

On land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own.

At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.

Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded.

EXAMPLE.--This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.