The Crisis Of Eighteen Hundred And Sixty-One In The Government Of The United States Part 2

"We may indeed with propriety, be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character, of an independent people, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblus.h.i.+ng violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interest not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor government.[2] Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we ent.i.tled, by nature and compact, to a free partic.i.p.ation in the navigation of the Mississippi?

Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers, a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us: Our amba.s.sadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of improved land, in most parts of the country, is much lower than can be accounted for by the quant.i.ty of waste land at market, and can be only fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending, is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from a scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befal a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?

"This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those very maxims and councils, which would now deter us from adopting the proposed const.i.tution; and which, not content with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make firm stand for our safety, our tranquility, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity.

"It is true, as has been before observed, that facts too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of general a.s.sent to the abstract proposition, that there exist material defects in our national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government of the United States is dest.i.tute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an _imperium in imperio_. This renders a full display of the princ.i.p.al defects of the confederation necessary, in order to show, that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended, otherwise than by an alteration in the very elements and main pillars of the fabric.

"The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing confederation, is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends."

A violation of any of the articles of the old confederation was the act only of the States, as sovereign and independent parties to a contract, and did not implicate individuals in the crime of _treason_, if acting _under the sanction_ of such a State. Not so, however, with individuals under the present const.i.tution, even though acting under the sanction of particular States; because the present const.i.tution is that of the _people_ and not of the States as States in their sovereign capacity, for the _people_ of the States have delegated to a general government, in the const.i.tution, certain powers, which are taken away from the States, and cannot, therefore, be exercised by those States without subjecting the _people_ of the States so exorcising them to punishment for _high treason_.

To show that eminent statesmen, even before the adoption of our present const.i.tution, so regarded the principles of the government proposed to be established under it, we will quote another extract from the "Federalist,"

commencing on page 102 of vol. I:

"If it be possible to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns, and preserving the general tranquility, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon the REVERSE of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed const.i.tution. It must carry its agency to the PERSONS OF THE CITIZENS. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislation; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of INDIVIDUALS, and to attract to its support those pa.s.sions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the means, and have a right to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is entrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the governments of the particular States."

An argument against the adoption of our present const.i.tution was urged by its enemies to prevent its adoption, that it would create a central government _too strong_--a government _so strong_ as to endanger the reserved rights of the States. This objection is thus stated and answered upon pages 106 and 107, vol. I, of the "Federalist:"

"It may be said, that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost lat.i.tude to the love of power, which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons entrusted with the administration of the general government, could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that pa.s.sion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State; the supervision of agriculture, and of other concerns of a similar nature; all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is, therefore, improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise them would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national government."

We will close our extracts from the luminous papers of the "Federalist,"

with the following, premising, however, that, in these fearful times of raging secession madness, it would be well if the whole two volumes could be put in the hands of every intelligent individual in the nation. This extract refers again to the defects and the lamentable inefficiency of the old confederation, as contrasted with the proposed efficiency and stability of the government under the new const.i.tution, a subject which cannot be too deeply engraven upon the mind of every patriot to whatever party he may belong. It can be found commencing upon page 131, of vol. 1, of the "Federalist," and ending on page 133:

"Having in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the princ.i.p.al circ.u.mstances and events which depict the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.

"The next most palpable defect of the existing confederation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now composed, have no power to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divest.i.ture of privileges, or by any other const.i.tutional means. There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact between the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of that part of the second article, by which it is declared, 'that each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not _expressly_ delegated to the United States in Congress a.s.sembled.'

The want of such a right involves, no doubt, a striking absurdity, but we are reduced to the dilemma, either of supposing that deficiency, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of those who oppose the new const.i.tution; and the omission of which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion and severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude that the United States affords the extraordinary spectacle of a government dest.i.tute even of the shadow of const.i.tutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have been cited, that the American confederacy, in this particular, stands discriminated from every other inst.i.tution of a similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.

"The want of a mutual guarantee of the State governments, is another capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guarantee from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion, from the like consideration. The want of a guarantee, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence, as the want of a const.i.tutional sanction to its laws.

