The Origins Of Political Order Part 16

39.Hugh Baker, Chinese Family and Kins.h.i.+p Chinese Family and Kins.h.i.+p (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 26. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 26.

40.Tribal societies like the Nuer pose a challenge to rational-choice political science because so much behavior in such groups seems grounded not in individual choice but in complex social norms. It is very difficult to see how one arrives at Nuer social organization based on the individual maximizing choices of the members of the society, as opposed to a sociological explanation that would ground social organization in religious beliefs like ancestor wors.h.i.+p.

The political scientist Robert Bates has taken up this challenge. According to him, the sociological tradition, whether Durkheimian, Marxist, or Weberian, sees order arising from norms that are either moral, coercive, or authoritative. He goes on to review Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer The Nuer through the lens of rational-choice theory, a model that grounds behavior in radical individualism. He argues that many of the choices made by Nuer families or segments in dealing with one another reflect rational calculations of self-interest, usually related to the maximization of cattle resources. He cites the ways dispute resolution among family groups can be modeled using individualistic premises; Nuer inst.i.tutions can be seen as efficient ways of solving coordination problems and modeled through game theory. He concludes: "It is d.a.m.ning, but true: the problem with political sociology is that it is too sociological. In affirming the primacy of society, it gives little reason to ask if it is possible for organized behavior to be orchestrated out of the decisions of individuals. Further signaling its inability to deal with the problem is the vigorous a.s.sertion of such methodological postulates as the 'independent validity of social facts' or the rigorous separation of 'levels of a.n.a.lysis.' An intellectual posture characterized by a conviction that social life is not problematic simply offers little encouragement to those who wish to examine the nexus between private choice and collective behavior. And yet the problem of social order requires precisely such an examination" (Robert H. Bates, "The Preservation of Order in Stateless Societies: A Reinterpretation of Evans-Pritchard's through the lens of rational-choice theory, a model that grounds behavior in radical individualism. He argues that many of the choices made by Nuer families or segments in dealing with one another reflect rational calculations of self-interest, usually related to the maximization of cattle resources. He cites the ways dispute resolution among family groups can be modeled using individualistic premises; Nuer inst.i.tutions can be seen as efficient ways of solving coordination problems and modeled through game theory. He concludes: "It is d.a.m.ning, but true: the problem with political sociology is that it is too sociological. In affirming the primacy of society, it gives little reason to ask if it is possible for organized behavior to be orchestrated out of the decisions of individuals. Further signaling its inability to deal with the problem is the vigorous a.s.sertion of such methodological postulates as the 'independent validity of social facts' or the rigorous separation of 'levels of a.n.a.lysis.' An intellectual posture characterized by a conviction that social life is not problematic simply offers little encouragement to those who wish to examine the nexus between private choice and collective behavior. And yet the problem of social order requires precisely such an examination" (Robert H. Bates, "The Preservation of Order in Stateless Societies: A Reinterpretation of Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer The Nuer," in Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983]), p. 19. [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983]), p. 19.

