Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy Part 20

1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "All the territory upon which the hostile parties may a.s.sail each other." This is insufficient. For an Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the subordinate objects that lead up to them."

A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."

2. _Theatre of Operations._--Is generally used of the operations of one belligerent only.

An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.

A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory we seek to take possession of or to defend.

A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the particular operation."

Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.

Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or movements may be offensive.

As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the _lines of operation_ and the _objectives_.

_Objective_

An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is directed." Thus, where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually be the _objective_.

"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." For purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply distinguished. _Objective_ is the end of some particular movement or operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. _Object_ is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the general staff or director of the war. An _objective_ is some definite point which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part of his strength which we wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term of anything we already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have been Rojesvensky's _objective_. It was, strictly speaking, only his _destination_. To reach it and concentrate with the units already there was the _primary object_ of the operations entrusted to him. He had no true _objective_ before him except Togo's fleet.

An _objective_ is always subordinate to some _object_. It is a step to the attainment of that object.

_Lines of Operation_

A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."

Lines of operation may be _exterior_ or _interior_. We are said to hold the _interior_ lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or a.s.sistance. Such a position is called an _interior position_. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Positions" are the converse of these.

_Lines of Communication_

This expression is used of three different things:--

(1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point which the operating force has reached.

(2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to each other's support.

(3) _Lines of retreat_, which are usually lines of supply reversed, _i.e._, leading back to the base.

For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines of pa.s.sage and communication," which were in use at the end of the 18th century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which pa.s.ses the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be supplied.

_Maritime Communications_

The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet may have to operate are:--

(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond to the communications of armies operating ash.o.r.e). These have greatly increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c.

(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base.

(3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of belligerents' possessions.

In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a consideration of Maritime Communications, and the extent to which they are the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "pa.s.sage and communication," and this is probably the best method of solving them.

PART TWO

NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF Pa.s.sAGE AND COMMUNICATION

NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED

By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major operations of the fleet. Such operations have for their object "pa.s.sage and communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy.

We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. This means something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or owners.h.i.+p. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system of the world is as a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular operations.

History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold:--

1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ash.o.r.e.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading neutrals as to partic.i.p.ating in the war).

EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

In this way we get a _Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy_, expressed in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of Major Strategy.

These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:--

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.).

(2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establis.h.i.+ng ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to that of the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a question of communications.

But not entirely. Circ.u.mstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action against territory before there is time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval Strategy.)

EXAMPLES.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758.

Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as possible by battle.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.