"Without a guarantee, the a.s.sistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers, which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State const.i.tutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could const.i.tutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation, from which Ma.s.sachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces, that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the mal-contents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what a despotism, established in Ma.s.sachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hamps.h.i.+re or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?

"The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an objection to the principle of a guarantee to the federal government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the princ.i.p.al advantages to be expected from Union, and can only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State const.i.tutions by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guarantee could only operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards the prevention of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions on this head. Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretence for the use of violent remedies, in partial or occasional distempers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular representative const.i.tution, is a change of men. A guarantee by the national authority would be as much directed against the usurpations of rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community."

We have thus far briefly enumerated some of the important powers granted by the people of the United States in their sovereign capacity, to the present federal government. We have endeavored to show that the people, having granted certain powers to the general government, such powers are necessarily withdrawn from the several States by the people thereof for the purpose of establis.h.i.+ng one grand central power, which, when exercised within its delegated authority, should be recognized as the supreme law of the land; hence the people of the several States having to the extent of the powers granted, surrendered the separate State sovereignty, they became one grand, inseparable, sovereign and independent nation. The very fact that each and every citizen of our entire country has a voice in controlling the policy of the general government, shows conclusively that they owe obedience to its enactments, consequently, our national laws are alike binding upon every individual from Florida to Maine, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.

But independent of our arguments, we have in the foregoing pages presented copious extracts from letters written by Messrs. Madison, Jay and Hamilton pending the adoption of the const.i.tution, all of which must convince the most skeptical, that all parties at that time understood that they were granting certain powers to the general government that could not thereafter be resumed and controlled by the various States. The able manner in which the importance of such an arrangement is argued, the clear and conclusive reasoning, the contrasts drawn between one great and powerful nation and several petty, jealous, contending little sovereignties, should cast into the shade the weak sophism that is palmed off by the political demagogues of the present day for the purpose of dividing the people, under the disguise of what is called State sovereignty.

The arguments already advanced to show that we have a national government whose authority is supreme throughout the length and breadth of this country, (State laws to the contrary notwithstanding,) should be sufficient to convince the most ultra States rights secessionist that his dogma is only a garbled name for treason. Nevertheless, we will now proceed to give in full the celebrated Proclamation issued to the nullifiers of South Carolina twenty-eight years ago by the hero of the battle of New Orleans, recommending its careful perusal by every American citizen who has a spark of patriotism left within him. Its n.o.ble, patriotic sentiments will be found decidedly refres.h.i.+ng when contrasted with the crouching imbecility and indecision that has characterized not only James Buchanan but many of our leading politicians in the present dangerous, suffering and distracted condition of our beloved country.

General Jackson, a brave, daring, n.o.ble hero, knowing his duty, hastened to perform it in defiance of every obstacle; he resolves to save his country, at every hazard, from falling into the vortex of anarchy, ruin and disgrace.

When the hydra-headed monster, treason, began to make its appearance, the honored son of Tennessee, whose name is held in reverence by every friend of liberty, whose memory will be honored as the savior of his country, actuated by a high sense of his duty, with true Roman firmness, standing upon the temple of liberty, proclaiming to the world that he will maintain the integrity of his country or perish while marching under its glorious banner warning the enemies of the Union, to pause and consider the awful consequences of persisting in their treasonable designs, and decide whether they are prepared to a.s.sume such a terrible responsibility.

I will now give his proclamation in full, hoping that the spirit of patriotism, firmness and justice therein contained will cause a heartfelt response by my fellow countrymen.

PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION.

_Proclamation of Andrew Jackson, President of the United States._

WHEREAS, a convention a.s.sembled in the State of South Carolina have pa.s.sed an ordinance, by which they declare "That the several acts and parts of acts of the congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and more especially," two acts for the same purposes pa.s.sed on the 29th of May, 1828, and on the 14th of July, 1832, "are unauthorized by the const.i.tution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor binding on the citizens of that State or its officers: and by the said ordinance, it is further declared to be unlawful for any of the const.i.tuted authorities of the State or of the United States to enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the said acts within the same State, and that it is the duty of the Legislature to pa.s.s such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to the said ordinance:

AND WHEREAS, By the said ordinance, it is further ordained that, in no case of law or equity decided in the courts of said State, wherein shall be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of the legislature that may be pa.s.sed to give it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose, and that any person attempting to take such appeal shall be punished as for a contempt of court:

And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard; and that they will consider the pa.s.sage of any act, by congress, abolis.h.i.+ng or closing the ports of the said State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harra.s.s her commerce, or to enforce the said acts otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistant with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union, and that the people of the said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do.