Bates is, however, setting up a false dichotomy between economics and sociology. From a sociological or anthropological perspective, there is no requirement that all all behavior be understood as normatively based, or any a.s.sertion that individual rational choice plays behavior be understood as normatively based, or any a.s.sertion that individual rational choice plays no no role in final outcomes. There is always some level of social interaction-usually at the level of the most highly aggregated social units-in which rational choice works best as an explanation of behavior of a social unit. Thus, for all their cultural differences from their European counterparts, the Ottomans behaved according to very familiar rules in their foreign policy, following not religious but realpolitik choices to advance their interests. What cannot be so readily explained from a rational-choice perspective is the nature of the lower-level social units themselves. Why do the Nuer organize themselves into descent groups, rather than forming religious fraternities, or organizing themselves into voluntary a.s.sociations like young Americans? Rational choice provides no theory of social mobilization since it deliberately ignores the role of ideas and norms. The latter may reflect a deeper evolutionary, as opposed to individual, rationality related to the interests of groups. There is a large discussion among evolutionary biologists whether genes can encode behaviors that promote group rather than individual fitness (understood in terms of inclusive fitness). There is no particular reason, however, why social norms cannot facilitate such behavior. The simple existence of phenomena like suicide bombing suggests that this is not unheard of. See David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober, role in final outcomes. There is always some level of social interaction-usually at the level of the most highly aggregated social units-in which rational choice works best as an explanation of behavior of a social unit. Thus, for all their cultural differences from their European counterparts, the Ottomans behaved according to very familiar rules in their foreign policy, following not religious but realpolitik choices to advance their interests. What cannot be so readily explained from a rational-choice perspective is the nature of the lower-level social units themselves. Why do the Nuer organize themselves into descent groups, rather than forming religious fraternities, or organizing themselves into voluntary a.s.sociations like young Americans? Rational choice provides no theory of social mobilization since it deliberately ignores the role of ideas and norms. The latter may reflect a deeper evolutionary, as opposed to individual, rationality related to the interests of groups. There is a large discussion among evolutionary biologists whether genes can encode behaviors that promote group rather than individual fitness (understood in terms of inclusive fitness). There is no particular reason, however, why social norms cannot facilitate such behavior. The simple existence of phenomena like suicide bombing suggests that this is not unheard of. See David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); and David Sloan Wilson, "The Group Selection Controversy: History and Current Status," (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); and David Sloan Wilson, "The Group Selection Controversy: History and Current Status," Annual Review of Ecological Systems Annual Review of Ecological Systems 14 (1983): 15987. 14 (1983): 15987.

4: TRIBAL SOCIETIES: PROPERTY, JUSTICE, WAR.

1."The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government." Madison, Federalist No. 10.

2.Dougla.s.s C. North and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 12. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 12.

3.Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science Science 162 (1968): 124348. See also Richard Pipes, 162 (1968): 124348. See also Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom Property and Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999), p. 89. (New York: Knopf, 1999), p. 89.

4.See, for example, Yoram Barzel, Economic a.n.a.lysis of Property Rights Economic a.n.a.lysis of Property Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

5.Such rights were said to have spontaneously emerged during the California gold rush of 18491850, when miners peacefully negotiated among themselves an allocation of the claims they had staked out. See Pipes, Property and Freedom Property and Freedom, p. 91. This account ignores two important contextual factors: first, the miners were all products of an Anglo-American culture where respect for individual property rights was deeply embedded; second, these rights came at the expense of the customary rights to these territories on the part of the various indigenous peoples living there, which were not respected by the miners.

6.Charles K. Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies Land Law and Custom in the Colonies, 2d ed. (London: Frank Ca.s.s, 1968), p. 26.

7.Quoted in Elizabeth Colson, "The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights," in Victor Turner, ed., Colonialism in Africa 18701960 Colonialism in Africa 18701960. Vol. 3: Profiles in Change: African Society and Colonial Rule Profiles in Change: African Society and Colonial Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 203. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 203.

8.Meek, Land Law and Custom Land Law and Custom, p. 6.

9.Colson, "Impact of the Colonial Period," p. 200.

10.Paul Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence Historical Jurisprudence (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 327. (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 327.

11.Meek, Land Law and Custom Land Law and Custom, p. 17.

12.Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence Historical Jurisprudence, p. 322.

13.For a discussion of the pros and cons of traditional land tenure, see Curtin, Holzknecht, and Larmour, Land Registration in Papua New Guinea. Land Registration in Papua New Guinea.

14.For a detailed account of the difficulties of negotiating property rights in Papua New Guinea, see Whimp, "Indigenous Land Owners and Representation in PNG and Australia."

15.The modern economic theory of property rights does not specify the social unit over which individual property rights extend for the system to be efficient. The unit is often presumed to be the individual, but families and firms are often posited as holders of property rights, whose const.i.tuent members are a.s.sumed to have common interests in the efficient exploitation of the resources they together own. See Jennifer Roback, "Exchange, Sovereignty, and Indian-Anglo Relations," in Terry L. Anderson, ed., Property Rights and Indian Economies Property Rights and Indian Economies (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991). (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991).

16.Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence Historical Jurisprudence, p. 343.