AND WHEREAS, the said ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina a course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its const.i.tution, and having for its object the destruction of the Union--that Union, which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and a common cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence--that sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy const.i.tution, has brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a state of prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equalled in the history of nations. To preserve this bond of our political existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow citizens have reposed in me, I, ANDREW JACKSON, _President of the United States_, have thought proper to issue this my PROCLAMATION, stating my views of the const.i.tution and laws applicable to the measures adopted by the convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitably result from an observance of the dictates of the convention.

Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be invested, for preserving the peace of the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the imposing aspect which opposition has a.s.sumed in this case, by clothing itself with State authority, and the deep interest which the people of the United States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger measures, while there is a hope that anything will be yielded to reasoning and remonstrance, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify, a full exposition to South Carolina and the nation of the views I entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.

The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts which are plainly unconst.i.tutional, and too oppressive to be endured; but on the strange position that any one State may not only declare an act of congress void, but prohibit its execution--that they may do this consistently with the const.i.tution--that the true construction of that instrument permits a State to retain its place in the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may choose to consider as const.i.tutional. It is true, they add, that to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the const.i.tution; but it is evident, that, to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad must prevail. If it should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the pa.s.sage of an unconst.i.tutional act by congress? There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the a.s.sumed power of a State more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an unconst.i.tutional act pa.s.sed by congress--one to the judiciary, the other to the people and the States. There is no appeal from the State decision in theory, and the practical ill.u.s.tration shows that the courts are closed against an application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject is superfluous, when our social compact, in express terms, declares that the laws of the United States, its const.i.tution, and treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land; and, for greater caution, adds "that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the const.i.tution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." And it may be a.s.serted without fear of refutation, that no federal government could exist without a similar provision. Look for a moment to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws unconst.i.tutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, there would be a clear const.i.tutional objection to their collection in every other port, and no revenue could be collected anywhere; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat, that an unconst.i.tutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality is to be decided by the State itself; for every law operating injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and certainly represented, as unconst.i.tutional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal.

If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the embargo and non-intercourse law in the eastern States, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed unconst.i.tutional, and were more equal in their operation than any of the laws now complained of; but fortunately none of those States discovered that they had the right now claimed by South Carolina. The war into which we were forced to support the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat and disgrace instead of victory and honor, if the States who supposed it a ruinous and unconst.i.tutional measure, had thought they possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several members of the Union, to the legislatures of none did this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in our const.i.tution was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of that State will unfortunately fall the evils of reducing it to practice.

If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our const.i.tutional history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been repudiated with indignation, had it been proposed to form a feature in our Government.

In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each other.

Leagues were formed for common defence, and, before the declaration of independence, we were known in our aggregate character _as the United Colonies of America_. That decisive and important step was taken jointly.

We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts, and when the terms of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of several States, by which they agreed that they would collectively form one nation for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns and all foreign relations. In the instrument forming that Union is found an article which declares that "every State shall abide by the determinations of congress on all questions which, by that confederation, should be submitted to them."

Under the confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision of the congress, or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision was made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but they were not complied with. The government could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue.

But the defects of the confederation need not be detailed. Under its operation we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neither prosperity at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be endured, and our present happy const.i.tution was formed, but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for important objects that are announced in the preamble made in the name and by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and whose conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that which is placed first in the rank, on which all others rest, is, "_to form a more perfect Union_." Now, is it possible that even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the const.i.tution and laws of the United States over those of the States--can it be conceived, that an instrument made for the purpose of "_forming a more perfect Union_" than that of the confederation, could be so constructed by the a.s.sembled wisdom of our country as to subst.i.tute for that confederation a form of government dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a State, or of a prevailing faction in a State? Every man of plain, unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy it.

I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, a.s.sumed by one State, _incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the const.i.tution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed_.