17.Gregory Clark, "Commons Sense: Common Property Rights, Efficiency, and Inst.i.tutional Change," Journal of Economic History Journal of Economic History 58, no. 1 (1998): 73102. See also Jerome Blum, "Review: English Parliamentary Enclosure," 58, no. 1 (1998): 73102. See also Jerome Blum, "Review: English Parliamentary Enclosure," Journal of Modern History Journal of Modern History 53, no. 3 (1981): 477504. 53, no. 3 (1981): 477504.

18.Elinor Ostrom cites numerous cases of common pool resources (that is, nonexcludable but rival goods) that have been sustainably managed by communities despite the absence of private property rights. See Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Inst.i.tutions for Collective Action Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Inst.i.tutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

19.Meek, Land Law and Custom Land Law and Custom, pp. 1314.

20.Colson, "Impact of the Colonial Period," p. 202.

21.Thomas J. Ba.s.sett and Donald E. Crummey, Land in African Agrarian Systems Land in African Agrarian Systems (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), pp. 910. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), pp. 910.

22.Colson, "Impact of the Colonial Period," pp. 19697; Meek, Land Law and Custom Land Law and Custom, p. 12.

23.During the scramble for Africa that began in the 1870s, European powers sought to build administrative systems on the cheap by using networks of local leaders to enforce rules, conscript corvee labor, and collect capitation taxes. See Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

24.Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence Historical Jurisprudence, p. 351.

25.Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer The Nuer, pp. 15051.

26.These examples are ibid., pp. 15069.

27.Bruce L. Benson, "Customary Indian Law: Two Case Studies," in Anderson, Property Rights and Indian Economies Property Rights and Indian Economies, pp. 2930.

28.Ibid., p. 31.

29.Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence Historical Jurisprudence, pp. 35355.

30.Maine, Early Law and Custom Early Law and Custom, pp. 17071.

31.Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence Historical Jurisprudence, p. 345.

32.Marshall D. Sahlins, "The Segmentary Lineage: An Organization of Predatory Expansion," American Anthropologist American Anthropologist 63, no. 2 (1961): 32245. 63, no. 2 (1961): 32245.

33.Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization War Before Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); LeBlanc and Register, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); LeBlanc and Register, Constant Battles. Constant Battles.

34.Keeley, War Before Civilization War Before Civilization, pp. 3031.

35.Ibid., p. 29.

36.For Tiger, Men in Groups Men in Groups, this was the origin of "male bonding." See LeBlanc and Register, Constant Battles Constant Battles, p. 90.

37.Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia, from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century Lord and Peasant in Russia, from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 3839. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 3839.

38.Political scientists like Robert Bates who see politics through the eyes of economics sometimes label warriors as "specialists in violence," as if their occupation were simply another economic category like making shoes or selling real estate. In doing so they mask the noneconomic sources of social solidarity that bind warriors to each other and to their leader. See Robert Bates, Prosperity and Violence Prosperity and Violence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

39.Tacitus, Agricola Germania Dialogus I Agricola Germania Dialogus I, trans. M. Hutton (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13.34, 14.1.

40.Ibid., 14.23.

41.The intellectual history of this transformation is given in Albert O. Hirschman, The Pa.s.sions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph The Pa.s.sions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

42.James Chambers, The Devil's Hors.e.m.e.n: The Mongol Invasion of Europe The Devil's Hors.e.m.e.n: The Mongol Invasion of Europe (New York: Atheneum, 1979), p. 6. (New York: Atheneum, 1979), p. 6.

43.Tatiana Zerjal et al., "The Genetic Legacy of the Mongols," American Journal of Human Genetics American Journal of Human Genetics 72 (2003): 71721. 72 (2003): 71721.

44.Tacitus, Agricola Germania Dialogus I Agricola Germania Dialogus I, 7.1.

45.Benson, "Customary Indian Law," p. 33.

46.Ibid., p. 36.

47.S. E. Finer, The History of Government The History of Government, Vol. I: Ancient Monarchies and Empires Ancient Monarchies and Empires (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 44041. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 44041.

5: THE COMING OF THE LEVIATHAN.

1.Some anthropologists, such as Elman Service and Robert Carneiro, distinguish an intermediate level of society between tribes and states, which is the chiefdom. Chiefdoms look very much like states insofar as they are stratified, have a central source of authority, and are legitimated through inst.i.tutionalized religion. They differ from a state, however, insofar as they don't usually maintain strong standing armies and do not have the power to prevent their own breakdown through fissioning of subordinate tribes or regions. Service, Primitive Social Organization Primitive Social Organization, chap. 5; Robert Carneiro, "The Chiefdom: Precursor of the State," in Grant D. Jones and Robert R. Kautz, eds., The Transition to Statehood in the New World The Transition to Statehood in the New World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

2.Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds. African Political Systems African Political Systems (New York: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 56. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 56.

3.Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). See Claessen and van de Velde, "The Evolution of Sociopolitical Organization," in Claessen, van de Velde, and Smith, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). See Claessen and van de Velde, "The Evolution of Sociopolitical Organization," in Claessen, van de Velde, and Smith, Development and Decline Development and Decline, pp. 13031; Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik, eds., The Early State The Early State (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 11. (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 11.

4.See the discussion in Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 9498. See also Kw.a.n.g-chih Chang, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 9498. See also Kw.a.n.g-chih Chang, Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 12729. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 12729.

5.See the discussion in Kent V. Flannery, "The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations," Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 3 (1972): 399426. 3 (1972): 399426.

6.This point was suggested by Steven LeBlanc, private conversation.

7.See Winifred Creamer, "The Origins of Centralization: Changing Features of Local and Regional Control During the Rio Grande Cla.s.sic Period, A.D. 13251540," in Haas, From Leaders to Rulers From Leaders to Rulers.

8.Robert L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," Science Science 169 (1970): 73338. See also Carneiro, "On the Relations.h.i.+p Between Size of Population and Complexity of Social Organization," 169 (1970): 73338. See also Carneiro, "On the Relations.h.i.+p Between Size of Population and Complexity of Social Organization," Journal of Anthropological Research Journal of Anthropological Research 42, no. 3 (1986): 35564. 42, no. 3 (1986): 35564.

9.This point is made in Flannery, "Cultural Evolution of Civilizations."

10.The three types of authority are defined in Max Weber, Economy and Society Economy and Society, Vol. I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 21254.

11.For background, see Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), chap. 2. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), chap. 2.

12.Ibid., chap. 1; Joseph Schacht, ed., The Legacy of Islam The Legacy of Islam, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 187.

13.Quoted in F. Max Muller, ed., The Sacred Books of the East The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), p. 202.

14.Robert C. Allen, "Agriculture and the Origins of the State in Ancient Egypt," Explorations in Economic History Explorations in Economic History 34 (1997): 13554. 34 (1997): 13554.

15.Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa States and Power in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 11. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 11.

16.Jack Goody, Technology, Tradition, and the State in Africa Technology, Tradition, and the State in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 37. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 37.

17.Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," International Security International Security 14, no. 4 (1990): 11739. 14, no. 4 (1990): 11739.

18.Herbst, States and Power in Africa States and Power in Africa, chap. 2.

6: CHINESE TRIBALISM.

1.Kw.a.n.g-chih Chang et al., The Formation of Chinese Civilization The Formation of Chinese Civilization, pp. 2130.

2.Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, eds. The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 90911. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 90911.

3.For more on the periodization of early China, see Li Xueqin, Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilizations Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilizations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 35. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 35.

4.On this period, see Herrlee G. Creel, The Birth of China: A Study of the Formative Period of Chinese Civilization The Birth of China: A Study of the Formative Period of Chinese Civilization (New York: Ungar, 1954), pp. 2137; and Edward L. Shaughnessy, (New York: Ungar, 1954), pp. 2137; and Edward L. Shaughnessy, Sources of Western Zhou History: Inscribed Bronze Vessels Sources of Western Zhou History: Inscribed Bronze Vessels (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

5.Chang, Art, Myth, and Ritual Art, Myth, and Ritual, pp. 2627.

6.Ibid., p. 35.

7.Ibid., p. 41.