After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine the particular application of it which is made in the ordinance.

The preamble rests its justification on those grounds: It a.s.sumes, as a fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they purport to be laws for raising revenue, were in reality intended for the protection of manufactures, which purpose it a.s.serts to be unconst.i.tutional; that the operation of these laws is unequal; that the amount raised by them is greater than is required by the wants of the government; and, finally, that the proceeds are to be applied to objects unauthorized by the const.i.tution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open opposition to the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them. The first virtually acknowledges that the law in question was pa.s.sed under a power expressly given by the const.i.tution to lay and collect imposts; but its const.i.tutionality is drawn in question from the _motives_ of those who pa.s.sed it. However apparent this purpose may be in the present case, nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an unconst.i.tutional purpose, entertained by the members who a.s.sent to a law enacted under a const.i.tutional power, shall make the law void: for how is that purpose to be ascertained? Who is to make the scrutiny? How often may bad purposes be falsely imputed--in how many cases are they concealed by false professions--in how many is no declaration of motive made? Admit this doctrine, and you give to the States an uncontrolled right to decide, and every law may be annulled under this pretext. If, therefore, the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a State may annul an unconst.i.tutional law, or one that it deems such, it will not apply to the present case.

The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This objection may be made with truth to every law that has been or can be pa.s.sed. The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that would operate with perfect equality. If the unequal operation of a law makes it unconst.i.tutional, and if all laws of that description may be abrogated by any State for that cause, then indeed is the Federal Const.i.tution unworthy of the slightest effort for its preservation. We have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our Union. We have received it as the work of the a.s.sembled wisdom of the nation. We have trusted to it as to the sheet anchor of our safety in the stormy times of conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it with sacred awe as the palladium of our liberties, and with all the solemnities of religion have pledged to each other our lives and fortunes here, and our hopes of happiness hereafter, in its defence and support. Were we mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching this importance to the Const.i.tution of our country? Was our devotion paid to the wretched, inefficient, clumsy, contrivance which this new doctrine would make it? Did we pledge ourselves to the support of an airy nothing--a bubble that must be blown away by the first breath of disaffection? Was this self-destroying, visionary theory, the work of the profound statesmen, the exalted patriots, to whom the task of const.i.tutional reform was entrusted? Did the name of Was.h.i.+ngton sanction, did the States deliberately ratify such an anomaly in the history of fundamental legislation? No. We were not mistaken. The letter of this great instrument is free from this radical fault; its language directly contradicts the imputation; its spirit--its evident intent, contradicts it. No, we did not err! Our Const.i.tution does not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power to resist them. The sages whose memory will always be reverenced, have given us a practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent const.i.tutional compact. The Father of his Country did not affix his revered name to so palpable an absurdity. Nor did the States, when they severally ratified it, do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of the United States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise it by implication. Search the debates in all their Conventions, examine the speeches of the most zealous opposers of federal authority, look at the amendments that were proposed--they are all silent--not a syllable uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made, to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws of the Union over those of the States, or to show that implication, as is now contended, could defeat it. No, we have not erred! The Const.i.tution is still the object of our reverence, the bond of our Union, our defence in danger, the source of our prosperity in peace; it shall descend as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical construction, to our posterity, and the sacrifices of local interest, of State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to bring it into existence, will again be patriotically offered for its support.

The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these laws, are that the sums intended to be raised by them are greater than are required, and that the proceeds will be unconst.i.tutionally employed.

The Const.i.tution has given, expressly, to Congress the right of raising revenue, and of determining the sum the public exigencies will require.

The States have no control over the exercise of this right other than that which results from the power of changing the representatives who abuse it, and thus procure redress. Congress may, undoubtedly, abuse this discretionary power; but the same may be said of others with which they are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Const.i.tution has given it to the representatives of all the people, checked by the representatives of the States, and by the Executive power. The South Carolina construction gives it to the Legislature or the Convention of a single State, where neither the people of the different States, nor the States in their separate capacity, nor the Chief Magistrate elected by the people, have any representation. Which is the most discreet disposition of the power? I do not ask you, fellow citizens, which is the const.i.tutional disposition--that instrument speaks a language not to be misunderstood.

But if you were a.s.sembled in general Convention, which would you think the safest depository of this discretionary power in the last resort? Would you add a clause giving it to each of the States, or would you sanction the wise provisions already made by your Const.i.tution? If this should be the result of your deliberations when providing for the future, are you, can you be ready, to risk all that we hold dear, to establish, for a temporary and a local purpose, that which you must acknowledge to be destructive, and even absurd, as a general provision? Carry out the consequences of this right vested in the different States, and you must perceive that the crisis your conduct presents at this day would recur whenever any law of the United States displeased any of the States, and that we should soon cease to be a nation.

The ordinance, with the same knowledge of the future that characterizes a former objection, tells you that the proceeds of the tax will be unconst.i.tutionally applied. If this could be ascertained with certainty, the objection would, with more propriety, be reserved for the law so applying the proceeds, but surely cannot be urged against the laws levying the duty.

These are the allegations contained in the ordinance. Examine them seriously, my fellow-citizens; judge for yourselves. I appeal to you to determine whether they are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt of their correctness; and even if you should come to this conclusion, how far they justify the reckless, destructive course which you are directed to pursue. Review these objections, and the conclusions drawn from them, once more. What are they? Every law, then, for raising revenue, according to the South Carolina ordinance, may be rightfully annulled, unless it be so framed as no law ever will or can be framed. Congress have a right to pa.s.s laws for raising a revenue, and each State has a right to oppose their execution--two rights directly opposed to each other; and yet is this absurdity supposed to be contained in an instrument drawn for the express purpose of avoiding collisions between the States and the general government, by an a.s.sembly of the most enlightened statesmen and purest patriots ever embodied for a similar purpose.

In vain have these sages declared that congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; in vain have they provided that they shall have power to pa.s.s laws, which shall be necessary and proper to carry those powers into execution; that those laws and that const.i.tution shall be the "supreme law of the land, and that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the const.i.tution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." In vain have the people of the several States solemnly sanctioned these provisions, made them their paramount law, and individually sworn to support them whenever they were called on to execute any office. Vain provisions! ineffectual restrictions! vile profanation of oaths! miserable mockery of legislation!

if the bare majority of the voters in any one State may, on a real or supposed knowledge of the intent with which a law has been pa.s.sed, declare themselves free from its operation--say here it gives too little, there too much, and operates unequally--here it suffers articles to be free that ought to be taxed--there it taxes those that ought to be free--in this case the proceeds are intended to be applied to purposes which we do not approve--in that the amount raised is more than is wanted. Congress, it is true, are invested by the const.i.tution with the right of deciding these questions according to their sound discretion; congress is composed of the representatives of all the States, and of all the people of all the States; but we, part of the people of one State, to whom the const.i.tution has given no power on the subject, from whom it has expressly taken it away--we, who have solemnly agreed that this const.i.tution shall be our law--we, most of whom have sworn to support it--we now abrogate this law, and swear and force others to swear that it shall not be obeyed; and we do this, not because congress have no right to pa.s.s such laws--this we do not allege--but because they have pa.s.sed them with improper views. They are unconst.i.tutional from the motives of those who pa.s.sed them, which we can never with certainty know; from their unequal operation, although it is impossible, from the nature of things, that they should be equal; and from the disposition which we presume may be made of their proceeds, although that disposition has not been declared. This is the plain meaning of the ordinance, in relation to laws which it abrogates for alleged unconst.i.tutionality. But it does not stop there. It repeals, in express terms, an important part of the const.i.tution itself, and of laws pa.s.sed to give it effect, which have never been alleged to be unconst.i.tutional. The const.i.tution declares that the judicial powers of the United States extend to cases arising under the laws of the United States; and that such laws, the const.i.tution, and treaties, shall be paramount to the State const.i.tutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes the mode by which the case may be brought before a court of the United States by appeal, when a State tribunal shall decide against this provision of the const.i.tution.

The ordinance declares that there shall be no appeal, makes the State law paramount to the const.i.tution and laws of the United States, forces judges and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions, and even makes it penal in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further declares, that it shall not be lawful for the authorities of the United States, or of that State, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the revenue laws within its limits.