8.Chang et al., Formation of Chinese Civilization Formation of Chinese Civilization, p. 85.

9.Chang, Art, Myth, and Ritual Art, Myth, and Ritual, p. 124.

10.Chang et al., Formation of Chinese Civilization Formation of Chinese Civilization, p. 170.

11.Ibid., pp. 16465.

12.On the survival of familism in China, see Francis f.u.kuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 6995. (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 6995.

13.See Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society Chinese Family and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946); Maurice Freedman, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946); Maurice Freedman, Lineage Organization in Southeastern China Lineage Organization in Southeastern China (London: Athlone Press, 1958); Freedman, (London: Athlone Press, 1958); Freedman, Chinese Lineage and Society: Fujian and Guangdong Chinese Lineage and Society: Fujian and Guangdong (London: Athlone, 1966); Freedman, (London: Athlone, 1966); Freedman, Family and Kins.h.i.+p in Chinese Society Family and Kins.h.i.+p in Chinese Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970); Myron L. Cohen, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970); Myron L. Cohen, House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Arthur P. Wolf and Chieh-shan Huang, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Arthur P. Wolf and Chieh-shan Huang, Marriage and Adoption in China, 18451945 Marriage and Adoption in China, 18451945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980). (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980).

14.For a discussion of how contemporary anthropology relates to historical research, see James L. Watson, "Chinese Kins.h.i.+p Reconsidered: Anthropological Perspectives on Historical Research," China Quarterly China Quarterly 92 (1982): 589627. 92 (1982): 589627.

15.Ibid., p. 594.

16.Paul Chao, Chinese Kins.h.i.+p Chinese Kins.h.i.+p (Boston: Routledge, 1983), pp. 1926. (Boston: Routledge, 1983), pp. 1926.

17.Michael Loewe, The Government of the Qin and Han Empires: 221 BCE220 CE The Government of the Qin and Han Empires: 221 BCE220 CE (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), p. 6. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), p. 6.

18.Donald Keene, Emperor of j.a.pan: Meiji and His World, 18521912 Emperor of j.a.pan: Meiji and His World, 18521912 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 2. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 2.

19.Loewe, Government of the Qin and Han Government of the Qin and Han, p. 6.

20.Ke Changji, "Ancient Chinese Society and the Asiatic Mode of Production," in Timothy Brook, ed., The Asiatic Mode of Production in China The Asiatic Mode of Production in China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989). (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989).

21.Franz Schurmann, "Traditional Property Concepts in China," Far Eastern Quarterly Far Eastern Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1956): 50716. 15, no. 4 (1956): 50716.

22.Chao, Chinese Kins.h.i.+p Chinese Kins.h.i.+p, p. 25.

23.Baker, Chinese Family and Kins.h.i.+p Chinese Family and Kins.h.i.+p, pp. 5559.

24.Chao, Chinese Kins.h.i.+p Chinese Kins.h.i.+p, p. 19; f.u.kuyama, Trust Trust, pp. 17273.

25.For background, see John A. Harrison, The Chinese Empire The Chinese Empire (New York: Harcourt, 1972), pp. 3637. On the origin of the Zhou and their conquest of the Shang Dynasty, see Creel, (New York: Harcourt, 1972), pp. 3637. On the origin of the Zhou and their conquest of the Shang Dynasty, see Creel, The Birth of China The Birth of China, pp. 21936.

26.For one effort to make such a comparison, see Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

27.For a major critique of the uses of the concept of feudalism, see Elizabeth A. R. Brown, "The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe," American Historical Review American Historical Review 79, no. 4 (1974): 106388. See also Jrgen Mller, "Bringing Feudalism Back In: The Historian's Craft and the Need for Conceptual Tools and Generalization," unpublished paper. 79, no. 4 (1974): 106388. See also Jrgen Mller, "Bringing Feudalism Back In: The Historian's Craft and the Need for Conceptual Tools and Generalization," unpublished paper.

28.See the discussion in Joseph R. Levenson and Franz Schurmann, China: An Interpretive History. From the Beginnings to the Fall of Han China: An Interpretive History. From the Beginnings to the Fall of Han (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 3440. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 3440.